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ABSTRACT
A study was carried out to examine the role of private
practitioners in a rural district in Malaysia and to identify
the nature of their interactions with public health services.
Underlying null hypotheses were that there is no difference in
the nature of the services, the characteristics of the health
workers or the clientele of public and private sector
facilities and that the interactions between both types of
providers were mutually beneficial.
Five sub-studies were conducted among 15 private clinics and
six public health facilities in Kuala Selangor district.
Quantitative and qualitative techniques were used and efforts
made to triangulate and validate findings.
The nature of services in private clinics is influenced by
competition with other facilities, the demand for the services
by users and the attempt to maximise profits by the providers.
Most private clinics offered a wider range of curative
services, operated for longer and had more flexible hours than
public facilities. However, private practitioners had a
limited role in providing preventive services. Private clinics
were mostly run by older doctors supported by younger and
untrained staff while public facilities were run by younger
doctors supported by older and more experienced staff.
Users of private facilities were more likely to be non-Malays,
of higher socio-economic status, seeking curative care for
acute illnesses and financed by third party cover. Users of
private facilities were prescribed more drugs and expensive
investigations than those using public facilities.
Weak andinappropriate policies, lack of incentives, poor
inter and intra-agency collaboration and negative attitudes
between the providers were among the problems identified in
public-private interactions.
:i.
Malaysian policy makers need to engage in a consultative
process in order to define the best mix of regulations,
incentives and other methods aimed at improving the services
offered by the providers and improving their interactions.
ii
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I. IN'rRODUCTION
1.]. ORGANISATION OF THE THESIS
This thesis is presented in twelve chapters. After this
introduction (Chapter I), a review of relevant literature is
presented in the second chapter.. The third chapter provides
background on Malaysia and Kuala Selangor District, the study
area. The study objectives and methodology are discussed in
Chapter IV. The next five chapters (Chapter V-IX) present
findings of the sub-studies undertaken in this research.
Discussion is presented in Chapter X followed by policy
implications (Chapter XI). Conclusion and further research is
given in the Chapter XII.
1.2 RATIONALE FOR THE STUDY
The aim of this study is to define the role of private modern
practitioners and their interactions with public practitioners
in the provision of health services in a rural district of
Malaysia. The justification for this study is as follows:
i) Financial crises faced by many developing countries coupled
with pressure from influential international agencies have
shaken policy makers into considering policies to mobilise
resources through private health care. Efforts to develop such
policies are being hampered by the lack of information: as a
result there have been calls for more research into the
nature, function and potential of private health care.
ii) Malaysia is among the few developing countries which have
developed an extensive network of public rural health services
(Ming, 1988). Although very few studies have been carried out,
there is evidence suggesting that private modern practitioners
are abundant in rural areas of Malaysia (Heller, 1982). Yet
the role of private practitioners in rural areas has rarely
been studied in Malaysia or other developing countries.
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iii) The Ministry of Health in Malaysia views private
practitioners as complementary to the government services in
the country (MOH, 1991 a). Since both providers are serving
the same population, interactions between them are inevitable.
However, very little evidence is available about the nature of
interaction between public and private providers, particularly
in rural areas. This study explores the form of existing
interactions between the two providers.
iv) A rural district is the focus of this study since it is
the basic unit in the administration of non-urban health
services in the country. The district level is where policies
formulated at national level are implemented. However, how the
policies were being conceived, interpreted and implemented by
health workers at the ground level has rarely been reported in
Malaysia. Results of this study will provide valuable feedback
to national level policy makers in terms of improving existing
and future policies.
v) Limitations in government health service in rural areas
such as shortages of manpower may force the rural community to
rely on the other providers including private medical
practitioners. On the other hand rural populations were
generally disadvantaged group because of their lower income
and educational status. Their ability to choose and utilise
health services will be affected. This study explores problems
faced by the rural community in utilising health services both
in the public and private sector. It is hoped that by
understanding these problems, action could be taken by both'
providers to improve their services.
This study attempts to answer the following questions:
1) Who are the private practitioners operating in a
rural district ?
ii) What services are provided by private
practitioners? How do these differ from those
available in the public sector?
2
iii) What is the distribution of health problems seen
by private practitioners? How does this differ
from those seen by public providers?
iv) What are the characteristics of the users of
private facilities? Are they different from the
users of public services?
v) What are the perceptions of the community with
regard to the services provided by the private and
public sector?
vi) What is the nature and form of interaction between
public and private providers? What problems are
present in their interactions ?
3
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 IN'rRODUCTION
This literature review examines evidence on the role of
private practitioners and their interactions with public
practitioners in developing countries. Relevant studies from
developed countries are occasionally cited.
The first section discusses the definition of private
practitioners. This is followed by the debate on the public
and private mix. Empirical evidence on the significance of
private health care is discussed in the third section. The
fourth section describes evidence of factors which influence
the utilisation of health services. Section five reviews the
interactions between private and public practitioners.
Finally a summary is given in section six.
2.2 DEFINITION
The private sector may be defined as all those organisations
and individuals working outside the direct control of the
state, that is both for-profit companies and individuals, and
not-for-profit private organisations (Bennett, 1991). In
health care, this is a heterogenous group consisting of a wide
range of providers with different motives. This definition may
lead to some confusion; for example in some African countries
there are hospitals managed by the church which are heavily
subsidised and controlled by the state (Green, 1987).
Claquin (1981) defined private practitioners as 'individuals
who were perceived by the community to provide resources and
assistance in illness but were not employed by the goverament
health service.' This definition makes a clear distinction
between public and private practitioners in relation to their
employer. Following this, he grouped private practitioners in
Bangladesh into seven categories: allopathic practitioners
with MBBS qualification or Medical Board license, unqualified
allopathic practitioners, homeopathic practitioners, ayurvedic
4
or unani practitioners, spiritual healers, traditional
midwives and others that do not fall into any of the earlier
categories such as bone setters.
The private practitioners or providers that form the object of
this study are those who are the allopathic practitioners with
MBBS qualification or its equivalent. Within this group, the
providers may have either a profit or non-profit motive. The
former usually pursue profit maximisation in contrast to the
latter who provide health care for humanitarian, religious,
charitable or other non-specified reasons. For-profit private
practitioners include general practitioners in group or solo
practice and doctors working in private clinics and hospitals.
Church and mission hospitals and clinics are examples of non-
profit providers. To add to the complexity, some non-profit
providers may identify their organisations only for tax
purposes, since in many countries non-profit organisations are
given tax relief and subsidies (Green, 1987).
Most of the discussion in this literature review will be on
private-for-profit practitioners, the main focus in this study
and the focus of economic arguments on the role of non-
government providers.
2.3 DEBATE ON PUBLIC AND PRIVATE HEALTH CARE
The acceptance of the Primary Health Care (PHC) concept by 134
countries in the world in the Alma-Ata declaration in 1978,
was perhaps the first move to recognise the role of non-state
providers. With t'Health for All by the year 2000" as the goal,
the PHC concept stresses the need for multi- agency
collaboration, appropriate health care and the promotion of
equity.
Whilst many countries which signed the Alma Ata Declaration
tried to implement and absorb the PHC concept into their
national health policies, the global financial crisis in the
1980's increased the pressure for greater private sector
development. Donor agencies such as the World Bank have been
5
campaigning in the recipient countries for this particular
agenda. Slow economic growth and record budget deficits in the
80's forced reductions in public spending, including health
sector in many countries. Public spending on health in some
countries has declined on per capita basis. Some countries
faced with debts have been required to cut public expenditure
as a prerequisite for further loans from international
agencies (Abel-Smith, 1985). The World Bank, one of the
largest lenders of health programmes in developing countries
since 1983, believes that government efforts to improve health
are unlikely to be able to rely on increased public spending
financed by debt or taxes or on reallocation of public
expenditure from other sectors (World Bank, 1987). Under the
reforms proposed by the World Bank, four main policies were
promoted in developing countries: introduction of user fees in
government health facilities, provision of insurance or other
risk coverage, effective use of non-governmental resources and
decentralisation of government health services.
Through these proposed reforms, the role of the private sector
will be enhanced. The World Bank argued that private sector
expansion guided by market forces will increase both
allocative and technical efficiency in financing and providing
health services. Private sector expansion in health care was
further promoted by the World Bank through its World
Development Report, Investing in Health in 1993 (World Bank,
1993). This report urged governments to promote greater
diversity and competition in the financing and delivery of
health services. Suggestions for private sector involvement in
publicly financed health services and for government to
encourage efficiency by promoting competition among private
providers were made.
The propositions of the World Bank were being promoted in both
developed and developing countries and had sparked
international debate. Opponents criticised the assumption that
private health care guided by market forces would be more
efficient than public services. The absence of perfect
competition in health care leading to market failure, were the
6
main points of their argument. Langwell et al (1982) defined
perfect competition as "a dynamic process of interactions
between independent buyers and independent sellers which
results in a tendency for prices of goods and services to move
toward the minimum level at which sellers are willing to
produce and offer goods and services."
For perfect competition to operate, Mills and Gilson (1988)
stated that the following conditions must be met
i) there are many buyers and sellers freely interacting;
each small in relation to the total number so that they are
unable to control price or output
ii) there should be no barrier to entry where the
producers are free to enter or leave the market
iii) there should be no significant economies of scale
which would give a price advantage to large-scale producers
and imply a tendency towards monopoly.
iv) no product differentiation or brand names; products
are homogenous, without quality differences.
vi) there is an assumption of self-interest; producers
aim to maximise profits and consumers aim to maximise
benefits.
vii) there should be no externalities or spill-over
effects.
viii) there should be no risks or uncertainty where there
is existence of perfect knowledge of prices, of products, of
the implications of consuming or not consuming a product.
In the health care market, competition is imperfect. Various
factors differentiate health care from other goods and
services which contribute to the market failure. In the market
for other goods, consumers are rational and use their economic
resources to maximise their benefits. In health care,
consumers' rationality may be absent as they may not know when
to seek treatment due their illness such as when a patient is
unconscious or mentally ill. Because of this, health care is
sometimes regarded as a merit good. Merit goods are goods or
services where government believes that individuals should not
be allowed free choice of whether to consume or not since
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individuals are not always rational in their decisions (Mills
and Gilson, 1988).
Risks and uncertainty also differentiate health care from
other goods. The need for health care is unpredictable and the
costs of seeking care are usually large.
Imperfect information is an important factor leading to market
failure of health care. For other goods, the consumers have
some understanding of the product or can acquire such
information by experience. On the other hand, patients come
into markets of health care without knowing how to choose
which services or type of treatment to consume. Individuals
consulting a medical practitioner are generally unable to
either diagnose their complaints or to determine the most
appropriate treatment (Bennett, 1991). Due to this most of the
decision-making by the patients is delegated to the
practitioner (Maynard, 1982), and thus demand for health care
is often initiated by the supplier. Patients may be exploited
when practitioners generate demand for their own services. The
concept of supplier-induced demand stated that the supplier,
acting as agent for the consumer, may bring about a level of
consumption different from that would have occurred if a fully
informed consumer had been able to choose freely (McGuire et
al, 1988)
The presence of externalities in health care further
differentiates it from other goods. Externalities refer to the
benefits or detrimental effects which are not captured in the
main transaction between the producer and consumer (Bennett,
1991). Examples of this are immunisations against infectious
disease which benefits the individual who is immunised as well
as the whole society due to reduced transmissions as
immunisation coverage expands. Services considered to be
public goods will not be produced at all or will be produced
in inappropriate amounts, if they are left to market
mechanisms due to the presence of externalities.
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Barriers to entry of the health care market are another reason
for market failure. Professional licensure and drugs
licensing are two examples of such barriers (Mills and Gilson,
1988). Friedman (1962) argued that professional regulation has
been used by the profession to further their own interests.
The profession controlled the entry into medical schools and
restricted the supply. He also argued that through the
licensing system, professionals have used their power to raise
their income above the market rate. He put forward the idea of
making the health care market competitive by abolishing the
professional licensure to ensure that professionals such as
doctors and dentists will have to compete with non-
professionals.
Proponents of private health care and the market approach have
argued that increased private sector involvement can augment
the supply of health services, remove the unnecessary burden
from government and allow it to target its resources to the
poor and the needy (Griffin, 1989; Roth 1988; Ferranti; 1985).
Ferranti (1985) classified health services into two groups of
curative and preventive services. He suggested that curative
services in which the benefits are enjoyed by individuals
consuming the services, are private goods rather than public
goods and should be targeted for take-over by private
providers. He argued that these services, which consume more
than 70% of total health expenditure, would, if shifted to the
private sector, increase resources for health care on the
whole.
Roth (1988) split preventive services into two groups, the
non-patient-related services and patient-related services. The
non-patient related preventive services are considered to be
public goods, the benefits of which are long term and not
normally received by individuals but shared by the community.
Public goods are defined as commodities or services that a)
can be used, consumed or enjoyed by an increasing nunther of
people without diminishing the amount available to others b)
are available to everyone in the catchinent area independent of
the size or existence of payment and c) cannot be held from
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non-payers (Mills and Gilson, 1988). Examples of non-patient
related preventive services are disease control programmes,
sanitation and health education. These services are normally
carried out by government but private practitioners may have
a role. In the control of communicable diseases, for example,
private providers may still be needed to notify cases.
Patient-related preventive services lie between the two
extremes of public and private goods. The benefits from these
preventive services are enjoyed by individuals. Some of these
services have already been provided by private providers
although in some countries government has given priority to
these services in their public health programmes. An example
of patient-related preventive services are Maternal and Child
Health care including immunisations.
Empirical evidence on competition and the market approach in
health care has been drawn from developed countries as studies
in developing countries are rare. One of the earlier studies
on competition was by Fuchs (1978) in USA where he used
national aggregate cross-sectional data to relate the supply
of surgeons and the number of operations performed. He showed
a positive relationship between the physician-to-population
ratio and the number of operations performed. The main
criticism of this study is that the number of operations
performed was exclusively related to physician inducement,
ignoring other factors such as income of patients, their
methods of payments for the services and incidence of illness
in the community (Wilensky and Rossiter, 1983).
Wilensky and Rossiter (1983) in a community-based study in USA
measured visits initiated by physician and expenditure as
dependent variables for physician induced demand. The
expenditure was calculated from the costs of waiting time,
travel time, treatment time and costs of tests. They showed
that patients with insurance coverage with a lower share paid
out-of-pocket are associated with higher physician initiated
visits and higher expenditures. They also found an increase in
physician to population ratio would increase the likelihood of
physician-initiated visits.
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Williams et al (1985) studied the differences in duration of
stay for eight surgical procedures in N}IS hospitals and
independent private hospitals in England and Wales. Beds in
NHS hospitals were divided into two groups; the pay-beds and
non-pay beds. It was found that NHS pay-bed patients has the
shortest stay followed by patients from independent private
hospitals and NHS non-paying patients has the longest stay.
This suggested that the independent private hospitals might
have prolonged the stays of their patients to get revenue from
the occupied beds. NHS non-paying patients had the longest
stay probably due to more severe illness resulting from long
waiting lists. Differences in severity of illness and the
presence of complications between various groups of patients
were not, however, taken into account in calculating the
duration of stay.
The negative impact of competition in health care was
demonstrated in a study by Robinson and Luft (1987) in the
USA. They compared the costs of providing care in hospitals
with different competitive environment. The degree of
competition between hospitals was measured by the number of
neighbouring hospitals within a 24 km radius. It was found
that the average costs per admission were 26% higher in
hospitals with the most competitive market (more than 10
hospitals within 24 km radius) than in hospitals with no
competitors within the same radius. The average cost per
patient day was 15% higher in hospitals with most competitive
market than in hospital with no neighbours. They concluded
that these results are consistent with 'medical arms race'
hypothesis which suggests that competition in the hospital
sector took the form of cost-increasing acquisition of new
technology to attract patients and physicians.. Nevertheless no
comparison was made on the actual equipment or technology
acquired by the hospitals in the various competitive
environment.
Mccarthy (1985) found that the primary care physician market
in USA is monopolistically competitive; the consumers were
sensitive to dollar and time prices and physicians were forced
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to offer lower waiting times if higher dollar prices were to
be introduced. It was also shown in this study that increase
in the number of physicians in the market would produce
downward pressure on prices. He went on to conclude that
competition has forced physicians to become better agents for
their patients. Inducement activities by physicians were
constrained by consumers who were sensitive to physician
behaviour. Although this study reported positive effects of
competition, these were limited by the use of only the
consultation fee to measure the price of care: costs of drugs
prescribed and diagnostic tests were not included.
One study suggestive of supplier-induced demand done in
developing country was by Barros et al (1986) in Brazil where
it was shown that attendance at antenatal clinics and the rate
of caesarean sections increased with family income but not
with gestational risks. Mothers in the poorest group had mean
antenatal visits of 4.7 while the richest had 9.3 visits.
Fifty-four percent of wealthy patients covered by private
insurance had caesarean sections compared to only 13% of
indigent mothers.
In conclusion, promotion of the private sector as a remedy for
inadequate resources for health care is a complex issue.
Assumptions that the efficiency of the private health sector
can be raised through competition have been challenged due to
market failure in the sector.
2.4 SIGNIFICANCE OF PRIVATE HEALTH CARE IN ASIAN COUNTRIES
This section considers the significance of private health care
in Asian countries. The importance of private health care will
be highlighted by empirical evidence on the extent to which
private sector services are utilised, the availability of
human resources in the sector and expenditure on private
health care.
In Malaysia, a National Morbidity Survey was conducted by the
Ministry of Health in 1986-87. This nationwide household
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survey using a two-week recall period showed that private
clinics were most commonly utilised for out-patient care.
During the two week period, for every 100 ill persons, 5.2
visits were made to the private clinics as compared to 2.1
visits to health centres, 1.4 visits to government hospitals
and 0.4 visits to traditional practitioners (MaH, 1988 b).
One obvious limitation of this study was the use of health
workers as the interviewers, which might affect the way
respondents report the providers visited. An example of this
problem is shown in a study in rural Kenya by Schulpen and
Swinkels (1980), where they found gross under-reporting of the
use of traditional healers when health personnel were employed
as interviewers.
Another study conducted in two Malay rural villages in the
state of Selangor in Malaysia, found that 32.5% of adults
above 18 years of age utilised the public services and 22.2%
sought treatment at private clinics, 33.6% used self-
medication and 11.7% visited traditional healers (Aljunid,
1992). The study was limited by the use of a six month recall
period which would lead to under-reporting, especially of
visits for trivial conditions.
In Indonesia, most of the doctors and a large number of nurses
and other paramedical staff working at private hospitals were
public sector employees either seconded or working part-time
in the private sector. Only 15% of the country's health
workers were directly employed full-time in private
institutions (Gish et al, 1988). Berman et al (1987) showed
that in Western Java, among the 3322 treatments contacts,
12.8% were made with private providers (doctors and
paramedics), 16.8% with public providers and rest with
traditional healers or self-treatment. In 1986, the private
sector accounted for 63.2% of the total health expenditure of
Indonesia (Brotowasisto et al, 1988).
Smith (1982) showed that among 132 physicians in the Northern
Thailand Provinces that he studied, more than two thirds of
the public sector doctors reported having after hours private
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practice. In 1985 it was estimated that there were more than
12,000 private clinics in the country as compared to 7,800
public health centres (Griffin, 1989). Private health care
expenditure in Thailand increased from 66.7% of the total
health expenditure in 1978 to 73.2% in 1987 (Wibulpoipraset,
1991 a)
In 1974, 69% of primary care facilities in the rural areas of
the Philippines were owned and run by private practitioners
(Griffin and Paqueo, 1993). A study among 399 households in
the Bicol region, a poor rural region of the Philippines
showed that 31% of the adults visited private practitioners as
compared to 18% using government clinics; the remainder
visited traditional healers or did not seek any medical help
(Akin et al, 1986). In 1980, the per capita expenditure on
health for the country was US$18.23; 135$ 13.39 was spent in
the private sector and only US$4.84 in the public sector
(World Bank, 1987). Roemer (1991) reported that in 1981, 59%
of physicians in the Philippines were engaged entirely in
private practice. Among the 41% of public doctors, nearly all
did some private practice part of the time.
In India, 56% of hospitals and 49% of dispensaries in the
country were owned by private organisations in 1988.
Furthermore it was thought that the figures for private
ownership are even greater as information on clinics and
nursing homes which exhibited strong private control were not
available (Bhat, 1991). It was estimated that about 73% of
qualified physicians in the allopathic system were in private
practice and only 27% worked in public services (Bhat, 1993).
Duggal and Amin (1989) in a household survey in a rural
district of Maharastra found that 77% of the illness episodes
were presented to private practitioners and hospitals as
compared to only 13% to government facilities. In another
study (Visvanathan and Rohde, 1990) it was shown that 65% of
diarrhoeal cases sought medical treatment, 80% of these cases
went to private practitioners and only 10% to government
health facilities. In terms of health expenditure, Nichter
(1980) found that 82 poor families in South Kanara district of
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Karnataka spent 7% of their family expenses on health, 60% of
which was spent for private consultations and drugs.
In Papua New Guinea, Kolehmainen-Aitken et al (1990) reported
that the percentage of doctors in full time private practice
increased from 13% to 18% between 1984 and 1990. In 1974 only
15% of the patients of all expatriate private practitioners
were nationals; ten years later this had increased to 50%.
Hillier and Zheng (1990) reported that China has 160,000
private doctors (including paramedics), 70% of them work in
rural areas and 45% of villages had at least one private
doctor.
These studies show that private practitioners are important
health care providers besides government and the indigenous
healers in rural areas In some of these studies private
practitioners were utilised more frequently than the
government services.
2.5 FACTORS INFLUENCING UTILISATION OF HEALTH SERVICES
This section aims to review evidence of factors which
influence the utilisation of services by private and public
providers. Identifying such factors could assist in
understanding the barriers faced by users using the services.
These barriers which limit accesibility to services need to be
considered by policy makers when promoting private or public
sector services.
The classification used by Kroeger (1983) were used to
classify factors infuencing utilisation of health services. He
broadly divided these factors into three groups:
characteristics of the subjects, the disorder and the service.
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2.5.1 Characteristics of the subjects
i) Socioeconomic status
Cortinovis et al (1993) argued that socio-economic
classifications based on income, occupations and literacy
used in industrialised countries were inappropriate to use in
developing countries because of structural and economic
heterogeneity between the countries. Many studies in
developing countries still use income or occupation as socio-
economic indicators but these classifications were tailored
according to the local situation (Benyoussef and Wessen, 1974;
Heller et al, 1981 and Berman et al, 1987). Others used a
combination of more than one variable such as occupation,
ownership of land and educational level to classify the socio-
economic status (Cortinovis et al, 1993; Ramachandran and
Shastri, 1983; and Amin et al, 1989). Recently, Dye and Lee
(1994) reported using only ownership of cows and sheep as an
adequate indicator of the socio-economic status of households
in rural Kashmir.
Socioeconomic status is commonly mentioned as an important
factor affecting the choice of provider in rural communities.
More importantly it also affects the decision of whether or
not to seek treatment (Fiedler, 1981).
Heller (1982) found that households with higher income level
shifted their demand from public to private clinics in
Malaysia. The National Morbidity Survey by the MOH showed that
lower income groups (monthly income of RN 500 and below) had
lower utilisation rates and have higher tendency to use public
services than higher income groups (MOH, 1988 b). However,
private clinics were utilised by 35% of the those in the
lowest income groups (less than RN 300 per month) while 25% of
those in upper income group (RN 2,000 and above per month)
used the subsidised public facilities. These two studies
however considered the whole country and did not disaggregate
urban and rural areas.
16
Aljunid (1992) in a community based-study in a rural village
in Malaysia showed that utilisation of private clinics by
adults aged 18 years and above increased significantly as
income increased. The percentage of respondents who utilised
private clinics increased from 7% for those with monthly per
capita income of less than RN 50.00 to 36.5% for the group
with income of RN 150.00 and above. The percentage of
respondents who visited traditional practitioners decreased as
income increased.
Berman et al (1987) showed that in Indonesia at all levels of
severity of illness, higher income groups were more likely to
seek treatment; he pointed out that the use of private
physician was primarily restricted to the upper income group.
Heller et al (1981) found that in Mexico, those in lower
socio-economic class were less likely to have a stable source
of medical care and more likely to use public rather than
private facilities.
ii) Ethnicity
Different ethnic groups have different patterns of
utilisation. In Malaysia, Heller (1982) found that, Chinese
people used out-patient services more frequently than Malays
and Indians even after controlling for socioeconomic status.
No explanation was offered for these findings. The National
Morbidity Survey in Malaysia also showed that the Chinese were
more likely to use private care facilities than Malays and
Indians (MOH, 1988 b). These findings are likely to be
confounded by income, not controlled in the analysis. The
explanation offered for the ethnic differentials in this study
was the distance to services: the Chinese population is more
urbanised than the other two population groups. Kroeger (1983)
suggested that differences in symptom sensitivity in different
ethnic groups may be one explanation for inter-ethnic
variations in utilisation. The patients' desire to choose
doctors from the same ethnic group who speak the same language
might be another reason for the observed ethnic pattern of
utilisation.
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Senior and Bhopal (1994) recently suggested four problems in
using ethnicity as a variable in research: difficulty of
measurement, heterogeneity of populations being studied, lack
of clarity about the research purpose and ethnocentricity
affecting the interpretation and use of data. Among other
things they suggested that ethnicity should be perceived as
different from race, that researchers should appreciate the
complex and fluid nature of ethnicity and that higher priority
be given to research on methods for ethnic classifications.
Such issues are as relevant in industrialised as in less
developed countries.
iii) Age
Health needs at different ages influence utilisation pattern.
A study by Benyoussef and Wessen (1974) in Tunisia found a "U"
shape utilisation rate with peaks at both extreme ages; this
was explained by the high morbidity rates in the very young
and elderly.
Heller (1982) found that the school children and households
members in the working age group in Malaysia were more likely
to consume out-patient services (public or private services)
despite their relatively lower morbidity rate. He showed that
the high morbidity group in the age 0-4 and more than 45 years
consume the smallest amount of out-patient care. He postulated
that this unusual finding might be due to household choices to
treat a significant fractions of minor illnesses of the
dependent age groups within the home. Another interesting
finding was that those aged 5-15 and those over 45 were more
likely to use traditional medical care rather than modern
treatment. The later finding might be due to the confidence of
older age groups to traditional practitioners but the former
finding has not been able to be explained by Heller.
In Singapore, Fong and Phua (1985) found that at all age
groups private general practitioners were more frequently
utilised than government outpatient services. For both
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services, their utilisation rate peaked at the age group 5-9
and over 50. There is another peak in the utilisation rate of
private general practitioners at the age group of 20-30. The
researcher suggested that this peak might be due to a number
of employees who require medical certificate for absences from
work.
iv) Gender
Studies from various countries have shown different
utilisation patterns between males and females. In Tunisia,
for instance, it was found that females had higher rate of
utilisation than men in both rural and urban areas in almost
all age groups (Benyoussef and Wessen, 1974).
Akin et al (1986) in their study on the demand for adult
outpatient services in the Philippines reported a
statistically significant increase in the probability of a
private versus a public sector visit if the sick person was
male. He suggested that such findings may be indicative of a
diversion of resources towards males to improve the quality of
their care.
The priority of men over women in receiving health care was
also found by Feldman (1983) in his study in Bangladesh. He
found that men are more likely to use allopathic treatment
than women. He suggested that allopathic medicine which has a
quicker effect and is more powerful may be reserved for the
males since male labour is assumed to be of greater value than
women's labour. This is particularly true for poor families
where males seek quick cures in order to be available for
employment opportunities. It is also possible that when men
control the family finances, they might give priority to their
own health needs.
In contrast Fong and Phua (1985) in Singapore found that
female visited private general practitioners 1.7 times more
often than males. Women also visited government out-patient
services 1.6 times more often than men.
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v) Sources of finance
Source of finance is one barrier to use of private health care
providers in developing countries. Third party payment
mechanisms such as health insurance coverage are poorly
developed in most of the developing countries; however, this
trend is increasing rapidly as part of health system reform
package. Coverage of such scheme tend to be limited to certain
sections of the population, usually those employed in the
formal sector. Services covered tend to be mostly hospital
admissions rather than out-patient services. Ron et all (1991)
reviewed health insurance schemes in 14 developing countries
and reported that in most countries public services were
utilised to deliver services under the scheme except in South
Korea, Philippines and Thailand where private practitioners
were selected through an accreditation process. In contrast,
Bennett and Tangcharoensathien (1993) noted that in Thailand
formal sector employees covered by national health insurance
demanded access to the private sector in return for their
contribution.
In Malaysia, only 6.5% of users of government facilities paid
by through third parties, 70% had free services and the
remaining paid out-of-pocket. Among the users of private
facilities 20.9% paid through third parties and the majority
paid out-of-pocket. Most with third party coverage in the
private sector received this privilege as employees benefit
(MOH, 1988 b)
In Indonesia, 13% of the population, almost all of them
government employees and their families, were covered by some
form of health insurance. Nevertheless direct out-of-pocket
payment comprise by far the greatest part of all household
care payments to public and private sector facilities
(Brotowasisto et al, 1988).
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2.5.2 Characteristics of the disorder
In a study in a Malay rural village in Malaysia, Colson (1971)
found that acute and fatal diseases were presented more
frequently to modern practitioners whereas chronic non-fatal
illnesses to traditional healers. In another study among
villagers attending a rural clinic in Malaysia, Heggenhougen
(1979) found that most people used the public clinic for minor
problems and presented their more serious health problems
directly to a private physician.
Lim (1991) reviewed 3,164 patients attending eight private
clinics in two rural districts of Pahang, an east coast state
in Malaysia, and found that 87% of patients came for medical
treatment and only 13% for preventive care. Minor conditions,
mostly acute illnesses represented 82% of the cases; major
disorders (mainly chronic illnesses such as hypertension,
asthma and diabetes mellitus) accounted for 18% of cases.
Upper respiratory tract infections were the commonest minor
conditions while hypertension was the most common major
condition. He suggested that chronic illnesses were not
commonly treated in the private sector because of the expense
of obtaining long-term treatment which were treated free of
charge in the public sector.
In Kenya, Mwabu (1986) reported that different illnesses gave
rise to different consultation patterns. He found that
although government clinics were more frequently visited on
the first consultation episode, villagers visited private
mission clinics for diseases like diarrhoea, malaria, leprosy
and tuberculosis.
A disease-specific utilisation pattern emerged in a study by
Sarder and Chen (1981) in Bangladesh. They found that although
some problems like diarrhoea and fever were treated by all
practitioners, others such as respiratory infections and
parasitic diseases were treated by allopaths and homeopaths
while jaundice, snake bites and headache were treated by
traditional healers. They stated that client selection of
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practitioners was influenced by availability, cost and the
perceived effectiveness of technology in relation to a
particular disease.
Yesudian (1994) in his study in Bombay India, showed for all
socioeconomic strata that patients with minor and chronic
illnesses more commonly used private sector provider than
other sources. However for acute illnesses, the level of
utilisation of private health care increased with socio-
economic status. Criteria for grouping the diseases into
minor, acute or chronic were not stated.
2.5.3 Characteristics of the service
i) Geographical accessibility
In rural areas of developing countries, a low degree of
geographical accessibility to modern health services is a
major reason for use of other services such as traditional
care. In a study in rural Nigeria, Stock (1983) found that
rural populations living further from health facilities tend
to delay using its services and preferred alternatives such as
self treatment with traditional or patent medicines. He also
noted that various factors affect utilisation in relation to
distance, including perceived effectiveness of Western-type
treatment and perceived quality of service. Males travelled
further than females to obtain treatment. This was attributed
to religion of Hausa people where married women must obtain
permission from their husbands before leaving their homes.
Adults were found to travel further for treatment than
children.
In the West Indies, a study by Poland et al (1990) showed
that distance to permanent health care services was a
significant predictor of utilisation. This was supported by a
study in Southern Iraq, where a decline in utilisation rates
at modern health care centres (both public and private) with
increasing distance travelled was noted. They concluded that
the single most important factor related to variation in
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utilisation was distance travelled by people to reach the
service, once variation due to sickness or need was taken into
account (Habib and Vaughan, 1986).
Mode of transport were also affected utilisation. In Ethiopia
patients in the cities use private or government cars to get
to private clinics; those in the periphery made the trip on
foot, overcrowded buses or taxi and used a mix of government
facilities and traditional remedies (Kloos et al, 1987).
In Malaysia, it was found that utilisation rates of both the
government and private services decreased with increasing
travel time and travel cost in the clinics (MOH, 1988 b).
Earlier in 1982, Heller reported that among households using
both government and private clinics, an increase in travel
time lowered the utilisation rate of government clinics but
not the private facilities.
Studies done in developed countries such as Joseph and Bantock
(1982) in Canada, Dutton (1986) in the USA and Haynes and
Bentham (1982) in UK have also found that distance is a
barrier to utilisation or affects the poor more.
ii) Quality of care
Patient satisfaction, component of quality of care, has been
given high priority in developed countries. Fitzpatrick (1991)
cited three reasons for the importance of patient
satisfaction: it determines compliance with recommended
treatment and influences patient choice of provider; it is a
measure of patient involvement in decisions about care; and it
can be used to choose alternative methods of organising and
providing health care.
Research in developed countries has focus attention on the
theoretical and methodological issues in assessing patient
satisfaction. Pascoe (1983) suggested that research on patient
satisfaction has not been guided by a well supported
definition or psychological model of satisfaction. He reviewed
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the Linder-Pelz value expectancy model and Lawler's
discrepancy and fulfilment theories and found that empirical
evidence failed to support these theories. Williams (1994)
supported Pascoe's views on the theoretical weaknesses and
identified the impact of different methodological approaches
on the results of patient satisfaction research. He showed
that in quantitative studies, satisfactions tended to be high
while greater levels of disquiet were revealed through
qualitative methods. The reductionism which characterised some
quantitative research has been seen as one reason for the loss
of meaning in such studies. Hall and Dornan (1988) in his
meta-analysis of 221 consumer satisfaction studies showed that
the overall satisfaction levels in these studies were high and
in three quarters of them, new study instruments were used. In
another recent literature analysis on patient satisfaction in
general practice, Wensing et al (1994) found very little
progress has been made as researchers focused more on
development of questionnaires and neglected other aspects such
as sample size and questioning procedures.
Few studies on patient satisfaction in developing countries
have exposed the weakness of public services and higher
patient preference for private health care. Gilson et al
(1994), using both quantitative and qualitative methods,
studied community satisfaction with primary care facilities in
Tanzania and found that services provided by church
dispensaries were much more appreciated than government
facilities. Drugs were more consistently available and health
workers in these services exhibited more positive attitudes
towards their patients.
Long waiting times, shortage of drugs, poor attitudes of
nurses and physicians were among the complaints about public
facilities gathered in group discussions in a study in Mali
(Ainsworth, 1983). The respondents indicated that personal
connections were important in skipping registration queues and
that the only way to obtain adequate care was to arrange for
private care after office hours.
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Kloos et al (1987), in a household study in a suburb of Addis
Ababa and four rural villages, showed that patients preferred
services from private physicians rather than government
clinics because of their personalised services and shorter
waiting times. He found that 60% of wealthy traders and 13% of
people from other socio-economic groups used private services
even though the charge was 10 to 15 times higher than in
government facilities.
In Malaysia, 90% of the patients bypassed the community
clinics manned by community nurses to seek treatment at health
centres, district hospitals and private clinics where doctors
were available (MOH, 1988 b). Patient perceptions on the
quality services by the doctors might be one reason for this
finding. On average patients have to spend a longer time in
government health centres as compared to private clinics (MOH,
1988 b)
Annis (1981) reported poor utilisation of government health
posts due to under-staffing, badly under-equipped services and
poor quality of services in rural Guatemala.
In rural Mexico, people preferred private physicians over the
better accessible health centres which were staffed with young
and inexperienced doctors (Walt, 1977).
In most of the studies mentioned earlier, patients perceived
quality of care given by private provider to be higher than
public services. However some studies using professionally
defined criteria for quality of care found contrary results.
Uplekar and Shepard (1991) studied the prescribing patterns of
143 private allopathic and non-allopathic doctors in treatment
of tuberculosis in a slum area of Bomlay. They found that the
doctors prescribed three times more expensive drugs than the
national standard and also used unnecessary drugs. Eighty
different regimes were used by the doctors in their treatment
although only four of these conformed with the regimes under
the National Tuberculosis Programme. He suggested that poor
participation of private doctors on continuing medical
25
education and the lack of integration with the national health
system were the reasons for the poor quality. In another study
on management of leprosy by 106 private practitioners from the
same area, Uplekar and Cash (1991) found that none of them
followed WHO recommended regime for treating leprosy.
Recently, Hooi (1994) reported that of 100 tuberculosis cases
treated in a public hospital in Malaysia, 48 of them had
consulted private practitioners and 67% percent of these had
delays in diagnosis and treatment compared to only 15% of
those in the government facilities. Furthermore he showed that
only 14.6% of those who had first consulted private
practitioners had undergone chest X-rays and only 2.1% had
undergone sputum analysis on their first visit. He suggested
that private practitioners may be unaware of proper diagnostic
and management regimes for tuberculosis. This study suffered
from selection biases as only those cases eventually treated
in public hospitals were studied.
A study in India showed that private doctors prescribed a
greater number of drugs and injections than public doctors and
that the most commonly prescribed drugs were vitamins and
tonics. Among the patients who visited private practitioners,
55% of them were given an antibiotics; of these, 23% received
two or more types. In contrast to patients who attended
government primary health care centres, only 18% of them were
prescribed with an antibiotics; of these only 6% of them
received more than one drug (Greenhalgh, 1987). This study did
not indicate whether the type and severity of illness suffered
by both groups of patients were comparable. In the same study,
the management of diarrhoeal cases differed, with private
doctors being less likely to recommend oral rehydration
therapy and more likely to prescribe an inhibitor of gut
motility or a binding agent than the doctors in government
primary health care centres and teaching hospitals.
Wyatt (1992) suggested that injections were very popular in
developing countries because these may epitomise western
medicine, reenforce traditional belief about healing and
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disease and may be the most profitable part of the doctors
work especially in the private sector. She cautioned against
the excessive use of injections for the danger of provocation
of paralysis in poliomyelitis cases and transmission of
hepatitis B and HIV virus if unsterile needles and syringes
were used.
Ahmad and Bhutta (1990) studied the prescription of four types
of non-essential drugs (anti-diarrheals, appetite stimulants,
multivitamins and brain tonics) promoted by pharmaceutical
industry among 100 private physicians in Karachi. Most of
these drugs were ineffective and some may be hazardous: 55% of
all drugs prescribed by the doctors were in this category. He
suggested that poor prescribing resulted from the dependence
of doctors on salesmen and promotional materials from drug
companies, the lack of involvement in continuing medical
education (CME) among private practitioners and the absence of
a national drug policy in the country. No comparison was made
with doctors in public services and the information was
gathered by questioning the practitioners rather than studying
their actual prescribing habits.
Gilson et al (1993) using retrospective data from patient
registers compared drug prescriptions from four church
dispensaries and 16 government facilities in Tanzania. Church
dispensaries prescribed 24% more drugs per visit than
governments units. Antibiotics, chloroquine and injections
were given in higher proportions by church compared to
government units. Most of the non-essential drugs were in
church dispensaries. It was suggested that the prescribing
pattern observed was due to the success of the Tanzanian
Essential Drugs Programme (EDP) in the government services.
Church dispensaries which were outside the EDP system, charged
fees for treatment and may prescribe more drugs to gain
revenue and to satisfy patient demand resulting from payment
of fees.
27
iii) Price of care
In most developing countries, public services are usually
highly subsidised and private health care is often expensive.
The high utilisation rate in private sector facilities,
despite the high charges has been used as evidence that demand
in services was not primarily determined by price of care. For
example, Akin et al (1986) in rural Bicol region of the
Philippines, showed that private clinics and hospital charges
were over 28 times higher than charges at government clinics
and hospitals. Despite this private facilities were still
utilised more frequently than public facilities.
In Malaysia almost all out-patients visits to government
health centres were free, and in 60% of visits to government
hospitals the charge was only RN 1.00 for both consultation
and medication. The average payment in a private clinic was RN
12, with 32% paying RN 5 to RN 9 and a further 30% paying RN
10 to RN 14. Despite the great difference in the fees, private
clinics were utilised twice as frequently as public clinics
(MOH, 1988 b). Heller (1982) showed that demand for out-
patient and in-patient care among Malaysian users was highly
inelastic to cash price. Price elasticity of demand measures
the responsiveness of demand to changes in price; he concluded
that the demand of out-patient and in-patient care in Malaysia
was not responsive to changes in the price of care. A 10%
increase in the price of public out-patient care would only
reduce demand by 1.5%. Nevertheless, consumers were responsive
to the relative cash prices of private and public out-patient
clinics. He showed that the cross elasticity of demand for
public care due to changes in the private out-patient prices
is approximately +0.15. Cross elasticity of demand measures
the response in quantity demanded of certain good or services
which arise from changes in the prices of other goods or
services. In this study, a 10% increase in the price of
private-out patient care increased the demand for public out-
patient services by 1.5%.
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Gilson (1988) and McPake (1993) criticised both studies by
Aikin et al (1986) and Heller (1982) for their failure to
estimate their impact of price on demand in relation to income
level. The impact on utilisation resulting from price would
probably be greater in lower than the upper income. Akin et al
(1986), however attributed his findings partly due to the
difference in quality of care between the public and private
sector and severity of illness. These two factors were not
controlled in his demand model: it is possible that patients
are willing to pay more for higher quality care and when their
disease is severe.
Yoder (1989) showed that in Swaziland the increase of fees in
government services led to a 32.4% decline in the attendance
at government facilities and an increase of 10% of attendance
at mission facilities. There were also declines in patient
visits to both government and mission facilities for BCG, DPT
immunisations, and for treatment of dehydration in children,
each showing substantial declines in average attendance at 16,
19 and 24% respectively. The negative impact of user fees on
utilisation of public facilities was also shown in Kenya
(Moses et al, 1992), Zimbabwe (Hongoro and Chandiwana, 1994)
and Zaire (Bethune et al, 1989; Haddad and Fournier, 1995).
iv) Types of services available
The types of service available also affects the choice of
facility. In developing countries the types of services of
private providers were rarely documented. This is basic
information needed before greater role of private providers
were to be promoted in developing countries. Tsui and
Donaldson (1987) suggested that lack of systematic and careful
record-keeping by private practitioners was one reason for
poor documentation of services by private providers.
It is generally assumed that curative services are the main
focus of private practitioners' activities although the actual
nature and extent of services has been little documented. In
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a survey among 17 private practitioners in the state of
Perak, Malaysia, they were asked to list their services
(Diong, 1988). The practitioners indicated curative and
preventive services, including procedures and diagnostic
investigations. The list has limited value since it did not
really reflect what is actually provided by the private
doctors. Some of the procedures listed (eg: deep lymph node
biopsy and removal of breast lump) can only be carried out by
trained specialists. The profile of the providers were not
given in this study.
Leopando (1988) reported that 74% of family physicians (mostly
private practitioners) in the Philippines provide immunisation
services in addition to other curative care.
Family planning services are widely provided by private
practitioners in developing countries. A study in Kenya among
592 private physicians using mailed questionnaires showed that
family planning services were being dispensed on patient
demand, the pill was the method largely prescribed, and
sterilisations were being done for older female clients (Mugo-
Gachuhi, 1977). Surveys carried out in 25 countries in
Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Middle East between 1979
and 1984 showed that an average of 13% of rural and 18% of
urban family planning users reported using private clinics
(London et al, 1985).
Antenatal services were also reported to be provided by
private practitioners. In Egypt 71% of the households in a'
rural area received antenatal services from government
facilities as compared to 21% from private clinics (Abu-Zeid
and Dann, 1985). The extent and comprehensiveness of this
service by private practitioners was not reported. Among the
urban poor in Kuala Lumpur, 13% of pregnant mothers received
antenatal care in private clinics and hospital and 11.5% of
children were delivered in these facilities (Gan and Yusof,
1993)
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Private practitioners were also found to provide services not
provided by government services. House calls by doctors are
common among private practitioners in Indonesia (Berman et al,
1987). In the Philippines, private clinics generally operate
longer hours than public clinics. Almost all private clinics
(96%) open on holidays compared to only 10% of the public
clinics. Nearly three quarters of the private clinics provide
services after office hours compared to only 6% of the public
clinics (Griffin and Paqueo, 1993).
2.6 INTERACTIONS BETWEEN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE PROVIDERS
Interactions between health workers in public and private
sector have been poorly documented particularly in developing
countries. It was argued that interactions between the two
providers were inevitable because of their coexistence but
were often ignored (EPU, 1985). Given that many health
programmes affect both private and public providers,
understanding the kinds of interactions and problems faced by
them provide valuable feedback to health planners seeking to
improve effectiveness and efficiency of such programmes. Due
to limited evidence in the literature, the interactions
between the two sectors on enforcement of regulations, human
resources, patient referrals and diseases notification will be
discussed.
2.6.1 Enforcement of regu].atione
Perhaps the commonest form of interaction between the public
and private health sector is through the regulation of private
health care. Proponents of the market approach are not in
favour of regulation even in the presence of market failure as
state intervention is not seen as providing any better
solution than that reached by market adjustment (Bennett,
1991). They blame excessive government regulation as the cause
for many of the current problems in health care. Regulation in
health services was argued to cause greater administrative
costs, greater inequality in attendance access, greater chance
of unnecessary or iatrogenic interventions and unjustified
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development of complex technology inadequately evaluated
(Belmartino, 1994).
Roemer and Roemer (1982) believe that the existence of free
market in health care provision may lead to monopoly or
oligopoly, turbulent competitive disequilibrium in favour of
providers and long term contractual arrangements between the
consumers and providers. He further suggested that these
outcomes might be very deleterious to consumers unless
regulated. It was argued that the government is responsible
for regulating the private health sector because it has
obligations to protect its citizens and to ensure that
resources are not wasted (Garner and Thaver, 1993).
Regulation of the private health sector in many developing
countries is weak because of lack of resources, poorly
decentralised government services, lack of information on
activities of the private provider and professional self-
interests of the regulatory agency (Bennett et al, 1994). The
World Bank while suggesting a greater role for the private
health sector recognises the need for government to strengthen
their capacity to regulate the private sector to ensure
quality of care (World Bank, 1993).
Registration of doctors and other health workers is usual in
most countries. In Malaysia, under the Medical Act (1971),
Malaysian Medical Council (MMC) was established to register
the practitioners and take care of ethical issues. The MMC is
a quasi-governmental body with government maintaining control
through nominations of 13 of 24 members. The nominated members
are government officers in MOH and the remaining members are
elected by the profession. Reports of the activities of the
MMC showed that there very few cases were reported and
investigated despite many complaints of medical negligence in
the media. Between 1989 and 1991, 72 cases were reported to
MMC, although only 35 were investigated and disciplinary
action was taken against only seven doctors (New Sunday
Times, 1993)
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In India, Yesudian (1994) reported that people's confidence in
Maharasta Medical Council had decreased because it tended to
protect the doctors rather than the public in cases of medical
negligence. He cited a case of medical malpractice where the
Council had to be forced to take action through court orders.
In 1990 in Malaysia there were 79 health laws and regulations
and 36 health-related laws in the country: it is commonly held
that these are poorly enforced. The Private Hospital Act
(1971) is the main act which regulate the private hospitals in
the country. It has provision for annual inspections and
registration of private hospitals. This is enforced by the
Ministry of Health. This Act is now being amended to extend
its coverage to private clinics in the country. It was
envisaged that under the amended act the minimum standards for
private clinics and their distributions in the country would
be spelled out (MMA, 1993 a). The existence of similar
regulations have been reported in Thailand (Bennett and
Tangcharoensathein, 1994), Singapore (MMA, 1993 a) and Malawi
(Ngalande-Banda and Walt, 1995).
Regulation regarding location of practice is applied in
developed countries but has rarely been reported in developing
countries. In Tanzania, regulations to control the location of
clinics and types of personnel to be employed were present but
were not properly enforced (Mujinja et al, 1993). Under the
Medical Practitioners and Dental Act, 1987, paramedicals in
Malawi were allowed to open private clinics but only in rural
areas. This regulation were not strictly enforced as most
paramedicals open their clinics in pen-urban areas (Ngalande-
Banda and Walt, 1995)
Government control over new investments has been applied in
many countries through the certificate of needs. This is aimed
at controlling cost escalation due to excessive use
particularly of expensive medical equipment. In developed
countries such as France and Canada, investments on expensive
medical technology were controlled by the government. Yang
(1993) reported that Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) in Korea
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had not been regulated by the state and the service was more
accessible to the rich than the poor. He further suggested the
formation of a corporate body responsible to assess new
technologies before adoption. Foote (1986) assessed the
Medical Device Amendments of 1976 which authorised the Food
and Drug Administration in USA to regulate medical equipment
for safety but concluded that it was not effective and failed
to stop the entry of unsafe medical devices into markets.
Bhat (1991) raised the issue of uncontrolled use of high
technology equipment in private clinics to attract customers.
He argued that this would lead to unnecessary waste of
resources and exposure of patients to unnecessary risks. One
example is the study by Hillman et al (1990) in USA: it was
found that patients were at least four times as likely to have
diagnostic imaging (ultrasonography and radiography) done if
they sought care from a physician who had the facilities in
his office rather than from one who refer patients to a
radiologist. This suggest the presence of supplier-induced
demand.
In Thailand, where there is no legislation to control the
purchase of sophisticated medical equipment, 35 out of 57 CAT
scanners in the country were in the private hospitals. Six out
of the total of eight MRI scanners in the country were owned
by the private hospitals (Wibulpoipraset, 1991 b). It is
difficult to argue the justification for prescribing a
particular investigation in a patient when there is no
standard of practice among medical doctors. However this issue
is important to address since in rural areas where population
may be less vigilant, unscrupulous practitioners may take
advantage of the situation for their own gain.
2.6.2 Human resources
Roemer (1984) expressed concern about how the private heath
sector competes with public services to attract trained
workers in developing countries. He stated that most
developing countries spent only 2-4k of the GNP on the public
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health sector leading to low salaries for public health
workers. Health workers such as physicians and nurses are
normally trained by government to serve the public health
sector. The private health sector attracts these trained and
sometimes experienced workers by offering high incentives
which are not able to be offered by the government services.
One way of retaining the health workers is through regulation
where health workers are required to serve in the public
sector for a certain period of time before being allowed to
leave for the private sector. In Malaysia, all doctors are
required to serve three years in government services under the
Medical Act. This was extended to five years in 1992. Those
sponsored by government for their training are bonded for
between seven to ten years to serve in government services.
Nevertheless, many doctors leave the public services after the
compulsory services and some pay their bond to be released to
work in the private sector (MOH, 1988 a).
Incentives to retain doctors in the public services by
allowing them to work in private clinics after office hours
were reported in Jamaica, Egypt, Sri Lanka, Thailand,
Indonesia and Malawi (Roemer, 1984; Ngalande-Banda and Walt,
1995). However this is not favoured in some countries for fear
of abuses or neglect government facilities. In Nigeria,
government doctors were reported to refer patients they see in
the government facilities to their own private clinics (Attah,
1986). In Egypt, even though newly graduated doctors are
required to work for least two years in government health
units in rural areas, they only saw public patients in a few
hours in the morning and spent the afternoon in private
clinics where he could earn more than their government
salaries (Roemer, 1984).
To solve shortages of manpower, private doctors were sometimes
employed to work in public facilities. In India for example,
private specialist were employed as honourary consultants in
public facilities. However these honourary consultants abused
the privilege by admitting their private patients to
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government facilities and charging them (Yesudian, 1994).
The Malaysian Medical Association has been urging the
government to allow government doctors to work part-time in
private clinics to reduce the influx into the private sector
(MMA, 1991 c). This suggestion was turned down by the MOH on
the grounds that public services would be neglected (The Star,
1992 a)
In India and the Philippines government doctors were not
allowed to open private practice (Roemer, 1984). Nepal,
Pakistan and Thailand had similar regulations but also paid
non-private practice allowance incentives to the public
doctors. However this financial incentives failed to stop
government doctors engaging in private practice (Bennett et
al, 1994)
2.6.3 Patient Referra].e
The referral system is the most important link between
different health providers and is the system through which
medical practitioners communicate with one another. Private
practitioners refer two groups of patients to public
providers: those who cannot afford to be treated by private
practitioners and those who cannot be treated or investigated
due to lack of facilities and expertise (Lachman and Stander,
1991)
In rural areas of Malaysia, private practitioners do not,
normally have in-patient services. Since most of the private
hospitals are located in urban areas, private patients needing
secondary care and in-patient services will be referred to
public hospitals (Ming 1982 a).
Interaction between providers have been studied through
analysis of referral letters in many studies in developed
countries. For example, studies in the UK and Netherlands have
focused mostly on interactions between general practitioners
and their colleagues in hospitals. The complaints of general
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practitioners include the failure of hospital doctors to
return the patient to their care and the failure of hospital
doctors to read the referral letters (Doeleman, 1987). General
practitioners have also accused hospital doctors of not
understanding the problems of the patient outside hospitals
(Grace and Armstrong, 1987) and considered the replies to
referral letters by specialists to be irritating, discourteous
and belittling (Westerman et al, 1990). Grace and Armstrong
(1986) studied 213 referrals in UK and found that only in
48.4% of the cases there was agreement between hospital
consultants and general practitioners on the reasons for the
referrals. The hospital consultants criticised the general
practitioner's management of patients before the referral and
felt that most of the referrals were unnecessary (Grace and
Armstrong, 1986)
The quality of referral letters by general practitioners has
also been studied. Creed et al (1990) found that doctors who
write detailed referral letters refer the least patients.
Westerman et al (1990) showed that 60% of referral letters
sent by general practitioners to specialists in Netherlands
were of poor quality.
A standard referral letter has in some setting been introduced
in health care system in attempt to improve the quality of
communication between providers. Yet, Jones et al (1990)
showed that despite the introduction of a standard ophthalmic
referral form, 19.2 % of the general practitioners did not use
it when referring patients to an eye hospital in Manchester,
UK.
The studies reviewed so far have been carried out in developed
countries. In developing countries assessment of referrals
between public and private practitioners had rarely been
reported. In South Africa, of 1143 referral letters received
in a children hospital, only 4.8% were considered to be
complete in terms of patient history, examination, diagnosis,
appropriate investigations and treatment at primary level
37
(Lachman and Stander, 1991). It was suggested that the varying
quality of referral letters found in this study was due to the
workload of referring doctors, lack of understanding of the
need for comprehensive details about patients and lack of
contact between the hospital and referring doctors. Yesudian
(1994) reported medical malpractice in referral system in
India whereby money was paid to general practitioners to
encourage referrals to consultants.
2.6.4 Disease notification
Disease notification is one component of communicable disease
surveillance programmes in many countries. Since disease
surveillance programmes is normally carried out in the public
sector, public and private provider may interact through this
programme. Disease notification is useful in advising
appropriate medical therapy, detecting outbreaks, and for
planning and evaluation of prevention and control programmes
(Chorba et al, 1989). Despite its importance, under-reporting
of notifiable disease has been identified in many developing
countries. Studies in seven East Mediterranean countries
(Pakistan, Sudan, Somalia, Syria, Yemen Arab Republic,
Democratic Yemen and Egypt) and five Asian countries
(Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Indonesia and Thailand) showed
that only 2 to 5 of neonatal tetanus cases in 1980-81 were
notified (WHO, 1982). This estimate was based on the number of
deaths from neonatal tetanus in the various countries and the
total number of reported cases. The low percentage of
notifications may also be due to people not seeking medical
treatment at all because of poor accessibility to health
services. However, a study in the Philippines in 1980-81,
found that although 85% of polio cases were seen by medical
practitioners during the acute phase, only 12% of cases were
notified (WHO, 1981 b). Whether a correct diagnosis was made
by the medical practitioners during the initial consultation
was not reported.
Under-reporting of notifiable diseases is also faced by health
authorities in developed countries. In the USA for example, a
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study of discharge records in 11 hospitals in Washington DC
revealed that only 35% of selected notifiable diseases were
officially reported (WHO, 1982). In the Netherlands, it was
estimated that only 3% of measles cases were reported by
general practitioners (WHO, 198]. a). Clarkson and Fine (1985)
estimated that 40 to 60% of measles cases and only 5-25% of
pertussis infections were notified in England and Wales in the
period of 1957-1980.
Although various studies reviewed here demonstrated under-
reporting of notifiable diseases, none has shown concrete
evidence that medical practitioners are wholly responsible for
that, even though they are required to do so once they are
suspicious or have diagnosed a notifiable disease (Gaibriath,
1990). There are several events that must occur before correct
notification by a medical practitioner is made. First, the
infected individual must suffer some clinical disease. The
patient must be seen by a medical practitioner. The
practitioner must make a correct diagnosis and then notify the
case (Clarkson and Fine, 1985). The first two steps are
beyond the control of medical practitioners. However, Konowitz
et al (1984) found that medical practitioners in USA failed to
report notifiable diseases despite making the diagnosis. They
found that some practitioners did not know which diseases
should be reported, others assumed that the laboratory workers
would notify the case. Practitioners may also fear that
notification will affect their patient's confidentiality and
violates doctor-patient relationship (Rothenberg et al, 1980;
deere, et a]. 1967).
Lack of uniformity in case definition also leads to confusion
among the medical practitioners as to whether or not to
notify. For example in the USA, in some states, Salmonellosis
infections are required to be notified if culture results are
positive; whereas in other states notifications are required
only when culture results are positive and the individual is
symptomatic (Chorba et al, 1989) -
39
Kirsch and Harvey (1994) suggested that private physicians
failed to notify cases because it was time consuming, lack of
reward, feedback and supervision. Nevertheless, as with all
the literatures reviewed earlier there were no evidence
whether private practitioners were any worse than those in the
public sector in disease notification.
Various ways to improve the notification rates were reported
such as by sending stamped reporting forms to the
practitioners (Hall and Douglas, 1976), actively telephoning
the practitioners (Rothenberg et al, 1980; Weiss et al, 1988;
Vogt et al, 1983), sending them feedbacks (Spenser and Warren,
1979) and by paying them (McCormick, 1987). Except by actively
telephoning the practitioners, all the other methods failed to
increase the notification rates significantly. In developing
countries, efforts to encourage notification and problems
facing medical practitioners in disease notifications have not
been reported.
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2.7 SUMMARY
Box 2.1: Summary of the literature reviews
* Medically qualified for-profit private practitioners are
the main focus of the study.
* Campaigns by influential agencies to enhance the role of
private health providers have been met with opposition from
those citing uniqueness of the health care market and
problems of imperfect competition.
* There is evidence to show that private practitioners are
important health care providers in many Asian countries
even in the rural areas.
* Existing literature showed that patient characteristics
(soda-economic status, ethnicity, age, gender, source of
finance), types of illnesses and characteristics of the
service (geographical accessibility, quality of care, price
and types of services offered) influence the utilisation of
public and private health care.
* Very little information is available on interactions
between public and private providers.
* In most developing countries, regulations on private
health sector are either absent or poorly enforced.
* Influx of human resources trained at the public expense
into private sector are common in developing countries.
Mandatory public services, payment of non-private practice
allowance, permission to work in private sector are among
the ways to retain health personnel in the public sector.
* When private practitioners are primary care providers,
they may interact with public providers through the
referral system.
* In communicable disease surveillance, public and private
providers may interact through disease notification.
* This thesis will contribute to provide the basic
information on the types of services provided by the
private providers and characteristics of their users. It
will also describe and analyse the interactions between
both types of providers leading on to consideration of
olicy implications.
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III. STUDY SETTING
3.1 MALAYSIA - THE COUNTRY
Malaysia consists of 13 states and a Federal Territory
covering an area of 329,758 square kilometres (Figure 3.1).
Eleven states are in Peninsular Malaysia (also known as West
Malaysia) and two in East Malaysia. The population of Malaysia
in 1993 was estimated to be 19 million with an annual growth
rate of 2.3%. Malays form 61.4% of the population, Chinese
29.9%, Indians 7.9% and 0.8% others. Fifty one percent of the
population live in the urban areas (MOH, 1993). The population
is relatively young with 36.2% between the age of 0-14 years,
59.8% between 15-64 years and only 4% over the age of 65. The
dependency ratio is 67.2 and the adult literacy rate is 78%
(Department of Statistics, 1990 a)
The main exports are electrical and electronic products,
petroleum, timber, palm oil and rubber. Malaysia achieved
strong economic growth after the 1985 recession. Between 1988
to 1992 the annual growth in GNP was between 8.5 to 9.7% (MOF,
1992). The per capita GNP was US$ 3,022 in 1992 and eligible
to be classified as middle income country (MOF, 1992; World
Bank, 1993). However it has been estimated that 21.8% of urban
and 17.1% of the rural population lived below the poverty line
(monthly household income RM 350 per month) (Prime Minister
Department, 1991 a).
3.2 HEALTH STATUS
The health indicators of the country improved markedly over
the last ten years particularly in Peninsular Malaysia (Table
3.1). Data for the East Malaysian States (Sabah and Sarawak)
is considered to be inaccurate. The infant mortality rate
(12.1 per 1000) is lower than many other South-East Asian
countries except for Singapore, but were still higher than
most other developed countries (Figure 3.2).
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Table 3.1: Health Indicators for Malaysia in 1981 and 1991
Peninsular	 Sabah	 Sarawak
Malaysia
1981	 1991	 1981	 1991	 1981	 1991
Crude Death Rate	 5.2	 4.8	 4.6	 4.0	 3.7	 3.8
Life expectancy
Male	 68.0	 68.8	 n.a	 n.a	 n.a	 n.a
Female	 72.9	 73.4	 na	 n.a	 n.a	 n.a
Perinatal Mortality	 23.8	 12.3	 n.a	 14.4	 n.a	 7.3
Neonatal Mortality"	 12.3	 7.6	 15.3	 13.2	 8.9	 6.7
Infant Mortality" 	 19.7	 12.1	 26.3	 15.7	 15.1	 9.5
Toddler Mortality"	 1.8	 0.9	 2.6	 1.0	 1.4	 n.a
Maternal Mortality""	 6.0	 2.0	 2.2	 3.0	 3.0	 1.1
per 1,000 births)
per 1000 live birth.)
per 1,000 children age 1-4)
per 10,000 liv. births)
(Sourcs, MOM, 1991 b) n.a - Not available
However within the
c o u n t r y,	 t h e	 Flgrs 3± Intuit Moilsifty Rstss In M.Iaysa and
8.4sd Countitss. 1801
improvement	 in
health status was	 N
not homogenous. The
East	 Malaysian	 TI,.id	 n
- •12
states had worse
- I.health indicators
-II
than	 Peninsular
Malaysia.	 In
Peninsular
bl -
Malaysia, most of
thewest coast _________________________________________
states had better
health indicators than the east coast states. The lower
figures in Sarawak are probably due to under-reporting (Figure
3.3). Poorer states (Kelantan, Terengganu, Kedah and Penis)
which have higher infant mortality rate, were also shown to
have poorer distribution of health resources. Coverage of
doctors and hospital beds were in favour of the more developed
states in the country such as the Federal Territory, Penang
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and Selangor (Appendix 1).
Figure: 3.3: infant Mortality Rate by States In
MalaysIa, 1991
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There were also inter-ethnic differences in the health
indicators of the country with the Chinese generally having
better indicators (Table 3.2).
Table 3.2: Ethnic differentials in selected health indicators for Peninsular Malaysia, 1990
Malay.	 chinese	 Indians	 Peninsular
Malaysia
Infant Mortality' 	 13.4	 8.2	 13.9	 12.2
Toddler Mortality" 	 1.0	 0.6	 0.9	 0.9
Maternal Mortality"	 2.5	 0.9	 1.5	 2.0
Life Expectancy at birth (Years)
Male	 69.2	 71.1	 €5.6	 68.8
Female	 72.6	 76.6	 70.5	 73.4
per 1,000 liv. births)
I.. : p.r 1,000 children age 1-4)p.r 10 000 liv. births(Sourc. D.part.ent of Statistics, 1990 b)
The "epidemiological transition" had arguably taken place in
Malaysia; the country has moved away from infectious and
parasitic diseases as major cause of death in the 1950's
towards cardiovascular diseases as major causes of mortality
from the 1980's (Omran, 1971; Phillips, 1991) . Between 1986
and 1991 heart diseases and neoplasms were the two major cause
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of medically certified death in the country (59% of all deaths
in the country were medically certified in 1991) (Appendix 1).
Proportions of certified deaths due to motor vehicle accidents
increased from 2.7% to 4.7% in the same period and it was the
third commonest cause of hospital admissions in 1991, the
commonest being normal delivery and complications of pregnancy
(Appendix 2). Cardiovascular diseases mortality rate increased
slightly more than two fold between 1981 and 1991 from 15.3 to
37.2 per 100,000 while number of road traffic accidents
increased by 22% (MOH, 1992 e). A community based study
carried out in the state of Selangor found that the prevalence
of hypertension among adults was 16.8% in urban areas and
12.3% in rural areas (Kandiah et al, 1980). Osman and Rampal
(1989) found that the prevalence of diabetes mellitus, was
3.9% among the Malays in three villages in the rural district
of Kuala Selangor and 60% of the cases were newly detected.
However, the epidemiological transition is not complete as
infectious diseases still present in certain areas of the
country. In 1991, 39,189 cases of malaria were notified to the
MOH; 74.8% of these cases were reported in East Malaysia
(mostly in Sabah) while the remainder mostly from the east
coast states of Pahang, Terengganu and Kelantan. 10.4% of all
malaria cases were among immigrant workers mainly from
Thailand and Indonesia (MOH, 1992 e).
Two other important infectious diseases were tuberculosis and
sexually transmitted diseases (Appendix 2). In 1991, 16.7% of
notifiable diseases was tuberculosis and it accounted for 1.3%.
of medically certified deaths. Despite under-reporting, it was
estimated that the incidence rate of gonorrhoea and syphilis
were 14.8 per 100,000 and 10.4 per 100,000 population
respectively in 1991. Most of the STD cases were reported in
the East Malaysian states (Sabah and Sarawak) and more urban
states in Peninsular Malaysia (P.Pinang and Federal
territory). AIDS was first detected in 1986 in Malaysia and
until 1992 there were 49 cases of AIDS and 2,377 people who
were HIV positive; 82% of those HIV positive carriers were
intravenous drug users (MOH, 1992 e).
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3.3 HEALTH SERVICES IN MALAYSIA
3.3.1 Public Health Services
The Ministry of Health is the main government agency (others
are listed in Appendix 3) responsible for providing health
services in the country. The health system is highly
centralised with most planning and organisation of health
services being done centrally. The Minister of Health is a
cabinet member. There are three main divisions in MOH at the
central level: the health division, hospital division and
finance division. The health division is responsible for all
preventive care programmes, the hospital division for curative
care and the finance division control the budget and
expenditure of all health programmes in MOH. At the state
level, each state has an Office of Medical and Health Services
headed by a state director who is responsible on all MOH
programmes in the state. At the district level, the Medical
Officer of Health is responsible for all the preventive
activities in the district and the services in health centres
while the Medical Officer In-Charge (MOIC) heads the district
hospital. Both officers report to their respective deputy
director at the state level. This build in a degree of
fragmentation within the public health sector at least at the
district level.
There were 131 districts in the country in 1991, each with a
population of about 100,000 to 200,000. From 1959 to 1975,
health services in the district were delivered through a threes
tier system. Each rural health unit in a district covered a
population of 50,000 and had three different types of health
centres: one main health centre, four health sub-centres and
20 midwifery clinics. A doctor is stationed at the main health
centre and is overall in-charge of the rural health unit.
Operational research conducted from 1969 to 1971 revealed that
the actual coverage for each rural health unit under this
three tier system was more than 100,000. The government
decided to convert the three-tier system into a two tier-
system. Under the two-tier system each rural health unit is
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supposed to cover a population of 15,000 - 20,000 with two
types of health facilities; one health centre and four
community clinics. In the conversion, health sub-centres were
upgraded to health centres and midwifery clinics were upgraded
to community clinics. A doctor and a dentist were stationed at
each health centre and the community clinics which functioned
as multipurpose rural clinics manned by a new category of
staff, the community nurse. The conversion from three to two
tier system supposed to be completed by 1985 was slow due to
lack of financial resources to build new buildings and
inadequate human resources particularly doctors and dentists
to be posted to the health centre. In 1991 of 422 health
centres in Peninsular Malaysia, 257 (61%) of them were still
health sub-centres. The ratio of health centre (health centre,
main health centre and health sub-centre) and community
clinic/midwife clinics to populations was 1:15,287 and 1:3,804
respectively in 1991 for the whole country. However four
states in the north and the east coast of Peninsular Malaysia
(Kedah, Penis, P.Pinang and Kelantan) and both the East
Malaysia states had lower coverage than the national average.
The district hospital typically has between 100 and 200 beds
and were normally run by six to 10 medical officers.
Specialists are not usually posted to district hospitals but
arrangements are made for specialists from bigger hospitals to
consult. District hospitals provide out-patient services,
delivery services and general in-patient care. There were 81
district hospitals in the country in 1991 (MOH, 1991 b).
State general hospitals have 500 to 1500 beds. Each state has
one state general hospital except for Sabah which has two.
These hospitals provide out-patient and in-patient care in
general surgery, paediatrics, medicine and obstetrics and
gynaecology and psychiatry. Services were provided by both
specialist and non-specialist medical officers.
The National Referral Centre is the highest level of hospital
in the hierarchy. This hospital has 2,600 beds and located in
Kuala Lumpur (MOH, 1991 b). Although it receives referral from
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other parts of the country especially for cases which need
specialist care not available in state general hospital such
as neurosurgery and radiotherapy, it also provides out-patient
and in-patient care for the surrounding population.
There are seven special medical institutions which provide in-
patient services for specific diseases in the country: the
National Tuberculosis Centre, the Hospital for Leprosy and 5
Mental Hospitals.
In 1991, there were 26,364 beds in public hospitals under MOH,
which is 78.5% of the total beds in the country. The bed
occupancy rate in the district hospitals was 51.9% while in
the State General Hospital is 70.6% (MOH, 1991 b).
There are six government hospitals not under the MOH with a
total of 2,336 beds. Two of these hospitals are teaching
hospitals under the Ministry of Education, three are army
hospitals under Ministry of Defence and one is a hospital for
the Aborigines under the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
Doctors and other health personnel in the public sector are
paid salaries and not allowed to engage in private practice.
Shortage of human resources is a problem in the public sector.
The government's target for a doctor-population ratio under
the Fifth Malaysian Plan (1986-1990) was 1:2,000. In 1991 the
ratio was 1:2441 with considerable maldistribution of doctors
between urban and rural areas and between states (MMA, 1991
b). By the end of 1990 there were 370 vacancies for doctors
and 171 specialists in the government service (Prime Minister
Department, 1991 b). Most of the doctors in the country are in
the private sector; in 1991 out of 7,198 doctors in the
country 42.6% worked in the public sector and 57.4% in the
private sector (Table 3.3). In the public sector, only 15.7%
are specialists while the rest were non-specialist (MOH, 1991
b). Most of the specialist were trained overseas especially in
the United Kingdom. It was estimated that 70% of all medical
specialists in the country were in the private sector (MMPL,
1993 d)
In 1991, the three medical schools in the country produced 382
doctors and another 200 returned from overseas. Among actions
taken by government to solve the shortage of doctors has been
to extend compulsory service for doctors from three to five
years starting from 1992, to start training medical
specialists in local medical schools and to establish two more
medical schools in the country by the end of 1995. Through
contractual agreements the MOH has also employed private
medical specialists to work in government hospitals.
Table 3.3: Distribution of manpower and facilities in public and private health sector in Malaysia, 1991
Public sector	 Private sector
	
Numbers	 Numbers
Doctors	 3,069	 42.6	 4,129	 57.4
Nurses	 12,876	 88.7	 1,644	 11.3
Hospitals	 97	 35.7	 174	 64.3
Hospital beds'	 28,700	 85.4	 4,898	 14.6
MOE and Non-MOE hospitals)
There was also a shortage of nurses in the country. By the
end of 1991, 400 vacancies for nurses existed in the
government service. The government started to employ foreign
nurses as a short term measure from 1991. The capacity for
nursing schools under MOH has been extended and private
hospitals were encouraged to set up private nursing schools.
In 1992, the government approved the setting up of Faculty of
Nursing in two medical schools. In 1991, 339 nurses were
trained in MOH nursing school and three private nursing school
has started their first intake of 141 trainees (MOH, 1991 b).
3.3.2 Private health serviceB
Private health providers in Malaysia can be divided into four
main groups: private practitioners, private hospitals, private
non-governmental organisations and practitioners of
traditional medicine.
i) Private Practitioners
Private practitioners are registered doctors who provide
services through private clinics. Little information is
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available. Basic information such as the number of private
clinics in the country and the range of services provided were
not available. In 1991, 79.6% of 4,129 doctors in the private
sector were private medical practitioners and 20.4% worked in
private hospital (MOH, 1991 b). Assuming that each private
practitioner owns one clinic, there were at least 3,300
private clinics in the country in 1991. Private practitioners
can practice anywhere in the country as long as they are
registered with the MMC and have completed their compulsory
service in the public sector. Currently private clinics are
not licensed and there is no regulation concerning their
location.
Most private clinics in rural areas were run by a single
doctor who owned the clinic. In urban areas private clinics
may also be run by group practices with chains of clinics
(Rajakumar, 1984). Private clinics generally provide
ambulatory services and dispense medicines and operate on fee-
for-service basis.
ii) Private hospitals
Private hospitals are licensed under the Private Hospital Act,
1971 and defined as
any private
facility with more
than one bed. There
were	 great
variations in the
size	 of	 the
hospitals in the
country, ranging
from 2 to 406 beds
in 1991. The number
of private
hospitals has grown
over the past 10
years. Between 1980 and 1991, private hospital beds increased
nearly five-fold from 1,171 to 4,898. Most of these private
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hospitals were located in the Cities and in the more developed
states of Malaysia (Figure 3.4). In 1991, 11.7% of all
doctors and 13.8% of nurses in the country were employed by
private hospitals (MOH, 1991 b).
iii) Private non-governmental organisatione
Red Crescent Society, St. John Ambulance, National Cancer
Society, Society for the Prevention of Tuberculosis,
Association for Mentally Retarded Children and Family Planning
Association are among the important private non-governmental
organisations involved in health functions in Malaysia (EPU,
1985). Some of these organisations which provide services
complementary to government were supported with grant mostly
through MOH (Roemer, 1991). For example Red Crescent Society
and St. John Ambulance which provide ambulance services in
urban areas and Family Planning Association which provide
contraceptive services in some rural and urban areas.
iv) PractitionerB of traditional medicine
Ethnic diversity in Malaysian population were responsible for
the presence of variety of traditional practitioners in the
country; the Malay 'bomohs', 'Chinese sinsehs' and Ayurvedic
and Unani practitioners among the Indians ( Chen, 1981).
However, the use of traditional healers in Malaysia has
decreased due to declining of illiteracy and increase in the
availability of modern health services (Roemer, 1991).
Nevertheless, Chen (1971) voiced the concerned on illegal
selling of patent drugs such as vitamins pills, cough mixtures
and antibiotics alongside traditional Chinese medicine in many
'sinseh' herb stores in the country.
3.4 HEALTH SERVICES FINANCING
The latest published figure on the country's health
expenditure was in 1983 whereby 76.6% was spent in the public
sector and the remaining 23.4% in the private sector (EPU,
1985; MOH, 1991 a) (Table 3.4). The expenditure for private
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sector was underestimated because direct payment to the
private doctors and hospitals was likely to be under-reported.
However based on this figure, the health expenditure is only
2.85% of the GNP. It was estimated that national health
expenditure will increase to 3.37% by 1995 and is projected to
be 4.4% of GNP by the year 2000 (MMA, 1992 a). This is very
low compared to most developed nations.
Public health services are financed mainly from taxes on
earned income. Other sources of financing for health services
are private voluntary insurance, social security and user
fees. Private voluntary insurance is not very popular and at
present there is no compulsory insurance or national health
insurance in Malaysia. It is estimated that only 250,000
people (1.5% of the population) are covered by voluntary
health insurance in Malaysia (EPtJ I 1985). Highly subsidised
user fees are charged for in-patient and out-patient services
in all public hospitals. However in a study in one state
general hospital, it was found that 27.5% of the user fees
were unable to be collected from the users (EPU, 1985).
Services in the health centres of rural health units are free
of charge.
Table 3.4 : Health sector expenditure in Malaysia, 1983
Components of health sector	 Expenditure
	
Anount	 Percent	 % GNP
PUBLIC SECTOR
Ministry of Health	 969,661,000	 53.1	 1.51
Other Ministries 	 155,837,847	 8.5	 0.24
State and local government	 79,534,333	 4.4	 0.12
Foreign Aid	 3,380,200	 0.2	 0.01
Statutory bodies	 189,590,801	 10.4	 0.30
Sub-total Public	 1,398,004,181	 76.6	 2.18
PRIVATE SECTOR
Hospitals	 69,050,462	 3.8	 0.11
Mines and Estates	 4,200,000	 0.2	 0.01
Voluntary bodies	 1,636,093	 0.1	 0.00
Private doctors	 343,412,568	 18.8	 0.54
Insurance	 10,117,401	 0.6	 0.02
Sub-total Private	 428,416,524	 23.4	 0.67
TOTAL	 1 826,420,705	 100.0	 2.85
(Source: EPU, 1985)
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The Social Security Organisation (SOCSO) was established under
Employees Social Security Act of 1969 covering all
establishments employing 5 or more workers and workers earning
less than RN 1,000.00 per month. It was estimated that 62.5%
of the total labour force and 25% of the total population of
the country would be covered by SOCSO in 1991. Under SOCSO,
employees contribute 1.75% of their salary and employers
contributed 0.5% of the salary to the fund. In return, the
employees were given free medical care due to accidents in
public and selected private clinics. Other benefits in the
scheme includes cash compensation, provision of artificial
limbs and rehabilitation in cases of disability related to
occupational injuries (EPU, 1989).
The total budget allocated for MOH continued to shrink as a
proportion of GNP over the years because the increase in
public funding for health was not as rapid as the increase in
GNP over these years (Roemer, 1991) (Appendix 4). In 1992, MOH
was allocated RN 2.3 billion, 70.7% were operating and 29.3%
developmental allocation. Hospital based curative services
received most of the operating allocation (58.4%) while
public health services which include preventive and rural
health services were allocated only 20.2% and the remaining
went to eight other programmes in MOH. Salaries of staff
absorbed 66.8% of the operating budget. The hospital services
were given 62.4% of the development allocation and only 6.7%
were allocated for rural health services (MOH, 1993).
The government is now looking into the possibility of
introducing National Health Insurance in the country as a
means of sharing the cost of health care between the state and
the public. Feasibility studies have been carried out by
contract consultants funded by the World Bank (EPU, 1985; EPU,
1989). One of the major recommendations made in the report is
to merge the Employees Provident Fund (EPF) and SOCSO to form
National Security Fund to pay for services given by public and
private providers. EPF is a compulsory saving scheme
contributed by all employers and employees working in public
and private sector to provide funds for pensions on
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retirement. However, among the problems that need to be solved
before national health insurance can be applied are the need
to establish ways to collect premiums from the self-employed
and those working in non-formal sectors such as farming and
fishing, to establish mechanisms for exemption for the poor,
methods of reimbursement for the providers, ways to improve
quality of care and to contain cost of health care.
3.5 KUALA SELANGOR DISTRICT
Kuala Selangor district is the second largest district in the
state of Selangor. It covers an area of 1,173 square
kilometres. The district is located about 120 km north-east of
Kuala Lumpur, the capital of Malaysia. There are 11 small
towns, 47 villages and 16 rubber and oil palm estates in the
district. It has a population of 123,095 in 1991 of which
58.6% are Malays, 20.0% Chinese, 21.3% Indian and 0.1% of
other ethnic groups (MOH, 1992 a). About 75% of the population
live in villages and estates and the remaining 25% in small
towns. Agricultural activities were the main source of income
for the population; where 46% of the land is utilised for
agricultural purposes. Rice, rubber and palm oil are the main
crops grown. In a survey in 1987 it was found that 44.7% of
households were below the poverty line (MOH, 1988 c): more
than twice the poverty incidence for rural areas of Peninsular
Malaysia in 1989 (19.3%). There were 23,662 households in the
district, 96% of which received pipe water and had sanitary
latrines (MQH, 1992 a)
The mortality rates for the district are lower than for the
whole country except for perinatal and maternal mortality
rates. The district received lower health resources than the
country as a whole; the doctor to population ratio, the health
facilities to population ratio and percapita allocation of MOH
budget were lower for the whole country (Table 3.5).
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Table 3.5: Social-economic and health indicators of Kuala Selangor District, 1991
	
Kuala Selangor District
	 Peninsular
Malaysia
	
1991	 1991
Crude Death Rate 	 6.6	 4.8
Perinatal Mortality Rate 	 13.1	 12 3
Neonatal Mortality Rate	 5.7	 7.6
Infant Mortality Rate 	 8.0	 12.1
Toddler Mortality Rate	 0.3	 0.9
Maternal Mortality Rate	 5.0	 2.0
Doctors/10000 population	 2.2	 4.6
Beds/bOO population	 9.3	 17.4
Health centres to population ratio 	 1:24,619	 1: 15,287
Mean household income/month 	 RN 715.00	 RN 1,254.00
Percapita allocation of MOB budget	 RN 62.77	 RN 119.83
(Source:	 MOB, 1991 b)
MOB, 1991 c)
Table 3.6: MOM operating and development allocation for Kuala Selangor District, 1992
	
Public Health	 District Hospital
	 Total
Operating	 2,752.891	 4,242,340	 6,995,231
Development	 333,322	 398.551	 731,873
Total	 3,086,213	 4,640,891	 7,727,104
Revenue collected	 9,155	 91,868	 101,023
% of operating budget 	 (0.3%)	 (2.0%)	 (1.3%)
(Source:	 MOB, 1992 a)
MOB, 1992 b)
The MOH delivers public health services through health
centres and the district hospital. There were five health
centres, 12 midwife clinics, eight community clinics and a
district hospital in 1993. Out of the five health centres, two
of them are main health centres and another three health sub-
centres. All the three health sub-centres were still in the
process of being upgraded into health centres. The district
hospital has 114 beds and provides in-patient and out-patient
care for the district (MOH, 1992 b). Apart from government
health centres, private health services are provided by 15
private clinics in the district, three dental clinics and one
private pharmacy.
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In 1992, MOH allocation for the district was RN 7,727,104; 60%
of the budget was allocated for the district hospital while
the district health office received 40% of the budget to run
preventive services and the health centres, midwife and
community clinics in the district (Table 3.6). Of the total
allocation, 90.5% of the budget covered operating costs and
only 9.5% for development. Salaries comprised a major portion
of the operating allocation (75.6%) while only 22.9% were
allocated for supplies and services including allocations for
drugs and for purchasing and maintenance of equipments. The
revenue collected from the users accounts comprised 1.3% of
the total operating costs. The district hospital collected RN
91,868.00 which is 74.6% of all the total monies due to be
collected from the users.
Chronic illnesses, accidents and poisoning were the main
health problems in the district. In 1992, the main cause of
death in the district hospital was heart diseases (Appendix
5). The prevalence of hypertension in the district is 17.5%
(Community Health Department, 1984) and diabetes is 3.9%
(Osman and Rampal, 1989). Motor vehicle accidents were the
third most common reason for admission to the district
hospital after normal deliveries and complications of
pregnancy in 1992 (Appendix 5). The second most common cause
of death in the district hospital was poisoning particularly
by agricultural pesticides. The incidence of infectious
diseases were grossly under-reported in the district. In 1992
only 56 cases of notifiable diseases were reported. Most of
these cases were dengue haemorrhagic fever (17 cases),'
tuberculosis (16 cases) and food poisoning (10 cases) (MOH,
1992 a)
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IV. MATERIALS AND METHODS
4.1 AIM
The aim of this research is to study the role of private
practitioners and their interactions with public health
services in a rural district of Malaysia.
4.2 SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES
The specific objectives of the study were to
i) Describe and compare services provided by private
practitioners and the public services in terms of the types of
health services provided, methods of payments for services and
the availability of diagnostic services, drugs and medical
equipment.
ii) Identify the health workers available in the private
sector and to compare them with those operating in public
services in terms of their demographic characteristics,
training, satisfaction with their jobs and attitudes towards
their patients.
iii) Describe the interaction between public and private
practitioners in patient care and to identify problems faced
by the providers in their interactions.
iv) Identify the users of private and/or public services and
to assess perceptions of the community on the services by
both providers.
v) Recommend guidelines concerning private and public
interactions in Malaysia and to consider ways of improving
such interactions.
4.3 METHODS
The study was divided into three phases: preparatory, based in
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London for 12 months; fieldwork in Malaysia (10 months) and
data analysis and writing up in London (18 months).
4.3.1 Preparatory Phase
This first phase was spent in developing the research proposal
and planning the research. The literature was reviewed and key
documents identified. Application for funds was made. Regular
meetings were held with the supervisor and members of the
research advisory committee and other researchers with
experience of researching private providers. MOH officers and
members of the Malaysian College of General Practitioners
(MCGP) who came to London either for visits or to attend
courses, were consulted.
The researcher attended courses on research methodology and
qualitative methods organised by the London School of Hygiene
and Tropical Medicine (LSHTM) and other institutions in the
UK. Letters were sent to the President of MMA and Chairman of
MCGP to seek their consent and support for this study. An
application for approval to carry out the study was made to
the Socio-economic Research Unit, in the Prime Minister's
Department. In order to obtain suggestions and opinions from
other researchers, the proposal was presented as a poster
presentation at a departmental PhD open day at LSHTM. Four
months before leaving for the field work, the proposal was
presented in an upgrading seminar to obtain views from other
researchers and also for the assessment by the PhD research
committee. Based on feedback gathered from the various
discussions and meetings, changes were made to the original
proposal. It was agreed that the study should be designed as
an exploratory one since very little work had been done on
private practitioners in developing countries especially in
rural areas. In this design, room would be made to accommodate
and explore new issues as they emerged in the study. For
example, on the interactions between private practitioners and
the public health services, it was decided that the activities
to be examined would be decided after interviewing key-
informants in the country. Drafts of interview guides and
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questionnaires were prepared in the first stage, keeping in
mind that they would require revision as the study progressed.
Funds for the study were approved by the National University
of Malaysia about two months before the fieldwork commenced.
4.3.2 Fieldwork
The fieldwork was divided into three stages.
i) First stage
The first stage focused on eliciting the views of policy
makers in public services and influential private
practitioners organisations at the national level. The aim of
this step was to understand current concerns regarding the
role of private practitioners in the country and to identify
those activities where interactions between the private
practitioners and public health services occur. A period of
eight weeks was spent interviewing personnel and reviewing
documents.
All interviews were conducted by the researcher. Each
informant was interviewed for one to one and a half hours. An
interview guide (Appendix 6) identifying major topics to be
discussed was used; this was revised as more interviews were
done to incorporate new issues emerging. All the interviews
were tape recorded and transcribed.
The informants in the public sector were selected after
discussion with senior officers from the Ministry of Health
and the Economic Planning Unit. A snowball sample was
generated: additional names were added upon the suggestion of
those interviewed. The informants interviewed in this stage
were both the national level managers and senior officers
involved in activities which had interactions with the private
health sector.
In the private health sector, three organisations namely the
MMA, Federation of Private Medical Practitioners Associations
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(FPMPA) and Malaysian College of General Practitioners (MCGP)
were approached. Other informants were included after the key
officials in these organisations were consulted (Appendix 7).
Information gathered in the first stage were analyzed as the
interviews progressed and by the end of this stage, issues to
be pursued in the subsequent stage were finalised.
Questionnaires and interview guides were revised to
incorporate issues identified in these interviews.
ii) Stage two
A pilot study was conducted in Sabak Bernam district, a rural
district with similar characteristics and located near the
study district. Private clinics and public facilities in the
district were used to test the questionnaires and interview
guides. The pilot study also provided an opportunity to study
the logistics for carrying out the study and anticipate
problems that might occur in the actual study. Discussions
were held with two private practitioners, two public health
physicians and members of the Community Health Department,
Faculty of Medicine, National University of Malaysia to get
their comments on the questionnaires and the interview guide.
Questionnaires and interview guides were then revised and re-
tested. Dr Anthony Zwi of the Health Policy Unit, LSHTM
visited the field at the end of this stage and meetings were
held to finalise the revised study tools.
iii) Stage three
Kuala Selangor rural district was selected as the study area.
The population size, ethnic mix and economic activities are
typical of a rural district in the west coast of Peninsular
Malaysia. The district has both private and public health
facilities present. It is not too far from the capital where
the first stage of the study was undertaken; travelling
expenses were much reduced by choosing this district. The
district has been used by the funding body i.e National
University of Malaysia to train undergraduate students in
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community surveys. Existing facilities such as the university
offices, computer facilities and accommodation could be used
by the researcher throughout the study; secondly, the
community surveys undertaken by the students provided valuable
basic background information on the district.
All 15 private clinics in the district were included in this
study. All the five health centres and the out-patient clinic
of the district hospital where medical doctors were posted
were included in this study. Other public facilities where
medical doctors were not posted, such as midwifery and
community clinics were excluded from this study.
4.3.3 Source of data
The study was divided into five sub-studies:
a) Survey of health facilities
b) Survey of health workers
c) Study of interactions between public and private sector.
d) User interviews
e) Study of community satisfaction.
A combination of both qualitative and quantitative methods
were used thus enabling information collected by one method to
be supplemented and validated by others. A combination of
these methods would provide a powerful means for analysis and
interpretation of data by triangulation; divergent findings
uncover biases in study tools or methods used while convergent
findings support the study findings (Yach, 1992).
At the end of the field-work preliminary results of the study
were presented to senior officers of the MOH in their annual
conference (14th July, 1993).
i) Survey of health facilities
The sources of information for this sub-study were: semi-
structured interviews with the doctors in-charge of the
facilities, structured observations, clinic drug lists, one-
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week prospective recording of cases and spot-checks
a) Semi-structured interviews
Interviews lasting 45 minutes to one hour were done by the
researcher using a semi-structured questionnaire (Appendix 8).
The respondents were the doctors in-charge of the health
centres and the owner of the private clinics. They were asked
about the ownership of the clinics, duration the clinics were
established, number and type of personnel providing the
services, clinic operating hours, types of services provided,
type of diagnostic investigations conducted and the average
numbers of patients attending daily. The doctors were also
asked about charges for their services.
b) Structured observations
Structured observations were carried out in the clinics. The
check-list included medical equipment available, stationery
and drugs. The assessment of medical equipment was divided
into three groups: the basic (sphygmomanometer, microscope,
infant weighing scale, sterilizer, disposable syringes and
refrigerator), emergency (laryngoscope, Ambu bag set, suction
and intravenous canula) and diagnostic (urine testing sticks,
calorimeter, glucometer, ECG machine, X-ray machine,
ultrasound scan machine and blood chemistry machine)
equipment. These items were checked for availability and
working order.
The stationery examined included out-patient cards,
appointment cards, antenatal cards, immunisation records,
referral forms, communicable disease notification forms,
medical certificate and drug register.
The drugs and supplies checked for their availability and
condition (expired or not) were all types of vaccines and
emergency drugs (hydrocortisone injections, adrenaline
injections, intravenous saline and Oxygen supply).
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c) Clinic drug lists
To assess the variety of drugs available in the public and
private clinics, the doctors were asked to list all the drugs
they kept in their clinic. Each clinic received a drug list
form to be completed by either the doctor him/herself in the
case of the private clinics or by the pharmacist assistant in
the health centre or by pharmacist in the district hospital
(Appendix 9). They were told to list all the drugs available
in the clinic for the following one week period.
d) Prospective recording
Cases attending the clinics were recorded prospectively for
one week in order to compare the variety of cases seen by each
sector. This was originally planned for one month but the
private doctors argued that such record-keeping would increase
their workload substantially. Each recorder in public and
private clinics was paid RM 15.00 per day.
In each public facility one medical assistant and one staff
nurse were responsible for recording. In the private clinic,
the most senior clinic assistants were responsible for the
recording. Doctors and other staff who treated the patients
were instructed to write on the out -patient cards the
diagnosis, investigations ordered, the charges, methods of
payment and name of the referral centre for cases referred
from the clinics. The cards were collected after each day by
the recorders who transferred the contents into the record
book (Appendix 10).
The study was conducted in a typical week of the year, for
seven consecutive days from 0800 hours, 19 April 1993 to 2400
hours, 25 April 1993. About two weeks before the actual study
was carried out, three days were fixed for training. After
the training, the record books were collected and checked.
Further visits were made to the clinics to give feedback to
the recorders and all those who treated the cases. Record
books for the actual recording were then distributed to the
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recorders. One day before the recording started, all the
clinics were contacted by telephone and the staff reminded to
start the recording the next day. During the week, all the
clinics were visited at least once to monitor the exercise.
The record books were recollected after the one week period.
e) Spot checks
Spot checks were conducted to check information given by the
doctors' in-charge in the semi-structured interviews. There
were two main problems in doing the spot checks. First, it was
not possible to check all items of information given in the
semi-structured interviews; secondly it had to be done in way
that it would not embarrass the doctors if they knew about the
spot check.
The spot checks examined the operation days and hours of the
clinics and checked the type and the number of staff actually
treating patients in the clinics (Appendix 1].). They were
carried out over a three week period from 6th May 1993 to 27th
May 1993. During this period, the clinics were visited at
least twice; one of the two days was either a public holiday
or a week-end day. During the visits the researcher approached
the counter staffs and asked to see the doctor in-charge.
Neither the doctor nor the staff were told about the main
purpose of the visits. While waiting to see the doctor, the
researcher observed the type and the number of staff running
the clinics for that day. The staff were asked informally how,
many of them were working that day and what the clinic opening
hours were for that day. When he was called in to see the
doctor, the researcher had a short informal discussion with
the doctor regarding the progress of the research. The idea of
seeing the doctor was to determine whether he/she was present
at that particular time.
ii) Survey of Health Workers
Four sources of information were used: self-administered
questionnaire, in-depth interviews, participant observation
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and focus group discussions.
a) Self-administered questionnaires
Self-administered questionnaires were carried out about one
month before the other three qualitative methods were
undertaken. The questionnaires (Appendix 12) were printed in
two languages, Malay and English. The first part was designed
to collect basic information on the health workers such as
their age, sex, occupation, educational level, salary and
level of training. The second part was aimed at studying the
health workers' level of satisfaction towards their job and
their attitudes towards patients. There were 28 statements, 19
of which were used to measure their degree of satisfaction
with their jobs and the remaining nine to study their
attitudes towards their patients.
Assessment of satisfaction covered the following aspects of
their jobs: salary, allowances, promotion, relation with
subordinates, relation with colleague, transfers, equipment
and office vehicles; training (two questions), workload (three
questions) and relation with their seniors (six questions)
(Appendix 13).
Nine statements to elicit attitudes of the health workers
towards their patients is listed in Appendix 14. These
statements explored the relationship between health workers
and their patients and considered patient demands, patients'
understanding towards the workers' needs, tolerance of the
patients' behaviour, patients' compliance to their advice and
appreciation towards the service they provided.
For each statement respondents were asked whether they
strongly disagree, disagree, undecided, agree or strongly
agree with the statement. The respondents remained anonymous.
The questionnaires were distributed to all the health workers
and were re-collected back after two weeks.
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b) In-depth interviewe
Respondents for in-depth interviews were selected based on
their occupations and the length of employment in the
services: all categories of staff who had direct contact with
patients in their daily work were included, the seniors and
juniors.
Among the private doctors eight of 13 were selected to be
interviewed. One of the private doctors who had practised
less than two years refused to be interviewed.
Among the public doctors, ten in-depth interviews were planned
and all were carried out. All the six doctors serving the
health centre and the district health office and four of the
eight doctors in the district hospital were interviewed.
Among the clinical staff in the private clinics, ten clinic
assistants were planned to be interviewed but nine were done.
For the non-doctors in the public sector, 15 interviews were
planned and carried out.
Appendix 15 list the characteristics of the respondents
interviewed from public and private sectors.
An interview guide (Appendix 16) was used in these interviews:
the first part considered satisfaction and the second part
attitude towards patients. The respondents were asked to
discuss those things with which they were satisfied or not
satisfied within their service. The attitude towards their
patients were assessed by asking the respondents problems they
face with their patients in their daily work and they were
asked to suggest ways to solve these problems. Their attitudes
were assessed by examining the ways in which they solved the
problems they faced. The respondents were presented with a
scenario of a common problem they face in their daily work and
were asked to discuss their views on how to solve the problem.
The scenario given was on a "mother who refused her child to
have an immunisation". Each interview took about one to one
67
and a half hours. Interviews were private and were conducted
in a closed room in both private and public clinics. In those
private clinics with limited space, the interviews were done
outside clinic hours when the doctors in-charge and other
staff were not present. Respondents were reassured that their
identity would not be revealed and their views would not be
disclosed. All the interviews were tape-recorded.
c) Participant observation
Three weeks were available for the researcher to participate
in the daily activities in public and private clinics. In the
private sector, seven of the 10 'long hours clinics' and two
out of five short hours clinics were randomly selected. In
the public sector, the researcher visited all the health
centres and the district hospital.
One whole day was spent in each of the clinics except the
district hospital where two days were spent.
In all facilities, the researcher divided his time between
various areas and units of the facilities: these included the
waiting room, consultation room, treatment room, laboratory,
registration and dispensing counter.
d) Focus Group Discussions
Two focus group discussions (FGD) were carried out in this
sub-study: one for the private clinic workers and another for
the public facilities. Participants for these FGDs were health
workers other than doctors, who were involved directly with
patient management. Each private clinic was asked to send the
most senior clinic assistant for the discussion. However only
six of the 15 private clinics were willing to send their
workers. The following categories of staff in the public
facilities were identified and invited to the discussion;
staff nurses, midwives, attendant, medical assistants and
community nurses. Two staff from each category were invited,
one from the health centres and another from the district
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hospital except for community nurse where no staff in that
category works in the district hospital. The selection of
participants were made by the researcher after consulting the
doctor in-charge of both type of facilities. Participants are
listed in Appendix 17.
Discussions were held in a seminar room in UKM office in
Tanjung Karang. The researcher facilitated the discussions
assisted by two recorders. The facilitator used FGD's guide
containing topics for the discussions (Appendix 18). The
discussions were tape recorded and lasted for about two hours.
iii) Study of interactions between public and private sector
After the first stage of the study it was found that the
private practitioners interact with the public providers
around a range of activities: immunisations, patients'
referrals, disease notifications, collection of health
information, medical examination of foreign workers, drug
enforcement, utilisation of public health facilities by
private practitioners, health education and private practice
by public sector personnel. Among these activities, the
following activities were examined in the district: MOH/MMA
Hepatitis B immunisation project, patients' referral, medical
examination of foreign workers, utilisation of public
ambulance services by PPs, disease notifications, private
practice by public sector personnel and immunisations returns
by PPs. The source of information for this sub-study included
in-depth interviews, focus group discussions and document
reviews.
a) In-depth interviews
All 13 PPs were selected for interviews. One private doctor
declined citing that he was very busy running two other
clinics outside the district. Twelve PPs were therefore
interviewed (Appendix 19).
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In the public sector, the public sector personnel selected for
this study were those who would be able to provide information
on interactions between the two sectors. Eleven key informants
were initially selected for interviews; another eight were
later included (Appendix 19).
In the private clinics the interviews were done in the evening
after clinic hours or at the end of the morning session. The
public health workers were interviewed during office hours.
All the interviews were tape recorded.
The researcher used an interview guide (Appendix 20) itemising
the major topics to be discussed. The guide had two sections:
general questions to elicit opinions on the relationship
between the public and private practitioners in the district
and a second section in which specific topics identified in
the first stage were reviewed. The guide was modified as the
interviews progressed to incorporate new issues emerging. The
researcher introduced himself and the purpose of the
interview, stressing personal particulars would be
confidential and their opinions would not be used against them
in any way. They were told that the interviews would be taped
recorded but were allowed to inform the researcher to stop the
recording at any point if desired. The researcher answered
any queries by respondents before starting the interviews.
Each interview took about one to one and a half hours to
complete.
The respondents were not asked all the topics or questions in
the guide. To maximise the value of the interview, a
particular focus relevant to each informant were identified.
For example in the interviews with Public Health Inspectors,
the discussion was mainly on disease notification and visits
by public health workers to the private clinics (Appendix 21).
b) Focus Group Discussions
Two focus group discussions, one for PPs and another for the
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public doctors were carried out in the district. All 13
private doctors were invited to attend the discussion and were
offered RN 200.00 to attend. Six of the 13 doctors attended;
the remaining seven indicated that they were unable to get
locum doctors to run their clinic during the discussion.
In the public sector, seven doctors (five from the health
centres and two medical officers from the district hospital)
were invited, and all attended the discussion. Appendix 22
shows the list of participants in both FGDs and the interview
guide used. Each discussion lasted for about 2 hours
facilitated by the researcher, assisted by two recorders. The
discussions were tape recorded.
c) Document review
Documents containing information on the interactions between
the two sectors were selected to be reviewed. In the public
sector, the documents included the Annual reports of
District Health Office (1989-1992), the Annual reports from
the District Hospital (1989-1992), the MOH Plan of
Implementation of MOH/MMA Hepatitis B project (MOH, 1990 b)
and MOH Guidelines on Referral System (MOH, 1992 d). In the
private sector, the MMP Newsletters from January 1991 to March
1994 were reviewed. In addition to this, newspaper cuttings
related to private practitioners kept by the MMA from January
1990 to June 1993 was also reviewed.
iv) User Interviews
Information for this study was collected through interviews
with patients attending the public and private facilities in
the district.
a) Interviewers
Fifteen school leavers aged 18 - 22 years old were employed:
eight were female and the rest males. Two of the interviewers
were Indians, four Chinese and the rest Malays. They received
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two weeks training.
b) Questionnaire forms
Two sets of questionnaires were used in this study; Form Q9
(Appendix 24) and Form Q10 (Appendix 25). Information
collected included socio-demographic characteristics of
patients, present and past medical conditions, treatment they
received during the visit and time spent in the clinics. The
second set of the questionnaires (Form Q].0) were completed by
the health personnel who treated the patients: this included
the diagnosis, investigations done, surgical procedures and
treatment prescribed. If the respondents were referred,
reasons for referral and the referral centre were recorded.
The questionnaire was first prepared in English and then
translated into Malay, Chinese and Tamil.
c) Sampling of respondents
Public and private doctors estimated the number of patients
seen weekly. For each clinic, approximately 10 percent of the
total number of patients per week were reviewed. Patients in
the public sector were selected from the four clinic sessions
in a week: antenatal, child health, hypertension/diabetes
clinic and general out-patient clinic. Patients attending each
clinic were selected using systematic random sampling to
spread out the selection to cover the entire operating period.
d) Data collection procedures
Respondents were selected when they registered at the
reception. The second questionnaire (Form QlO), completed by
health personnel, was clipped to the patient's OPD card. The
respondents were interviewed in the waiting room while waiting
to be seen. The respondents refusing to be interviewed were
skipped and the next patient selected. For emergency cases,
patients were interviewed after receiving treatment.
Accompanying adults were interviewed for children and patients
who were too sick to talk.
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Distance travelled by patient was measured from the centre of
their villages to the health facilities using the usual route
travelled. One of the interviewers was employed to measure the
distances.
To check the reliability of the questionnaires, 10 percent of
the patients were randomly selected and re-interviewed at
their homes within 48 hours of their visit to the clinic.
v) Study of Community Satisfaction
Focus group discussions and in-depth interviews were employed
among three major ethnic groups. Three typical villages
representing each ethnic group were selected for the study. In
selecting these villages, discussions were held with the
district agricultural officers and the district health team.
The district agricultural department kept the latest census of
district villages and had regular meetings with the community
leaders under their extension programmes. District health
workers conduct routine surveillance to control communicable
disease in the district and have reasonably reliable
background data on each village in the district. Figure 4.1
shows the location of the three villages in the district.
Details of the three selected villages are given in Appendix
26.
i) Focus Group discussions
FGDs were carried out among the community in the three
villages; four in each village (two male and two female
groups). In addition two further FGDs were conducted among
government servants in the district to elicit views from this
section of the community. Technique suggested by Dawson et al
(1992) in conducting FGD in the community were used in this
study.
The researcher contacted the village headmen in each village
and visited them to introduce the study and obtain their
cooperation. Following the visits, meetings were held with the
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village committees. In these meetings the researcher again
explained the project to the committee members. Criteria for
participants were stressed and the leaders suggested 15 people
for each discussion group. The time and the venue for the
discussions was fixed.
The first criteria for the participants in this study was that
they must not be community leaders but ordinary people in the
community, was to avoid the leaders dominating the
discussions. Secondly the participants should be married with
children. This was important since the presence of unmarried
men or women would inhibit discussions: married men or women
would not discuss matters related to pregnancy and child-birth
in the presence of these single men or women. Thirdly, only
participants between the age of 25 and 50 years old were
selected. Older people were respected in. the community and
enjoyed almost the same status as community leaders and would
overly influence the discussion.
The community leaders were asked to suggest 15 people about
two weeks before the discussion. The researcher and his team
then ensured that all prospective participants met the
criteria. Those who did not meet the criteria such as leaders
in the community, those below 25 or single men or women, were
removed from the list and replaced. Finally 15 people were
invited for each discussion; each was offered RN 5.00 for
their time. In each community, four focus group discussions
(two for men and two for women) were planned.
In the FGD among the government servants, the same criteria
for age and marital status of the participants used in the
villages were applied. Health workers and those whose spouses
work in the government health services were excluded so that
the participants would not feel reluctant to discuss issues
related to the public health facilities. Senior civil servants
were also excluded to prevent them from dominating the
discussions. The lists of participants were received about one
week before the FGD and were checked by the researcher to make
sure that all of them met the criteria.
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For each village, a team of workers was formed comprising six
people, three males and three females. Two of them served as
moderators, two were observers and another two were general
assistants. The selected FGD workers were from the same ethnic
group and spoke the same language and dialect as the
villagers. The workers were also married and fell within the
same age group as the participants. It was necessary to ensure
that the members of the team were not working in public or
private clinics so that the villagers would not hesitate to
express their views during the discussions. All members of the
team were school teachers but they were not from the same
village as the participants. They were employed for a period
of three months and paid RN 25.00 per day. Three teams were
formed, one for each village, 18 workers in all.
The workers were trained for three weeks by the researcher and
his research assistant with the help of two other lecturers
from the Department of Community Health Faculty of Medicine,
National University of Malaysia. Six focus group discussions
were carried out by the workers during this training period.
The FGDs were video recorded and the video used to provide
feedback to the workers.
The FGD guide was piloted during the training of the workers
in the three selected villages. The guide (Appendix 27) was
prepared in English and translated into the three different
languages. Based on the pilot study the guide was modified to,
include local terminology and dialects.
About one week before the FGDs, the list of participants to be
invited was finalised; all participants were invited through
the village committee. The team also visited the place where
the discussions were to be held to ensure their suitability:
away from noise was desirable. A space to set up a creche was
identified especially for FGD's for the women's group.
The discussions were started when at least 10 of the 15
invited participants had arrived. Those who arrived late were
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kindly asked not to join the discussions. The moderator was
assisted by an observer in the discussions. Besides these two
workers and the participants, no one else was allowed into the
room during the discussions. The discussions were tape
recorded. Each discussion took one and a half to two hours to
complete.
After each FGD, all the workers returned to the headquarters
for a short discussion: the moderator and observer provided
feed back on whether the discussions were successful and
discussed any difficulties they had faced. The tape recorder
and the recorded tape were briefly checked.
Another discussion on the FGD was held the next day. In this
meeting, the suitability of the place chosen for the FGD, the
clarity of the guide, the participants and the team
performance in the FGD were discussed. The meeting also
discussed the notes taken by the observer and clarified any
ambiguities. Plans for transcribing and translating the tapes
were made.
ii) In-depth Interviews
Unstructured in-depth interviews were carried out among the
community leaders in the three villages. Formal leaders such
as village headman, village committee members or political
party leaders in the district and informal ].eaders such as
teachers and religious leaders were selected for the
interviews. All the respondents were married with children and
stayed in the district.
Altogether 12 in-depth interviews were done, two males and two
females in each village (Appendix 28). All the interviews were
conducted by the researcher.
The interview guide had two parts (Appendix 29): including two
questions about usual health providers and reasons for their
choice, four questions about their satisfaction and
dissatisfaction about the public and the private facilities,
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and other topics related to health services were listed. These
topics included operating hours, types of services available,
waiting time, charges, drugs, equipment and relation with the
health workers. This list was used to remind the researcher of
the various aspects of health services to cover with the
respondents in the interviews.
Respondents were asked to describe both the community
perspective and their personal opinions on issues being
discussed.
Some interviews were carried out in the respondents homes,
others were in the community hall or in their workplace. All
interviews were tape recorded. Each interviews took about one
to one and a half hours to complete. All the interviews were
done in Malay.
4.3.4 Data Analysis
i) Qualitative data
Qualitative data analysis commenced during the field work
following the methods suggested by Dawson et al (1992) and
Krueger (1991). Since this study was designed to be
exploratory, information collected in the first stage of the
field work needed to be analysed as the field work progressed.
This was to enable relevant issues to be followed up in the
subsequent stages of the study. During the second and third,
stages of the study, some analyses were carried out to ensure
that the respondents understood the questions in the interview
guide. Local terminology was also clarified based on these
analyses.
All the tapes of the FGD and in-depth interviews were
transcribed by the FGD workers and the researcher. Once
completed, the researcher and the team members went through
the transcripts and the notes from the observer. Any mistakes
were clarified and when necessary the tape was listened to
again. After the team were satisfied, the transcripts were
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sent for typing using WordStar, later converted into
Wordperfect 5.1. The transcripts were then converted into ASCI
files and prepared to be analyzed using Ethnograph software.
Contents analysis (Stewart and Shamdasani, 1990) was carried
out on the transcript. After initial reading, a coding scheme
was developed based on topics listed in the interview guide
and the emerging themes. Transcripts were coded and the coded
segments grouped according to topic. The coded segments were
the unit of analysis. Descriptive and interpretative analysis
were then carried out.
ii) Quantitative data
Quantitative data were entered into computers using Dbase 3^
and then cleaned. This was carried out during the field work.
Statistical analyses were done using SPSSPC+ 3.1 programme.
Cross tabulations comparing the public and private sector were
prepared: Chi square tests and Fisher exact tests were
performed for categorical variables and t-tests for continuous
variables. Multiple regressions and multiple logistic
regressions were carried out to control the relevant
confounders when comparisons were made between public and
private sector.
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V. SURVEY OF HEALTH FACILITIES
5.]. RESULTS
5.1.1 Clinic location
Six of the 15 private clinics, one health centre and the
district hospital were located in Tanjung Karang, the biggest
town of the district (Table 5.1). The other health centres and
the private clinics were located in other small towns in the
district (Appendix 30).
Table 5.1: Location of public and private facilities in Kuala Selangor district
Towns	 Population	 Private	 Health Centree District Hospital
Clinics
Tg. Karang	 4,441	 6	 1	 1
Kuala Selangor	 3,411	 1	 1	 -
Sungai Buluh	 2,478	 3	 1	 -
Btg. Berjuntai 	 2.983	 2	 1	 -
Ijuk	 1,695	 1	 1	 -
P. Penambang	 2,336	 2	 -	 -
5.1.2 Providers
There were a total of 27 doctors serving the district, 13 of
them worked in the private and 14 in the public sector. Eight
of the 14 public sector doctors worked in the district
hospital and the remaining six in the health centres. Twelve
of the 14 public doctors were medical officers and the other
two were administrators (the district health officer and
medical officer in-charge of the district hospital). Five of
the 13 private practitioners (PPs) had more than one clinic.
Four of the PP5 with multiple clinics had at least one of
their clinics in the nearby district. Two of them had two
clinics, another two had three and one had four clinics. Two
of the 15 private clinics were run by two doctors while the
rest were run by a single practitioner.
There were 401 supporting staff in the public sector and 49 in
the private sector. The staff to doctor ratio was about 7.5
times higher in public than private sector (28.6 vs 3.8).
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5.1.3 Clinic Operation
i) Operating hours
The public facilities follow the usual government office hours
and opened for 38.5 hours per week. Private clinics operating
less than 38.5 hours per week were grouped as 'short hours
clinics' and the rest were considered 'long hours clinics'.
Five of the private clinics were 'short hours clinics' and the
other 10 were 'long hours clinics'. The five 'short hours
clinics' were all owned by PP8 who had more than one clinic.
These doctors travel from one clinic to another in one day.
The average operating hours per week for 'short hours clinics'
was 15.3 hours (SD = 7.0 hours) whereas the 'long hours'
private clinics were open on the average for 62.8 hours (SD =
11.7 hours), about 1.5 times longer than the operating hours
of the public facilities.
The public facilities open Mondays to Saturdays, with Saturday
a half day. The public facilities generally did not provide
services on Sundays and public holidays except for the
district hospital. The district hospital provided services
through the Accident & Emergency Unit only for emergency cases
on Sundays, public holidays and after normal office hours. The
health centres were closed on Sundays and public holidays but
the medical assistant and staff Nurses 'on-call' provide
services for emergency cases during these period. In the
private sector, seven (one 'short hours' and six 'long hours'
clinic) of the 15 private clinics open on Sundays. On public
holidays, six of the 15 clinics all of them 'long hours
clinic' were open.
On average, 93.8% of the operating hours of the 'long hours'
private clinics had their doctors present compared to be only
60.5% of total operating hours of 'short hours' clinics.
Health centres had the lowest hours covered by doctors (47.3%)
while in OPD clinic of the district hospital, doctors were
present all the time.
81
Table 5.2: Operating hours of public and private facilities
Facilities	 No. of	 No. open on
	 Av hours Av. hours
	 Av total	 Av % of
	
services	 Sundays	 on week days on Sunday. 	 hour/week	 doctor
hours
Short hours PC	 5	 1	 2.6	 4.0	 15.3	 60.5
Long Hours PC	 10	 6	 10.1	 7.9	 62.8	 93.8
Health Centres	 5	 0	 7.0	 0	 38.5	 47.3
District	 1	 0	 7.0	 0	 38 5
	 100.0
hospital
No. - Number of facilities
Av. hours on week days - Average number of operating hours per day from Monday. to Fridays
Av. hours on Sundays - Average number of operating hours on Sundays
Ày . total operating hours per week - Average total operating hour. for one week from Mondays to Sundays
Average % of doctor. hours - Average percentage of doctors hours to total weekly operating hours
- Health centres and A&E Unit of District Hospital accept emergency case, on weekends and public
holidays.
ii) Workload
The 15 private clinics were estimated to be visited by 3,918
patients per week while the six public facilities were
estimated to receive 3,926 patients per week. The district
hospital received the highest number of patients while the
'short operating hours' private clinics the least (Table 5.3).
The PPs had a lower workload than public sector doctors. PPs
in the short hours clinic saw the least number of patients per
hour (2.8 per hour) while the public doctors working in health
centres treated the most patients per hour (8 per hour).
Table 5.3 : Workload in public and private facilities
Facilities	 Av. No. of patient	 Ày . opening hours 	 No. of patient per
	 No. of patient seen
	
per week	 perweek	 clinic per hour
	 per doctor per hour
Short hours PC
	 71	 15.3	 4.6	 2.8
(N - 5)
Long hours PC	 356	 62.8	 5.7	 5.3
(N - 10)
Health centres	 515	 38.5	 13.4	 8.0
(N - 5)
District	 1350	 38.5	 35.1	 7.5
hospital
N - 1)
iii) Range of services
a) Curative services
All the private clinics provide general out-patient services.
Among the public facilities only one health centre did not
provide this services, HC1, which is located in Tanjung Karang
town and only about half a kilometre from the district
hospital which has an out-patient service.
82
Emergency services were defined as services given to patients
with conditions which need urgent medical attention. It ranges
from minor trauma to life threatening conditions such as
bleeding and shock. One health centre (HC1) and five private
clinics did not provide emergency services and patients were
asked to go to the district hospital (Table 5.4). None of the
private clinics provide this service on 24 hour basis as the
district hospital and health centres.
House calls, whereby doctors from the clinics visited the
patient's home for treatment, was not available in the public
sector. Most private clinics (nine of the 15 clinics) mostly
with long operating hours offered this service.
None of the private clinics has any ambulance. The ambulance
services were provided by the district hospital and three of
the health centres.
Available services for treatment of three communicable
diseases (malaria, sexually transmitted disease (STDs) and
tuberculosis) and two chronic disease (diabetes mellitus and
hypertension) were assessed. In the district, only the
district hospital treats malaria cases. Cases of malaria when
detected by the health centres or the private clinics were
referred to the district hospital for management. All the
private clinics treated STDs. In contrast, none of the health
centres treated these cases. All STDs diagnosed in the health
centres were referred for treatment to the district hospital.
All the public facilities managed tuberculosis cases but only
five of the 15 private clinics treated this disease.
All the public and private facilities in the district treated
patients with hypertension and diabetes mellitus. In the
public facilities one day per week was allocated for the
treatment and follow-up of these cases. None of the private
clinics allocated any special day for these cases and patients
were free to come any day for treatment and follow-up.
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b) Preventive services
The provision of antenatal, family planning and immunisations
was examined in all services. These three services were
readily available in public facilities.
Antenatal services was provided by only two of the 15 private
clinics but by all the public facilities. Patients in these
two private clinics were referred to the health centres or
district hospital at the end of the second trimester or early
part of the third trimester to be followed up until delivery.
In the district hospital, antenatal clinics was held for one
and a half days in the week. Once a fortnight an obstetrician
from the state general hospital visited the hospital to see
cases referred by the medical officers. All the health centres
allocated one day per a week for antenatal clinics run by
medical officers and public health nurses. In public
facilities antenatal mothers with normal pregnancy were
followed up once a month in first 28 weeks of pregnancy, then
once a fortnight until 36 weeks and thereafter weekly until
delivery.
Family planning services were available in all private clinics
and the health centres but not in the district hospital. Oral
contraceptives and condoms were the two most common methods of
contraception in both types of facilities. Intrauterine
devices (HiD) were not inserted in the public facilities since
none of the public doctors were trained to carry out this,
procedure. ItJD insertions were available in five of the 15
private clinics. In the health centres one afternoon was
allocated for family planning sessions where women who wanted
contraception came for consultation with public health nurses.
For new cases physical examination were done, PAP smears were
taken and they were advised on methods of contraception. Oral
contraceptives and condoms were given free of charge.
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c.	 i	 x	 x	 I	 I	 I	 X	 I	 I	 X	 I	 I
PCl2	 I	 X	 X	 I	 I	 I	 X	 X	 X	 X	 I	 I
PCIS	 I	 X	 X	 I	 I	 I	 X	 X	 X	 X	 I	 I
PCIS	 I	 X	 X	 I	 I	 I	 X	 X	 X	 X	 I	 I
Long ho.i Pci
PCI	 I	 X	 X	 1	 1	 1	 X	 X	 1	 X	 I	 I
pca	 I	 X	 I	 I	 I	 I	 X	 I	 I	 X	 I	 I
PG3	 I	 X	 X	 1	 1	 1	 X	 I	 X	 1	 1	 1
Pc.	 I	 X	 X	 I	 I	 I	 X	 X	 X	 X	 I	 I
PC4	 I	 X	 X	 I	 I	 I	 X	 I	 I	 X	 I	 I
PC?	 I	 X	 I	 I	 I	 I	 X	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I
I	 X	 I	 I	 I	 I	 X	 I	 I	 X	 I	 I
PCIO	 I	 X	 X	 I	 I	 I	 X	 I	 I	 X	 I	 I
PCII	 I	 X	 I	 I	 I	 I	 X	 I	 I	 X	 I	 I
PCI4	 I	 X	 X	 I	 I	 I	 X	 I	 I	 X	 I	 I
PiSk Fks
DII	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 X	 I	 I	 I
IICI	 X	 X	 I	 X	 I	 I	 X	 X	 X	 I	 I	 I
tic.	 I	 X	 I	 X	 I	 I	 X	 I	 X	 I	 I	 I
tic.	 I	 X	 I	 X	 I	 I	 I	 I	 X	 I	 I	 I
HC4	 I	 I	 X	 I	 I	 I	 I	 X	 I	 I	 I
tics	 I	 X	 I	 X	 I	 I	 I	 I	 X	 I	 I	 I
= Shc
X - Sonic.. not aoalI.
Women who needed to use intrauterine devices were referred to
the private clinics. Oral contraceptives were only given to
those below the age of 35 years without any contra-indications
such as high blood pressures and the presence of varicose
veins. In the private clinics no standard procedures were
being followed. New cases were not normally screened and PAP
smears were only done on the patients request. Patients could
buy contraceptives pills from the private clinics without
seeing the doctor. Women who were disallowed to take oral
contraceptives pills for health reasons when they visited the
health centres, came to buy the pills from the private
clinics.
In the health centres, all immunisation for children were
provided during child health clinics on a specified day of the
week. The district hospital only provided BCG and first dose
of Hepatitis B vaccine for the newborn; others were provided
by the health centres. The piivate clinics provided all
immunisations for the children except for BCG, which was kept
by none of the clinics. Home visiting was undertaken by health
personnel in the public sector to trace children who defaulted
an immunisation schedule. This was not done in the private
sector.
Vaccine storage was assessed against guidelines used by the
Ministry of Health which were circulated to the PPs through
the MMA newsletter in 1990 (MMA, 1990). The cold chain is
poorly maintained in the private clinics and the condition is,
worst in 'short hours' clinics (Appendix 3].). Two of the 15
private clinics do not even have a refrigerator. In these two
clinics (PC 9 and PC 15), the vaccines were transported from
the other clinics using containers not suitable to maintain
cold chain. In three of the private clinics, the fridge was in
poor condition and not suitable for vaccine storage. In most
of the private clinics (10 out of 13), medicine and food
stuffs were stored together with vaccines in the same fridge.
Cold chain maintenance is satisfactory in all the public
facilities. All the fridges in the public clinics used to
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store vaccines were in good condition. In the public
facilities, at least two fridges are available and one of them
is used solely for vaccine storage.
Power failures were quite frequent in the district and
sometimes lasted for more than 24 hours. Although all private
clinics had a back-up generator these generators were only
used for lighting and fans and not for the fridges during
power failure. In the private clinics, vaccines were normally
left in the f ridge during the power failures. The district
hospital is the only public facility with a generator used for
fridges during power failures. When power failures were
anticipated to last for more than eight hours, the vaccines
were transported from health centres to the district hospital.
Ice packs in the freezer compartment to cool the fridge
temporarily during power failures were found in all the
fridges in the public facilities but only three of the 13
fridges in the private clinics. All the fridges for vaccine
storage in the public facilities had a mini-max thermometer
to record refrigerator temperature. This was done twice a day
and the reading charted in a log book. None of the fridges in
the private clinics had such thermometers and temperatures in
the f ridge were not monitored. Vaccines were stored in door
shelves of the fridges in all except two of the private
clinics. All the vaccines were arranged in the general
compartment of the fridges in public facilities. Expired
vaccines were also found in two of the private clinics.
c) Medical procedures
All the private clinics and the public facilities study except
one health centre (HC1) conducted medical procedures such as
wound dressings, toilet and suturing as well as simple
incision and drainage (Appendix 32). Male circumcisions were
conducted by six of the 15 private clinics, the district
hospital and four health centres provided this kind of
service. Reduction of fractures and application of Plaster of
Paris (POP) were conducted only in the district hospital and
three of the 15 private clinics; the absence of X-ray
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facilities in the health centres and most of the private
clinics was the main reason cited for this.
d) Diagnostic Service
Urine analysis (tests for glucose, protein and microscopic
examination) were provided in all public facilities and four
of the 15 private clinics (Table 5.5). Although all the
private clinics did urine for glucose and protein examination,
most of them did not do microscopic examination. Urine
pregnancy test (UPT) were available in all private and public
facilities. The UPT kit in the public facilities was only
allowed to be used for women who took contraceptive pills from
the health centres and missed their periods. Other women
wishing to have the test were asked to go to private clinics.
Table 5.5 Diagnostic aervices in public and private facilities
Clinics	 Urine	 UPT	 HB G6PD	 Sputum Stool BFMP Blood	 Blood	 PAP	 CG X-ray Ultrasound
Analysis	 test	 P5MB	 P5MB	 glucose cholesterol Smear 	 SCan
Long HourS PC5
Pd	 1	 1	 1	 X	 X	 X	 X	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1
P2	 1	 1	 1	 X	 X	 X	 X	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1
PC3	 5	 1	 5	 X	 X	 X	 X	 1	 X	 1	 1	 5	 5
PC5	 X	 1	 1	 X	 S	 X	 X	 1	 1	 1	 1	 5	 1
PC6	 1	 1	 1	 X	 S	 S	 5	 1	 1	 5	 1	 5	 5
PCI	 5	 1	 5	 5	 X	 S	 S	 X	 5	 1	 1	 5	 5
PC8	 1	 1	 1	 5	 X	 S	 S	 S	 X	 1	 5	 1	 1
PC1O	 5	 1	 1	 X	 S	 S	 S	 S	 I	 1	 5	 I	 I
PC11	 5	 1	 X	 S	 X	 S	 5	 1	 I	 1	 1	 I	 S
PC14	 5	 1	 1	 X	 I	 I	 5	 1	 1	 X	 1	 I	 1
Short Hour. PCs
PC4	 5	 1	 I	 I	 S	 I	 X	 I	 I	 1	 I	 I	 I
PC9	 1	 1	 1	 X	 S	 S	 S	 S	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I
PC12	 X	 1	 5	 5	 X	 S	 S	 X	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I
PC13	 I	 1	 5	 I	 X	 S	 I	 1	 I	 I	 1	 I	 I
PC15	 X	 1	 5	 I	 I	 X	 I	 X	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I
Public clinics
DH	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 I	 1	 1	 I
HC1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 X	 I	 1	 I	 I	 I
BC2	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 I	 I
HC3	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 X	 I	 1	 I	 X	 I
5C4	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 I	 5	 1	 1	 5	 X	 '
HCS	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 5	 5	 1	 1	 I	 I
1 • services available 	 I - services not available
MB • Haemoglobin BFMP - Blood film malaria parasites
P5MB • Pull sxamnation including microscope
GSPD - Glucos.-6-phosphO-dmhydrogenaae deficiency
Blood for haemoglobin level were available in all public
facilities but only in seven of the 15 private clinics.
Measurement for blood glucose and cholesterol level were more
commonly available in private than public facilities. Blood
glucose were available in one health centre and the district
hospital in the public sector but eight of the 15 private
clinics. Blood for cholesterol level were available in five of
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the 15 private clinics but only in the district hospital among
public facilities.
PAP smears were taken by all five health centres and nine of
the private clinics. None of the private clinics examined
blood films to detect Malaria Parasite (BFMP), Glucose-6-
Phosphate Dehydrogenase deficiency screening (G6PD), sputum
and stool microscopic examination (FEME). These investigations
were available in all the public facilities
The district hospital provided all the diagnostic services
except for ultrasonography and PAP smear. All the five
ultrasonography machines in the district were owned by the
PPs. Three of the five private practitioners had the
ultrasonography for eight years, one for two and a half years
and another one just for six months before the interview. Two
of the five private practitioners who owned the machine did
not undergo any training but learned to used the machine
through video tapes supplied by company which sold the machine
to him. Three of the doctors who had undergone training
organised by drug companies when they first bought the
machine; two of them went for a two week course and the other
one attended a two day course. None of them had any access to
person trained in ultrasonography that they could consult for
a second opinion.
In the public facilities X-ray services were only available in
the district hospital. Three of the private clinics had X-ray
machine. These clinics were among the five clinics which has
ultrasound machines. The PPs had these machines from 5 to 10
years. None of the private doctors were trained in radiology,
aside from their undergraduate training. They learned to take
X-rays from sales representative who sold them the machine.
All the machines were licensed by the licensing board of MOH
who visited their clinics during the first year when they have
been installed. Every two years they received renewal forms
from licensing board. However none of them have been visited
again by the inspectors. In all the private clinics the X-ray
machines were located in special rooms with leaded walls and
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air-conditioning.
While the private clinics provided only plain X-rays, contrast
studies such as barium meal and intravenous pyelogram (IVP)
were carried out in the district hospitals. The X-ray machines
in the district hospital was run by a trained radiographer
whereas in the private clinics, clinic assistants were
trained by the PP5 to do the shooting. In the district
hospital, medical officers sent the X-ray for reading by the
radiologist in the state general hospital. In the private
clinics, only one of the private doctors had such an
arrangement. This doctor (from PC8) had made an unofficial
arrangement with his friend who worked as a radiologist in the
state general hospital for second opinion.
Electrocardiograms were available in the district hospital and
three of the five health centres. In the private sector, nine
of the clinics provided this service.
5.1.4 Medical equipment and supplies
All the public facilities had all five basic forms of
equipment (sphygmomanometer, microscope, infant weighing
scale, sterilizer and disposable needles and syringes) in good
working order whereas only four of the 15 private clinics met
this criteria. Most of the 'long hours' private clinics had
the items except for a microscope. Most of short operating
hours private clinics were found to be very ill-equipped
(Table 5.6).
When items for treating emergencies were checked, in the
public sector, only the district hospital had all the eight
items whereas none of the private clinics were found to fulfil
these criteria (Table 5.7).
90
Table 5.6: Availability of basic equipment and supplies in public and private facilities
Clinica	 BP set	 Microscope	 Infant weighing	 Sterilizer	 Disposable need es B
scale	 syringes
Long Hours PC5
pci	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1
PC2	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1
PC3	 I	 I	 1	 1	 1
PCS	 1	 I	 1	 1	 1
PCS	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1
PC7	 1	 I	 1	 1	 1
Pc.	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1
PC1O	 1	 5	 1	 1	 1
PC11	 1	 I	 1	 1	 1
PC14	 1	 5	 1	 1	 1
Short Hours PCS
PC4	 I	 5	 1	 1	 1
Pc,	 1	 I	 I	 I	 I
PCl2	 1	 1	 1	 I	 1
PC13	 1	 5	 1	 I	 1
PC1S	 1	 I	 I	 I	 1
Public clinics
OH	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1
SCI	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1
HC2	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1
HC3	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1
5C4	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1
((CS	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1
BP set: 1 - All BP sets in consultation rooms in good working order(Cuffs not torn, control knob not faulty, tubes connected properly)
Microscope: 1 • Microscop, is available and in good working order
(Eye piec. present and not faulty, bulb is working)
Sterilizer: 1 - Available and in good working order
(Clean, not rusty, not leaking)
Infant weighing scale: 1 - Available and in good working order
(Pan is present, no sharp edges, the meter marking and pointer
clearly visible)
Disposable needle/syringes: 1 • Available and have at least 20 in stock
I - Not available
Table 5.7: Availability of emergency equipment and supplies in public and private facilities
Clinics	 Drip set	 Anihu Bag Laryngoscope	 Suction IV solution Hydrocortisone 	 Adrenaline	 Oxygen
injection	 inj action
Long Hours PCB
PCi	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1
PC2	 1	 I	 I	 1	 1	 I	 1	 1
PC3	 1	 5	 5	 I	 1	 I	 I	 1
PC5	 I	 I	 X	 1	 5	 1	 1	 1
PC6	 I	 I	 X	 1	 5	 I	 I	 I
PCi	 I	 I	 I	 NW	 I	 I	 I	 I
PCB	 I	 I	 I	 1	 I	 1	 X	 1
PC1O	 I	 X	 B	 X	 1	 3	 B	 1
PC11	 I	 1	 1	 5	 I	 1	 I	 1
PC14	 I	 X	 X	 1	 I	 I	 X	 I
Short Hours PC5
PC4	 B	 X	 I	 I	 X	 I	 1	 X
x	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I
PC12	 I	 B	 X	 I	 X	 I	 I	 I
PC13	 I	 I	 I	 B	 I	 1	 1	 1
PC15	 I	 I	 I	 I	 X	 I	 I	 I
Public clinics
OH	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1
HC1	 I	 I	 X	 1	 I	 I	 I	 I
HC2	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1
HC3	 1	 NW	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1
HC4	 B	 1	 X	 1	 1	 1	 B	 1
NC5	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1
1 - Available in good condition I • Sot available
NW - Available but not working I - Expired
5.1.5 Medical records
All the public and private clinics used out-patient cards to
record the consultation (Appendix 33). The public facilities
used a standard form printed on yellow card which record
patient's name, address, sex, age and identity card number.
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For each consultation, the patient's complaint, diagnosis and
prescription were recorded. In the private clinics the OPD
record varies from clinic to clinic. Besides using cards of
different colours and sizes, items recorded varied. In most
the private clinics, only medicines prescribed were recorded
in the cards but not the complaints and diagnosis.
Appointment cards were given to patients attending all public
facilities. Hypertensives and diabetics patients had their
appointment dates written in this card. Other patients were
also given this card where it was used as a reference for the
registration number for any future visit. In the private
sector ten of the 15 clinics used the appointment card mainly
to record the patients registration number rather than the
date for follow-up visit.
Private clinics do not maintain a separate record for
antenatal cases. The same OPD cards were used to record
antenatal consultations. In public facilities where a separate
recording form is used. Every antenatal mother in the public
facilities has an antenatal card recording their progress
through out the pregnancy. This card is kept in the clinics.
The mothers were given a smaller card ('Red Card') which had
the summary of the antenatal record. The mothers presented
this card when going for delivery in the hospital.
Patients recieving immunisations in public facilities were
given a small yellow book which recorded the date of
immunisation given and the appointment date for subsequent
immunisations. The child health record was also used to record
the consultations for child health clinics for all children
below 7 years of age. In the private facilities, all the
recordings were done on the OPD card and only two of the
private clinics provide their children with a card to record
the immunisations given.
The public facilities used standard referral forms (Appendix
34) when referring patients to other centres. These forms have
two parts with a detachable portion to be used by the
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receiving doctor for replying to the referral. Except in three
private clinics, most of the private practitioners do not have
any referral form and they normally refer using the clinic
letter heads for referral.
Only two health centres, the district hospital and only one
private clinic had communicable diseases notification forms
(Form Health I issued by MOH) used to notify notifiable
diseases to the district health office (Appendix 35).
Medical certificates were found in all the public and private
facilities although they were not standardized in the private
sector.
Only four of the 15 private clinics kept a drug register as
required under the Dangerous Drug (Amendment) Act (1984) and
Poison (Amendment) Act (1987) but none of the registers were
up to date. In the public facilities the register is kept by
the hospital pharmacist and was the only up to date register
in the district.
5.1.6 Charges
Most private doctors did not separate the consultation fees
and drugs charges when charging their patient. PPS in seven
private clinics did not charge for consultation at all. In
eight private clinics the minimum consultation charges was RN
3.00 and the maximum was RN 7.00. The minimum total charges,
ranges from RM 7.00 to 15.00 and the maximum ranges from RN
12.00 to RN 25.00.
The health centres provide services free of charge while the
OPD clinic of the district hospital charges RN 1.00 for cases
seen by medical officers and RN 5.00 if referred by the
medical officers to the visiting specialists.
All private doctors indicated that they charged their patients
by looking at their socio-economic status and the medicines
they prescribed (Appendix 36). They charged a higher fees for
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patients whom they judged to be of higher 8ocio-economic
status and discounts were given to poor patients. In the
district hospital, charges for poor patients and the
government servants were exempted. Poor patients were required
to apply for exemptions by completing a form which needed to
be endorsed by the village head or the sub-district head. The
government servants had to show a letter of confirmation
called the 'guarantee letter' from their departmental head to
get the exemption.
Private doctors charged higher fees to patients prescribed
with branded medicines than those given generics. Injections
were also charged at higher rates than oral medications.
Patients prescribed long courses of medications such as cases
of chronic illness like hypertension and diabetes were charged
higher than those given shorter course of medicine. Eleven of
the 15 private clinics charged higher fees for patients paid
by third a party. These are mainly factory workers and workers
of parastatal bodies in the district. None of the private
doctors followed the MMA schedule fees giving the reasons that
it was too expensive. Six PP5 charged higher fees for adults
and lower fees for children.
Table 5.S Charge. in public and private faciliti.s
Clinics	 n itati n fees RN	 Total charges (RN
Long Hours PC.
PCi	 hONE	 10.00 - 15.00
PC2	 3.00 - 5.00	 15.00 - 25.00
PC3	 NONE	 5.00 - 14.00
pcs	 NONE	 12 00 - 15 00
PC6	 3.00 - 4 00	 10 00 - 15.00
PC7	 500-7.00	 500-12.00
pca	 3 00 - 5.00	 10 00 - 15.00'
cio	 3 00 - 5.00	 10 00 - 20.00
pcii	 300-500	 700-14.00
pj4	 4.00-500	 500-1600
Short Hours PCI
Pca	 NONE	 10 00 - iS 00
Pc,	 5.00 - 7 00	 I 00 - 12.00
PC12	 NONE	 10.00 - 15 00
PC13	 NONE	 12 00 - 15.00
PC15	 IIE	 12.00 - 15.00
Public Clinics
District Hospital	 NONE	 1 00 - 5 00
Health Centres	 NONE	 NONE
5.1.7 Clinic Drug Lists
The drugs listed in the clinic drug lists from each clinics
were grouped according to their mode of action (MOH, 1992 c;
MIMS Asia, 1992). Among the groups of drugs compared, except
for dermatologicals and vaccines, the private clinics had a
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greater range of different types of drugs than the health
centres (Table 5.9). In eight of the 15 groups of drugs
compared the private clinics had more than twice the number of
drugs than the health centres. When compared to the district
hospital which has in-patient service, the private clinics
still had more types of drugs in seven of the 15 groups of
drugs.
All drugs listed were compared against the WHO's Sixth Model
List of Essential
Drugs (WHO, 1990
b). Drugs falls on
the	 list	 are
considered to be	 '.5
'essential' Out of
276 types of drugs
available	 in 51
private	 clinics,
only	 53	 (19.2%)	 19.2%
were essentials. In 	 HseIthC.ntres Dst1ctHospIt&
the health centres
• E.wiflt Non-Eas.naI
and the district
hospitals	 which
both had less than half the number of drugs available in the
private clinics, 42.6% of the drugs in health centres and
46.3% of those in district hospital were essential (Figure
5.1)
Table 5.9 Types of drugs available in public and private facilitiag
Drugs	 Private Clinics	 Health	 District HospitalCentrea
Ranga	 Mean	 Range	 Mean	 Noa.
Antibiotics	 7 - 19	 13.4	 5 - 7	 6.2	 3.2
.T..nalgesics/ Antipyratica	 5 - 12	 8.6	 4 - 5	 4.2	 ii
Cough and cold remedies 	 2 - 11	 5.0	 2 - 3	 2 6	 3
Vitamins Minerals/electrOlytes 	 7 - 17	 9.2	 7 - $	 7.6	 11
Derisatological	 2 32	 10.2	 8 - 20	 3.3.2	 14
Asthmatic drugs	 3 - 10	 4.7	 1 - 3	 1.6	 S
Anti-diabetics	 2 - 5	 3 4	 2 - 3	 2.5	 4
Anti-hypertenaivas	 4 12	 7 5	 4 - 7	 5 4	 10
Anti-spasmodica	 4 - 8	 5 3	 1 - 2	 1.5	 5
Anti-diarrboeala	 2 - 5	 3 2	 1 - 2	 1.3	 2
gy./ear/isouth preparationa 	 S - 12	 11.2	 3 - 6	 4.6	 6
Antacids and antiulcerants	 6 - 9	 7.3	 2 - 3	 2 5	 4
Ant3.histamiflea	 6 - 12	 10 5	 3 - 4	 3 6	 4
Vaccines	 4 - 6	 5.3	 5 - 6	 5.8	 6
Othera	 15 - 22	 18.2	 10 - 3.2	 11.6	 18
Number of different types of drugs)
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5.1.8 Spot checks
Thirteen spot visits were made to the six public facilities
and 31 visits to the 13 of the 15 private facilities. Two
private clinics were unable to be visited during the spot
checks because their opening hours were too short.
Nine of the 13 private clinics visited were operating on the
operating hours and days as given in the semi-structured
interviews. Two clinics opened for longer hours than reported
(PC4 and PC12), one shorter (PC3) and another one opened on
public holidays even though it was reported to be closed
(PC6). All the 13 private clinics were run by doctors except
two of them (PC4 and PC12). These clinics were owned by
doctors with more than one clinic and remained open when the
doctors were away at other clinics. In the doctors absence
these clinics were manned by clinic assistants who sold
medicines to patients.
In the public facilities, spot checks done on weekend revealed
that only in two of the five health centres were staff on-call
available to provide emergency services during the visits.
However in term of the clinic sessions, their schedule and the
operating hours, information collected in the spot visits were
the same as given in the semi-structured interviews.
5.1.9 Prospective Recording
i) General
For the one week period of recording, a total of 7,231 cases
were recorded, 3,855 in public and 3,376 in private clinics.
In the public facilities, cases from 41 clinic-days were
recorded and in the private clinics 94 clinic days. When
average number of patients attending the clinics from
prospective recording were compared with figures estimated by
the doctors in semi-structured interviews, that the difference
was below ten percent except for 'long hours' private clinics
where the attendances has been over-estimated by 14.3%
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(Appendix 36). It is also possible that some patients
attending the facilities may not have been recorded.
ii) Patient's characteristics
a) Gender
There were more
males attending
private facilities
than	 females
whereas	 more
females than males
attended	 public
facilities (Figure
5.2) . Females
formed 53.9% of
patients attending
public facilities
but this dropped to
47.7%	 in	 the
private	 sector.
Males	 comprised
46.1% of patients
attending	 public
facilities	 but
52.3% of those
attending private
clinics.
b) Ethnicity
46.1%
	
52.3%
1776
	
1767
53.9%
	
47.7%
2079
	
1609
Public
	 Private
(Chsquars-28.O6;df-1 :p.cO.0001)
Figure 5.2: Gender Distribution Among Public and Private
Patients
Male
D Femal•
Figure 5.3: Ethnic Distribution Among Public And Private
Patients
Among the users of -
public and private facilities, most Malays (64.7%) and Indians
(53.2%)used public facilities while most of the Chinese used
private facilities (74.9%) (Figure 5.3).
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Figure 5.4: Age Distribution Among Public and Private
Patients
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c) Age
The proportion of
patients seen in
public rather than
private facilities
increased with age
(Figure 5.4). Of
those below	 15
years, 49.7% of
them used public
facilities
increasing to 59.5%
for patients 65
years and above.
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iii) Medical conditions
The diagnosis made by health workers on each patient was
classified using lCD 10 Morbidity Classifications (Figure
5.5). The group 'Other contacts' corresponds to'Factors
influencing health status and contact with health services' in
lCD-b. This group comprises mainly those who came for
preventive care such as antenatal care, post natal care, child
health screening and immunisations, contraceptive management
and pre-employment medical examination. Most of the patients
attending public facilities were in this group (27.7%).
Diseases of the respiratory system were the commonest illness
both among the public (18.4%) and private patients (36.9%).
Another group of health problems ranking third among public
patients and second among private patients were non-specific
illnesses as grouped under 'Symptoms, signs & Ill defined
conditions'. The commonest conditions under this category were
'cough' for the public patients and 'fever' for the private
patients.
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Figure 5.5: Diagnostic categories of pati.nts attending public
and private facilities
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Upper respiratory
tract infections
were the commonest
illness suffered by
patients from both
types of services
although	 the
private clinics
received about one
and a half times
more patients
suffering from this
condition than the
public facilities
(Appendix 37). The predominance of patients seeking preventive
care and treatment for chronic illnesses in public facilities
is shown here. Patients attending for antenatal care and child
health screening were the second and third most common reason
for consultations in public facilities. Asthma, hypertensive
disease and diabetes mellitus were three chronic illnesses
which were common among the public patients. About 17% of
those attending the public facilities suffered from one of
these conditions. Only asthma and hypertension appeared in the
top ten list for the private clinics which represent the
chronic illnesses, both accounted for only 6.7% of all cases.
Another obvious difference was the presence of transport
accidents in those attending public facilities but this
conditions did not make up the top 10 in the private clinics.
iv) Types of care
Table 5.10 shows the subsequent analysis where patients were
grouped into those who sought preventive care and those
seeking curative care. Since females were more likely to seek
preventive care than males, the analysis was stratified
according to gender. In both sexes, there were significantly
more patients seeking preventive care in public than private
private facilities.
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Table 5.10: Types of care sought by public and private patientS by gender
Type of	 MALE	 FEMALE
care	 Public	 Private	 Public	 Private
Curative	 1486 (83.7)	 1680 (95.1)	 1302 (62.6)	 1440 (89.5)
Preventive	 290 (16.3)	 87 (4.9)	 777 (37.4)	 169 (10.5)
Total	 1776 (100.0)	 1767 (100.0)	 2079 (100.0)	 1609 (100.0)
	
- 119.9 d.f- 1	 - 341.9 d.f- 1
	
p < 0.0001	 p < 0.0001
iv) Payment methods
Among those who attended public facilities, 71.5% of them
obtained free treatment, in marked contrast with those
attending private clinics where most of them (99.5%) paid for
the	 services
Figure 5.6: Methods of payment made by public and private patients(Figure 5.6). Out-
of-pocket payments 	 21 0.5%
375 11.1%
were the commonest	 1o76 27.9%
form of payment
both in public and	 ___	 •FREE
private facilities.	 2986 88.4%OUTOF40CT
2758 71.5%	 • THIRD PARTY
Third	 party
payments were not
common	 although	 15 0.4%
PUBUC	 PRIVATE
they	 comprised
slightly more than
11 % in private clinics (0.5% in the public facilities). Most
who paid through third party were employees of private
companies and parastatal bodies.
vi) Referral
The referral rate from public facilities and the private
clinics were almost similar (Table 5.11). All patients
attending public facilities and 17 of 25 patients (68.0%) from
private clinics who need referral were referred to public
facilities.
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Table 5.11: Referral rates and places of referrals in public and private facilities
	
PUBLIC	 PRIVATE
	
Nos	 Nos
Referred to public facilities	 30	 (0.8)	 17	 (0.5)
Referred to private facilities	 0	 (0.0)	 8	 (0.2)
Not referred	 3825	 (99.2)	 3351	 (99.3)
Total	 3855	 (100.0)	 3376	 (100.0)
- 0.03 d.f - 1 p - 0.854
vii) Investigations
The public patients underwent more investigations than those
attending the private clinics (Appendix 37). Altogether a
total of 631 tests were carried out among those attending
public facilities giving the rate of 16.4 per 100 patients.
Among those attending the private clinics, only 127 tests were
carried out giving the rate of 3.8 per 100 patients. Although
fewer investigations were done on those attending private
clinics, nearly half were ultrasound scan.
viii) Multiple Logistic regressions
The bivariate analysis presented earlier has suggested a
number of differences between public and private patients.
However in order to control the confounding effect of many
other variables, logistic regression was used. The dependent
variable was the type of clinic visited and the independent
variables were gender, ethnicity, age, type of care sought and
presence of third party coverage (Table 5.12). All independent
variables were entered into the model in a single step.
Results of the analysis shows that gender does not influence
the type of facilities visited by patients when all the other
factors are taken into account. Users of private clinics were
more likely to be non-Malays, younger patients, those seeking
curative care and having a third party coverage (Table 5.13).
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Table 5.12: Description of variables used in multiple logistic regressions
Variables	 Values
A. D.p.nd.nt
Types of facilities used
	 Dtmuny	 Private - 1
Public - 0
3. Xmdsp.nd.nt
i) Personal
Age	 0-93 years
Gender	 Durmy:
Male -1
Female - 0
Ethnicity	 Dummy:
Non-Malays - 1
Malays	 - 0
ii) Type of care sought	 Dummy:
Curative • 1
Preventive - 0
iii) Have third party cover	 Dummy:
Yes - 1
No -0
Table 5.13: Results of the analysis using multiple logistic regression on factors influencing the use
of private facilities
Variables	 B	 S.E.	 p	 R	 Odds	 95%
	
ratios	 Confidence limit
Non-Malays	 1.053	 0.052	 0.000	 0.201	 2.87	 2.59 - 3.17
Seek curative care	 1.572	 0.797	 0.000	 0.197	 4.81	 1.01 - 22.97
Age	 -0.009	 0.001	 0.000	 -0.068	 0.99	 0.98 - 0.99
Have third party	 3.140	 0.230	 0.000	 0.136	 23.11	 14.72 - 36.26
coverage
Male	 0.077	 0.528	 0.144	 0.004	 1.08	 0.38 - 3.04
constant	 0.805	 0.053	 0.000
R - Partial correlation ; S.E. - Standard error of B)
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F5.2 SUMMARY
Box 5.1 Sunlnary of findings of health facilities survey
* The private clinics and public facilities were located in major towns of the district.
* Most of private clinics were run by single practitioners.
* Except for 'short hours clinics', most private clinics had longer operating hour., open during
weekends and had more hours being run by doctors than the health centres.
* PP. had lesser workload than public sector doctors.
* Private clinics provided greater range of curative services but their preventive services were
less comprehensive and of lower quality.
* Most of the public facilities were better equipped with basic equipment and supplies than private
clinics but both were poorly equipped to handle medical emergencies.
* 'Short hours' private clinics, mostly owned by PP5 with multiple clinics, were poorly equipped
with basic and emergency equipments, offered limited hours of service and were manned by untrained
staff in the absence of doctors.
* Medical records were better maintained in public than private facilities.
* Most PPs consider patient's socio-economic status, type and amount of medicine prescribed and
methods of payment when charging their patient.
* Private clinics kept greater variety of drugs than public facilities but most of them were non-
essential.
* Expensive diagnostic equipment was more likely to be kept by PPs, mostly with limited training.
* Public patients underwent more basic investigations while those visiting private facilities
undergone more expensive investigations.
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VI. SURVEY OF HEALTH WORKERS
6.1 RESULTS
6.1.1 Socio-demographic characteristics
A total of 374 self-administered questionnaires were returned,
314 from the public and 59 from the private facilities. Eleven
questionnaires from the public sector were excluded from the
analysis because they were grossly incomplete. As the total
number of public sector personnel was 415 and those in private
was 62, the response rate is 73.0% in the public sector and
95.2% in the private sector.
1) Occupational categories
Based on their occupations, the respondents were divided into
three categories: doctors, clinical staff and non-clinical
staff (Figure 6.1). Clinical staff were those
directly involved
FIgure 6.1: Type of Health Workers In Public and Private Sectorin patient care in
their daily work
and included the
nurses,	 medical	 733%
a s s i s t a n t s ,
	
46%	 /
midwives,	 health	 14
inspectors,
dispensers,	 67	 48
laboratory	 Public	 Private
technicians,
radiographers,
Doctors D Clinical Staff • Non-CU nical Staffpharmacists,
attendances	 and
public health assistants in the public sector and all clinic
assistants in the private sector. The non-clinical staff had
no direct contact with patients or patient care, and included
clerks, drivers, store-keepers, carpenters and labourers, all
in the public sector.
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ii) Gender and ethnicity
Eighteen of the 27 doctors in the district were male and 9
females. Most PPs were males (12 out of 13) while most public
sector doctors were females (8 out of 14). Almost all (97.9%)
of the clinical staff employed by the PPs were female but in
the public facilities about one-third (32.0%) of the clinical
staff were male. Most (74.6%) of the non-clinical staff in the
public sector were males (Table 6.1).
Table 6.1 Gender distribution of public and private sector personnel
Public	 Private
DR	 CS(%)	 NCS(%)	 DR	 CS(%)
Male	 6(42.9)	 71(32.0)	 50(74.6)	 12(92.3)	 1(2.1)
Female	 8(57.1)	 151(68.0)	 17(25.4)	 1(7.7)	 45(97.9)
Total	 14(100.0)	 222(100.0)	 67(100.0)	 13(100.0)	 46(100.0)
DR - Doctor,; Cs • Clinical staff; NCS- Non-clinical staff)
Fi.hers Rxact test (Public doctor. vs PPa) p - 0.009
X (Public vs private clinical .taff( • 15.75 d.f • 1 p 0.0001
X' (Public clinical vs non-clinical ataft) - 36 72 d S • I. p 0.0001
Most of the public sector doctors were Malays (10 out of 14)
while those in private practice were mostly Indians ( 9 out of
13). The clinical staff public sector were mainly Malays
(94.1%) while higher proportions of Chinese and Indian
clinical staff were employed in the private than the public
sector (Table 6.2).
Table 6.2 • Ethnic dietribution of public and private sector personnel
Public	 Private
	
DR	 CS %)
	
NCS (%)
	 CS %)
Malaya	 10(71.4)	 209(94.1)	 60(89.6)	 2(15.4)	 24(52.2)
chineae	 1(7.2)	 3(1.4)	 0(0.0)	 2(15.4)	 15(32.6)
Indians	 3(21.4)	 10(4.5)	 7(10.4)	 9(69.2)	 7(15.2)
Total	 14(100.0)	 222(100.0)	 67(100 0)	 13(100.0)	 46(100.0)
(Dk • Doctors; CS • Clinical staff, NCS. lion-clinical staff
X (Public doctor vs PP.) - 6 46 d f - 1 p • 0.011
X' (Public vs privat, clinical staff) - 55.4$ d.f • 1 p • 0 00001
X (Public clinical vs non-clinical staff) • 1.05 d S • 1 p • 0 306
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iii) Age
The PPs were, on average about 10 years older than the public
sector doctors. However, the clinical staff in the private
sector were about 15 years younger than clinical staff in the
public sector (Table 6.3). The non-clinical staff in the
public facilities were about 2 years older than their clinical
colleagues.
Table 6.3: Differences in age between public and private sector personnel
N	 Mean	 SD	 t-value	 p value
Doctors
Public	 13	 31.1	 5.8	 4.76	 < 0.0001
Private	 14	 41.2	 5.2
Clinical staff
Public	 222	 37.4	 7.3	 12.34	 < 0.0001
Private	 46	 22.8	 7.2
Non-clinical staff
Public	 67	 39.8	 6.6	 2.40	 0.017'
* Unpaired t-teet between clinical and non-clinical public Sector •taff
iv) Educational level
All the doctors were university graduates, 11 (78.6%) public
sector doctors were trained locally and only 3 (21.4 %) were
overseas trained. In contrast, only 2 (15.4%) of the private
doctors were local graduates and 11 (84.6%) were overseas
graduates (Table 6.4). Most of the public and private sector
doctors did not have any post-graduate or specialist
qualification; only two of them, one in each sector had Master
degree in Public Health.
Most of the clinical staff in the public and private sector
had completed their upper secondary school although 4.1% of
those in the public sector were trained in colleges or
university (Table 6.5). Most of the non-clinical staff (67.2%)
in the public sector were educated at or below the lower
secondary level.
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Table 6.4: University background of public and private doctors.
Public doctors	 Private doctors
Woe	 Woe
Local graduates	 11	 78.6	 2	 15.4
Overseas graduates	 3	 21.4	 11	 84.6
Total	 14	 100.0	 13	 100.0
- 8.4 d.f • 1 p - 0.004
Table 6.5: Educational level of public and private sector staff
Educational level 	 Public sector
	 Private sector
Non-clinical	 Clinical	 Clinical
staff	 staff	 staff
	
Nos	 Woe	 Nos
Primary school 	 31	 46.3	 34	 15.3	 3	 6.5
Lower Secondary 	 14	 20.9	 38	 17.1	 10	 21.7
Upper Secondary	 22	 32.8	 141	 63.5	 33	 71.8
Universities	 0	 0.0	 9	 4.1	 0	 0.0
Total	 67	 100.0	 222	 100.0	 46	 100.0
Z' (Public vs privat, clinical staff) • 2.69 d.f- 2 p • 0.261X (Public clinical vs non-clinical staff) - 32.76 d f • 2 p 0 0001
v) Income
Most of the private doctors had higher incomes than the public
sector doctors (Table 6.6); 84.6% of them stated that their
monthly income was RM4,000 and above while 92.9% of the public
doctors earned below this amount.
Most of the clinical staff in the private sector had lower
income than those in public sector where 84.8% of them earned
less than RN 500.00 per month compared to only 13.5% in the
public sector who earned less than this amount. The public
sector clinical staff also earned higher income than their
non-clinical colleagues where 27.0 % of them earned RN 1000
and more per month compared to only 4.4 % among the non-
clinical staff.
Table 6.6: Income distribution among public and private sector doctors.
Income level (RN)	 Public doctors	 Private doctors
Was	 'a	 Woe	 'a
less than 2000	 9	 64.3	 0	 0.0
2000 to 3999	 4	 28.6	 2	 15.4
4000 and above	 1	 7.1	 11	 84.6
Total	 14	 100.0	 13	 100.0
X-13 4df.1p0 0001
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Table 6.7: Income distribution among public and private sector staff
Income level (RN)
	
Public sector	 Private sector
Non-clinical	 Clinical	 Clinical
	
Nos	 %	 Hoe	 lbs
less than 500	 32	 47.8	 30	 13.5	 39	 84.8
500 to 999	 32	 47.8	 132	 59.5	 7	 15.2
1000 and above	 3	 4.4	 60	 27.0	 0	 0.0
Total	 67	 100.0	 222	 100 0	 46	 100.0
X (Public vs privat. clinical staff) • 97.34 d f- 1 p 0 00001X (Public clinical vs non-clinical .taff) - 33 82 d f • 1 p 0 0001
vi) Part-time occupation
Six of the 14 public sector doctors (42.9%) stated that they
worked part-time in private clinics. Among the public sector
clinical staff only three (1.4%) of them worked part-time in
private clinics and hospitals. Three non-clinical staff (4.5
%) in the public sector had part-time jobs, all working in
fields not related to medicine. In the private sector, only
one clinic assistant had a part-time job, working as a
kindergarten teacher.
vii) Length of service
Most (76.9%) of the private doctors had been practising in the
private sector for 5 years or more while most (71.4%) of the
public doctors had served less than 5 years (Table 6.8). Among
the clinical staff, the public sector had more experienced
staff where most of them (83.3%) had served for 5 years or
more, whereas most of those in the private sector (80.4%) had
been working there for less than 5 years. Most of the non-
clinical staff (89.5%) in the public sector worked for 10
years or more, more than the clinical staff (73.4%) in the
same sector.
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Table 6.8 Length of service in each sector among public and private sector personnel
Length of service	 Public sector
	 Private sector
DR (%)	 CS(%)	 NCS(%)	 DR	 CS(%)
< S	 10(71.4)	 37(16.7)	 5(7.5)	 3(23.1)	 37(80.4)
5 - c 10	 2(14.3)	 22(9.9)	 2(3.0)	 6(46.2)	 7(15.2)
10 and above	 2(14.3)	 163 (73.4)	 60(89.5)	 4(30.7)	 2(4.4)
Total	 14(100.0)	 222(100.0)	 67(100.0)	 13(100.0)	 46(100.0)
(DR • Doctor.; CS • Clinical staff; NCS. Non-clinical staff
X (Public doctor vi PP.) - 6.41 d.f - 2 p • 0.041
X' (Public vi privat. clinical •taff) - 86.64 d.f - 2 p a 0.0001
X (Public clinical vs non-clinical staff) • 7.71 d.f - 2 p - 0.021
6.1.2 Training
i) Pre-employznent training
None of the clinical staff in the private facilities attended
any training related to their job prior to their employment
while 60.8% of those in the public sector had undergone
training (Table 6.9). Most of the non-clinical staff in the
public facilities were untrained and only 17.9% of them had
attended some training before their current appointment.
Table 6.9 : Attendance of pre-employtnent training among public and private sector staff
Public	 sector	 Private sector
	
NCS(%)	 CS(%)	 CS(%)
Attend	 12(17.9)	 135(60.8)	 0(0.0)
Do not attend	 55 (82.1)	 87 (39.2)	 46 (100.0)
Total	 67(100.0)	 222(100.0)	 46(100.0)
(NcS - Non-clinical staff CS - Clinical staff)
X (Public vs private clinical staff) - 53 96 d.f - 1 p a 0.0001
X' (Public clinical vs non-clinical staff) • 36.20 d.f • 1 p a 0.0001
ii) In-service training
In-service training undertaken by the health workers between
1988 and 1992 indicated that doctors spent less time in in-
service training than non-doctors (Table 6.10) Public doctors
spent about four times more time than PPs in training (1.73
days/year vs 0.42 days/year), although time spent was low in
both sectors. None of the clinical staff in the private sector
had undergone any formal training. Public sector clinical
staff spent more time on in-service training than any other
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staff (11.25 days per year).
Table 6.10 : In-aervice training attended by public and private sector personnel
Number attended any 	 Mean days	 SD	 p value
training	 /staf f/year
Public doctors	 7(50.0%)	 1.73	 2.21	 0.054
Private doctors 	 4(30.4%)	 0.42	 0.84
Public clinical staff	 77(34.7%)	 11.25	 35.13	 O.O24
Public non-clinical staff
	 25(37.3%)	 3.86	 18.22
•	 t-test (Public vi private doctor) • t - 2 07
t -test (Public clinical vs non clinical staff) t - 2.28
6.1.3 Job satisfaction
i) Job satisfaction score
In this analysis, non-clinical staff were not included because
there were no such category of workers in the private sector.
The Cronbach's Alpha coefficient of the 19 items on
satisfaction was 0.842, indicating that the questionnaire had
high reliability (Vaus, 199]. p.256)
In almost all aspect of their jobs, proportion of health
workers satisfied (score of 4 and above) was higher in the
private than the public sector (Table 6.11). This difference
was statistically significant between public and private
sector clinical staff in six of the eleven aspects (their
relationships with their superiors, prospects of transfer,
allowances, workload, availability of equipment and access to
office vehicles). Among the doctors, significant differences
between the public and private sector were only found in three
aspects of their jobs (prospects of promotion, training and
access to office vehicles)
110
T.bl. 6.11 Proportions of public and private health workers who were uti.fi.d with various aspects of their job.
	
CLINICAL STAFF	 DOCTORS
	
Public	 Private	 p value"	 Public (5-14)
	
Private	 p va1ue"
	
(5.222)	 (5-46)	 (5-13)
Income	 26 7	 37 2
	
0 225	 21.4	 53.9	 0.019
Prospect of promotion	 19 6	 11 6
	
0 976	 14 3
	
66.7	 0.023
R.lation with superiors	 9.3	 37.5	 0.000	 7.1	 66.7	 0.063
Relation with .ubordjnates	 50 7	 65 9	 0.119	 57.1	 S3.3	 0.216
Relation with colleague	 55 S	 90 7	 0 542	 71 4
	
50.0	 0.999
Prospect of transfer	 30.1	 63.4	 0.000	 53 S	 100.0	 0.109
Allowance.	 42 6
	
63.4	 0.026	 57.1	 55.7	 0.337
Workload	 12.6	 51.2	 0.000	 5.3	 50.0	 0.109
Training	 2.4	 9.3	 0.075	 7.1	 60.0	 0.037
Availability of equipment	 51.4	 69.9	 0.040	 35.7	 69.2	 0.175
Access to vehicle	 25 9	 66 7	 0 000	 50 0	 100.0	 0 047
• Scor, of four and above	 X test	 Fisher Sxact	 test
Multiple regression analysis was carried out whereby the
dependent variables were the score for each aspect of job
satisfaction. The independent variables used were satisfaction
with different aspects of their work (Table 6.12). Individual
characteristics shown to be different between the public and
private sector were included as independent variables. For
categorical variables, dummy variables were created. Table
6.13 summarised the result of the analysis.
Private sector personnel had higher scores than those in the
public sector in all aspects of job satisfaction except for
relationship with their subordinates and colleagues after
controlling for other confounding influences. Space
limitations prevent discussion of the influence of factors
other than public-private sector on these findings.
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Table 6.12: Description of vanables used in multiple regression analysis for job satisfaction
and attitude scores
Vanables	 Va ues
A. Dependent Variable
Satisfaction scrore for:
Income
Prospect of promotion
Relation with euperiors
Relation with subordinates
Relation with colleague
Prospect of transfer
Mowances
Workload
Training
Availability of equipment
Office vehicle
Total attitude score
B. Independent variables
Personal characteristics of health workers:
Age
Gender
Income level
Ethnicity
Level of Education
Occupational group
Length of service
Score 1 -5
Score 13-44
15- 55 years (Continues variable)
Dummy: Male = I
Female =0
Dummy: less than RM 500
AM 500- <1000
RM 1000 and above
Dummy: Malay
chinese
Indian
Dummy: Primary School
Secondary School
University
Dummy: Doctor =1
Clinical stafi =0
0.8 - 36.08 years (Continues variable)
Types of Facilities	 Dummy: Pnvate = 1
Public =0
Table 6.13: Results of the analysts using multiple regression on job satisfaction scores
Dependent vanables Independent variables 	 b	 Beta	 p	 R2
Income score
Private/public	 0.931	 0.279	 0.001	 0.081
Gender	 -0 364	 -0.129	 0.048
Promotions score
	
Private/public
Age
Chinese
Gender
Private/public
school education5-
University education
Gender
bordinates
Private/public
ueRelation with colleag Private/public
Transfers
Private/public
IncomeRM 1000 and above
Indians
Secondary school education
Mowances	 Private/public
Income RM SOOto <1000
Income RM 1000 and above
Workload
Private/public
Secondary school education
University education
	
1.187	 0.406	 0.000	 0.138
	
0.037	 0.290	 0.039
	
-0.698	 -0.194	 0.003
	
-0.317	 -0.128	 0.044
	
0.751	 0.371	 0.000	 0.251
	
-0.712	 -0.381	 0.000
	
-0.944	 -0.377	 0.003
	
0.288	 0.173	 0.007
0.440	 0.194	 0.062	 0.115
0.295	 0.134	 0.126	 0.059
1.100	 0.378	 0.000	 0.199
0.834	 0.339	 0.000
0.772	 0.194	 0.004
-0.548	 -0.209	 0.013
1238	 0.449	 0.000	 0.164
0.501	 0.225	 0.033
0.982	 0.415	 0.000
	
1.190	 0.534	 0.000	 0.281
	
-0.695	 -0.310	 0.000
	
-0.785	 -0.274	 0.039
Training
Private/public
Equipments
Private public
Age
Gender
Length of service
0.368	 0.179	 0.044	 0083
0875	 0.302	 0000	 0.107
-0041	 -0.319	 0.026
0334	 0134	 0038
0039	 0298	 0031
Office vehicle	 Pnvate/public	 1419	 0451	 0000	 0.266
Chinese	 0725	 0137	 0031
Secondary school education	 -0557	 -0184	 0045
(R2 = Coefficient 01 determ nation)
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ii) Qualitative data
a) Income and allowances
In in-depth interviews most of the public health workers
expressed their dissatisfactions with their pay (13 of the 15
clinical staff and 7 of the 10 doctors). They felt that their
pay was too low compared with their workload and with the
salary of health workers in the private sector.
P524 m. way the doctors are struggling . .going on call 24 hours. . . awount they are slogging. . . if you
care with the pay that we are getting here. .that's not worth it. The sama kind of job or sacrifices
are not being done by any other profession and yet they are earning very ach r. than us. That's why.
everyone is leaving the goveroment service because the goveroment doctor ha. to work so hard.... (1D3
P82, Prom the ties the I started, th. pay of staff nurse was RN 400, nov the recent batch.a they are
starting around RN 500 or 600.. so what's the different . .bow many years is that.. .not woch
Idifferenti.. this shows that people don't appreciate us. I think in other countries when you say a
nurse esana you do nursing procedure but here we do fran & to S . a lot of thing not within our scope
also we are doing it and also the pay that we are receiving I think sometimes it is very frustrating
so. . . if we look at the pay ... you will never be happy with your work. (ID)
The new remuneration scheme (NRS) introduced in 1991 was
criticised by most of the public staff. Under the new scheme,
'10 hours call allowances' for clinical staff in health
centres had been abolished, 'critical allowances' for nurses
and doctors had been introduced. Before the NRS, clinical
staff on call in health centres after office hours were paid
10 hours of allowance per month irrespective of whether they
attended any patients or not. Under the NRS, they were only
paid if they attended any patient during their call hours. The
staff felt this was unfair because even though they did not
attend any cases they had to be available in the health
centres during the call hours. The 'critical allowances' was
a non-private practice allowance paid to staff nurses and
doctors to compensate them for working in the public sector.
Doctors received 5 percent and the nurses 10 percent of their
salary. The doctors felt that the allowance was too low to
compensate or to have any effect on reducing the ef flux of
doctors to the private sector. Clinical staff who were not
eligible for this allowance (the assistant nurses, midwives
and medical assistants) argued that if the payment was
justified on the grounds of shortage of staff in the public
sector, then it should be paid to other categories of staff
which were also in short supply in the public sector. For
example the medical assistants argued that they should be paid
the allowance since there was also shortage of medical
114
assistants in the public services. They also argued that the
community nurses who had almost the same qualifications,
duties and responsibility as the staff nurses should be paid
the allowance.
The public doctors especially those working in the district
hospital voiced, their dissatisfaction with the failure of the
government to pay call allowances to them. They felt that the
amount of work they put up with during their call duties was
not compensated by their salary. Although in some hospitals
those on-call on weekends and public holidays were given a day
off, this privilege was not standardised and left to the
discretion of the head of the hospital.
The doctors in the health centres who have to travel from one
health centre to another when carrying out their duties were
eligible to claim a mileage allowance. However they rarely
bothered to claim this allowance because it required a lot of
paper-work for little benefit.
The six private doctors who discussed their incomes were all
satisfied and cited poor salary as one of the reasons for
leaving government service. Although they worked long hours in
the private sector, they were satisfied as they felt their
efforts were compensated by their income.
PP2: There is no point isn't it, stay in government service, you see, you work so hard, you get paid
so little, how can you remain in government service its iosaibl.... (ID]
PP3, Financially.. .you get the reward if you work hard in private practice In the government you work
only eight hours per day, you get your weekends off. Here if I want to cloa.. my clinic I hav, to think
twice. My patient will run away But if you work bard you get the benefit .... (1D3 (Trans.]
Seven of the nine clinical staff in the private sector were
satisfied with their salary. In addition, they were paid a
bonus every year ranging from one third to one month's salary,
transport allowance to come to work and were paid extra when
they worked overtime or during public holidays. Two of them
also said that their employers paid for their contribution to
the Employers Provident Funds (EPF) and Social Security
(SOCSO) subscriptions instead of deducting this from their
salary. Clinical staff in two private clinics (PC2 and PC5)
were also given paid holidays every year by their employers.
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b) Promotions and transfer
Most of the public doctors (five out of eight doctors -ID) and
the clinical staff (10 out of 12 - ID) in the public sector
were not satisfied with their prospects for promotion. They
were concerned about the need to be transferred to another
site as a prerequisite for promotion. They complained of
limited posts for promotion and that most of these posts were
in hospitals not health centres. The increase in
responsibility entailed by promotion was not compensated by
the increase in salary. Promotions were more likely to be
given to those doctors with specialist qualifications or for
other health staff who had successfully attended professional
training to upgrade their skills. Among the barriers to
attending such courses were the age limit imposed by the
administrations (eg: staff over the age of 35 were not
eligible for upgrading courses) and family constraints. It was
suggested that more consideration should be given based on
their job performance rather than extra degrees or
certificates. In FGD, among the public sector staff, the
participants complained that the more senior vacancies were
not widely announced to the workers in rural areas and that
often their applications were not forwarded by their superiors
to central headquarters.
PS12 U a doctor you sea. . . if you don't specialise, you cannot go up, I find every where there is a
gap for you.. .but for siis of the peopl. that is not a problem... they lust do th. basic BA (Bachelor
of Arts) or whatever it is.. they go into government service, and after that you keep going
up . . . everything depend on 'laporan (report) from the boss... I ID)
PS37 All the fellows I trained ars 'kanan' (senior post]. I oriented and trained thee in hang Hospital
in 1969. they at. all now 'kanan . I can t say anything, this thing is my 'nasib (fate) maybe if I was
in hospital I would have got prtion Health people, on. they cannot rSl.as. them. Suppose I
go for an interview end say I get 'kanan' (senior post), surely I hay, to work in hospital. Once you
get 'kanan' you cannot work in health centre If they pull - out who is going to replace .s. (ID)
There was no formal system of promotion among the clinical
staff in the private sector. However differences in tasks were
carried out by different members of staff, mostly based on
their length of service in the clinics. While junior staff
carried out clerical work such as searching for patient cards
and registrations, the more senior staff assisted the doctor
or dispensed drugs. In two of the private clinics the most
experienced clinical staff were operating the X-ray machine.
None of the private sector clinical staff complained about
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their promotions.
c) Relation with superiors
Most of the public doctors (nine out of 10 - ID) were not
satisfied with their superiors. They complained of poor
supervision and guidance. Doctors working in health centres
complained that the district health officer rarely visited the
clinics to supervise them; they expected more guidance in the
management of the health centres since they were not trained
in administration. Doctors working in the hospital expressed
their dissatisfaction on the insensitiveness of their superior
to their problems. For example they felt the Medical Officer
in-charge (MOIC) of the Hospital had not done much to get more
doctors to run the hospital to reduce their workload. Worst
still when the doctors were struggling to run the busy OPD
clinic, the MOIC 'is reading the newspaper in the coffee room'
(PS2O - ID). The hospital doctors also felt that the MOIC was
not supportive of them whenever there were public complaints
about them. Supervision by visiting specialists were also far
from satisfactory because of workload and limited time.
PS23 Sowetimea with the workload we alway, go back late. Th, management don t bother about us. The MOIC
never eec. how we work. He never doee rounds et night. He alway. come. at the vrg tim.. He ii not
intereat.d to .olve our problem.... IIDI
Most of the public clinical staff were not satisfied with the
quality of supervision they received (12 out of 15 - ID). They
complained that their seniors were more interested in finding
faults rather than helping them improve their performance and
were more interested in the job being done than in their
welfare. Personal problems were rarely given any
consideration. Supervisory visits were often carried out
during clinic hours when they were busy; these created
problems for patients and the staff. The staff in lower
categories such as the community nurses and midwives
complained about being supervised by too many people; the
doctors, staff nurses and the sisters. Sometimes the
instructions given were contradictory. They also felt that
their seniors were not supportive when they faced problems
such as public complaints. During meetings, opinions from the
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staff were rarely considered by their superiors. Some
respondents also complained of unprofessional attitudes by the
supervisors, including scolding and shouting at them in front
of patients and their colleagues. Their superiors were also
said to be unsympathetic in terms of workload. A medical
assistant working in a health centre said that some doctors in
the health centre were not willing to share their workload and
were unwilling to see patients unless referred by them.
All the private doctors had contracts with factories and
parastatal bodies to provide services. Most of the private
doctors (five out of seven) complained of the delay in
receiving their reimbursement from the employers. Furthermore
some employers limited the amount they could reimburse; some
of which was considered so low that they had to ask patients
top up the payment. The doctors also complained that often
employers interfere in their patients' management. Some
employers unofficially instructed the doctors not to give
medical certificates to their employees even when they were
sick and unfit to work. The private doctors were in a dilemma
about serving their patients and at the same time wanted to
preserve their good relationship with the employers so that
their contracts would be renewed.
PP11: When yo1are eick, temperature ii so high, definitely the next day csJmot do it.. .they (employers)
don't let us give (MCII for two days. Unless you fight for it.. .if you fight, you are going to loose
the contract. (IDI
PPi, Some companies restricted (their amount of reimbursementi . . . same don't but even then they try to
keep the doctors with the lowest charges in their panels and they will strik, off those with the higher
charges.. .1 charge then the same as other cash (paying) patients.. for cany which restrict the
claims... I tell the patients this is what company pays . . 50 ames of them if they want they put up the
balance on their own.., otherwise I refer them to (goverorsenti hospital (ID).
The supervision of private clinical staff was less
complicated, as they were mostly directly supervised by the
private doctors. Most of the respondents (7 out of 8 - ID)
were satisfied with their superiors. In contrast to those in
the public sector, they described their employers as friendly
and willing to help them when they had personal problems such
as financial difficulties. Their employers were also very
supportive and if they made any mistakes they would not be
scolded but given guidance.
CA2: I can discuss my problems with the doctor H. is very helpful. He is a good counsellor (ID).
CAlS First of all is my boss's attitude .. be does not control em When I give advice to patients, be
will not pass any adverse cnts I feel free to do my work I did what be taught me When I made
mistake like giving wrong instruction to patients, when he hear it be will cover our mistake.., patient
will not realise I feel happy (PGDJ (Trans I
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d) Relation with subordinates
All ten public doctors had difficulty supervising other
personnel who were older and longer-serving. Even though on
occasions the doctors were not happy with the quality of the
services provided they were not confident to advise those
staff. The doctors felt that because they were young and new
in the service, their instructions were often ignored. When
they exercised their power over these staff such as by
transferring them, their actions were interfered with by
political leaders in the community who had connections with
the staff.
PSl Some of them wer. in their plac.s for the last tw.nty years or so they have been left on their
I feel that's one area I feel dissatisfied in that respect you know and is not easy to so y, them
you know. Even if you have to... .they may be politically quit. rooted in their places you know and
again powers is not in our hand you know, We can make decision. .. . finally it goes up and filter and then
again many people don t like to do transfers... .it involved funds ... and also you kno, everybody like
the ship wanted it to be sailing smoothly .... you rock the boat a little bit then there is always
reply.. why is it you disturb them, they ar. in the lower categories... (IDI
The public sector doctors also complained of interference from
the sisters who were supposed to supervise the nurses on
matters related to nursing procedures. They found that the
nurses were more likely to listen to the sisters than to the
doctors. They also felt that sometimes the sisters encroached
into their areas and even to the extent of instructing the
doctors on matters related to patient care which they found
unacceptable.
P510' Now I am starting my hypertension and diabetes clinics.. .patient. ar. supposed to c with
appointments. I took one staff, an asaistant nurse to help me to check the BP (blood pressure) • but the
sister interfered. She doesn't like me to use the staff. She (sister) is not stationed here whereas I
am working here. I am in-charge of all the staff. I control all of them.. .but when I want to do anything
she interfered... (ID) (Trans.)
The public sector clinical staff with junior staff to
supervise were more innovative and more confident in dealing
with their subordinates than the doctors. Most of them had
served for longer in the service and were more experienced
than the doctors. Like the doctors, they also found
difficulties dealing with the longer-serving staff but they
mentioned various approaches to dealing with them. They
described treating them as friends, respecting them,
identifying their weaknesses and helping them to improve
through individual coaching and the need to establish a
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balance between trust and supervision.
Most of the private doctors had worked in the public service
before and said that they were able to use their experience in
managing their clinics and subordinates. They did not have
many problems with their subordinates except that they faced
the problem of retaining staff for long periods since many of
their staff left to obtain permanent jobs in public sector.
They mentioned bonuses and higher pay as incentives to attract
the workers to serve longer in their clinics.
e) Relations with colleague
In the public sector, the doctors and clinical staff were
generally satisfied with working relationships with their
colleague. They got the cooperation they needed in their work
and problems they faced could be solved through negotiation.
However the relationship with those working in the health
centres and the hospital were not very good. Poor
communications between staff in hospitals and the health
centres resulted in non-reply of referral letters and poor
cooperation between them. Doctors in the health centres were
happy with the cooperation they had received from their
colleagues and attributed this to being of the same sex,
mostly of the same age and having graduated from the same
university. In addition, many knew each other before they
worked in the district. However doctors in the district
hospital were not happy with their colleagues because of
unequal distribution of workload.
In the private sector, the clinical staff described their
colleagues in the clinics where they worked as 'family
members'. Their problems were normally solved through
negotiation mediated by the most senior staff. Most of the
private doctors mentioned that they had few interactions with
other private doctors inside or outside the district. They had
little time for social activity and did not normally attend
conferences or seminars.
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f) Workload
All doctors and the clinical staff in the public sector
complained about excessive workload. They felt that the
increase in the population covered by their facilities was not
matched by an increase in staff numbers. Furthermore some of
the posts were not filled, thus burdening the existing workers
with additional workload. Only one of the of medical assistant
and community nurse posts in each health centre and community
clinic had been filled up. The doctors in the public sector
particularly those working in the district hospital felt that
the shortage of doctors in the country was worst in rural
areas where doctors used their "contacts" to avoid being
posted there.
P86, In health centre there wer, not enough staff I mean one MA tmedical assistanti and on. attendant.
The nuater of patients now has increased Attendant do the registration and MA treat the cases. It's
too heavy . .when I lifted my head it is already 12 noon... (FGDJ (Trans.)
PS39: Prom my experience, if suam staff were promoted or attend coursee • there will be a shortag.. We
have to relief here and there. The vacant poets were not filled isuiediately. We have to shoulder the
burden... PG) (Trana.1
The private doctors complained about the long hours they have
to worked in their clinics and often have little time for
social and family life. However they felt that they had to
fulfil their patients' demands in order to avoid losing them.
The clinical staff in the private sector did not complain
about excessive workload and most of them felt that they had
enough staff working in the clinics to cover their workload.
Incentives such as overtime pay and free meals were provided
by their employers during busy clinic days.
PP9 • When we open our own practice, you are tied to your clinic. You don't have time on your own. You
have limited time for your family. As a GP most of the time you spend in the clinic because I am working
alon, without any partner in my practice. LID) (Trans.)
PP7 The work load is heavy. Here we work from S in the morning till about 10 o'clock at night. Long
working hours and we tend to missed out on many other things . to catch up on world newe, to catch up
in any form of news • our family life.. .and so many other things... we missed these out. LID)
g) Drugs
Shortage of drugs and the drug list used by the MOH was the
main issue discussed by doctors and clinical staff in the
public sector in relation to drugs. Shortage of vaccines
particularly polio vaccines and drugs for chronic illnesses
such as anti-hypertensive, anti-diabetic and anti-asthmatic
drugs were voiced by both the doctors and staff in the health
centres. Drugs in the health centres were ordered from the
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state store through the district hospital and distributed
through the district store. Because of this complicated line
of supply, often one level would blame another for shortages.
The health centres usually did not get the amount of drugs
they ordered for or there were long delays. The public health
nurses mentioned that vaccines supplied often came near to
their expiry date and many were spoiled before being used.
The drug list use by MOH (called the "Blue Book") was
criticised by doctors and clinical staff in the public sector
because it restricts their ability to treat a wider range of
diseases and lead to unnecessary referrals.
On the other hand doctors and staff in the private clinics did
not face any problems with drug supplies. They simply phoned
the drug companies and ordered what they needed. Furthermore
since they stored a wide range of drugs, if one type of drugs
was in short supply they can change to another from the same
group. In two private clinics (PC2 and PC5) computers were
used to keep record on the amount of drugs they have in store.
The private doctors also felt that in their practice they had
access to more effective drugs than when they were in the
government service before. Most of them believed that branded
medicines were more effective than generics. Often patients
who can afford branded drugs were prescribed these rather than
the generics. Cost is the only restrictions in their choice of
drugs. Normally patients suffering from chronic illness and
need continues supply of medications were referred to the
public facilities where they can get drugs for free.
h) Equipment, vehicles and supplies
The doctors and the clinical staff in the public sector were
not satisfied with the equipment and supplies they were using
in their practice. Among their complaints were shortages and
poor quality supplies such as gauze, plasters and disposable
syringes and poorly maintained basic equipments such as BP
sets and otoscope, the absence of daptone and cardiotocogram
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in the hospital. They also complained about difficulties in
referring emergency cases because of shortages of ambulances.
They felt that these were due to an inadequate budget being
allocated to the health centres and the district hospital
coupled with the bureaucracy in the public service which
delayed the process of acquiring new equipment and maintaining
existing equipment.
In participant observations, in the district hospital and two
of the health centres (HC1 and HC5), laboratory assistants
complained about the shortage of strips for urine tests and
have to use the boiling method to test for sugar and protein
which take longer time. In HC5, it was also observed that one
patient who came in for daily wound dressing brought with him
gauze which he had taken from the district hospital because
there was a shortage in the health centre.
The clinical staff in the private sector were satisfied with
the equipment they had in their clinics although most of their
employers felt that they wanted to acquire more equipment so
that they would not need to refer their patients to other
facilities. Ultrasound machines and X-rays were the main
equipments wanted to be acquired by the private doctors who
have not yet had these equipments.
1) Training
Most of the public doctors and clinical staff were satisfied
with the amount of in-service training courses they had
attended and felt that the courses were relevant to their work
and necessary to keeping them updated with new developments in
medicine. However most public sector workers preferred more
courses to be conducted within the district and for them to be
of shorter duration. This would enable them to attend the
courses without leaving their families, and it would be easier
to get other workers to relieve them while away. One category
of health personnel, the medical assistants were all
dissatisfied with their in-service training. Since most of the
time they were alone in the health centres because only one of
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the two posts was filled, they were rarely given any chance to
attend courses. Most public doctors were not interested in
post graduate training primarily because of family
commitments.
The private doctors gave very little priority to training: few
of them attend courses, seminars or conferences because of
difficulty of finding locums and fear that they would lose
patients and income. Most of them mentioned that their main
source of information to update their knowledge was the
information and articles provided to them by pharmaceutical
company salesmen.
Most of the clinical staff in the private sector did not
attend any formal in-service training: they were trained by
their employers and their senior colleagues. They obtained on-
the-job training in such fields as medicines dispensing.
6.1.4 Attitudes toward patients
i) Attitude score
The Cronbach's alpha for nine items assessing attitudes of
health personnel towards their patients, was found to be
0.814, which shows that they were reliable (Vaus, 1991 p.256).
The total score of the nine items were calculated. The mean
attitude score of the private doctors were significantly
higher than public sector doctors. For the clinical staff, the
mean score between public and private sector were not
significantly different (Table 6.14).
Table 6.14: Differences in attitude score between public and private sector personnel
N	 Mean	 SD	 t-value	 p value
Doctore
Public	 12	 27.3	 4.23	 2.33	 0.035
Private	 11	 33.6	 8.03
Clinical staff
Public	 168	 27.6	 5.73	 0.49	 0.625
Private	 41	 28.1	 7.16
Unpaired t-test between public and public sector personnel
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The total attitude score was then analysed using multiple
regression analysis. The same independent variables as for
satisfaction scores were used. Results in table 6.15 shows
that after controlling for other variables, private sector
personnel had higher attitudes score than those in the public
sector. None of the other independent variables such as age,
sex, ethnicity, income level and educational level account for
this difference.
Table 6.15: Result of analysis using aliltiple regression on attitude score
Independent variables	 b	 Beta	 p valu.
Private/Public facilities	 3.415	 0.232	 0.019
Age	 -0.061	 -0.087	 0.563
Gender	 1.649	 0.117	 0.106
Income level (RN)
e500	 0	 0
500 -	 1000	 2.173	 0.176	 0.101
1000 and above	 2.917	 0.221	 0.071
Level of education
Primary School
	 0	 0
Secondary School	 -0.695	 -0.045	 0.693
	
University	 6.252	 0.321	 0.126
Occupational group	 -6.431	 -0.313	 0.090
Length of service	 0.109	 0.149	 0.315
Ethnicity
Malaya	 0	 0
Chinese	 -0.155	 -0.006	 0.913
Indians	 0.949	 0 043	 0 584
In both sector, the attitude score correlates with job
satisfaction score on four aspects (relationship with
superiors, workload, allowances, prospect of transfer). The
attitude score correlates with job satisfaction score on
income and availability of equipments only among the public
sector health personnel. The attitudes score correlates with
job satisfaction score on relationship with subordinates and
access to office vehicle only among private sector personnel
(Table 6.16).
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	Table 6 16 Coefficient of Correlation It) between attitude score and satisfaction •core
	 ng public and private sector
p.rscnn.l
	
Public sector
	 Privat. Sector
	
(N.121)	 14.35)
Incone	 0.202k	
-0.103
Prospect of prtion	 0.089	
-0 299
P.elation with superiors
	 0.346**	 0.403
Rel&tion with subordinates"
	 0.149	 0.465
Relation with colleague
	 0.045	 -0.286
Prospect of transfer	 0.194	 0.4$9**
Allowances	 0.409	 0.411*
Workload	 0.398•	 0.435•
Training	 0.177	 0.219
Availability of equipment
	 0.294	 0.108
Access to vebicle	 0 132	 0.518"
• p*0.05; **pcO.01
ii) Qualitative data
Attempts to study the attitudes of the public and private
heath workers towards their patients by using a scenario in
the in-depth interviews and focus group discussion did not
yield convincing results. The health personnel were found to
be responding to the scenario by giving an ideal response
solving problems rather than what they actually do in
practice. Participant observation was deemed by the researcher
to be a more valid approach to determining attitudes to
patients.
Behaviour reflecting poor attitudes toward patients was more
commonly observed among public than private health sector
workers. In public sector facilities, staff at the reception
counters in three health centres were observed to behave
rudely to patients; a patient was scolded for not bringing his
son's birth certificate, an attendant shouted at a patient for
not taking off her shoes when she entered the clinic and an
attendant showed anger towards a patient for not putting his
identity card in the correct place on the reception table.
Patients with urgent medical needs in public facilities were
not attended and were made to wait while the staff attended
other non-urgent cases. One patient with a badly bleeding and
painful foot laceration was asked to wait in the waiting room
for about 30 minutes before being treated. During
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consultations, medical assistants in health centres were not
normally assisted by any other staff. The patient's name was
called by the medical assistant from his desk behind a swing
door and patients who had to be called more than once (because
they could not hear their name being called) were scolded by
the staff. Doctors and medical assistants in the public sector
were seen to take a very brief history, rarely to examine
their patients except for antenatal mothers where abdominal
palpation was done. Public sector personnel generally had poor
eye contact with patients, concentrated on writing and
recording on the patient's card and prescription slip, rarely
explained the illness to patients or reassured them. Patients
privacy during the consultation was rarely observed. For
example in the district hospital and one of the health centre
it was observed that at least two patients were in the same
consultation room at any one time. Staff were also observed to
leave the facilities while there were still many patients
waiting to see them and some were absent without leave. In two
health centres, it was observed that both the pharmacist and
the medical assistant left the facilities for a tea break and
returned about 45 minutes later when there were still many
patients in the waiting room. In the district hospital one of
the medical assistants in the casualty and in one health
centre the laboratory assistant did not turn up for work in
the afternoon session without informing their head of the
unit.
In the private facilities, the behaviour of the private
doctors and their staff was in marked contrast with those in
the public sector. Staff manning the reception areas were
polite to patients, often greeted them when they came to the
counter and offered them a seat while registration was done.
Staff came out of the counter to call the patients, often
addressed them as "Mr" or "Mrs" and accompanied them to the
doctor's room. Emergency cases were immediately seen by the
doctor. In two private clinics cases of motor vehicle
accidents were immediately attended by the staff who brought
the cases into the treatment room and the doctors informed
about the cases came to see them immediately. During
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consultations, the private doctors spent more time talking to
patients rather than writing. They often explained their
illness to the patients, reassured them and explained the
types of medication they would prescribe. Patients attending
private clinics were also seen to ask more questions to the
doctors than those attending the public facilities. Often they
asked about the seriousness of their illness. Some brought
medicines they had taken from other clinics to show the doctor
and often explained problems they faced taking the drugs.
Doctors were normally assisted by a staff member who helped
patients and parents with children during the physical
examination. The registration counters in the private clinics
were always manned by staff and they took their breaks in
stages so that there were always staff there to attend to
patients.
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6.2 SUMMARY
Box 6.1: Summary of findings of health workers survey
* The PP5 were mostly older, males, Indians and trained
overseas while most public sector doctors were younger,
females, Malays and trained locally.
* Most PPs had served longer in the sector while most
public sector doctors had served less than five years.
* Most PPs had higher income than public sector doctors.
* Public sector doctors spent longer time on in-service
training than PPs.
* Most of the supporting staff in the public sector were
Malays while more Chinese and Indian staff were employed in
the private sector.
* Most of the clinical staff in both sectors were females
and had completed their upper secondary school education.
* Private sector staff were mostly younger and had lower
income than those in the public sector.
* Most of the clinical staff in the public sector had
served longer and were more likely to have attended pre-
employment and in-service training than those in the
private sector.
* Private sector personnel were more satisfied with their
jobs and had better attitudes toward their patients.
* In both sectors, the attitude score correlate well with
satisfaction scores on relationship with superiors,
workload, allowances and prospect of transfer.
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VII. STUDY OF INTERACTIONS BETWEEN
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTOR
7.1 OUTLINE
This chapter presents the findings on interaction between PPs
and public sector personnel (PSP) in seven activities
(immunisation returns from PPs, MOH/MMA hepatitis-B
immunisation project, patient referrals, utilisation of public
ambulance by PPs, medical examination of foreign workers,
private practice by public doctors and disease notification)
in Kuala Selangor district. A brief background on each
activities is given in each section followed by the responses
from PPs and PSP.
7.2 IMMUNISATION RETURNS FROM PPs
7.2.1 Background
The Health Information System (HIMS) in the MOH was started in
1976. Since then information from all public services were
collected regularly by MOH. The aim of the HIMS was to collect
all health information in the country and to use it for
planning and monitoring of health services in the country
(MOH, 1989). However the information collected through HIM
only covered the public sector. With private sector growth,
the MON felt that information from the private sector should
be collected in order that information to be available for
planning the health services of the country. From 1986, the
MOH had asked all the district health officers to collect
information on the immunisations given by the PPs in their
districts.
7.2.2 Findings from Kuala Selangor District
i) Response from public sector personnel
All the nine PSP interviewed were well informed about the
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reasons for asking the returns from the PPs. The district
health officer explained that the MOH was concerned about the
lower coverage of immunisations than expected and attributed
this gap to the under-reporting of those receiving
immunisations from the PP5.
P81: Quit, a lot of iu.mini.ation are covered by the OP.. you know and therefore, it you look at our
return., in certain area. may be under-covered, you know. gro.. diaparity which definitely doe.nt
reflect the coverage, you know. Therefore, we were directed few year. ago to get the Idata) fro. private
aecter.. lID)
P82, The aim i. to .e. what i the overall coverage for the dietrict and for the atat. and for the
nation becau.e you know the p.opl. do not ju.t cow. to our clinic alon, for i*anh.ation, they do go
to th, private con.idering the time, the facility in the privat, aide So they did go, quite a big
nuIrer go... I mean that count for our coverage and alao ic quite iaçortant that we take note of) what
they have been giving. (ID)
When this exercise was started, letters were sent to all PPs
in the district explaining that every month PSP will visit the
clinics to collect the returns. This activity was
decentralised to the health centres. Forms were distributed to
the PPs to provide the information. Most of the time, either
the clerk or assistant nurses from the nearest health centres
visited the clinics to collect the returns.
In the private clinics, the PPs normally assigned the
completion of these forms to his/her clinic assistants. The
public staff visiting the private clinics therefore usually
dealt with these clinic assistants. The returns sent by the
PPs contained the information on the numbers of different
types of vaccines given for that particular month (Appendix
38). Patient particulars such as names and address were not
collected.
The district health officer and another doctor were satisfied
with the data they received so far. Both of them had not faced
any problem with this activity since nothing has been brought
to their attention by their subordinates; another was unable
to comment since she had left the task entirely to her nurses.
A number public sector staff were doubtful about the accuracy
of the data provided by the PPs: first they observed that the
PP5 did not keep proper records of their immunisation
activities and secondly people outside the district who came
to the private clinics to get vaccination were included. These
were mainly family members of people in the district who came
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back to visit their relatives in the district during weekends
and holidays and brought their children for vaccination. This
would be recorded by the PPs and the public staff were not be
able to distinguish them since their addresses will not be
stated in the returns. This would overestimate local coverage
figures. Generally they felt that the PPB were not doing it
seriously.
P58- Usually we juet uk th. PP. how many people take the immi.ations and th. types of Lanisatioagiven. - only the number. • that • s all we aak fro, them. Stimes s PP. do not have any record, that
is a bit difficult. I think that will be difficult. Kay be the data they give is not accurate. (103
Another problem was the delay of submitting the returns. The
PPs has to be reminded monthly to send the returns; they were
especially late during public holidays when the clinics were
run by locum doctors.
PS5: Currently there i. no problem for me. .. - I do get data f row them except during public holidays like Chine..
New Year when other doctor. are running the clinics. During holiday, it is a bit slow. Sometime it', too late to
wait for them so we just submit our data and we carry forward their data next month.....but we still get their
data.., (ID] (Trans.]
One of the sisters, said that only two of seven PPs inside her
operational area were providing the returns and both of them
were involved in the MOH/MMA hepatitis-B immunisation project
and therefore required to submit these. She had been informed
that five other clinics did not provide immunisation services;
this contradicted our study on health facilities which showed
that these five clinics were actually providing imrnunisation
services.
Another problem faced by the public staff was the problem of
getting returns from private clinics which opened after office
hours. Since the public sector staff did not normally work
during these hours except for those on-call, immunisation
returns had never been collected from these clinics.
ii) Response from PPB
Among the ten PPs, nine of them said they were providing
returns to the PSP; one who had just started his practice six
months before said that he had not been asked to submit the
returns.
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Although the public staff maintained that the private clinics
were visited monthly to get the returns, some of the PPs
contradicted this: visits were irregular or that the PSP
telephoned for results.
None of the PPs were sure about the purpose of submitting
returns. None of the PPs admitted that they were not
cooperating with the public sector staff in providing the
data. They denied that it was a burden to provide such
information data but at the same time felt that they were not
getting any benefit from the exercise. The PPs felt that they
were just helping the public staff with their work.
PPll For lie, i don't think co there ic any h.aef it in that, There ic no benefit for lee becauce I don't
get any eupply from them either but vs give only and they u.t come and tak. the data. Only, we are
aiding the government that's all. Nothing ala.. It ia only they benefit. We got no benefit. IID
Most of the PPs complained that they were not informed of what
was being done with the data they were submitting. However
only two of the six FGD participants wanted feedback on the
data: most showed very little interest.
The PSP admitted that since the programme started no feedback
had been given to the PPs.
7.3 MOH/MMA HEPATITIS-B Inimunisation PROJECT (MOH/MMA-HB)
7.3.1 Background
Hepatitis B immunisation was introduced into the Expanded
Programme on Immunisation (EPI) in Malaysia in 1989. Under the
MOH programme, the vaccines are given to three high risk
groups: newborn infants, health personnel exposed to the risk
of infection and drug addicts (MOH, 1990b). Those not in these
three groups have to get their vaccine from private clinics
and hospitals at a cost of RN 40.00 - 45.00 per adult dose,
expensive compared to the other vaccines in the EPI programme.
The vaccine needs to be given in three doses: in infants it is
given at birth, at one month and at six months.
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The National Morbidity Survey in 1986/87 showed that only 67%
of children in the country had completed their immunisations
under EPI as scheduled by their first birthdays (MOH, 1988 b).
The coverage was much lower in urban areas where more PPs were
found than in the rural areas. The MOH believed that there
were two reasons for this: first the PPs may not be involved
in EPI; or second, they may be giving immunisations but data
on their activities were not captured by the MOH statistics.
The MOH/MMA-HB project launched in September 1990 was aimed to
encourage the PPs to be actively involved in EPI and to supply
complete data to MOH on the EPI coverage. In this project, the
MON provides the vaccines to the private practitioners at a
subsidised price: the PP5 were, however, prevented from
charging anything above the price fixed by the MOH.
Although the MMA was chosen by the MOH to represent the PPs in
this project, three other private organisations, the
Federation of Private Medical Practitioners Associations
(FPMPA), the Malaysian Doctors' Cooperative (KDM) and Apex
Pharmacy were involved in this project. At the national level
a coordinating committee was formed comprising of
representative from these organisations chaired by MOH.
The MOH role is "to ensure that the project is implemented
within the overall context of EPI" (MOH, 1990 b). The MOH
provides technical and administrative support to the project
including provision and stocking of vaccine and monitoring
support. The MOH is also supposed to provide educational
material support for the project and appoints the chairman of
the coordinating committee at the national level. At the
district level, health personnel in the district health office
are supposed to carry out spot checks on cold chain in the
participating clinics and also in the Apex branches. Besides
this, the district health office is supposed to collect
imrnunisation returns from the participating private clinics.
The Malaysian Medical Association (MMA) is the professional
organisation for doctors in Malaysia. In 1993, 75.2% of
doctors in the country were members of this organisation. Most
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of the members (58.4's) of the MMA were from the private sector
(MMA, 1993 d). When the MMA was appointed by the MOH to run
the MOH/MMA-HB project, it gave the actual task of running the
project to KDM because the MMA constitution forbade its
involvement with business transactions. Although it was
stipulated that the role of the MMA in this project was to
coordinate and monitor the PPs' involvement in this project,
the main activities which involved the MM were the use of its
newsletter to spread information about the project. Everything
else was done by KDM. The July 1990 issue of Berita MMA (MMA,
1990) contained a special four-page supplement explaining the
project and enclosing application forms.
The Federation of Private Medical Practitioners Association
(FPMPA) is a Federation of eight state Private Medical
Practitioners Associations (PMPA). In contrast to the MMA,
FPMPA membership is only open to private practitioners. Before
the project began, both the MMA and FPMPA submitted proposals
to run this project; the MMA was appointed. Nevertheless the
FPMPA was co-opted by the MOH to be a member of the national
coordinating committee for the project. Its main role was to
spread information on this project to its members.
The Malaysia Doctors' Cooperative (KDM) runs the project on
behalf of the MMA. This organisation is registered as a
cooperative movement and was formed in 1988 with "the primary
objective to improve the socio-economic status of its members"
(KDM, 1990). Membership is open to all registered medical
practitioners in Malaysia irrespective of whether they are
members of the MNA or not. Although on paper KDM is a separate
organisation and run as a cooperative movement its
relationship with the MMA is clear. All members of the board
of directors are members of the MMA council and it operates
from the MMA headquarters. Basically it functions as the
business wing of MMA. KDM members are required to buy a
minimum amount of the cooperative's shares and to pay monthly
subscription fees. Apart from running the MOH/MMA-HB project,
KDM provides various types of loan to its members to buy
clinic facilities and equipment. In the MOH/MMA-HB project,
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KDM processes the applications from PPs to join the project,
processes the orders of vaccines from the PPs and sends the
vaccines through Apex pharmacy to PPs' clinics. The KDM
claimed that PPs who wanted to take part in the project need
not be members of KDM or MMA.
Apex Pharmacy is a drug company appointed by the MMA and KDM
to distribute the vaccines to the PPs. Sixteen Apex branches
covering all the 13 states in the country were approved by the
MOH to have suitable facilities for cold chain. Vaccine from
the government integrated stores in each state are collected
by Apex Pharmacy to be distributed to the PPs. Besides this,
Apex Pharmacy act as agent for the MMA and KDM in order "to
monitor the cold chain and facilitate prompt returns of
immunisation data" (MOH, 1990 b).
In this scheme, vaccines were sold at RN 5.00 per dose by MOH
to MMA and KDM. MMA and KDM charged a commission of RN 1.35
per dose and Apex Pharmacy charged another RN 0.65. Finally
the vaccines is sold to the PPs at the price of RN 7.00. The
PPs were allowed to charge a maximum of RN 15.00 per dose,
thus assuring a profit of RN 8.00.
The MOH has agreed with the MMA on four conditions: only PPs
who showed evidence that they are providing all the EPI
vaccines are allowed to participate; the vaccines supplied
under this project are only given to infants for the second
and third doses and only those below one year old were
eligible; the MMA is responsible for monitoring the PPs
involved in the scheme so that the cold chain is maintained
and immunisation returns are submitted; and the PPs should
charge no more than RN 15 per dose.
To ensure that the vaccines are only used for the particular
age group the amount of vaccines allocated under this project
are calculated using a formula derived by the Health Division
of the MOH. For each state and district the maximum number of
vaccine allowed to be sold to PPs is calculated based on this
formula. For example when the project was launched in 1990,
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the formula used was the number of live births in 1988 minus
the number of DPT3 given by government agencies in 1989. The
vaccines were supplied quarterly by MOH.
7.3.2 Findings from Kuala Selangor District
i) Awareness about the project.
Most PPs (11 of 12) were aware of the project but only two of
them took part in it. Only one of them had not heard anything
about the project: he had started his private practice in the
district only six months prior to the interview.
Among the eight PSP interviewed only two of them knew about
the project: one sister and the district health officer. The
lack of awareness about this project among the PSP was also
apparent in the FGD: it was not raised at all.
ii) Role of the District Health Office
Neither the district health officer nor the district health
sisters carried out any spot checks on cold chain in the
private clinics involved in this project. In fact neither of
them had ever visited any of the private clinics in the
district. The district health officer himself was not very
sure how many PPs or which private clinics in the district
were involved in the project. He indicated that he was very
new in the district and had delegated the task of looking into
this project to the sister. He was transferred to the district
about two years before this research was done.
psi.	 as fax as Ia concern y district, even in Luala S.iangor I have not actually participated with
the GPs on this issue.... IID
One of the district health sisters knew most about the
project. She said that the district health office involvement
in the project was limited only to collecting immunisation
returns from the GP's. She named the two PPs involved in the
project and every months she made sure that the returns from
these two PPs were submitted to the state office.
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Box 7.1: Main agencie, involved in MOHfIt4A-HB project
MINISTRY OF HEALTH
Provide vaccines at RN 5.00
Provide educational material.
Chair the coordinating
PPMPA	 ?44A	 KDM
*p.licity on the
	 Publicity on the project 	 *Process application from
project to members	 to members	 PPS
* Process vaccines order
cor,nission of RN
________________________	 ___________________________	 1.35/dose
APEX PHARMACY
*Distribute vaccines
*Monitor cold chain in PP. clinics
*Chargeg RN 0.65 /dose
pPs	 DISTRICT HEALTH OFFICE
*Aduinister the vaccine	 *Monitor cold chain in
*b ni t immunisation	 PP. clinics
data to DHO	 *Collect ininunisation
*Maximum charges RN	 data from PP5
15.00
iii) PPe' participation in the project
Both of the PPs who participated in the project said that they
joined the project because vaccine bought through the project
was cheaper and hence they could charge their patients less.
Nine of the 10 PPs who knew about the project were asked their
reasons for not participating. Most of the PPs who did not
join the project were worried about the vaccine supply (Table
7.1). Five of them mentioned that they had good, regular and
reliable supply of vaccine from their own supplier. They were
not confident that they would get the same service from the
project.
PPS: Yes. .. this cm. whsnev.r I want I just call direct. Iven at night I can call hi. and say I n..d
20 vaccines tomorrow. H. gives it to me It, not wch of a problem (IDi
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Table 7.lz R.e.ona for PP. not joining rh. MO/*th-BB project
Raona	 Private practitioner.
PP3	 PP4	 PPS	 PP6	 PP7	 PP8	 PP9	 PP1O	 PP11
Vaccine supply
	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I
Colt of vaccine	 I	 I	 I
.c.iv.d wrong inZezticn	 I	 I	 I
Poor d..and	 I	 I	 I
Paper wOrk	 I	 I
Vaccine atorag.	 I
The concern voiced by those who did not join the project is
not without justification. In fact the two PP5 in the project
are facing the same problem, having difficulty in getting the
vaccine through the project. They have to pay in advance and
send their request form to the KDM office in Kuala Lumpur. The
KDM manager explained that the delay in sending the vaccine is
due to several reasons. Firstly KDM has to check that the
number of vaccine ordered do not exceed the limit in the
'ceiling' agreed by committee. According to him this is to
monitor that the vaccine will not be given by the PPs to other
age groups not covered in this project. Since the 'ceiling' is
divided quarterly, if the limit is reached for that quarter
than KDM cannot supply the vaccine for that quarter but has to
wait for the next quarter which means delays can be up to
three of four months. KDM also has to check that the PPs were
sending their immunisation returns to the district health
office before allowing the Apex Pharmacy to supply them with
the vaccines.
Three of the nine PPs said that the price of vaccines
purchased through the project did not differ very much from
those bought outside the project. Furthermore the private
suppliers give credit and discounts when the PPs make bulk
purchases or combine the purchase of the vaccines with other
supplies needed for their clinics.
PPB For a long time from the same company. That'a one. Tb. other on. i. pric.-wiae, they ar. almost
th. same price. Makes no difference to	 lID)
PP6 No Th. price from the •alecman is a bit higher, but not vezy moch, f.w dollars more. (ID)
Table 7.2 shows that the cost of the vaccine through the
project is still the cheapest. However, most PPs used Angerix-
B vaccine bought outside the project which cost RM 4.50 to RM
7.00 more but they could get almost the same amount of profit
as in the project by charging higher prices. Only two PPs
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admitted using two other types of vaccines in the market;
Hepavac and KGCC which were cheaper than the Angerix B outside
the project. PPs using these vaccines will have bigger profit
even by charging the patients the same charge when they used
the Angerix-B outside the project.
Table 7.2: Costa and charges for different type. of Hepatitis H vaccines used by PP.
Types of vaccin
	 Costa per dosed
	Charges per dose
	 profit' per do..
	 Ho.. of
Pp.
Ang.rix-3 (Outside the project)	 11.50 - 14.00	 15 00 - 20 00	 1.00 - 5.50	 11
Angerix-B (Insid, the project)
	 7.00	 15.00	 5.00	 2
Hepavac	 5.00 - 9.00	 11.00	 20.00	 9 00 - 12.00	 1
10CC	 9 00 - 10 00	 20.00 - 22.00	 10.00 - 13.00	 1
Dose - Children dos. (0.5 ml)
Four of the PPs were interested to join the project but failed
to do so because they were misinformed about the requirements
for participation. One of the PPs, was incorrectly told about
the project by one of his colleague that the vaccination
covers only the first dose for the newborn and that only the
Specialist Centres were eligible to join the project. Two
other PPs, indicated that they were told by one of the sisters
in the district health office that they need to apply to MMA
but were also told that it was too late for them to join the
programme after it had started. In fact no dateline was set by
MMA and PPs could join the project even after it had been
launched. Another PP was informed by drug salesmen that the
project was only for MMA and KDM members.
Only one PP who did not participate in the project were
worried about his vaccine storage. Since he felt that he
needed to order in bulk to cover for the delay in supply of
vaccine ordered through the project, he needed to have a good
storage system. On the other hand he could order the vaccine
from other companies in small quantities and need not worry so
much about the cold chain. His view was supported by one PP
who participated in the project and had to order the vaccines
in bulk because the supply was so slow under the project.
Three PPS who did not join the project also said that they did
not have many patients who wanted to take the vaccines from
them. The health centres were giving the vaccines free of
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charge for children under one year.
FF10, we rarely get this below 1 year cases. Pven though when they cone, I will always tell them that
it is free in the hospital You want to go you go, here you have to pay 520/. So quite a nuwher of them,
they don't mind I tell all my patient's, it's free there you can go to even the health centres.....but they don't mind.. LIDI
FF4, Most of my regulars have taken the iwunisation Now children ar, getting 2 r gov.ronsnt centre.
So, in fact I encourage them all to go. For Hepatitis 3 iawuni.ation I tell them to go to hospital. It's
free of charge there.,. (ID]
Another reason put forward by the PPs for not joining the
project was the need to apply to join the project and to order
the vaccine. The need to do the paper-work added to many other
factors which discouraged them to join the project. None of
the PPs mentioned sending the immunisation returns as a factor
which discouraged them from joining the project.
In the FGD, the PPs' main reason for their reluctance to
participate in this project was the age restriction. The PPs
collectively suggested that the project should not be
restricted to the children below one year of age. The PPs
would not get many patients in this age group since they were
getting it free from the health centres. They suggested that
the PPs involvement would be more significant if the projects
were open to other age group as well.
The PPs who participated in the project suggested that the
distribution of vaccine should be decentralised to the local
health centre. This would avoid delay in the supply.
7.4 PATIEN'T REFERRALS
7.4.1 Referral centres
Most PPs referred their patients to private hospitals and the
State General Hospital; both of these were outside the
district (Table 7.3). Generally the PPs tend to bypass the
district hospital for other hospitals outside the district.
Within the district, the PPs were more likely to refer cases
to the district hospital than the health centres especially
for emergency cases which needed ambulance services. The PPs
rarely refer patients to their colleagues in other private
clinics in the district.
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In the public sector, the doctors and supporting staff running
the health centres normally refer their patients to the
district hospital. They do not bypass this hospital unless
their patients need facilities or modes of treatment not
available there. They also refer cases to the local private
clinics. These latter referrals were limited to antenatal
mothers needing ultrasound scanning which was not available in
the district hospital. The public sector personnel running the
district hospital refer their cases to the State General
Hospital and the Kuala Lumpur General Hospital. All the PSP in
the district rarely refer their cases to private hospitals
unless requested by their patients. These were normally
patients covered by private insurance.
Table 7.3r Referral centres us.d by PP. and public sector personnel
Referral Centres	 Number of respondents
	
PP.	 MC personnel	 Dli personnel
	
(N. l2)	 (N-li)	 (N-6)
Private clinics
	
1	 10	 1
Private Hospital.	 11	 0	 3
Health Centres	 4	 HR	 0
District Hospital	 S	 HR
State General Hospital	 11	 •	 6
Kuala Lumpur General Hospital 	 6	 3
University Hospital 	 4	 1	 1
N = number of respondent. HR - Not relevant
HC - Health centres DR • District hoapital
Seven of the 12 PPs interviewed said that they bypass the
local district hospital because of their patients' request to
go to private or public hospitals outside the district. Three
PPs explained that their patients believed that doctors in
bigger cities were more competent than the local ones and
hence preferred to be referred outside the district.
Furthermore, some patients who had been to the district
hospital before refused to be referred back to same hospital
which failed to cure their illness in the first place.
PP2' . . the problem here even if the patient want to be adoitted, they did not request 'F Harang. lie
will request Kiang I. sur, if you ask all the OP. in T.PLarsng they will tell you They don't trust
the district hospital They trust the General Hospital in Kiang They don t want to be adeitted here.
They ask am to send them to Rlang. (ID)
PP1O It depend. on the patient because sti.es you ask them to go there they are not happy. First
public ... saybe it's psychology, tbey feel the hospital in their area is always not good As I
experienced in my 6 years as a OP. they feel that always the bigger place is better. The public attitude
is lik, that. ivan they feel that the GP her, ii not as art as the OP in XL. LID]
PP3' Those who came here have been to the hospital many times.. .when we want to refer there they do not
want because they have to see the same doctor again. So they request to be send outside Tg Karang. (ID)
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Absence of surgical facilities and specialists in the district
hospital is another reason for the PPs to bypass it. The PPs
(5 out of 12) felt that the facilities in the district
hospital were almost the same as theirs and preferred to send
patients straight to the facilities outside the district to
avoid any delay.
PPS This hospital in T X.... because whet they have we also got .. what do you call... same facility.
So any case I can't manag. say surgical.. . . it ast be sand to big hospital you know like hang OH, eye
cases to Tun Huesin Onn eye hospital]. (ID]
Two PPs preferred to send their patients to other hospitals
outside the district because their patients were poorly
managed in the district hospital: emergency cases were not
given immediate attention and often PPs' opinions were ignored
by the attending doctor.
PP4 Prom my past experience in the last 20 years, I always found that unless you know the doctor
personally, then your patient might hav, acme chance Otherwise they couldn't be bothered. In fact
personally I have taken one or two times patients there, and th. doctors there I mean he does not know
you ..... . but then when he's been told that a doctor brought in he hardly bother sometimes. That's what
this Tg. Xarang hospital is about. (ID)
PP9: May be they feel we are interfering with their work there. May be they are new, or are afraid or
shy. Sometimes we want to discus honestly, but from their response, it's as if they don't care shout
us. So it is limited to discuss with them. Sometimes they are 4 or 5 years your junior. Sometimes you
know them as your juniore. May be they are shy .... so we discuss but not in detail. Sometimes we want
to tell them but they may feel we are trying to be smart. (ID)
7.4.2 Types of cases referred
Most PPs indicated that acute abdomen and injuries were the
two conditions they most commonly referred (Table 7.4). These
two types of cases were also commonly referred by public
sector personnel but antenatal cases were the commonest
condition mentioned by them. The PPs also referred out cases
of communicable disease which they did not manage in their
clinics but this group of conditions did not appear to be
commonly referred by the public sector personnel.
Six of the 12 PP5 received cases from public doctors of
antenatal mothers requesting them to do ultrasound scans
either to ascertain the gestational stage or to locate the
placenta. Two PPs received referral cases of tuberculosis for
daily injections of anti-tuberculous drugs. Another PP
received referral cases of haemophilia for daily
administration of desferoxamine.
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T8ble 7.4: Types of cases referred by PP. and public sector personnel
PUBLIC (N - 17	 PNIVATE (N - 12
Cond tions	 No.	 Conditions	 Nos
Antenatal enther.	 9	 Acute Abdomen	 7
Acute Abdomen	 $	 Injuries
Injuri.s	 B	 Comicab1e diseases	 5
BT with clicationa	 3	 Antenatal enth.rs	 3
tN • with clications	 3	 Prolonged fever	 2
Abortions	 2	 lschsisic Heart Disease	 2
Prolonged fever	 1	 B with cosplicationa	 2
Congenital hurt disease.	 I	 Abortions	 2
Poisoning	 1	 Cancers	 1
Clicated labour	 1	 Convulsions	 1
N • nuober of respondent. * NT - Hypertension ** t - Diabetes .ellitus
7.4.3 Private to public sector referrals
i) Problems faced by PPs
In both the in-depth interviews and FGD done among the PPs,
the issue of lack of feedback and the loss of their patients
to public facilities dominated the discussions.
The PPs complained that although they sent referral letters
with their cases, the letters were rarely replied to by the
public sector doctors (Table 7.5).
PP8: Moat of them they see the patients. The only problem is they don't writ, back to us. That's the
problem. Very rarely I get letters back. Sometimes I get probably the surgical sid. once a while I get
back letters from thee. University Hospital usually they write back ... (IDI
PP2: Wow there's one very good reacon and one very frank thing I want to tall you .... when we refer
a patient to the hospital, the hospital never write back. That's really irritates me I ID)
PP1: When we refer cases, when you refer to private specialist, you get reply. But with government.
we don't know what happened to the patient. What ever feedback we get i. from the patient himself. LID]
Table 7.5: Problem. faced by PPI when they refer patients to public facilities [ID)
Problems	 Private practitioners
PP1	 PP2	 PP3	 PP4	 PP5	 PP6 PP7 PU PP9	 PP1O	 PP11	 PP12
Lackoffeedback	 N	 N	 N	 N	 N	 N	 N	 N	 N	 I	 N	 I
'Lou. of patients'	 N	 N	 I	 I
Limited access to specialist 	 z
Different opinion.	 I	 x
Poor patient management 	 I	 I	 I
When nine of PPs were asked in the in-depth interviews why
they thought the public sector doctors did not reply to their
referral letters, five of them suggested that excessive
workload on the public doctors was the main reason. Another
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four of them suggested that lack of supervision by their heads
was the main reason for non-reply.
Seven of the PSP who usually deal with the referrals cases
were asked to comment on complaints of non-reply made by the
PPs. Even though all of them admitted that they do not reply
to the referral letters sent by the PPS, they felt that the
PPs were not interested in knowing about the cases they had
referred (Table 7.6). In the FGD, all the public doctors gave
this as the only reason for their non-reply. They make this
assumption because the PPs never indicate in their letter that
they wanted the feedback or phoned them to ask about the
patients they had referred.
PSlO Normally they (PP5J never ask for it. They never ask for a reply, normally they ask ua to continua
treatment... IIDJ
P89: They ar. not interacted, they never follow up their patient.. .he just refer for further management
only... that'. all.., they don't want to follow-up because they lent for ua to manage... IFGDJ
Table 7.6. Reason, for the public aector personnel not to reply to referral letters sent by PPs 11D3
Re.ponsea	 Public Sector Personnel
PS7	 PS1O	 PS12	 P814 P815 P816 PSi?
PP. not interested in the case	 2	 2	 2	 2	 I
Bxcesaive workload	 X	 I	 2	 2
No reply format	 2	 2	 2
Case. referred to other place	 x
No directive to reply	 x
Although the PPs thought that workload was the main factor
which led to non-reply of their referral letters only four of
the seven public sector personnel mentioned this in their
interviews.
967' Actually, by right we should reply because that is their case.. But because we have too acb
workload, I don't have time to give him the reply. And he never ask me after that even though they can
contact us by phone. H. never ask about the case he referred to u. LIDI (Than,.)
The absence of a specific format in the PPs letter is another
reason cited by the PSP in the in-depth interviews. Within
public facilities a formalised common referral form was used.
The form has two parts, one filled out by the referring doctor
and another filled in by the receiving doctor for the reply.
The PSP do not reply to the referral letters from the PPS
since they do not use a similar format when referring their
patients. Most PPs use their letter-heads to write the
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referral letter.
PS17: Actually in th. governeent when a doctor refer to us, at th. back there is a reply she.t. They (PP.) don't
have that in their referral They don't have the reply sheet So, aince they don't have that stime. we just
forget. . . we never reply They never say they want a reply. Never phone us asking for reply. If they insist, we
will reply. (ID)
The MOIC of the district hospital (PS12), gave a totally
different explanation for the non-reply. He said that most of
the cases referred to his hospital were further referred to
the state general hospital. Once the patient returned to be
followed up in the district hospital, he/she might be seeing
a different doctor from the one who referred him/her to the
State General Hospital. This 'new' doctor may not know that
the patient has been referred by the PPs before or even if the
patient saw the same doctor he might have forgotten that the
patient was referred to him earlier by PPs. Nevertheless he
agreed that the responsibility to reply to the referral
letters lies with the doctor who first received the case from
the PPs. He did not have any plan to record all cases referred
to the district hospital for the purpose of replying to the
referring doctor because there are 'very few cases' being
referred from the PPs. Instead he suggested that if the PP5
want to know about their referrals they should contact him
through the phone giving details of the patients they have
referred.
The assumption by the PSP that the PP5 were not interested in
the cases they referred was rejected by all the PPs asked to
comment on this issue. They argued that they have built long-
term relationship with their patients and often patients they
refer come back to them. Furthermore their workloads and those
of public doctor may not permit them to contact the public
doctor every time they refer a case.
PPB This is the wrong iepres.ion from the goveroment doctors . because I was in the goveroment service
for so many years so I know how it is . I don't think all OP's ar. like that, we are interested in
our patient.. because I have been hers long tim. Stime patient c back and ask me and I will tell
them... (ID)
PP1O: Of course, we lik, to know shout the came lie are sending the case, the patient comes hers. They
are our patient, we definitely want to know what happens to him. It's cn sense, any doctor or OP.
he would want to know shout the patient's welfare The only thing is we don t get the tedback and then
we have to call thee and trac, them, We can't be doing it host know who are the doctors and all that.
Sometimes we are busy also (ID)
In the in-depth interviews and the FGD, the PPs complained
that whenever they refer patients to public facilities, the
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patients were never returned back to them and instead they
were continued to be followed up in the public facilities. In
this way the PPs 'lost' their patients to the public
facilities. Furthermore PPs also said that their patients had
been discouraged by the public staff from attending their
clinics once referred to the public facilities. The highly
subsidised services in the public facilities were the main
point used to discourage patients from seeking private care.
According to the PPs this is unprofessional and should not be
happening. They argued that the public doctors should realise
that the PPs were helping to reduce their burden.
PP2. To be frank with you, after all we ar. CPa, we also got a rice bowl. When I refer a patient to
you, when you finish managing him pa.. back to us. ITheyl never pass it back to you. You'll be dreaming
if you think they're passing back to you (ID)
PP8 I know of government doctors who criticised their patients for going to the OPe. The patient cow.
and complained to me. 	 you have a lot of money.. . want to go there. . .csn't you cas straight her. I
Their attitude is that... •specially nowadays is bad. (1D1
PPI, Basically the interrelation between doctors. . . we have to atop. I mean we have to get along more
better among ourselves. This back stabbing. . .1 don't think also it happens in other professions, like
this, to that extent where when going to the hospitals, the (government) doctors say • Why you want to
pay so much there? Come this side I I • We also make our living here. So basically there should be a close
interactions between us doctors. (FGDI
Eight PSP were asked whether they discouraged patients from
attending private clinics and all of them denied this. Those
PSP running the out-patient clinics denied the allegations but
explained that the patients themselves cross over from the
private clinics to the public facilities especially among
those with chronic illnesses like diabetes mellitus and
hypertension. These patients cannot afford to pay for their
long term treatment in private clinics. The public facilities
which have an open-door policy will accept anyone whether or
not they are referred by their previous doctors.
P56. One example, a diabetic case . .sometime these villagers have diabetes or hypertension case, he
went to OP. But as you know it is all the question of financial. When c to certain extend, at saee
stage he cannot afford any more. Then he will cm to me. (ID) (Trans.)
pSP running antenatal clinics denied allegations by one of the
PPs that they discouraged pregnant mothers from attending her
clinic. They argued that maternal and child health was given
high priority by MOH. The public services provide
comprehensive care for maternal and child health which
included antenatal care, home and hospital delivery, postnatal
care and child health care. On the other hand the services by
the private clinics were very limited. The PP in question, for
example, provided only antenatal care whereas the delivery and
147
postnatal care are carried out by the PSP. PPs who run
antenatal service normally referred their patients to the
health centres or hospital to be 'booked' in for delivery.
Once the patient goes to the public facilities, they were
asked to attend the antenatal follow-up in the public
facilities regularly even though they may be under the follow-
up of the private doctor. The PSP did this to ensure that
patients were closely monitored until delivery. The PSP were
not confident to allow these patients to be followed up by the
PPs for fear that they would not have access to the follow-up
data kept by PP8 when the patient came for delivery. At the
same time, once the patient was registered with them the
responsibility lay with the PSP should anything goes wrong
with the patient in the future. The PSP admitted that it was
inconvenient for patients to visit two clinics for the follow-
up and most of the time patients would drop off from the PPs
clinics.
PS5 So at least we can do close monitoring ... thorough examination .. even though sh. ha. the same
one fin PPs clinic]. Furthermore data from private Iclinic] are not entered in the small appointment
cards .. .so we do not know.. . if anything happen next time there ia no proof. (ID]
PS2 I know Ops send to us just to get the red card end then they also most understand that they are
not losing the patient. I feel that they are being selfish, in term of income they are losing the
patient but they don t understand, if they are following up end then subsequently when mother has the
maternal death and infant death.., we are doing the dirty work, you know... (ID]
In both the in-depth interviews and the FGDs, the PPs also
discussed problems they faced when their opinions on cases
they refer differed from those of the public doctors who
received them. Patients who received contradictory advice
sometimes returned and complain to them. The PPs felt that the
reasons for this were because the public doctors were
inexperienced and sometimes failed to take into consideration
all the relevant information in making their decisions.
PP9 Query Appendicitis.....Sometimes we refer cases to (public] hospital, because we are worried
about th, patient anything could happen. Usually we send theta to Klang hospital. There are patients
who courçlain not th. doctors but th. patients.. that they have been asked to go back by the hospital
doctor. So the patient are not happy why ths doctor from here refer to hospital, and the doctor from
the hospital ask them to go beck. Sometimes this kind of probleta arises. (ID]
PP2: Stimes when we send them in, is meant tot observation May be one day observation They think
is not necessary. If you do that, is unfair for the patient. When we sent there most be reasons. May
be to be warded for observations. One day then next day discharge (ID]
The PSP admitted that this situation does occur. The cases
referred to the public facilities such as the hospital will
further be assessed by the PSP at the facilities and the
subsequent management is based on the judgement of the
receiving doctor. Investigations were often carried out before
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taking further action. Hence they may or may not follow the
recommendations made by the PPs. Furthermore it is stipulated
in the MOH guidelines that the PP cannot admit any patients
directly and all cases must be assessed by PSP before
admission.
P517 We look at the cases. Sometimes they don't need admission.. For exançle ca.e of chest pain... .w. fs,l that
it is ga.tritis, we just give s medicine Sometimes patients came with abdominal pain and ask for
admi..iong . referred for admission but when we gave Gelusil be is okay, we send the patient back... but be (PP.]
wrote there indly take aver for admission.... somstimss we &dmit... (103
P314. He saw a OP .. hay, fever., high fever .. may be at that time When be reached hospital our doctors feel
that it is not serious ..o we hav, to investigate first. N. ask him to go h and c back for further
examination. Then only doctor will decide for admission or not. So it happens when the patient said private
doctors told me I have to get admitted.., so there is s
	 contradictions between cur MOs and the PP5 ... but thi.
is not always the case. (ID] (Trans
The PPs also complained that the public hospitals give poor
service to their patients when they refer. Their patients had
to wait for a long time or were mismanaged by the public
doctors. They felt that the private hospitals gave better
service to their patients.
PP2: If I refer a patient to a private hospital things are done pretty fast. It's very fast. They will
investigate very fast, come to a diagnosis very fast and decide what to do with the patient very fast
In the government hospital its slow. I have referred haamaturis case, you know. Pour f iv. times he went
to the hospital (but it's] still not investigated. (ID]
PP4' Let s say a patient comes with abdominal pain. I may be making provisional diagnosis of
appendicitis. Previously we will send patient here and with the hope they'll put up a drip or something
and send up with ambulance to government hospital (in Xlang]. What was happening in Tg. arang hospital.
they will sit on the patient for 2 or 3 days. Probably they're not too sure of the diagnosis. Raving
given on black and white its appendix case, yes. Otherwise they 11 sit on the case until the patients
were quite late, you know. Then they'll send to hang with perforated appendix. (ID)
PP13' Recsntly we have this ureteric colic I think very comuon among people here. Patient having pain
and he had all the injections and we send to hospital that fellers gave a few tablets of baralgin and
send back. No admission. (EGO]
The PPs complained about their referrals for specialist care
in public facilities. They were not satisfied because when
they referred their patients to specialists in the public
hospital, specifically the state general hospital, their
patients were asked to go to the general OPD clinic of the
hospital and only be referred to the specialist clinic after
being assessed by the medical officers (MO) in the OPD. They
felt that this would only delay the patients from getting the
attention. of the specialist and reassessment by the hospital
MO5 is unjustified since both of MOs and PPs have the same
qualifications.
PP11. en we refer and to the hospital . .the goveroment hospital, they should not be having the
barrier like that Private practitioners •bould only refer to the out-patient Becaus, it is actually
from one MO to the other MO It's of no ice This only prolonging the period for the patient to suffer
anre There should be a direct cinicatiom between the GP and the specialist (ID)
PP13 In the sense that he is not being seen by the specialist He is seen by ordinary doctors and he
paid me 30 and he is given appointment two week later. Re is referred acutely. So he is being treated
like a normal patient (POD]
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When this issue was presented to the Medical Superintendent of
the State General Hospital during the Ministry of Health
Annual Conference (14th July, 1993), he explained that the PPs
had the right to refer the patients to the Specialist Clinics
but the clinics only operated on certain days of the week.
Cases referred to specialist Clinics during the day when the
Specialist Clinics were closed were automatically channelled
to the OPD clinic. The MOs in the OPD clinic examined the
patients and if necessary admit urgent cases to be seen by the
specialist in the ward. Non-urgent cases were told to come
back to the Specialist Clinic on a specific day. He suggested
that the PPS referring cases might not know the days on which
Specialist Clinics operated. This could be overcome if the
public hospital informed the PPs of their specialist clinics
time-tables as suggested by one of the PPs.
ii) Problems faced by public sector personnel
The public sector doctors complained about the inadequate
information given by the PPs in their referral letters. Other
health staff (the non-doctors) in the public sector felt that
the information provided by PPs was adequate (PS2, PS6, PS7
and PS13); their reluctance to criticise might be due to the
higher status of the doctors. Another reason is that the non-
doctors do not normally use the information in the referral
letter since they can further refer problem cases to the
public sector doctors.
Table 7.7: Probleia. faced by public .ector personnel on PP referral. (ID)
Re.pons.a	 Public sector personnel
PS2	 PSG	 PS7	 PS8	 PS9	 PS1O	 PS12	 PS13	 PS15	 PSi?
Inadequate inforLation	 X	 X	 2	 2	 2
'Abuse of public facilities 	 2	 2	 X
We referral letters	 2
Illegible band vriting	 x
Lat. referrals	 X
The public sector doctors complained that vital information
such as drugs prescribed and investigations conducted were
often not described. PPs had occasionally not even identified
themselves when referring the cases; this made it difficult to
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contact them to obtain more information when necessary. They
also felt that some PPs purposely hid information in the
presence of unethical practice; for example, patients referred
for vaginal bleeding from uterine perforation following a D&C
performed by the PP was not disclosed. D&C for termination of
pregnancy is illegal in the country. The referral letters of
the PPs were sometimes illegible and some PPs had sent
patients to the public facilities without any letter at all.
PS9 Most of them, usually they write very brief, they just say this case... Oravida 3 or Gravida 2
and then P0k and so on, the Rb level and kindly take over for management. That's all very brief chat
they give... (101
PSlS OP did the D.0.....incotupl.t.... .but then when they refer, they refer as PV bleeding, no D.0
done....	 (FOOl
PSl9 5
	 an experience like that... she came in with perforated uteri, She denied any D.0 done.
Patient referred as PV bleeding.. .when we detected then only she did (confessi. IFODI
The PSP also complained that the PPs were abusing the referral
system to avoid higher charges rather than for them to manage
the case. For example cases that the PP5 want to send to the
specialist at state general hospital were first referred to
the health centres or the district hospital just to get the
referral letters from public staff. This is because cases
referred straight by the PPs to the State General Hospital
will be charged Rm 50.00 instead of the usual RN 5. The public
sector staff felt that they were being used by the PPs to
abuse the system.
PS17: If he goes straight to the specialist he has to pay RN 50. S.e of them IPP5J used the OPO like
an .conoeic plan If we refer to the specialist the charges is 514 5... from the govermnent doctor. If
OP refer, th. charge is RN 50. If they want to see th, eye specialist, they con. to us first... because
if they (PP.) refer straight, they will be charged 514 50... (ID)
The PSP also complained that some PPs refer cases to their
clinic at a very late stage. The PPs were said to refer cases
who had died or suffered complications in their clinics to
avoid being blamed for the death and also to protect the
credibility of their clinics.
PSl9 Ther. is s child 11 annthe old history of *DO (Acute diarrboeal disease) for three days or so.
Re has gone to OP before that.., the doctor said okay go hack . . .he went back. Mter two days he went
again to the OP.. at that time it ii already serious. OP refer to us.....the patient came in stiff, blue
already . . she (mother) said 'ust now the doctor said my child ii airight. The patient has died forhow many hours elready. . But at time he do not give referral letter.., she (mother) said I went there(the private clinici the doctor ask me to come here straight away... (TOO)
PS20 May be they do not went any cases died in their clinics... .they want to take care of the clinic (name).(POD)
In the FGD, when they were told about the public doctors
complaint, the PPs disagreed that their referral letters were
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incomplete. Although they admitted that their referral letters
were short and brief they felt that they had provided all the
relevant information on the case.
PP7 We are making clinical diagnosis What are we supposed to write? Patient corn. for etchache. We
know it is appendix. He'. got all the sign and syuçtoms of appendicitis. What are we going to writ.?
You writ, the vital sign. Patient come with Stomach ache.., pain in RIP, his BP. his cardiovascular
system, his respiratory system are normal. What's there to write .. Tenderness in right iliac fossa,
rebound tendernes, presence. He has got all the sign and syitows of appendicitis. I would Lik, you to
examine this caa., I suspect he is having appendicitis. I make a clinical di.gnoeis. IPWJ)
7.4.4 Public to private sector referrals
i) Problems faced by the public sector personnel
The Guidelines on Referral System of MOH circulated to health
centres and public hospitals (MOH, 1992 d) did not mention
anything about referrals from public facilities to the private
facilities at the district level. Most of the contents of the
guideline concerned the referral from the private to public
facilities. In fact it assumed that the public facilities
would always be the recipient of referred cases from the
private facilities. Hence some PSP felt that referral to the
private facilities were generally not allowed under the
present system.
Some public sector doctors believed that only specialist were
allowed to refer cases officially to private sector doctors
with contactual agreement with MOH. Others were confused and
hoped to have proper guidelines on this kind of referral.
PS1 No. we as government doctor., we are not supposed to refer them to private practitioners anyway,
you see. OP's can refer to us you know But not the other way round. Officially it's not allowed. But
as it stand.s we cannot refer a patient for a CAT scan outside you know. lie are supposed to refer the.
to 01W!.. tb)
Pse I am not so sure whether its right or not to refer to the GP. So I em quits reluctant. I don't know
whether what I have don, is allowed or not. (ID) (Transj
In the district there was no ultrasound facilities in the
public sector and specialist was not posted permanently to the
district public facilities. While the nearest public hospital
with ultrasound scan was 80 km away, five of the private
clinics in the district had this facility. Although there was
no contractual agreement with these private clinics, the
public sector doctors unofficially refer patients to these
private clinics. To avoid any administrative problems, they
referred cases to the PP5 without writing an official referral
letter. Instead a short note is written to the PPs and given
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to the patient to be handed to the PP5. Sometimes patients
were sent to the private clinics without any referral letter
at all.
PS4r Dr h (PP1J will .end back the finding.. We don't refer to him .... cur doctor will say to thepatient verbally to go to the privat. clinic. (IDI
PSB: I send a letter 1 just writ, on a email piece of paper lik, this ... 'Dear Dr. • pleas. do scan for
this mother for this uterus larger than date. Then I clipped it on her card.. LIDJ
The need to use the ultrasound scan facilities in the private
clinics were echoed by all the public doctors who were asked
on this issue. The cost and time needed to travel to the state
general hospital discouraged patients from going there. The
cost of a scan in the private clinics is between RN 15-20
which is almost the same as the travelling expenses to the
state general hospital before taking into account the whole
day waiting to get the ultrasound done in the hospital.
Furthermore the attenders were often given two weeks to one
month appointments. In the private clinics the scan can be
done on the same day whenever the patient was referred.
PSB I feel that scan from PP5 is also necesaary. If patient want to go to Slang you have to make
appointment, have to queue That • 5 why I refer to Tg Karang. She go there for booking in hospital and
do the scanning (in private clinici at the aame time. If you refer for scam in Slang, you hav, to make
appointment. It takes a long time. Patient has to go two or three times there whereas they ar. not going
to deliver there. It is also difficult to ask the patient to go to Slang, its far. (ID)
In the FGD, the public doctors stated that the state
obstetrician and gynaecologist had asked them to stop their
referral to PPs since she was not confident with the scan
results from the PPs who were mostly not trained. However the
public sector doctors felt that the reason to discourage such
referrals was that the management was worried about the public
complaints of the charges they had to pay and the lack of
facilities in the district hospital. All the public doctors
felt that the regulation to disallow their referral to private
clinics was not practical and most of them continued to refer
their patients to the PPs.
The public doctors realised that some of the PPs were not
trained to do the ultrasound scan since some of them failed to
provide vital information in the scan report. Some PP5 did not
even give the scan result when they were not sure of the
findings while others were found to repeat their scan
unnecessarily.
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PS19 I think with regard to the ultrasound, they all not very sure, becaus, not everybody can do scan,
but by right if the clinic, the staff cannot do it accurately, it's better if they do not hav, the
ultrasound. Many clinics are uk. that, if they ar, not cur, of th. findings, they will not give the
scan results. (lCD)
PSil Sometimes when we asked for the (previous) scan results, they do not give us, wh.t they do is
they do it again on the patient and give th, result for that day In fact it is nor. u..ful, if we have
the .arli.r result.. But they do not give the earlier ultre.eound results. (ID)
The public doctors currently send only non-urgent cases for
scanning in the private clinics and they also choose the PPs
whom they thought were able to give most accurate findings.
ii) Problems faced by PPs
Unofficial referral to PPs exposed the public sector doctors
to criticism especially from PPS who did not receive regular
referrals. Although five clinics had the facilities, only one
was getting most of the referrals. The PPs felt that some
public doctors were being lobbied to send cases for scans to
certain PPs only. They felt that it was unfair and suggested
that the public doctors should leave it the patients to make
their choices.
PPS. You see, this hospital hers they don't have scanning. So. I don't know what is th. connection
between this hospital and one private clinic on the oilier sids. It seems to me that hospital s
referring cases for scanning to that particular clinic. (ID)
7.5 UTILISATION OF PUBLIC AMBULANCES BY PPe
7.5.1 Background
In Malaysia, ambulance services are provided by the MOH and
voluntary organisations such as the Red Cross and St. John's
Ambulance. Voluntary organisations provide their services in
the urban areas leaving the rural areas to depend on the
government services. Ambulances are stationed in the district
hospitals and health centres to transport emergency cases as
well patients referred from these public facilities.
Most PPs do not have their own ambulance, and therefore
occasionally use public ambulances to transport cases referred
to the public facilities. At present, the MOH does not allow
this practice. This is stipulated in Guidelines on the
Referral System of MOH. Under item 4.2.5 of the document it
stated that:
The private practitioner shall make the necessary travel
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arrangements for the patient. If there is a need for the
patient to be accompanied, the PP shall make all the necessary
arrangements" ( MOH, 1992 d).
Interviews with senior officers of the MOH indicated that the
reasons for this were the shortage of ambulances in the
government services and fear that PPs would misuse the
ambulance to transport non-emergency cases. In addition there
was concern at the medico-legal implications whereby the MOH
did not want to be blamed for cases which were mismanaged by
the PPs.
7.5.2 Findings from Kuala Selangor District
i) Practice in the district
There were altogether five ambulances available in the
district. Two of them were in the district hospital and
another three in the health centres. Most of the PSP in the
district knew that they were not allowed to provide the
ambulance when requested by the PPs. Nevertheless they still
provided the ambulance when requested to by the PPs on
humanitarian grounds. They also felt that MOH policy is
difficult to follow especially when dealing with emergency and
life-threatening conditions. Box 7.2 outlines the tedious
steps required to be taken by PPs when requesting an
ambulance from the public facilities.
ii) Problems faced by public sector personnel
The most common problem faced by PSP when requested by PPs for
ambulance services was that the patients were not resuscitated
by the PPs; intravenous drips for example had not been set up
for cases of haemorrhage. In some clinics, the PPs had not
even helped the ambulance staff (mainly paramedics) to
resuscitate and stabilise the patient before putting them into
the ambulance. The PSP felt that there was little emergency
equipment available in the private clinics to enable the PP5
to resuscitate patients. Furthermore when patients died, the
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Box 7.2 £t.ps involved when pPs utilie.d
public admulance servic, for
	 rg.ncy cases
1. Boergency Cas. at private clinic
2. PP resuscitates and stabilises the patient
3	 PP call A & B doctor or MA
4.	 PP give information on th. pati.nt
5 •
	pp writes referral letter
6.	 MA/Doctor ask MOIC for p.rmission
7	 MOIC checks with the supervisor whether the aabulanc. is
available
8.	 MOIC allows ardmlance to go
9	 MA accani.e	 alance
10. Ambulance arrived at the alinc
11. Patient prepared for transfer
12. pp accanie. cases to hospital when n.c.seary
13. Cane arrives at hospital
14	 pp briefs public doctor about the case
15. Public doctor takes over the case
16. PP contacted for further information
17. Patient admitted to ward
PPs refused to take any responsibility and put the blame on
the public staff. Even the task of explaining to the relatives
about the death when it occurred in the private clinics had
been left to the ambulance crew.
In the FGD, the PPs were told about the complaints that they
had not resuscitated and stabilised their patients when
calling for ambulances. The PPs admitted that they did not
resuscitate the patients because most of their clinics did not
have emergency equipment such as drips. They said they were
not required under the regulation to keep such equipment, only
private hospital were required to do so. Furthermore they felt
it was wasteful to keep the equipment such as drips which were
likely to expire before use.
Another problem was the use of ambulances by PPs for non-
urgent cases. All the requests from the PPs had to be screened
before allowing the ambulance to be used.
P819 • Usually I talk to the doctor with the PP. I ask hi. what is the problem.. at least we
know.. .and if we feel that it is necessary we send I think if our relationship with tb is good, if
they want our help we can help, provided that we are not busy. (FC)J
The PSP argued that the PP5 did not follow proper procedures
when calling for the ambulance. Most of the time the PPS
contacted the police who then conveyed the message to the PSP.
156
The PSP were not happy with this kind of communication since
there was a delay in contacting the hospital and most of the
time the third party was not able to provide the information
required.
PS12 •
 Police Station is ringing us up, telling us there ii a critically ill patient in Clinic H(private clinic) • pleas. 5.nd an auulancs inediat.ly. So my HA here on duty received be call ... but
he was confused becauee before we send an awulanc.... we want to g.t enr. details. Decauss ha is a
policenan vs cannot get any detail.. lID)
The PSP also felt that they did not have enough ambulances at
their disposal to cater for the needs of the PP8. The hospital
had two ambulances; these were not adequate to meet the needs
of the hospital itself. The district hospital had five
ambulances in 1985, but by 1992, three had been condemned
without replacement, leaving only two in service. The PSP felt
that the hospital needed at least five ambulances to operate
optimally because ambulances were also being used to send
specimens and also documents to place outside the district.
In addition, there were not enough paramedics and drivers to
run the ambulance service. No paramedics had been specifically
employed to run the ambulance service but instead they were
taken from those who ran the service within the hospital.
Most PSP expected the PP5 to accompany emergency cases to
hospital especially when there were not enough paramedics to
run the ambulance service. Most PP5, on the other hand, were
not willing to leave their clinics because there would be no
one to replace them in their absence.
iii) Problems faced by the PPs
The PPs complained that their requests for ambulances were
often turned down by the PSP. In such cases the PPs either
used their own transport or sent patients in public transport
or taxis to the hospital. Furthermore the PPs complained that
the ambulances often arrived late and were not properly
staffed and equipped. They also complained that the staff were
reluctant to take the cases.
The MOIC of the district hospital denied these allegations and
maintained that the ambulances were well equipped. However, he
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admitted that he was sometimes unable to send medical
assistants to accompany the ambulance because of a shortage of
medical assistants in the hospital especially during weekends
and when staffing levels were low. If the medical assistants
were not available he would send an untrained attendant. He
expected the private doctors to accompany the case to the
hospital.
7.6 MEDICAL EXAMINATION OF FOREIGN WORKERS
7.6.1 Background
Due to the rapid economic growth in Malaysia after 1985, the
country faced a shortage of workers. Since 1986, the
government has recruited foreign workers for the oil palm and
rubber estates in the rural areas, and for construction and
domestic work in urban areas. Most of these workers came from
Indonesia, Bangladesh and Philippines. It was estimated that
in 1994 there were one million immigrants in the country, only
40% were legal (MMA, 1994 b). The rest were illegal
immigrants, especially from Indonesia, had been coming to the
country long before the government had decided to allow them.
The health implications of immigration concerned the
importation of communicable disease through these workers. To
control this, foreign workers were required to undergo medical
examinations to screen for these diseases; the screening is
done by PPs with the cost borne by the employers. This avoids
overloading the public health services and freed the
government from shouldering the costs. Three organisations
were directly involved in this activity: the Ministry of
Health, the Immigration Department and the Malaysian Medical
Association representing the PPs.
The MOH monitors the activity and is responsible for
controlling communicable diseases while the Immigration
Department issues the work permit. The PPs were responsible
for doing full physical examinations, which included chest X-
rays, blood test for hepatitis B, HIV screening, blood film
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for malaria parasites, urine for morphine and cannabis and
urine pregnancy test for female patients. The PPs were
required to certify the fitness of these workers, notify the
district health office if they detected any communicable
diseases and to refer the workers with such diseases to
government hospitals for treatment.
Foreign workers who decided to come and work in Malaysia were
requested to undergo medical examination in their country of
origin. The workers were then brought into Malaysia by their
employment agencies and on entering the country were given a
one year temporary work permit. They are required to undergo
another medical check-up in this country within three months
of arrival. Annually they have to undergo medical examinations
to renew their work permit. Those who failed the medical
examination are admitted to the government hospital for
treatment and a decision would then be made by the Immigration
Department whether to deport them or to allow them to work in
the country after their treatment.
At the end of 1992, the Ministry of Health reported that over
137,000 foreign workers working in the country suffered from
various forms of communicable disease (The Star, 1992 c). The
MOH felt that the PPs were not doing the screening properly.
Furthermore there were reports of the involvement of PPs in
unethical practices such as signing the medical reports
without doing the required physical examinations and
investigations (The Star, 1992 d). Some PPs were reported to
return the medical report to the workers or the employer to be
sent to the Immigration Office. A worker who was certified as
unfit to work could then shop around for other PPs who were
willing to provide them with a favourable report.
In view of this, from 1st January 1993, the MOH, MMA and the
Immigration Department had decided to improve the process.
The issue of medical examination forms were controlled by the
Immigration Department. Each form had a reference number. This
would prevent the workers from getting new forms for a re-
examination. Secondly PPs were instructed to make the result
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of the medical examination confidential and to return the
result to the workers or agents in a sealed enveloped.
Thirdly the PPs were requested to report to the Immigration
Department directly any foreign workers who failed the medical
examination. Fourthly, the MOH agreed to undertake random
checks on the PPs to ensure that proper procedures were being
carried out (MMA, 1992 b; The Star, 1992 d)
Rox 7.3: Role of PP. in foreign workers medical .m(nation
1. Conduct full. phy.ical awi.tion
2. Conduct or arrange for investigations
3. Certify whether th, worker is fit to work
4. Return medical report to Imeigratico Dept. through
evçloyer or worker. in sealed envelop.
5. Inform limuigration Dept. directly if worker fail.
medical examinstcn
6 llotify coimminicable diseases to district health office
7. Refer worker who fails medical examination to
government hospital
7.6.2 Findings from Kuala Selangor District
i) Response from PPs
Eight PPs indicated they were actively involved in carrying
out this activity. All of them used the services of private
laboratories in the capital to carry out investigations. Blood
samples were submitted to private laboratories; K-rays were
taken in private radiology clinics in the city.
One PP who was not involved in this activity felt that the
government should not have privatised this activity because he
believed that the PPs would be tempted by financial gain to
carry out improper examinations.
The most common issue discussed in the FGD and the in-depth
interviews was charges. The MMA recommended that the PPs
should charge RN 180.00 for the service; a number of the PPB
believed that some of their colleagues were charging much
lower than the recommended charges. By 'undercutting'
sometimes as much as 50% of the recommended charges they would
attract more clients but at the same time they would not be
able to conduct all the required investigations. The PPs
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suggested that the charges should be standardized by the
government. Most of the PPs did not believe that the private
doctors provided false medical reports to foreign workers but
blamed on organised syndicate.
PPl, We do a lot of foreign worker, medical examinations and vs aend out aU the blood specimen to the
lab. Ivan what we can do, we norTsally send it out to the lab. Like this, they have the third party
certificate showing that it ha. been don. II. make our charge. standard, ! 140-150. I mean a lot of
people sak me for discount They said it, available for Ru RO-lOS .. where it. doubtful they do any
test, you ss.. So we tell them please go ahead and do it there. (WI
PP7, I think rubber etssçs ar, being mad, and forged signatur. of the doctor. I don't think so. I personally
feel... .1 mean I know I studied, met a lot of the doctor,, I know the calibers of th. doctor.. .1 don't think
so, the doctor would do that. Mayb. you can get black sheep in th, profession. But I peraonally don't think the
doctor will do that. (IDI
Some of them questioned the value of some of the
investigations required. For example they felt that blood
films to detect malaria parasites was useless since the
clients did not have fever and it was very unlikely that the
test would detect anything. One PP was unsure whether patients
diagnosed as having certain communicable diseases should be
certified unfit for work: he suggested that patients with
infectious disease such as hepatitis B were fit to work
although they needed to be given health education.
In the FGD and the in-depth interviews the PPs were asked
their opinions on suggestions that MOH carry out spot checks
on them. Although the PPs did not object to monitoring by the
government to ensure that the PPs carried out this activity
appropriately, they doubted whether the spot checks would
uncover any malpractice.
Three of the six PPs in the FGD admitted that they were
unaware of the recent changes from January 1993, two months
before the FGD: they still informed the workers directly of
their results.
ii) Response from the public sector personnel
Although the district health office was supposed to receive
the notifications from PPs of communicable diseases among the
foreign workers, this was not happening. The district health
officer was aware of the activity going on but was not aware
of his role. Most PSP felt that it was appropriate to
privatise this activity because it would reduce workload in
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the public sector. However most expressed doubts on the
quality of the job done by PPs and stressed the need for close
monitoring. They felt that the PPs were more inclined to do
improper and incomplete examinations for the sake of financial
gain. Most of them expressed doubts whether MOH will be able
to carry spot checks to detect malpractice by PPs since it
would increase their workload substantially.
PSO. It is a good move since it will reduce our workload After all w hav, our .n patients. If many
of them cowe her., we do not have enough equipment and staff so it will reduc. our burden. But there
is a problem. ..I think they (PP.) ar, not sincere ... LID) (Trana.)
PS11r I coae to know that s of the food handlers., they never had inlectioc (Typhoid iemsniaatioc).They lust pay and th. doctor sign it.. .that'e all.. .me if thay were given.... (ID)
7.7 PRIVATE PRACTICE BY PUBLIC DOCTORS
7.7.1 Background
Currently public sector doctors in Malaysia are not allowed to
work in private practice or to open their own private clinics.
However, many public sector doctors do locums in the private
sector. The MMA has urged the government to allow this locum
as an incentive to keep the doctors in the public sector. On
the other hand the MOH feels that legalising locums will
adversely affect the public service: not only was there a fear
that those doing locums would neglect their public sector
work, but there was also fear that the public doctors would
misuse the public facilities to boost private clinics that
they might open.
In 1991, when the new remuneration scheme was introduced in
the public service, the issue of locums surfaced again. Under
the new salary scheme, senior doctors and specialists would
benefit. This resulted in a sudden increase in the number of
doctors especially the juniors resigning from the public
service to enter private practice (The Star, 1992 b). The
government was again urged by the MMA to reconsider locum
practice as an option to boost the morale of the public sector
doctors; it suggested that locums should be allowed for those
who had completed their compulsory service and should be
monitored by the MOH. Those who abused this privilege should
be banned from doing locums in future. This recommendation was
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turned down by the MOH and instead the government lengthened
the compulsory service from a three year period to a five year
period (MMA, 1993 c).
7.7.2 Findings from Kuala Selangor District
i) Response from public sector doctors
The public sector doctors admitted that they often engaged in
private sector locums. Due to its illegal status this could
not be done openly: they tended to practice in private clinics
further away from their district to avoid being caught by
their superiors. They also tried not to take unnecessary risks
during their locum hours. They would refer cases at the
slightest indication to avoid any complications such as deaths
and would not identify themselves when they referred cases to
public facilities.
PSl7 Now we are doing it in fear. .fear if the officer cea and ch.ck on us. (WI
PS8 So we the government doctors can work without any fear. Now we are doing it qui.tly and aar boa...
also do not know. Xf t ii allowed we can do it with a peace of mind. . .1101
PS11: We are scared of our rice bowl... scared that our superiors might know becaus. on., we are not
doing the right thing and locum is not really legalised yet. IFGDI
All the public sector doctors wanted locums to be legalised;
citing the main advantage as their ability to supplement their
salaries. They felt that the only alternative to doing locums
was for the government to increase their salaries. However
only two of the public sector doctors were convinced that
legalising locums would keep the public doctors in the
government service for longer (Table 7.8); the others felt
that it would not have any impact and that public doctors
would still leave because of poor service conditions such as
excessive workloads. One of them felt that the public sector
doctors would be influenced by the PPs and would leave the
government service earlier.
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Tabi. 7. $ s Opinion, of public .ctor doctors on advantag.s of isgalisation of locum (1D3
Reapona..	 Public ..ctor doctor.
Psi	 P88	 P89	 P910	 P811	 9917
10cr.... inc
	 of public doctor.	 X	 X	 2	 2	 x	 x
P..l ..cur. when doing locu.	 2	 2	 x
Iaprov. marvic.. in privat. clinic.	 2	 2	 2
Reap doctori in public ..rvic.	 2	 2
lot lu.nc. on PPa practics 	 x	 z
Learn new things from PPB	 2
Other reasons given by the public sector doctors for
legalizing private sector locum work included that they would
feel more secure working in the private sector; that the
public would benefit from their practice as they would be able
to improve the quality of medical practice in private sector;
that they would educate the PPs which they observed to have
unacceptable practice such as the over-prescribing
antibiotics, poor maintenance of the cold chain and use of
anti-motility drugs to treat diarrhoea. Two of the public
sector doctors in the FGD suggested that this was unlikely,
and that public sector doctors would simply follow the PPs
practice to avoid creating problems in the private clinics.
PS9' Those OP. who have practiced for year., they just think of money. Ha doean't cais about patient'.
welfare. The government doctor, have different attitude from the GPe. If they practic. in ho.pital they
can bring to the OP. our management, the proper management, co we don't treat pati.nt just for money....(103
PS1O We are trained in Control of Diarrho.al Disease (COOl and Ak! (Acut. Respiratory Infection how
to manage them. In the COD we are not allowed to use anti-diarrhoeal drug to atop the diarrhoea and we
are a.ked to use ORS only and to educate the mother to treat at homo. ... for the API we ar. not
encouraged to uae cough mixtures, anti-vomiting drugs, Sanadryl and Phenergan which will nak, it worae.
So I think when we work in GP (clinici we can use th, knowledge .....and th.n we can interact with the
GP and educat, them. IFGDJ
Three of the public sector doctors also argued that the
private clinics would be able to provide better services to
the community through their locums. The PPs could extend their
operating hours and offer a greater variety of services: one
example cited was the opportunity to employ part-time women
doctors to run services for women such as antenatal clinics.
One public sector doctor reflecting her own experience in
doing locums felt that the public doctors would have the
opportunity to learn about the different types of new drugs
which were not available in the health centres. She felt that
the drugs in her health centres were limited and not
effective. She had also learned about the cost of the drugs
that she prescribed while working in the private clinics
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because patients had to pay for the drugs.
All the six public sector doctors in the in-depth interviews
agreed that the main disadvantage of legalising locum practice
was that the doctors would neglect their public service. The
PPS sought locums during odd hours such as at night or during
weekends when the public sector doctors were supposed to be
off-duty; the long hours in locum private clinics could,
however, deplete their energy. Lured by the good income in the
private clinics, some public doctors may take leave or even
use false medical certificates to do locums. They suggested
that if it was legalised this activity should be properly
monitored although they recognised this would be difficult.
psi it tiocuas] .ill avoid people from running away from service, you know and it will keep them
working in th. government service . I think that way you'll have mor. stable doctor', population. The
only thing is that, the fear is that they may be spending to ouch time in their privat. clinics even
neglecting the official work in this one, you know. Even now you have problem with people taking
emergency leave and you know very well they are going for locuins, you know... the work of taking MCI
tmedical c.rtificate3 and emergency leave to do locumz. (ID)
ii) Response from the PPs
Seven out of eight PPs interviewed agreed that locums should
be legalised because of poor salary received in public sector
(Table 7.9). Only one PP suggested that government should
rather increase the salaries in the public sector as he feared
that the government doctors would neglect the public service.
In the FGD all the participants wanted locum to be legalised.
Table 7. 9: Opinions of PPa on advantages of legalisation of locuma 1101
Private Doctors
PPi	 PP3	 PP4 PP6	 PP7 PPB PP1O	 PP11
Increaa. inc	 of Public doctor.	 S	 S	 S	 I	 S	 S	 I	 X
PPacsn.bave.orerest	 x	 x	 x	 x
Public doctor, stay longer in governt service 	 S	 S	 S
Easier for PP. to find locua	 S	 S
Government gets extr. tax 	 S
Exposure to private practice	 x
Only three of the PPs felt that legalising locums would keep
the doctors in the government service. The PPs benefitted
through having a ready supply of locum doctors, could have
more time for themselves, and could expose public sector
doctors to private practice which would be beneficial to them
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if they wanted to join the private sector later.
PP1. You a.., for on. thing at least the doctor, are legally allowed to earn extra inc. It •erves
both parties. The OP. are abi. to get locum more freely, and the doctor. are legally able to
sam.......You see for ages . it has been going on. I mean government doctor. Moat of th. locu ar.
from government doctors, you know Ivsr since I was a kid, as far as I can reuiseher even before going
to the medical school. So. all this while its been going on quiet basis. If legalized, at least the
IRD (Inland Revenue Departmentj can get some money from you. And there need to be a	 control. (WI
PP11, Of cours, it helps the government doctors himself. You see. . b.c*use somehow they think on. day
they also want to b. am, private practitioner. On. thing, it helps them to ioow what privet, practice
is all about Secondly, I thuik economically also they 11 be aach happier. Thirdly, they will stay
longer with th. government because both side they get income. And it is more educational and economical(1D3
However most PP5 felt that the public service would suffer if
the locums were legalised without controlling the amount of
time spent on this activity. One disadvantage could arise if
locum doctors unofficially referred patients seen during their
locum hours to themselves while working in the public
facilities to undergo the investigations not available in the
private clinics. In this way private patients would be given
priority over other patients in the public facilities.
7.8 DISEASE NOTIFICATIONS
7.8.1 Background
Control of communicable diseases is a responsibility of the
MOH. This includes active and passive case detections, contact
tracing, source reduction and treatment. Under the regulation
covered by Communicable Disease Control Act (1988), all
doctors in the public and private sector are required to
notify to the district health office any communicable diseases
they come across (WHO, 1990 a). Currently there are 24 types
of diseases covered by this regulation (Appendix 39).
Notifications were done using a form called 'Health 1'
(Appendix 35). Eight of the 24 diseases need to be immediately
notified by telephone.
7.8.2 Findings from Kuala Selangor district
i) Responses from the PPs
Eight of the 12 PPs interviewed, had not made any previous
notifications. However the PSP said that they never received
any notifications from the PPs in the district. The only
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notifications they ever received were from one PP in another
district.
Breaching their patients' confidentiality was the main concern
among the PPs leading to their refusal to notify (Table 7.10).
They were worried that their patients would be socially
stigmatised, especially when dealing with sexually transmitted
diseases. They were worried that they would loose their
patients and face repercussions as a result. They also
criticised the unprofessional attitude of the PSP when they
handled the investigations of notifiable diseases.
PP5: I got a gonorrhoea. Ha comas here. You a.. you seast stop it at that treatmant level itself. Youdon't tell that fellow that I got to notify it you see. Other wise the whol. people in the hous, will
know you a.. create. social problem. That. the main problem. (ID]
PP2 That's the main problem (in notifications] they c
	 and scold you . retaliation can be bad, you
know .... you know what type of retaliation, you know. They cowie bang and bash your car. Many peopi.
will c
	 to my house.... I am not going to do this (notify]. (ID]
PP1O: The health people go to the family and they go end said such person has TB (tuberculosis]. Maybe
for these people the health (staff] go to the house, the neighbour sight be wondering, our society is
like that. They won't let their children to go next door. The society can be like that. That can be the
reason (for not notifying]. (POD]
Table 7.10: Reasons for PPS not notifying notifiable diseases LIDI
Private Doctors
PP1	 PP2 PP3	 PP4	 PP5 PPG PP?	 PP8	 PP9 PP1O PP11 PP12
Breach of patient confidentiality 	 X	 X	 X	 x	 X	 K
Cases referred to hospital 	 X	 H	 H	 K	 K
Unsure of diagnosis	 X	 H	 K	 K
Ho notification forms 	 I	 K	 K
No cases to notify	 H	 I
No time to notify	 H	 H
No lists of notifiable diseases	 x
Another common reason for the failure to notify is that the
PP5 referred these cases to hospital and hoped that the
district hospital would notify the cases. They felt that once
the cases were referred, it was not their responsibility to
notify the cases; the responsibility was with the hospital
doctor.
PP6. Well, you see, when I have this sort of notifiable disease, we normally refer thea to the hospital.
And I suppose they (boapital doctoral have to notify. I leav, it to them. (ID)
PP7. ... actually that is a form of notification too I write a (referrall letter end they go to the
hospital and the hospital take th. cases and they will notify. (ID]
The PPs were sometimes unsure of the diagnosis, as the private
clinics were not fully equipped with laboratory facilities to
confirm the diagnosis. They would often refer these cases and
hope that the hospital staff would run a full investigation to
167
confirm the diagnosis. The PPs were not sure whether they
should notify the case they suspected and the diagnosis was
not confirmed. The PPs felt that notifications of cases
without confirmation would create false alarms and would
increase the number of notifications unnecessarily. The senior
health inspector and the health inspector in-charge of control
of communicable diseases wanted notifications for confirmed
cases rather than suspected ones. Notifications of suspected
cases would increase their workload but they were also aware
that it may be too late if they have to wait for confirmation
of diagnosis before taking preventive measures.
P821. So, sinc, hospital also giving the suspect and cases, it will be good if the OP. giv. us the
suspected cases so that, at least they give us the early warning. So that w. can take actions before
anything move further that. But th, other aspect it will give us the overload, We may be given a lot
of false reporting, we will be getting suspected cases but in th, end it did not turn out to be ca...
So that will overload our work. LID]
Three of the PP5 did not notify because they did not have the
notification forms. Among the 12 PPs, only two of them had
received notification forms distributed by the District Office
a 'few years ago'. There were some contradictions in the
explanations by the district health officer and the senior
health inspector on the distributions of the Health 1 form to
the PPs. The district health officer felt that his office was
not responsible for distributing the forms and maintained that
the PPs themselves must take responsibility to ask for them.
The senior health inspector however explained that the
district health office used to, but no longer, distributed
these forms, as he was waiting for a new forms which was
redesigned following the amendments of the Communicable
Diseases Control Act four years ago.
Two of the PPs said that they had not notified because they
never had any notifiable cases in their practice; one of them
had been in private practice in the district for over 15
years. The other one had recently opened his private clinic;
he also said that he did not have the list of notifiable
diseases. Two PPs said that they did not have time to do the
notifications.
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ii) Responses from the public sector personnel
Among the five public sector doctors in the in-depth
interviews, only one of them had previously notified any
disease. In the FGD only two of the six doctors had done
notifications before. Both of them worked in the hospital.
In the in-depth interviews, three public sector doctors
admitted that they did not know the procedure for
notifications; neither what forms to use nor to whom they
should be sent. Their ignorance was because in the health
centres and the hospitals the work is assigned to nurses or
medical assistants who fill up all the forms only to be signed
by the doctors.
P817 Actually this one on notifying the diseas., th. nurses and th. paramedic... they already used
to it. They always insist us to notify the cases. If there is any cases they will say Boss this case
have to be notified. • So we notified.....through phon. or what. They know... LID]
P811: First, I do not know the procedure. What fore should b. filled. . .1 don't know. I do not know to
whom I should notify even though I work in the district office.... (ID)
A number of public sector doctors working in the health
centres said that they do not notify cases of notifiable
disease because they referred them to hospital hoping that the
hospital staff will do the notifications.
P88: Because if we have a cas. say I suspect a case of dengus fever, I will refer to hospital and be
admitted there. They will inform the 1K (Health inspector), they will notify district h.alth officer.
I never fill up the notification fore before. (ID)
Table 7.11: ReasOns for public sector doctors not notifying notifisble dis.asea LID]
Private Doctors
P88	 PS9	 PS1O	 P811	 PS17
Do not know th. procedure	 X	 K	 K
Notifications done by other staff	 K	 K
Cu.. referred to hospital 	 K	 K
No notification forms	 K	 K
Mo cases to notify	 K
Mo dir.ctivs to notify	 I
Breach of patient confidentiality 	 x
Public sector doctors also attributed their failure to notify
to the absence of notification forms in their clinics or said
that there was no directive from the seniors to do the
notifications.
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Only one public doctor was worried about the breach of patient
confidentiality: he was reluctant to notify cases of STD
especially among respected people in the community.
iii) Ways to improve notifications
The district health officer was not satisfied with the
enforcement of regulations concerning notifications in the
country. He attributed the failure of the PPs to notify partly
due to the non-enforcement of the regulation.
The senior health inspector was worried about the delay in the
production of the new notification form. He was still using
the old forms although these were not legally acceptable under
the new regulation. He hoped that the MOH would expedite this
process. Under the new regulations, the lists of notifiable
diseases had been amended and the person responsible for
notifications had also been modified.
Most PSP dismissed the suggestions for monetary incentive to
PPs to encourage notifications. They felt that the PPs were
already earning a lot of money from their practice and would
not response to such incentive.
In order to improve the current notifications, the PP5
suggested that the district health officer should send their
personnel regularly to collect the notification forms. They
felt that this would ensure that the PPs would always be
reminded of their duty to notify. In the FGD, it was also
suggested that the PSP provide feedback to the PP5 regarding
the presence of epidemics in the district. They felt that in
this way they could be more helpful in controlling
communicable diseases. The PPs otherwise depended on the media
for such information and this was sometimes not accurate. They
also wanted the district health office to send the
notification forms to them.
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7.9 Suary
We have examined seven different types of public-private
interactions. These reveal a number of interesting findings.
In sending the immunisation returns most PPs were poorly
informed on the purpose of the exercise even though it was
well understood by the PSP. The PSP were doubtful on the
quality of information given, faced poor response from the PPs
who delayed in sending the returns. The PPs complained of
irregular visits by PSP to collect the returns and felt that
they were not benefitting from the exercise.
The MMA/MOH-HB project was aimed to increase participation of
PPs in EPI and to provide incentives to PPs to provide data on
immunisation. The project was planned centrally and the local
district health office was poorly informed on their roles.
Most PPs in the district were reluctant to participate because
of the poor supply of vaccine and poor demand for the service
due to age restrictions and having to compete with the health
centres. Furthermore vaccine supplied through the programme
had to compete with other brand of vaccines in the market
which would give similar or even higher profit to the PPs.
PPs were more inclined to refer their patients to private
hospitals or government hospitals outside the district than to
the district hospital. They bypassed the district hospital
because of patient requests, lack of surgical and specialist
facilities and poor management on their referrals. The PPs
also complained of lack of feed-back on their referrals,
losing their patients to public facilities and limited access
to specialist in the public sector. Even though the PPs
thought the main reason the public sector doctors failed to
reply to their referral letters was because of excessive
workload, most PSP felt that the PPs were not interested to
know about their patients once referred to the public sector.
The PSP complained of inadequate information from referrals
from PPs and suggested that they abused of the referral system
to avoid charges on their patients and refer cases at a late
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stage. Public to private sector referral were complicated by
lack of guidelines to be followed by PSP, untrained PPs
providing poor quality of ultrasound service while the PPs
were unhappy with unfair distribution of cases sent.
There was clear indication that policy made at the central
level on utilisation of ambulance service by PPs were
unacceptable to public sector personnel at the ground level.
They extended the ambulance service to PPs but in doing so
they faced a range of problems: shortage of ambulance and
staff to run the service, refusal of PPs to resuscitate
emergency cases and accompany cases to hospital, use of
ambulance for non-emergency cases and failure of the PP5 to
follow proper procedure when requesting for ambulance. The PPS
on the other hand had to undergo long and tedious process to
get the service which often arrived too late or the ambulance
is poorly equipped and staffed.
Medical examination of foreign workers was privatised to
reduce the burden on public sector. However the programme were
poorly monitored and information was not systematically
disseminated to those involved in the public and private
sector. Competition among the PPs to reduce charges in order
to attract clients had resulted in practices not adhering to
the requirements of the programme. The poor dissemination of
information led to the lack of awareness on the role of
district health office and failure of the PP5 to follow the
instructions regarding notifications of communicable disease.
PPs and PSP felt that spot checks to uncover malpractice among
PP5 were not feasible to be done by MOH.
Locum in private sector by PSP is widely practice despite of
it is being illegal. Both the public and private sector
doctors wanted this practice to be legalised. The main
advantages of legalising locums in private sector include the
ability of public sector doctors to supplement their income,
improve quality of care in private sector by influencing the
PPs on good practice of medicine and increase the range of
services, as an opportunity for public sector doctors widen
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their knowledge and experience and easier for private doctors
to get locums when they need. However few were convinced that
such move will make the public sector doctors stayed longer in
government service but most agreed that it might lead to the
neglect and abuse of public services.
Most of the PPs did not notify notifiable diseases because
they were worried about breaching their patient's
confidentiality. They did not notify when they refer the cases
to hospital, when they were unsure of diagnosis and some of
them indicated that they did not have the notification forms.
Most public sector doctors did not notify because it was done
by other staff and they were not aware of the proper procedure
for notifications. The laws related to disease were not
enforced and new notification forms were yet to be produced by
MOH in line with the amendments made in the law.
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VIII. USER INTERVIEWS
8.1 RESULTS
8.1.1 Respondents
Four hundred and forty respondents were interviewed in private
clinics and 504 from the public sector. Incomplete
questionnaires (12 private; 15 public) were excluded from the
analysis, leaving a total of 428 users of private clinics and
489 of public facilities. This represented 12.5% of the total
number of patients per week seen in public and 10.9% of
private patients (Appendix 40)
Ninety-five patients were re-interviewed at home: 58 from
public and 37 from private facilities. Twelve items were
cross-checked. Ten of the items were highly correlated with
a correlation coefficient of more than 0.80 but two items
(land ownership and using a regular health care provider) had
a correlation coefficient of 0.60.
8.1 .2 Socio-demographic characteristics
i) Gender and ethnicity
There	 were
FIGURE 8.1 : GENDER DISTRIBUTiON AMONG PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
significantly more	 PATIENTS
male patients in
private than in
public facilities	 Male 35.6%	 Male 48.6%
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(48.6% vs 35.6%;
MaliFigure 8.1). Most
of	 the	 Malay
pat i en t s	 us e d	 Fee 64.4%	 Female 51.4%315	 220public facilities
Public	 Private(64.0%) while 76.7%
of the Chinese and
52.9%	 of	 the
Indians used private facilities (X2 = 82.99 df = 2 p < 0.0001;
Figure 8.2). After stratifying by gender, the relationship
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between ethnicity and type of facility was still statistically
significant (Appendix 40).
ii) Age FiGURE 82 ETHNIC DISTRIBUTION AMONG PUBLIC AND PRIVATEPATIENTS
In both sectors,
most patients were
below the age of 45
years (Figure 8.3).
The	 age
distribution was
not significantly
different between
patients in the two
sectors (X2 = 0.91
df = 3 p = 0.824).
iii)	 Level	 of	
FiGURE 8.3 : AGE AND SEX DISTRIBIJT1ONS AMONG PUBUC AND PRIVATE
education	 PATIENTS
AGE (YEARS)
Children below the
age of 15 years
were excluded from
the analysis on the
relationship
between level of
education and type
of facility
visited. Although
there were slightly
more patients without formal education or those with upper
secondary school education in the public than private
facilities these differences were not significant (X2 = 4.34
df = 4 p = 0.361; Figure 8.4)
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Table 8.2: Socio-economic status of patients in public and private facilitiel
Socio economic group	 PUBLIC	 PRIVATE	 BOTH
Nos	 P.	 Nos	 P.	 Moe	 P.
Upper	 94	 (19.2)	 88	 (20.6)	 182	 (19.8)
Middle	 101	 (20.7)	 130	 (30.4)	 231	 (25.2)
Lover	 294	 (60.1)	 210	 (49.0)	 504	 (55.0)
Total	 489	 (100)	 428	 (100)	 917	 (100)
- 13.84 d.f - 2 p c 0.001
v) Household characteristics
The households of the private clinic users had more working
individuals compared to those using the public sector
facilities (2.2 vs 1.9 people). The number of children and
total number of individuals in the households were not
significantly different (Table 8.3)
Table 8.3: Different in household characteristics of patients attending public and private facilitie.
Mean	 SD	 SE	 t	 p
No. of childr.n
Public	 2.9	 2.19	 0.99	 0.82	 0.414
Private	 2.8	 2.23	 0.11
No. working individuals
Public	 1.9	 1.33	 0.06	 2.57	 0.010
Private	 2.2	 1.53	 0.07
Total No. of Individuals in hou..holda
Public	 6.0	 2.71	 0.12	 1.66	 0.096
private	 6.3	 3.20	 0.16
vi) Distance travelled
On average private patients travelled 2.5 km further than
public patients to seek care in their preferred facilities
(Table 8.4).
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Table 8.4: Distance travelled by patients attending public and private facilities
Datance travelled (tn)
Public	 Private
488	 424
Mean	 6.3	 8.8
SD	 7.85	 9.09
t value	 4.51
p value	 < 0 001
( One patient in public sector and 4 in private sector were excluded because they were visiting the
district)
vii) Bypassing of nearest health facility
To assess the extent of bypassing of the nearest health
facilities, patients were asked whether there were any health
facilities near their homes apart from the one they visited.
Among public patients 38.2% admitted that there were other
health facilities nearer to their homes; for the private
patients the figure was 48.1% (Table 8.5).
Table 8.5: Percentage of public and private patients who bypassed the nearest health facility
PUBLIC	 PRIVATE
Nos	 8808
Bypass	 187	 (38.2)	 206	 (48.1)
Do not bypass	 302	 (61.8)	 222	 (51.9)
Total	 489	 (100.0)	 428	 (100)
X - 8.72 d.f- 1 p - 0.003
8.1.3 Medical conditions
i) Current medical condition
Diagnoses made by the health workers were classified using
ICD-].O classifications. Among public sector users, the largest
reason for attendance (29.5%) was for preventive care
classified within 'Other contacts' in 'Factors influencing
health status and contact with health services' of lCD-b
(Figure 8.5). In contrast, the largest group of patients
(39.7%) in the private sector suffered from diseases of the
respiratory system.
Upper respiratory tract infections were the commonest
illnesses among patients in both sectors (Table 8.6). Unlike
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in the private sector, patients seeking preventive care
(antenatal check-ups for women and child health screening)
were among the top ten reasons for consultations in the public
sector. Three important chronic illnesses (hypertension,
bronchial asthma and diabetes mellitus) were among the top ten
conditions in public sector patients, and together comprised
of 17.9% of public patients. Only two of these conditions
(hypertension and asthma) were among the top ten reasons for
seeking private care and comprised 5.6% of patients.
FiGURE 8.5: DIAGNOSTiC CATEGORIES OF PATIENTS ATTENDING PUBUC
AND PRIVATE FACIUT1ES
DIAGNOST)C CATEGORIES
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ii) Curative and preventive care
Reasons for patient consultations were divided into two:
curative care and preventive care. Included under upreventiven
care were antenatal and post-natal care, contraception,
childhood immunisations and pre-employment medical
examinations. All others were considered to be seeking
curative care. Patients seeking curative care were further
divided into those suffering from acute or chronic conditions.
In this study those diagnosed as having hypertension,
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diabetes, bronchial asthma and ischaemic heart diseases were
classified into chronic conditions and the others were
considered acute.
There were significantly more patients seeking curative care
for acute illnesses in private than public facilities (59.8%
vs 40.2%). However there were more patients seeking preventive
care and curative care for chronic illnesses in public than
private facilities. The differences were still significant
after stratification by gender (Table 8.7).
Table 8.6: Top ten reasons for consultations among patients attending public and private facilities
PUBLIC	 PRIVATE
Conditions	 Conditions
URTI	 20.2	 URTI'	 26.6
Antenatal check-up	 19.2	 Bronchitis	 5.6
Others	 24.4	 Others	 41.7
urn - tipper respiratory tract infection
Table 8.7: Types of care sought by patients attending public and private facilities
Type of	 MALE	 FEMALE	 TOTAL
care	 Public	 Private	 Public	 Private	 Public	 Private
Acute curative	 132 (41.3)	 188 (58.7	 126 (39.3) 195 (60.7)	 258 (40.2) 383 (59.8)
chronic curative	 23 (57.5)	 17 (42.5	 65 (80.2)	 16 (19.8)	 88 (72.7) 33 (27.3)
preventive	 19 (86.4)	 3 (13.6	 124 (93.2)	 9 (6.8)	 143 (92.3) 12 (7.7)
Total	 174 (45.5)	 208 (54.5)	 315 (58.9) 220 (41.1)	 489 (53.3) 428 (46.7)
X'.19.46d.f-2	 X7-13l.18d.f-2	 X2-156.73d.f-2
p c 0.0001	 p < 0.0001	 p < 0.0001
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iii) Chronic illnesses
The presence of four chronic illnesses (hypertension, diabetes
mellitus, asthma and ischaemic heart disease) among the
patients were assessed by asking them directly if they
suffered from these illnesses. The prevalence of any of the
four diseases among adult (age 15 years and above) was found
to be significantly higher among public than private patients
(33.4% vs 23.3%) (Table 8.8)
Table 8.8: Presence of chronic illnesses among adults using public and private facilities
Types of illnesses	 Public (N - 329)	 Private (N-292)
	 X Value p value
	
Nos	 Nos
Hypertension	 83	 (25.2)	 39	 (13.4)	 13.07	 c 0.001
Diabetes mellitus
	 12	 (3.6)	 17	 (5.8)	 1.19	 n.s
Asthma	 23	 (7.0)	 18	 (6.2)	 0.06	 n.e
Ischaemic heart disease	 5	 (1.5)	 11	 (3.8)	 2.28	 n.s
Miy of the four 	 110	 (33.4)	 68	 (23.3)	 7.30	 0.007
chronic illnesses
children wer, excluded f row th. analysi.
8.1.4 Choice of providers
i) Regular providers
When patients were asked whether the clinic that they visited
in the study was their regular one, 87.5% of public patients
and 79.0% of private patients said "Yes" (Table 8.9).
Table 8.9: Presence of regular provider among public and private patients
PUBLIC	 PRIVATE
Hoe	 Hoe
Have regular provider 	 428	 (87.5)	 338	 (79.0)
No regular provider 	 61	 (12.5)	 90	 (21.0)
Total	 489	 (100)	 428	 (100)
- 11.53 d.f - 1 p < 0.001
For the current episode of illness, patients were asked
whether they visited any other facilities before the present
one. Those who visited other facilities before but were not
referred to the current one were defined as 'healer shoppers'.
When referred patients were excluded (47 public and 8 private
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patients) the proportions of healer shoppers among public and
private patients were not significantly different (17.6% vs
21.2%) (Table 8.10).
Table 8.10; Healer chopping among patients attending public and private facilities
Public	 Private
Healer shoppers	 78 (17.6)	 89 (21.2)
Non-healer shopper	 364 (82.4)	 331 (78.8)
Total	 442 (100.0)	 420 (100.0)
• 1.51 d.f- 1 p - 0.219
ii) Reasons for choosing the provider
Patients were asked the reasons for choosing the facilities:
proximity of the clinic to their homes was the most common
reason (49.2%) for their choice among patients attending
public facilities. Patients in the private sector were more
concerned about choosing the provider who was perceived to be
providing the most effective treatment (45.1%). Effectiveness
of treatment was the reason given by 19.8% of public patients;
14.4% of them chose the facility because of low or free
charges. Shorter waiting times and good relations with health
workers were mentioned by private patients but not by those
using the public sector (Table 8.11)
Table 8.11: Reasons for choosing the facilities among public and private patients
Reasons	 Public	 Private
	
Woe	 Woe
Near to house	 253	 49.2	 103	 24.0
Treatment is effective	 102	 19.8	 194	 45.1
Service is cheap free	 74	 14.4	 0	 0.0
Referred to the facilities	 27	 5.3	 0	 0.0
Regular clinic	 15	 2.9	 15	 3.5
Arranged by eiiçloyers	 0	 0.0	 32	 7.4
Short waiting time 	 0	 0.0	 23	 5.3
Good relations with health workers	 0	 0.0	 12	 2.8
Doctor speaks his her language	 0	 0.0	 12	 2.8
Other reasons	 43	 8.4	 39	 9.1
Total	 514	 100 0	 430	 100 0
( Patients mey give enre than on. reason)
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8.1.5 Patient management
i) Time epent
Waiting time was defined as the time from arrival at the
clinic until s/he was called in for consultation; consultation
time is the time spent on consultation and total time spent as
time from patient arrival untill ready to go home.
The mean waiting time and the total time spent in the clinics
was about twice as long for those attending public facilities
compared to private patients (Table 8.12). Patients in public
facilities had shorter consultations with the health workers
than those in private facilities (5.6 vs 6.8 minutes).
Table 8.12: Time spent by patientS in public and private facilities
Waiting Time	 Consultation time	 Total time
	
Public	 Private	 Public	 Private	 Public	 Private
Mean	 52.1	 21.1	 5.6	 6.8	 67.4	 35.4
SD	 53.29	 22.43	 4.09	 5.36	 58.53	 24.24
N	 489	 428	 489	 428	 489	 428
t value	 11.74	 3.70	 11.07
p value	 < 0.0001	 c 0.0001	 c 0.0001
ii) Health workere
While almost all those attending private clinics were seen by
doctors (99.3%), only 49.9% of public patients were managed by
doctors, the rest were treated by other support staff such as'
medical assistants, nurses and midwives.
Table 8.13. Types of health personnel seen by patients in public and private facilities
PUBLIC	 PRIVATE
	
Nos	 Nos
Doctors only	 183	 (37.4)	 425	 (99.3)
Doctors and other staff	 61	 (12.5)	 0	 (0.0)
Other staff	 245	 (50.1)	 3	 (0.7)
Total	 489	 (100)	 428	 (100)
- 279 91 d.f - 1 p • 000001
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iii) Referral
The referral rate among the patients attending public
facilities was twice as high as in those attending private
facilities (6.3% vs 3.0%). Those attending public facilities
were more likely to be referred to other public facilities
whereas those in the private sector were likely to be referred
to other private providers. Among the 31 public sector
patients who were referred, only 9 of them (29.0%) were given
referral letters whereas among the private patients, 8 out of
13 referred patients (61.5%) were given referral letters.
Table 8.14: Referral rates and place of referral in public and private facilities
PUBLIC	 PRIVATE
Nag 	 NOB
Referred to public facilities	 27	 (5.5)	 5	 (1.1)
Referred to private facilities	 4	 (0.8)	 8	 (1.9)
Not referred	 458	 (93.7)	 415	 (97.0)
Total	 489	 (100)	 428	 (100)
I' • 4.75 d.f • 1 p • 0.029
iv) Drug prescriptions
a) Types of drugs prescribed
Drugs prescribed were classified according to their mode of
action (MOH, 1992 C; MIMS Asia, 1992) (Figure 8.6) . Analgesics
and antipyretics were the most common groups of drugs
prescribed in both sectors; 44.6% of public and 71.0% of
private patients were prescribed drugs in this group. The
second commonest drug prescribed were antibiotics in the
private sector and vitamins/minerals in the public sector.
Prescriptions for analgesics/antipyretics and antibiotics
varied widely between the public and private sectors. The
differences in the proportions of patients prescribed drugs
were significant (p < 0.05) except for dermatological,
antidiabetics and asthmatic drugs. More public patients were
given vitamins & minerals, antihypertensives and vaccines than
private patients: this was probably because more antenatal
mothers (who were prescribed vitamins and minerals routinely),
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children attending child health clinic (they were immunised at
the same time) and hypertension cases attended public than
private facilities. In all the other groups of drugs, more
private than public patients were prescribed drugs.
When the types of drugs prescribed were compared for patients
seeking curative care for acute illness only (258 in public
and 383 in private sector), private doctors prescribed
significantly more antibiotics, antiasthmatics and
antidiarrheoals than public sector doctors (p < 0.05). However
public sector doctors prescribed more dermatologicals than
private sector doctors (Figure 8.7).
The different types of drugs which were prescribed to public
and private patients were classified into essential and non-
essential drugs using the WHO 6th Essential drug lists. There
were more than twice the number of different types of drugs
prescribed in the private than the public sector (213 vs 94).
The proportion of these drugs that was essential was higher in
the public than private sector (42.6% vs 23.0%) (Table 8.15).
FIGURE 8.6: TYPES OF DRUGS PRESCRIBED TO PATiENTS ATTENDING
PUBUC AND PRIVATE FACIUT1ES (ALL CASES)
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Table 8.15: Essential and non-essential drugs prescribed to patients in public and private facilities
Public Sector	 Private sector
Nos	 S	 Nos	 S
Essential drugs	 40	 (42.6)	 49	 (23.0)
Non-essential drugs	 54	 (57.4)	 164	 (77.0)
Total	 94	 (100)	 213	 (100)
- ii.ie d.f -1 p	 0.001
Table 8.16 shows the top five drugs prescribed to patients.
Paracetamol is the commonest drug prescribed among patients in
both sectors. Prescriptions of two antibiotic (amoxycillin and'
ampicillin) and two analgesics/antipyretics (paracetamol and
mefenamic acid) were among the top five common drugs
prescribed in the private sector. Only one of these,
paracetamol was found among the top five in the public sector.
The presence of benadryl expectorant as one of the top five
drugs in both groups can be explained by the presence of upper
respiratory tract infections as the commonest illness in both
sector.
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Table 8.16: Top five drugs prescribed to patients in public and private facilitiel
Public sector	 Private sector
Drugs	 Drugs
Paracetamol	 (33.7)	 Paracetamol	 (44.9)
Benadryl Expectorant	 (20.0)	 Ampicillin	 (15.4)
Naeuiatinics	 (13.1)	 Benadryl Expectorant 	 (12.6)
Metoprolol	 (7.7)	 Ainoxicillin	 (11.2)
Magnesium Trisilicate	 (6.7)	 Mefenamic Acid	 (10.7)
Since upper respiratory tract infections (tJRTI) were the
commonest illness among private and public patients and two
types of antibiotics were among the commonest drugs prescribed
by private doctors, there is a possibility that private
doctors	 were
prescribing more
antibiotics	 to
patients with this
condition than in
the public sector.
To examine this,
the drugs received
by 99 patients in
the	 public
facilities and 114
patients in private
clinics suffering
from URTI in both
facilities were compared. Nearly three quarters (74.6%) of
private sector patients were prescribed with antibiotics while
in the public sector less than half (45.5%) received this.
group of drugs (p < 0.001) (Figure 8.8). Prescriptions of
analgesics/antipyretics and antihistamines were almost the
same between the two groups of patients. Private patients
were also more likely to be prescribed with cough mixtures and
throat preparations such as lozenges than public patients (p
< 0.05). However public sector personnel were more likely to
prescribe vitamins and minerals to their patient with URTI
than the private doctors (p < 0.0001).
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b) Prescriptions of injections
The prescription rate of injections was about fifteen times
higher among private than public patients (O.8' vs 12.4%)
(Table 8.17). Most of these injections were for antibiotics
particularly lincomycin and ampicillin and analgesics
especially diclofenac ("Voltaren).
Table 8.17: Injections as part of treatment of public and private patient.
Public	 Private
	
No.	 No.
Antibiotics	 1	 (0.2)	 24	 (5 6)
Analgesic.	 1	 (0.2)	 15	 (3.5)
Others	 2	 (0.4)	 14	 (3.3)
No injections	 485	 (99.2)	 375	 (87 6)
Total	 489	 (100.0)	 428	 (100.0)
X - 50.40 d.f -1 p • 0.0001
c) Number of drugs prescribed
Patients attending private clinics were prescribed more items
of drugs than public patients. While 59.3% of patients
attending public facilities received 2 or less items of drugs,
72.6% of private patients were prescribed 3 or more items.
Among patients with acute illness, 58.9% of patients in public
facilities were prescribed three or more drugs compared to
77.6% in the private sector (Table 8.18).
Table 8.18: Number of items of drugs prescribed to patient. attending public and private facilities
No.	 Patients seeklng	 acute curative care 	 All patients
of drugs
Public	 Private	 Public	 Private
	
No.	 %	 No.	 No.	 %	 No.
0	 9	 3.5)	 12	 (3.1)	 48	 (9.8)	 20	 (4.7)
1	 25	 (9.7)	 13	 (3.4)	 135	 (27.6)	 22	 (5.2)
2	 72	 (27.9	 61	 (15.9)	 107	 (21.9)	 75	 (17.5)
3	 119	 (46.1)	 191	 (49.9)	 150	 (30.7)	 196	 45.8
4	 30	 (11.6)	 84	 (21.9)	 40	 (8.2)	 90	 (21.0)
5	 3	 1 2	 22	 (5.8	 9	 (1 8)	 25	 5.8)
Total	 258	 100	 383	 100	 489	 (100	 428	 (100
I' - 35.55 d.f • 5	 p • 0.0001	 X'-12717 dr-S pO.0001
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v) Diagnostic investigations
The rate of any investigations among patients attending public
facilities was three times higher than among private patients
(42.5 vs 13.3/100 patients). Simple tests such as blood
(mostly haemoglobin test) and urine analysis (mostly urine
sugar and protein) were more likely to be carried out among
public patients whereas private patients were more likely to
undergo X-rays or ultrasound scan.
Table 8.19: Types of tests undergone by public and private patients
Types of	 Public (489)
	 Private (428)
test	 NOB	 NOB
Basic tests
Blood tests	 108	 51.4)	 9	 (14.8)
Urine analysis	 86	 (40.9)	 26	 (42.6)
Stool exam.	 2	 (1.0)	 0	 (0.0)
Expensive tests
ECG	 3	 (1.4)	 2	 (3.3)
X-rays	 4	 (1.9)	 7	 (11.5)
Ultrasound	 5	 (2.4)	 13	 (21.3)
Total	 208	 (100.0)	 57	 (100.0)
Rate/lOO patients	 40.1	 8.2	 P c 0.000l
(Basic test)
Rate/l00 patients (Expensive test) 	 2.4	 5.1	 p c 0.05
Rate/100 patients	 42.5	 13.3	 p c 0.000l"
(All test)
* t-test :	 Mean (Public) • 0.401 SD • 0.947
Mean (Private) - 0.062 SD • 0.343 , C • 6.60
** t-tSst	 Mean (Public) - 0.024 SD - 0.190
Mean (Private) - 0.051 SD - 0.221, t • 1.98
*•. t-test	 Mean (Public) • 0 425 SD • 0 995
Mean (Private) • 0.133 SD - 0.409 ; C - 6.67
vi) Payment
Most patients attending public facilities received free
services while most private patients paid out of pocket. The
percentage of patients with third party coverage was
significantly higher in the private than public sector (14.01
vs 0.2%) (Table 8.20).
Those charged for public services paid RN 1.00 for out-patient
services in the district hospital; services in health centres
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were free of charge. Most private patients paid between RN
10.00 to RN 20.00. The mean was RN 17.54 which is equivalent
to one day's salary of a labourer in the district (Table 8.21
and 8.22). The difference in charges for patients with acute
and chronic illnesses was not statistically significant (Table
8.22). Although the charges for preventive care were about
twice higher than charges for acute illnesses, the difference
was not statistically significant. This is probably due to the
small number of cases for preventive care in the private
sector.
Table 8.20: Methods of payment among patients attending public and private facilities
Public	 Private
Payment method	 Nos	 Nos
Pree	 418	 (85.5)	 6	 (1.4)
Out-Of-Pocket	 70	 (14.3)	 362	 (84.6)
Third-party	 1	 (0.2)	 60	 (14.0)
Total	 489	 (100)	 428	 (100)
- 653.61	 d.f • 2 p c 0.00001
Table 8.21 : charges in private facilities
Asnount (RM)
	 Nos
Oto<5	 9	 2.1
Sto<10	 25	 5.8
10 - c 15	 168	 39.3
15 - c 20	 116	 27.1
20-2S	 56	 13.1
25-Above	 54	 126
Total	 428	 100.0
Table 8.22: Mean charges in private facilities for different types of care
N	 Mean	 SD	 p value
CURATIVE CARE
Acute illnesses	 383	 16.96	 9.18	 p - 0.670
chronic illnesses	 33	 17.71	 11.56
PREVENTIVE CARE	 12	 35.50	 39.97	 p - 0.137
TOTAL	 428	 17.54	 11 88
• t-te.t between acute and chronic illneai t • 0 43
•• t-t.at between acuts illn.uea and prev.ntiv. car.. t - 1.61
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8.1.6 Multiple logistic regressions
The bivariate analysis suggested differences between those
seeking care in public and private sector. However in order to
control for the confounding effect of many other variables,
logistic regression was applied. The dependent variable was
the type of clinic visited and table 8.23 indicated the
independent variables used in the model.
Results of the analysis is shown in table 8.24. Age, gender
number of household members and number of working households
did not influence the choice of facilities made by patients.
Type of care sought by patients was the most important factor
which influence the type of facilities visited by patients.
Those using private services were 19 times more likely to be
seeking seeking curative than preventive care (Odds ratio =
19.18; 95% confidence limits = 9.72 - 37.87). Users of private
care were three times more likely to be non-Malays than Malays
(Odds ratio = 3.35 95% confidence limits= 2.40 - 4.68). Users
of the private facilities were more likely to be those in the
middle and upper socio-economic group, travelled a longer
distance and were more likely to have third party coverage
than those using public facilities.
Users of public sector facilities were more likely to have
chronic illnesses, had regular provider and had more children
in their households than those using private facilities.
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0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
Tabl. S .23 Description of variable, used in .zltipl. logistic r.gression in user interviews
Variables	 Value.
A. mepdest
Types of faciliti.s used	 Duy	 Private • 1
Public • 0
B. Zdspd.et
t) Psrscaal
Ag.
Gender
lthnicity
Socio-.conoeic
status
Distanc, travelled
Typs of care sought
Raving a regular
provider
Presence of chronic
diseases
Have third party coverage
ii) Nonashold
Household au.
Number of children
in household
Number of adults working
0-93 years
Male .1
Pseals • 0
Non-Malays - 1
Malays	 - 0
Dum
Low
Middle
Upper
o - 64.3
Dum
Curative - 1
Preventive • 0
No -i
Yes • 0
Dunmy
No - 1
Yes • 0
No • 1
Yes - 0
1 - 30
0 - 20
0 - 13
Table 8.24: Results of the analysis using multiple logistic regression on factors influencing the use
of private facilities
Variables	 B	 S.E.	 p	 R Odds ratio 95% Confidence
limits
Non-Malaya	 1.210	 0.170	 0.000	 0.195	 3.35	 2.40 - 4.68
Socio-economic
status
Low	 0
Middle	 0.814	 0.191	 0.000	 0.113	 2.26	 1.55 - 3.28
Upper	 0.498	 0.228	 0.029	 0.047	 1.65	 1.05 - 2.57
Distance travelled
Seek curative care
Rave regular
provider
With chronic illness
Have third party
coverage
	
0.039	 0.010
	
2.954	 0.347
	
-0.771	 0.225
	
-0.803	 0.234
	
4.636	 1.029
	
0.103	 1.04	 1.02 - 1.06
	
0.236	 19.18	 9.72 - 37.87
	
-0.087	 0.46	 0.29 - 0.72
	
0.088	 0.45	 0.28 - 0.71
	
0.120	 103.09	 13.72 - 774.98
Number of children	 -0.201	 0.087	 0.021	 -0.051	 0.82	 0.69 - 0.97
Age	 0.002	 0.005	 0.642	 0.000	 1.00	 0.99 - 1.01
Male	 -0.075	 0.167	 0.654	 0.000	 0.93	 0.67 - 1.29
Number of households	 0.135	 0.077	 0.081	 0.029	 1.15	 0.98 - 1.33
members
Number of working	 -0.055	 0.089	 0.535	 0.000	 0.95	 0.80 - 1.13
individuals
( R - Partial correlations
( Odds ratio of having sought private rather than public sector care)
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8.2 StTh4MARY
Box: 8.1 Summary of findings from user interviews
Use of private services were strongly associated with non-Malays, those in the upper and middle
come socio-economic status and those with third party coverage.
Users of private facilities were more likely to be those seeking curative care for acute illness
ile users of public facilities were more likely to be those with chronic illnesses or needed
eventive care.
* Patients using private facilities were more likely to travel a longer distance to the facilities
of their choice and more often bypassed the nearest health facilities.
* Patients using public facilities were more likely to have regular provider than users of private
facilities.
* Users of public facilites were significantly related to those having more children in their
* Age, gender, educational status, number of working individuals in the households and size of the
households did not influence the type of facilities used.
* Patients using private facilities had shorter waiting time, longer consultation time and were
more likely to be treated by doctors than those using public facilities.
* PPs prescribed more items and a greater variety of drugs, most of which were non-essential.
* Even though patients attending private facilities undergone fewer diagnostic tests than those
ettending public facilities, they were more likely to undergo more expensive ones such as X-raya
and ultrasound scan.
Patients attending private facilities were less likely to be referred but if they were to be
ferred they were more likely to be given referral letters and to be referred to private rather
an public facilities.
In both facilities, the coumnonest method of payment in both sector is out-of-pocket but most
tients attending public facilities received free care.
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IX. STUDY OF CONMUNITY SATISFACTION
9.1 RESULTS
9.1.1 Respondents
In each of three villages, four FGDs was carried out (two
males and two female groups) in each. Two FGDs were carried
out among government workers; altogether 14 FGDs were carried
out involving 131 participants. Twelve community leaders were
interviewed, four in each community (two males and two
females)
9.1.2 Choice of health facilities
The participants used full range of services provided by both
the public and the private sector: district hospital, state
general hospital, health centres, community clinics, the
midwifery clinics, the private clinics, estate hospital,
specialised private clinics and private hospitals located in
the capital.
In all cases, the private clinics were preferred by the
participants followed by the district hospital, state general
hospital and the health centres were given least preference.
Most participants were using multiple providers. They often
first visited the private doctors and hopped from one private
doctor to another for the same episode of illness until it was,
cured. If not cured and if they felt that the disease was
serious, they would then go to the public facilities.
The type of illness influenced the choice of providers. Across
all the FGDs, the participants used private facilities for
simple illnesses such as cough and colds. The public
facilities, especially the state general and district hospital
were used for serious illness especially those requiring
hospitalisation such as severe injuries due to motor vehicle
accidents or occupational injuries and deliveries. The most
common reason for choosing private providers for simple
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illnesses was in order to avoid long waiting times. They chose
public facilities for serious illnesses because of the high
costs which would otherwise be incurred in private facilities.
Women more than men preferred the health centres, community
and midwifery clinics. Women used these facilities for
maternal and child health services which were not widely
available in private clinics in the district (antenatal care)
and were provided good quality free of charge in the public
facilities (immunisations). They preferred to go to the
district hospital and state general hospital for deliveries
because it was too costly in specialised private clinics and
hospitals.
9.1.3 Satisfaction with public and private facilities
i) General
Table 9.1 shows the various issues discussed in the FGDs.
Most women discussed their satisfaction and dissatisfaction
based on their experience with deliveries and child care.
Their comments were mostly on the services in the labour rooms
and maternity ward as well as the antenatal care and child
health services in both types of facilities. The discussions
among the men were mostly drawn from their experience in
obtaining out-patient services.
All the leaders raised issues related to staff attitude,
waiting time, drugs, charges and equipment (Table 9.2).'
Communication problems were only discussed by the Chinese and
the Indian leaders, not the Malays. The leaders rarely raised
concern with the technicals skill of health personnel.
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Table 9.1: Issues discussed in POD in study of couinunity satisfaction
Issue discussed	 Malays	 Chinese	 Indiani	 Government	 Total
workers	 no. of
PODs
Ml M2 Wi W2
	 Ml M2 Wi 52	 Mi 142 Wi 52
	 Ml	 Wi
Staff attitudes	 I X X I	 X X X I	 X I X I
	 X	 X	 14
Doctors' attitudes	 I X I X	 I I I I	 X X X I
	 X	 X	 14
Charges	 X XXX	 XXXI	 XXIX	 I	 X	 14
Waiting time	 I I X I	 I I X I	 X X X I
	 X	 X	 14
Drugs	 X XXX	 XXXI	 I XXX	 X	 I	 14
Services available	 I I I X	 0 X I I
	 I I I X	 I	 X	 13
Equipments	 I 0 X I
	 I X X I	 I X I X	 I	 X	 13
Operating hours	 I X I I	 X X 0 1	 I X 0 0	 I	 I	 10
Coimiunications	 0 0 0 0	 X X X I	 X X 0 0	 0	 0	 6
Clinic environment	 0 X 1 0	 I 0 0 0	 X 0 0 0	 X	 I	 6
Technical skills	 0 0 0 X	 I 0 X 0	 0 0 X 0	 I	 0	 5
Othere	 0 X00	 ox oo	 0000	 I	 X	 4
Mi • Men group 1	 51 • Wn group 1	 X - iiiue digcuezed
142 • Men group 2	 52 • Women group 2	 0 • i.au. not dscuseed
Table 9.2: Issues discussed in In-depth interviews of cooinunity leaders
Issue discussed	 Malays	 chinese	 Indians	 Total
Ml 142 Wl W2	 Mi 142 Wi W2	 Ml M2 Wi 52
Staff attitudes	 I	 I I X	 x X x I	 X I X X	 12
Doctors attitudes	 I	 X X X	 0 0 X I	 X X 0 I	 9
charges	 I	 X X X	 I I X X	 X X X I	 12
Waiting time	 I	 X X I	 X I I X	 X I X X	 12
Drugs	 X I X I	 X X I X	 X X I X	 12
Services available	 X	 X I I	 X X X I	 0 I X X	 ii
Equipments	 X I X I	 X I I I	 I X X X
	 12
Operating hours	 0 X X 0	 0 0 I I	 X X 0 0	 6
Coiiinunications	 0	 0 0 0	 X I I I	 I I 0 0
	 6
Clinic environment	 I	 X 0 0	 I I X 0	 X 0 0 X	 7
Technical skills	 I	 0 X 0	 0 X 0 0	 0 0 0 0	 3
Others	 0	 0 X 0	 X X I I	 X 0 0 x	 7
Mi • Men leader I Vi - Women leader 1 	 X - jasue diucuseed
M2 - Men leader 2 52 • Wn leader 2	 0 - i.eu. not diecu.s.d
ii) Attitudes of the health staff
The most important factor appearing to influence community
satisfaction was the attitude of staff toward their patients.
In most FGDs and in-depth interviews this issue was raised by
the respondents without prompting. Most of them were not
satisfied with the attitudes of the public sector staff
compared with the private staff.
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The public health staff were severely criticised for being
rude and unhelpful to the patients. The participants
complained that the public staff were easily angered, showed
no respect for them and scolded them with abusive language
over small matters. They refused to help patients. On the
other hand staff working in the private clinics were
considered polite and helpful.
I have children..., three times my wif. delivered in (public) hospital and sh. was Scolded by the
nurse .1 em not satisfied. They scolded her, shouted at bar and abused her. I feel this is not good
because my wife is a government servant and the nurses are governt servants too, We are not
satisfied...	 (Malay man,	 MVM1)
When I delivered last time, I was given enema and wa. asked to go to the toilet, The toilet is far and
she ask us to go quickly. While walking I stop because of pain. Sh. scolded me Quick! Quick! Otherwise
it will cnms out here, don't be slow, go faster! • When the contraction goes off I can walk. But she
shouted to us lik, that. (Malay wn; P):MVW2J
I myself have never been to the government hospital, my friend has been there. The nurses are very bed.If there is any emergency and you need them they will not come. Th, patient cannot get up from the bed,
but when we call them they scolded us and ask us to go to private hospital.....(Chines. woman;
CVM2J
It is better to go the clinic (private). If you feel lik, vomiting, they will help you. In the hospital(government) there is no such thing. They will scold you if you do like that in the government hospital.
I am always in favour of (private) clinics. (Indian wn; PGD IVW1I
In term of 'layanan' (attitudes), if we go to the private clinics, if an old patient cannot walk, quickly
they will send a wheel chair. We don't have to go and search. They will send it to you ismiediately. I
Malay wusn; lCD: GWW1J
Private clinic is easier, for exaiçle if we want treatment for serious illness, if we have to wait it
won't be long and in emergency it is faster to get the treatment. Th, government staff are very rude,
they shout at you but the staff in private clinics talk to you nicely. (chinese man, lCD: CVM2J
The Indian and Chinese respondents complained that they were
being discriminated against by mainly Malay health staff in
the public facilities; they felt that the Malays were given
priority and better treatment.
If you had en accident at 1 or 2 am if you go to the government hospital. .if you call them, they will
not come quickly with the trolley. We have to take the trolley ourselves. The Malaya (staff).., they
will not carry the patient. We have to wait for registration, then only they will call you. If the same
thing happens to the Malays (patient), they will take the trolley and carry them maid.
quickly	 .. (Indian man; FGD:IVM1)
If we take our children there, she won't bother. She will just talk to th. Malay.. She won't bother our
children, the Chinese people. Our children are hungry but there ii no milk. The children cry if we have
to wait long. There is no phone there to phone family members to send milk She just talk to the Malay..
She don't bother th. Chinese She also work slowly.... (Chinese momsn POD: CVW1J
The public staff were also said to be lazy, not conscientious,
wasting time by doing things not related to their jobs and'
being absent from their posts during working hours. The staff
were claimed to do their work properly in the presence of the
doctors. On the other hand the private staff were seen as hard
working, serious about their jobs and to work faster than the
public staff.
In texu of layenan' (attitude from my experience in 52 clinic (Health Centre). I cams at 9.00 in the
norning at that time th. attendant in front is not around . . he went out for a drink so I waited. At
9 30 be is still not around He came hack at 10 00 then I get my card and when I wanted to go in... the(Medical A.esistantj went out for drink. That is why I a not satisfied It's already 10 00 o'clock.
I went out for a drink and at 10 15 I c back .. he MA) ie still not around. At 11 00 I hav, yet
to see hi.. After I have Seen hi. get his report and all that I went out .. th. dispenser was not
around... I	 frustrated . .1 just left the place.....(Malay man 7C	 Qmiil)
I en not satisfied with the staff in TX Hospital (district hospital). When I send my friend there, I
took his identity card and go to register him. They work very slow, they don't do it quickly, they
wasted tine and they are not responsible. (Chinese man; POD. CVWXJ
Sometimes the staff were busy hoitting .. making flowers They don' t bother to look at patients whojust came in She just continues with her 'work' I have seen this happen many times at night when I
stay there to look after my sick child... (Malay woman, 	 MVW1J
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The thing that I am satisfied (in the private clinics) is they Ist.ffl work very fast end they cooperate
and work very hard. Bveryone is hardworking Furthermore they work together to Clete their job. For
example when they push th, trolley. . .they send the patients to the plac. f or treatment .. they do itfaster.... (Chinese woman, F(. CVM1)
The public sector staff were criticised for giving priority
to their relatives and friends rather than those who really
needed urgent attention. Participants who knew the health
workers personally admitted that they were given preferential
treatment; for example they were called in faster than others.
The participants said that in the private clinics the staff
follow the queue properly and call in patients according to
their turn.
One more thing, for my previous delivery I went to government hospital. Because I knew a staff nurse,
all the nurses there treat me nicely, they don't shout at me During labour my placenta was stuck. I
have already booked but I delivered at h. When I reached hospital, I was not scolded., they attended
me straight away because I know her. But I saw someone beside me, she is a government servsnt. Because
she doesn't bring anything and she did not know anyone, she was scolded. I don't like that.., when you
know sneone they treat you nicely. (Malay woman, POD, WVW1)
When I went for treatment, sometimes even if we come early someone else that knows tham will go in
first. They get treated earlier......(Malay woman, POD: WlJ.
The public staff were said to be 'rough' and inconsiderate.
They carried out medical procedures such as episiotomy and
wound suturing without proper anaesthesia. They refused to
allow patients in pain to be treated early. In private clinics
those in pain were given immediate attention and they did not
have to wait.
I am not satisfied with the staff attitude. For example I had a cut on my leg.. .the skin was broken,
so I put sons medicine and bandaged it. Th, next day, it had to be cleaned and the plaster need to be
removed The nurse knew that it would hurt, she just pull it.. very hard.. .it bleeds. I want to tell
her ... I can't tell her. . . .she should be mor, gentle, should be more careful and do it slowly.., she
ip just too rough. (Chinese man, p 1) .J?42I
It's about deliveries. I heard that many people are not satisfied with this. For example when women
delivered they have to wait. Sometimes in the (government) hospital they want to be fast. In the village
we normally wait for the right time. In the hospital they don t went to wait so they cut (episiotomy).
When they cut they don't give any anaesthesia. So the pain is double. Pain because of the cut and also
because of th, labour.... (Malay man, POD, MVM2J
A few participants satisfied with the treatment they received
from the public staff praised those providing the maternal and
child health services at the health centres, community clinics
and midwifery clinics. They also felt that staff running the
bigger public hospitals such as the state general hospital and
the Kuala Lumpur General Hospital had better attitudes than
those in the district hospital.
Eleven of 12 leaders were not satisfied with the attitudes of
the public staff. Although they admitted to receiving given
better service because of their status in the community,
sometimes they received complaints from villagers regarding
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the staff. They felt that the main reason for poor attitudes
was over-work; there were too many patients attending these
facilities. They felt that the public facilities were
understaffed and suggested that more staff should be sent by
the government. The leaders also suggested that the staff
should not be totally blamed for their behaviour. This was
because some patients did not follow their instructions or the
regulations of the hospitals and clinics. The positive
attitudes of the private staff were attributed to the fact
that they are running a business and needed to attract
customers.
For exatrçle, sometime I came to know .... I heard stories... awong th, many staff sometime, there are
good ones and there are not so good ones and th. patients also ar, the .ame. Some of thee (staff) are
hot-teuçered.....It never happens to me. Sometime when they work, the government workers when they
overworked, work continuously . .1 have seen it my self. . . . they work continuously for $ hours they were
negligent... that', the prohiems... (ID: Malay man)
The 'iayanan' (attitude) in private clinic, is good because we pay them. They are private... .liks
co.çani.s. They want to preserve their good name.... (ID: Chine., man)
iii) Attitude of doctors
The public sector doctors were criticised for not examining
their patients during consultations. Consultations with the
public doctors were brief: they were asked about their illness
and then prescribed the medicine. The public doctors often did
not provide any information about their illnesses. Some FGD
participants and three of their leaders indicated that the
public sector doctors were rude and scolded them when they
asked about their illnesses. The public doctors showed no
interest in their patients and were eager to end the brief
consultations in order to see the next patient.
If you go to government hospital and complain that you have comm growth or cancer, the doctor just
presses with his hand and says 'Oh, it's nothing'. If I go to the private clinics, they will examine
properly and if they find your illness and they will give s referral letter and send you to Kiang. If
you go to government hospital they just give medicine and viii not examine you. You won't know what you
are suffering from.. . (Indian man; P. IVill)
lihen we go in be just ask you. In private clinics he will ask what is the illness. how long you have
been having it and so on till he is finished with you But not here (puhlic facilities). Stomach ache
he just write the medicine and that • a all If we are admitted to the ward if the doctor cs end we
tell him our problems .what! you are sickl Re shouted like that. Why can't be just say it nicely.
Mister, you are sick, please do not talk so mach e That's better. I am not satisfied at all... (Malay
man; PGD: Gil]
The participants were more satisfied with the private doctors
who examined them thoroughly, explained their illness to them
and reassured them. The private doctors were felt to be polite
and friendly.
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U we go to the privet, clinic., first of all the receptionist will se. us and tak, down our particulars
and a,k us to sit down to wait When cur turn cones the nurse will call us, she open. th , door and asks
us to sit. Th, doctor will take good car, about you. H. .xamin.s thoroughly and gives advic, to you.
He then writes the medicine. Th, medicine is the exact one for your illness. If in th. (governeent
hospital), he viii cay what is your illness? Go out and take your medicins. In the privsts clinic itis not like that. (Malay wonan, 	 .MV2Wl)
Another thing the doctor (private) will be very patient and they take time to ask about their sickness
so what is happening, what is th, actual problem... . they talk on all the things, they talc, time,
sometime, they spend twenty minutes or so with the patient, they will see, then they will
ask. . . sometimes they sek about the family sod everything, so they record everything. . so then after that
only they say you go back and rest and the only thing that you have is this and so we can cure this
one, so you take the medicine for first time and vs see later.... sthing like that.. .sc we are verypleased with th. doctor.... (ID: Indian men)
Most of the community leaders thought that the poor attitudes
of the public doctors resulted from overwork.
iv) Waiting time
Another cause for community dissatisfaction with the public
health services were the long waiting times. People usually
had to wait ' a few minutes' in the private clinics as
compared to 'a few hours' or the 'whole day' in public
facilities. Among the women, most of them complained about
having to wait very long with their sick children.
The thing which I am not satisfied with is when I take icy children,I have to wait very long. I
understand that there are many people there but if it is too long it'. not easy for we. Purth.rsor.
the children ars sick.... (Malay woman; PGD MV2W2)
If we went at two pm... .we came back around 4 to 5.... if we go to private (clinic) it will only take
twenty minute, or half an hour only. .. .and s sore we can go at night., we can go after work.., but
not the government hospital. (ID: Chines. wonen)
Many of the Indians and the Chinese observed that they had to
wait longer than the Malays because of the discriminatory
attitude of the staff. In the Malay FGDs the public staff were
criticised for allowing their relatives and friends to get
earlier consultations leaving others who came earlier to wait
longer. The participants also complained about registration,
staff working slowly and wasting time by talking or doing
other thing. Besides their official lunch breaks the public
staff also took frequent breaks for drinks. In contrast, staff
in private clinics worked during lunch hours and would not
take their breaks if they had patients to serve.
8times the clerk, work very slow Be will eat first. He should register the old man first, he want
to go faster, but he eat first Be eat in front of us and talk with hi. son. Be bring hi. son to work
After he ha, finished eating, then he will call us... I don't like to go to counters lik, that, not onlyin hospital but .verywhere they should serv, better If they serve v.11 when we go ther, we feel happy.But here the service is poor, it is slow Altsr that we still have to wait end it's going to be late
Be can eat first, talk.. .stime it a so long to wait for the registration just like waiting to see
the doctor. I have seen it bet ore, an old san who want to go in faster, he was scolded because he vsnt.d
to be registered when the staff were eating. .. I sure in the hospital they can eat some other time(Malay vn; Ion MVW1J
Private clinics is jch easier, it i. not the same as govercnt clinic. The gov.rnt clinic you have
to wait and weit. For exarçle at 12.00 the governeent staff want to rest for one or two hours, so we
have to wait. In private clinics, if they want to rest they will try to finish their pati.nt. first.(Chinese man, P CVM2I
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In general. I have seen once in governt hoepital in Tg Parang.... Samson. csa in with oil palm torn
injury on his back. The wound is still there he can't •tand the pain So I ask him to go and ask
he is given the l&st number, number 111. He went and asked to get treated earlier, but he was asked to
•it and wait. Rut there is on. Malay man,
	 he cams and whispered to the registration clerk and he
waa allowed to go in, get his medicine and went back early. He can t etsod Ithe pain) ao he told we
he want to go to the private clinic and he went out There ii racial problem in Tg karang Hospital. The
Indians were not well treated.....(Indian sans PGD: IVMI.J
In the district hospital the doctors who run the OPD have to
take care of in-patient services. So these doctors only come
to the OPD two or three hours after the OPD clinic have
opened. Sometimes the doctors running the OPD clinic have to
leave the clinic to attend the urgent cases in the ward. In
contrast to the private facilities the participants stated
that these facilities were visited by fewer patients and there
were many such facilities available for patients to go
resulting in shorter waiting time than in the public
facilities.
Six community leaders suggested that the long waiting time was
due to overcrowding and five attributed this to the inadequate
number of doctors running the public service. The leaders also
suggested that the short waiting times in the private clinics
resulted from their business nature. One of the Chinese
leaders observed that his villagers who wanted to get faster
attention at the public hospital would first go to the private
clinic and ask the private doctor to refer them to the
hospital. With the letter from the private doctors, the
patient would be given priority in the public hospital and do
not have to wait long. He was not happy with this situation as
the patients were 'forced' to go to the private clinics in
order to get faster attention in public facilities.
Wormally I will go to the private clinics because I am busy. I have been to (public) hospital. I arrived
at 5 when the hospital just opened. Ry 12 30 1 had not got treatment yet. There are too many people but
there are not enough doctors There is only one doctor The roams are there but there is only one
doctor. Only at 11 o'clock three doctors C 	 in.....(Malay lady, PGD.GWWl)
I don't have to wait very long . There are one or two people only in th. private clinic, usually not
many people when we go. The most is 2 or 3 people. So when we go we can just go in and get examined
straight away. (IDr Indian man)
We have to wait very long. We bcw that sowetime the doctor is busy with more sick patients but
atiaes I think there are not enough doctors and it'e worst when there are many patients usually after
public holidays such as after festive season such as 'Han Raya'. During these tines the waiting time
is worse, everyone is impatient. That a why those who can afford said that going to (governtJ
hospital is a waste of time. It'a better to go to private clinics. (ID. Malay man)
v) Charges
Charges were one aspect of the public sector services that the
participants were generally satisfied with. The charges in
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private facilities were considered to be very high. They were
very much higher for severe illnesses, deliveries, in-patient
care and surgical procedures.
A number of FGD participants and community leaders complained
about the unstandardized charges in private clinics. They
observed that for the same illness there were huge differences
in the charges between the private clinics. Some participants
complained that even the same clinic charged them differently
for the same illness on different visits. The private clinics
were observed to charge lower fees on the first visit and then
to increase the charges subsequently. Charges were also much
higher in specialist clinics compared to non-specialists. The
private doctors were also said to have charged more for those
in the higher socio-economic classes but they rarely gave
discounts to the poor. The leaders suggested that the
government should control the charges in the private clinics
and private doctors should be made to display their charges in
their clinics. At present patients only know how much they
have to pay after seeking treatment. Those who used private
hospitals were also not satisfied since most of the time they
had to pay much more than had earlier been estimated.
I ala not satisfied because in some clinics their medicine is the same, lb. treatment is th, same but
the charges are not. I do not know maybe the coats is higher or may be the doctor is better trained.
That I do not know May be the higher the costs and the more knowledge the doctor has then the charges
will be higher. May be that's the reason. Soms clinics are cheap and some are expenaive. (Malay woman;
PGD GWW1J
Th problem Is .....first of all is the charges. I never se, them display their charges list • how muchfor the medicine, how much for injections and all that. Sometimes we are worried becaus. after we have
received trestment how much the d ctor charges we have to pay. You can't bargain. Th, privat, clinic
should have the list, for exaile how wocb is the charges for X-ray.....(ID. Malay man).
The private doctors also refused to treat patients who could
not afford to pay. One Chinese man reported that the private
doctors refused to give medicines that had been prescribed
when he did not have enough money to pay for the charges. One
Chinese woman mentioned a relative who was admitted to a
private hospital for surgery but the doctor refused to carry
on with the surgery and discharged the patient from the
hospital when the family could not raise the money for the
operation.
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A number of FGD participants and community leaders felt that
the private clinics tended to overtreat their patients to
increase the charges. They complained that the private doctors
asked the patients to return for unnecessary follow-ups and
prescribed more medicines than they should. The private
doctors in private hospitals were said to persuade patients to
undergo surgical procedures even though other modes of
treatment had yet to be tried. A Chinese lady complained that
she was asked to be admitted in a private specialist clinic
for induction of labour even though her pregnancy had not gone
post-term and ended up in having a Caesarean section when the
induction failed.
There is on. more thing about private clinics. They give treatment and we go back but after we have
taken the medicine and cured he ask u p to cowe back for the second time. The second tim. they treat us.
they take our money but do not give any injections. Then they ask us to come back for the third time.
I don't know whether this ie right or not. My financial source is limited. I am already cured why
should I be treated some more. Ar. they going to make so much profit? I can't stand this. I am not
satisfied. May b. the follow-up visits is good for me but I feel that I am already cured. Everything
i. fine and I feel that I do not need to go any mor, but he kept asking me to go. So I don't go.....(Chineas man, FGD CV7421
The private doctor. .. they want money only they only want money.. .if they pay this one . . .let say
like my tonsil.. .my tonsil is not healthy, got to remove it... .firat time or •econd tim. they will ask
you to rv. it . . . .may be if you go to government hospital they will try the medicine first... .try
to cure.. .then only if cannot. .cannot cur, already.. .then only they will remove it. is it. so in the
govmrnt hoapital they take long time, is it.. .1 realised all th. private doctor they want money
only.. .1 think every time you go there... cut, cut, cut... .one or two time cut.. .1 don't know whether
they examine thia properly or not. They ask you to cut.... (ID Chines, women)
On the other hand, the public services were praised for giving
subsidised care. Apart from that the poor are exempted from
paying the charges or are given discounts. Patients were also
allowed to pay in instalments. Preventive care such as the
antenatal care and immunisation services which were given free
of charge by the public facilities to the community were
praised by the participants.
The government clinic ia good in term of it's charges becaus. not everyon, is rich and ha. got the
money The poor can go to the government clinic for treatment. Not oniy the rich can get treatment.
I am happy with the charges in the government clinic, it is much easier (to pay). It we don't have money
now we can pay later. If we cannot afford we ask for a discount ......(Malay woman; FGD Mviii)
Despite high charges in the private clinics, the Chinese and
the Indians were more willing to pay for these services than
the Malays and the government workers. The Chinese and Indians
interviewees mentioned that they would borrow money to seek
care in private clinics. Besides not liking to wait in the
public facilities they also believed that treatment given by
private clinics was more effective and cured their illnesses
rapidly. Among the Chinese community (two out of four FGDs)
they believed that the more expensive clinics gave better
quality care than the cheaper ones. They believed that those
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who charged higher fees gave them better medicine which cured
their illnesses more quickly.
Most of the time I go to private (clinic) Once a while is alright. My child health is sore isportant.
How woch he asked we just give The medicine cured the illness fast. He gives injections The governt(clinic) rarely give injection., the disease take a long time to recover. The charges i. high.....(Chines. woman; POD, CVW2)
In the government hospital we have to spend time We have to leave our work sod wait in the hospital.
The good thing about private clinic is the long opening hours. iven if it's expensive it's all right.
If only one person is sick you can go to the government hospital. In private clinics they use scanner(ultrasound scan). They tell us about our illness but Sn the goverlssnt hospital sometimes they ask us
to c	 again many times Sometimes they refer us to General Hospital in Salang or Zuala Llur
(Indian en; POD: IVM2I
vi) Drugs
Most of the FGDs participants and six out of 12 of their
leaders were more satisfied with the drugs in the private than
the public facilities. They preferred drugs from private
clinics because they beleived them to be more effective. The
drugs from the public facilities were said to be 'less strong'
and a took longer time to cure an illness without recurrences.
If the medicine is from the private clinics, normally two or three days, th. disease is cured. If it's
from the government hospital, it will take one week.., private only two or three days only and it'.
cured.... ( Malay man; POD, MVM1)
It's woch cheaper here (government hospital), you pay only one dollar and you get the medicine but the
medicine is slow to cure. If I go there when my child had fever. . .it take a long time to be cured. If
my child has fever, cough and ordinary fever, up to three days it will not be cured yet but it I go
to private clinic, after taking the medicine for one day, ha is cured..., no wore coughing.... (Malay
woman; POD: MVW1J
The medicine is not strong enough. After you have finished taken the medicine, the disease is not cured.
The medicine is not strong enough. So if I am sick I go to private, for deliveries I go to government(facilities) . (Chinese woman; POD: CVW1)
Mostly among the Chinese, the preference for privately
provided drugs over those from the public sector is also
largely due to the availability of injections in private
facilities. They believed that drugs were more effective and
cured the disease faster if injected. They criticised the
public doctors for refusing to give injections but praised the
private doctors who were willing to fulfil their request. The
Chinese leaders generally preferred the drugs obtained through
the public rather than the private sector. They felt that the
private doctors were prescribing unnecessary drugs like
vitamins and 'too much antibiotics' and trusted the public
facilities more than the private ones.
It's easier to get injections The governt (doctor) rarely gives injections. Sick children will be
cured faster if given injections. The government (clinic) refused to give injections and the medicine
is not very effective. The medicine from private (facilities) is nor. effective. For exançle if you have
fever, private (doctor) give injections and it is cured faster. Government (doctor) do not give
injections. They just .' .'e only. (Chinese woman; POD: CVW1)
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Another reason for their preference for private facilities was
the variety of drugs available. The private doctors could
therefore change from one medicine to another if the first one
did not work. On the other hand the public doctors were
prescribing the 'same medicine over and over again' making
them less effective.
In t.rma of the medicine, if I c 	 twic., ha (PP.) give different medicine He check hi. medicine. Hegive a other medicine. He chang. the medicine. (Malay woman, PGD: GWW1J
On. thing that I am not .ati.fied ii when we ask for medicine he k..p giving the 'grern on. Last time
when I had cough, I think it. quite a bad one, I want and asked for medicin, and he give em the green
one until I told him • Don't you have other medicine, doctor? You keep giving me the green ass. It•
not good' • I said that. That is why I am not aatiatied. (Malay woman, FGD HVW1J
A few informants were more satisfied with the drugs received
from the public facilities than private ones because in public
facilities drugs were given in stages starting from the
weakest to the strongest. They believed that this 'step by
step' treatment was longer lasting although it would take a
longer time to cure an illness. It would also prevent the
disease from recurring. In contrast they believed that the
private clinics gave drugs which cured the disease faster but
had little long-term effect. They also felt that drugs from
private clinics facilities were 'too strong' and has side
effects even though they may cure the disease faster than the
one from public facilities.
In private (clinics) because they want to take care of their customers, they must give good aervice so
that they will be trusted by the customer.. Sometime the customer, do not know that the medicine has
caused a shock when it react. with the body. So if that medicine is not effective, there is no other
medicine to give.... (Malay man, FGD MVM1I
In terma of medicine, what I heard from many of my friend., they said that the medicine in private
clinic, is good. But we have to consider that in government hospitals they give the medicine at the
lowest dose because they want our own antibody to work. If we give the high doae medicine, our antibody
becomes lazy. If there i. any diaease in future, it will not be able to fight. This is because we always
go to the private clinic. and the doctor give, high doas medicine.....(Malay men;
	 GWM2J
I think the private clinic in 1K, th, medicine cures vezy feat but aometim,a when he cannot managed he
has to push to hospital. Laat time there waa a case, a kidney case. He (private doctor) give the
medicine but when he cannot manage he send to hospital. When we reach hospital the government doctor
ecoldad us.. . Why did you go to private clinic?. We were told that he was given too much medicin than
it ahould be.... (Malay men; POD. MV2M2J
vii) Conuxtuxiication
Language barriers were an important issue raised by the
Chinese and Indian FGD participants and community leaders.
Chinese women identified this as a problem when they sought
care in public facilities. They reported being scolded by the
staff in the public facilities when they could not communicate
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with them in Malay language. Those Chinese and Indians who
could speak Malay said that they received better treatment.
I rarely go to the goverTanent hospital. It's difficult for me to wait. Furthermore I don't understand Malay Stime they
don't bother about you. When asked I don't know how to answer. They scolded me I am scared... (Chines. vn, P: CYWlI
Once I vent there (gov.rnesnt clinic) and I am really scared. I don't understand Malay. They asked am and I don't know how
to answer If .y child is pick. I can't tell about his illness so he will not be well treated If I go to private (clinic)
I can ccminicate well and it's faster. Sometimes the gov.rlamnt (staff I ask us a lot of questions. It we can't cnicats
how to answer them There are no Chinese workers there. If there is any it 11 be easier for us. Most of us do not speak
Malay.... (insse vn. Ps). CVW2J
In the private clinics, some of the private doctors spoke more
than one language. An Indian doctor who spoke Chinese was
popular among the Chinese community. The private practitioners
also employed staff from the three major ethnic groups in the
district who act as interpreters to the doctor when necessary.
The Chinese and the Indian leaders confirmed that this problem
existed in their community. They suggested that the government
should employ staff from other ethnic groups to work in the
public facilities.
viii)	 Range of services available
The private doctors, particularly those operating in the
district were criticised for refusing to treat 'complicated'
or 'serious' cases. These cases are normally referred to
public facilities. They suggested that the private doctors
were irresponsible for refusing to treat such cases especially
where the cases had been followed up earlier in their clinics.
The bad thing about private clinics in this district that I observed, many of them ar, not responsible.
If the disease is sisple, not serious one they will treat If it is serious, they will say •Oo to
hospital s . I am not happy about that Say if scaeon. got hypertension and has been going to the private
clinic to buy medicine, it happened to anemone in this village. For years he has been going to Clinic
A, every month ha spend 20 to 30 dollars but when his blood pressure get worse ha was sent to hospital(public). Private (doctor) are not responsible. He is his regular custr but when it is serious he
has to be sent to hospital. So whatever his condition the (public) hospital baa to accept him..........(Malay mani POD, MVM2J
Serious illness you have to go to (public) hospital If you go to (private ) clinic he will send you
to hospital He cannot do anything If you need an operation you have to go to hospital. If you have
fever or mild illness you can go to private clinics If you hav, serious illness and you go to private
clinic they will surely send you to (public) hospital I think the people here knew about that.....(ID:
Ou.nese leader)
The emergency services provided by the public facilities,
especially the district hospital (24 hours), were very much
appreciated. The Indian community used this service for
occupational injuries in the oil palm plantations. Private
clinics usually refused to accept these cases and asked the
patient to go the district hospital. The participants were
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satisfied with the presence of the ambulance services in
public facilities to be used during emergencies; these were
not available in the private clinics.
The preventive care provided by the public services were
positively regarded especially by the women: antenatal care,
home delivery, post-natal care and child immunisation services
were all appreciated.
Mentioning about the good thing about the govsrneent servic*s.... When you deliver a child, injection
for isms,nisation is given If you forget, they will cons to your house and tell you that the inj.ction
is due. I think they are responsible. When you ar. pregnant if you don't go for examination they corn.
to your house to see if you had already delivered. You can ask them to bath, your newborn at hone. They
will cons end do it. That ii th, good things... (Chinese wn FGD'CVW2I
Participants preferred not to travel to the state capital for
specialist care: most of the surgical cases had be sent to the
state capital because of the absence of a specialist in the
local district hospital. The leaders suggested that specialist
should be sent to the district hospital.
ix) Equipment
The public facilities, especially the state general hospital
was considered to be better equipped than the district
hospital and the private clinics. The private doctors often
had to refer 'serious' cases to the public hospital because of
a the lack of equipment. The private clinics were noted to not
have emergency equipment and the equipment in the private
clinic was considered to be poorly maintained.
Another thing is if it is a serious illness, the privati doctor will send you to the goverawsent hospit&l. The gov.raseent
hospital has hatter equipment. For arasipi. the General Hospital has equipment to treat all types of d3.a.as.s.....(Chinas.
man 7. Cw21
There is a privat, clinic near Gil supermarket in Klang You most not go there for deliveries. Tb, governt hospital has
all the equipment. If anything happens they can handle it If you go to privet, clinic they cannot do snything. They just
examine only. I have faced this situation before.......(Chines, man; Fi CVM1J
Most FGD participants and also seven of their leaders were
impressed with the ultrasound machines in private clinics and
their only worries were with the charges. They felt that the
government should provide this equipment in the district
hospital to avoid paying for this service in private clinics
or having to travel to the state capital.
I think there Cr. a lot of defici.ncies in T district hospital. For ,xaeipl. equipment like ultrasound
scan is not available. If you want to check you have to go to hang. It doesn't matter if you are rich
because you hays a car. For the poor they need to spend s money. It's difficult for those who work
in the village. I think ve should have it here (district hoapitali. (Malay vn. ?W. MVW1I
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There was a lack of surgical facilities in the local district
hospital, again leading to referrals. Participants believed
that these referrals, including women in labour, could be
avoided if the district hospital was better equipped.
x) Operating hours
The presence of 24-hour services in the district hospital for
emergency was appreciated. Most of the private clinics
extended their service after the government office hours
usually untill 9 pm. Those who work in the estates and the
government workers were therefore be able to attend the clinic
after finishing their work. However, most participants
expected the private clinics to accept emergency urgent cases
even after their usual hours.
If you are sick at two or three am, th, private clinics close at 10 or 9 pm. The govoriment hospital
opens 24 hours. (Indian man, PGD: IVM1J
Private doctors who owned more than one clinic were criticised
for having a very restricted clinic hours.
Because they want so ench profit, one doctor may open up to 3 clinic. sometimes.... So they limit their
hours. For exatrgle from 9.00 am to 4.00 pa in TX, 4 00 pm till 8.00 pm in SB. So if there is any urgent
case who has been going to that clinic for so long and he gets admitted in the (government hospital)
nobody knows what treatment he is on... Only the (private] doctor will know about his problem. So if
the patient was admitted to the hospital, they (government doctor) want to know about his diseas. and
treatment but the records in the private clinic is not available. The previous record is not there. So
he (public doctor] has to start the treatment from the beginning. So th, patient is not well. I think
the problem is they want to get enrs profit.....(Haley men; FGD MVM1)
xi) Technical skills
Negligence by the public doctors was raised by FGD
participants and leaders interviewed. They mentioned a number
of cases: the failure of the public doctors to detect acute
appendicitis leading to perforated appendix, diagnosing acute
appendicitis instead of liver abscess and the failure to give
proper surgical treatment to a case of hand injury resulting
in complications and amputation. Two cases of negligence by
staff in the labour room of a public hospital were considered
to have led to injuries to newborn babies. One of the Chinese
women (leader) described how her mother was wrongly diagnosed
and treated as a case of gastric ulcer for 10 years by public
doctors and was found to have gall stones by a private doctor.
She was cured when the gall stones were removed.
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My stomach is v.ry painful. Wat.r is coming out. He (public doctor) used scissors to cut the placenta
Nay be ha has cut my baby or my blood vessels Blood was pouring out After that I was sent to Xlang
But my baby is dead. I am not satisfied. I am r.ally angry. My child should not have died. The doctor
was Dot good. (inese woman, PGO CV2W1]
When I saw him (public doctor) for stomach ache, he said 1t's okay s
 and he gave injection and ask en
to go back After the in ection and when the medicine finished the pain comes back and so I se, him
again. I was not given injection but was given s
	 water. For three days and three nights I was 1sf t
like that, without any treatment They only checked my blood pressure, gave me s water but no
medicina. Until that thing (appendixi ruptured than only they rush ma to Slang hospital........(Malay
man, PUD; GWP4l)
The public doctors, particularly those in the district
hospital, were said to be less experienced than the private
doctors and were 'still in training'; most of the public
doctors were considered to be still under the three year
compulsory service before they could establish a private
practice. Few FGD participants observed that the staff working
in the private clinics were not trained: they were worried
that these assistants might make mistakes in dispensing
medicines.
The weakness of the private clinics is during dispensing of medicine. They just employ the girls from
the villages. They war, not good. Nonnally they have to go in two or three times to ask the doctor.
Sometimes they can't even reed the doctor's handwriting. In that way I not satisfied... (Malay man;
FGD GWM1I
xii) Clinic environment
Some FGD participants stated that the public facilities,
especially the out-patient clinics, were over-crowded, noisy
and dirty. There were often not enough chairs for them to sit
while waiting. Most of the private clinics were clean, not
overcrowded and had fans or air-conditioning to add to the
comfort. Even the examination couch in the private facilities
were said to be more comfortable.
The chairs, the bed and the place for examination in the private clinics is better. Just look at the
chairs in the waiting room, they are so ench different from the govarnt hospital (Malay man, P.
NV2.
It is mere comfortable to wait in the private clinics In governt clinic there are too many people.
In private clinics there are not many people waiting so it is not too noisy. You feel mere sick waiting
in the government clinic Malay man, PGD. MVII2).
xii) Other issues
The government workers complained about the difficulties of
getting medical certificates (MCs) from the public doctors.
The public doctors were said to refuse issuing !4Cs to working
mothers accompanying their sick children to treatment but were
giving it to their friends who were not sick. These were
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sometimes sold by private clinics.
The regulations in the public facilities were also
criticised. During consultations in the public facilities only
the sick were allowed to go in whereas close relatives or
spouses were allowed to be present during the consultations
in private clinic. They suggested that this practice should be
permitted in the public facilities because the close relatives
or the spouses would be able to help the doctor and the
patients especially for elderly or uneducated patients.
9.2 SUMMARY
The community focus groups and interviews with leaders
indicated frequent use of multiple providers and bypassing of
the nearest public health facilities to visit private
facilities or higher public sector facilities. Private
facilities were preferred by the respondents except for
emergency cases, serious illness and maternal and child health
services.
Generally, respondents were more satisfied with private than
public facilities. They praised the attitudes of the staff and
doctors, shorter waiting times, better communication with
providers, greater effectiveness and availability of drugs,
better technical skill of doctors and staff and more pleasent
clinic environments. Positive features of the public services
were the lower charges, 24-hours emergency services and good
quality of maternal and child health services. The private
clinics were criticised for their high and unstandardized
charges and the absence of emergency services and equipment.
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X. DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS
This chapter is presented in three sections. The first
discusses the limitations of the study, the second the
approach to triangulating the results and the third
interpretations and explanations of the findings. A summary is
provided to conclude this chapter.
10.1 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY
In this research issues arising in earlier phases of the study
guided its subsequent stages. This study was limited by
various factors:
10.1.1 External factors
The district selected (see Chapter III) was typical of most
rural districts on the west coast of Peninsular Malaysia in
terms of population size, ethnic composition and household
income. However the study district is located in Selangor
state, one of the most developed states in the country. The
presence of many private practitioners (11 per 100,000
population) in this district may have been related to the
wealth of the state, as well as to the proximity of the
district to the capital.
The district is used as a training area for community surveys
by the Department of Community Health, National University of
Malaysia. Respondents may have had experience of previously'
being interviewed and this might have affected their answers.
However this bias is likely to be minimal, and multiple
methods were used in this study to assess validity.
Furthermore qualitative methods had rarely been used
previously in the district. Generalisations from this study to
others should nevertheless be made with caution.
During the study period, a proposal by the Malaysian Medical
Association to increase the charges by private practitioners
was met with resistance from the general public. Extensive
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newspaper coverage highlighting this issue (March to May,
1993) might have affected this study and respondent opinions.
Private practitioners may also have been cautious in providing
information on charges or may have charged less in order to
avoid negative media coverage.
Finally, the study was carried out during the first year of
the implementation of the New Remuneration Scheme among civil
servants which includes public health workers. Weaknesses and
strengths of the Scheme were publicised by the media and might
have influenced the job satisfaction of health workers.
10.1.2 Internal factors
A range of qualitative and quantitative methods were employed
in this research. Through triangulation, validity and
credibility of the findings were enhanced (Patton, 1992 p.
61) . However this was time-consuming and costly and sometimes
had to be done surreptitiously (e.g. the spot-checks) in order
to avoid upsetting or embarrassing the respondents.
Whenever structured observations in health facilities and
participant observations of health workers are undertaken,
there is always a possibility that this will stimulate change
in the behaviour of the respondents (Henerson et al, 1987 p.
33). This bias was minimised by not informing the health
workers explicitly of what was being sought in the
observations.
In some parts of the study (prospective recording of cases,
recording of diagnosis and drug prescriptions in user
interviews) data were recorded by doctors and their
assistants. Bias may occur due to selective incompleteness,
systematic errors in recording or deliberate attempts to hide
information which might reveal unacceptable or unethical
practice. This was addressed, in part, by building good
rapport with respondents, assuring them of anonymity, training
and close monitoring by the researcher.
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Most elements of the research were personally conducted by the
researcher, a public health physician. This ensured his
acceptance by the private practitioners who were willing to
trust and cooperate with him. However, as a medical doctor,
his observations may be biased by his own professional views
and value judgements. Study subjects may also have responded
differently, knowing his background.
Private practitioners have been reported by others as being
cautious of providing information that would expose their
income (Ngalande-Banda and Walt, 1995; Bennett et al, 1994;
Tsui and Donaldson, 1987). Respondents may not disclose
sensitive and confidential information in the FGDs and in-
depth interviews which were tape recorded (Booth and Booth,
1994) . Information related to their income such as workload
and charges might therefore be affected. To improve the
quality of this information the private practitioners were
reassured of the purpose of the research, including the
anonymity of individual respondents. In the FGDs and in-depth
interviews, respondents were allowed to stop the recording
whenever they wanted.
This study was also limited by the time participants were able
to contribute to the research. The private practitioners,
although enthusiastic and interested, were busy with their
clinics and some interviews had to be conducted during lunch
times or after clinic hours. This might affect the quality of
the information collected. Incentives were paid to the
respondents to encourage their participation and to improve
the quality of data collected.
Due to the limited funds available, user interviews rather
than a community-based study was carried out to examine the
clientele of public and private sector providers. This
provides information only on the users of public and private
facilities while those using other services, such as those of
traditional practitioners and the non-users, were missed.
Population-based data would be able to cover both users and
non-users and also provide a denominator necessary for
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estimating service usage and types of health facilities used.
Nevertheless, in this study all the private clinics and major
public facilities in the district were covered. Furthermore
community studies conducted earlier in the country (MOH, 1988
b; Aijunid 1992) showed that only about 10% of the population
used other forms of services such as traditional healers and
other non-allopathic providers. This suggested that findings
from user interviews in this study are unlikely to differ very
much from the views of users of services based on a community
survey.
In user interviews, systematic sampling was carried out to
select the respondents. This may have led to over-sampling of
patients attending public facilities for specific clinics
(antenatal, child health, family planning and
diabetics/hypertensive clinics). However this effect was
reduced by selecting respondents on the days with and without
specific clinics.
Table 10.1: Key limitations in each Sub-Study
Study components	 Key limitations	 Attempt to address
Interview of policy	 Selected key informants might offer	 Recognition of potential bias
makers	 biased information 	 and care in interpretation of
results
Health facilities survey	 PPs might give biased information 	 Reassurance and anonymity of
related to income	 respondents
Prospective recording may be	 Financial incentive for
incomplete	 recorders
Training and monitoring by
researcher
Health workers survey	 change in behaviour of health	 Health personnel not informed
personnel when observed 	 on the actual purpose of the
observation
Public-private	 Lack of time to participate in FGD 	 Payment to PPs to cover
interaction study	 among PPs	 transport and loss of income -
User interviews 	 Over-sampling of cases from special 	 Selection of cases spread
clinics	 over days with and without
special clinics
Coeinunity eatisfaction	 Sensitive issues may not be	 Reassurance and anonymity of
study	 discussed when tape-recorded	 respondents
Respondents allowed to stop
the tape recorder whenever
they wanted
10.2 TRIANGULATION OF FINDINGS
In this study, findings from a variety of study methods were
triangulated within and across the sub-studies. Most of these
findings supported each other confirming their validity (Table
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10.2). For example, the semi-structured interviews with
doctors in health facilities showed that the private clinics
provide mainly curative services and their role in preventive
care was limited. This finding was supported by prospective
recording of cases and user interviews: both showed that most
patients attended private facilities for curative services and
public facilities for preventive care.
Table 10.2: Triangulation of findings from different methods in the study
Sub-study	 Main findings	 Main method	 Other methods	 Methods with
supporting the
	 contradictory
findings	 findings
Survey of	 Private clinics provide greater Semi-structured
	 User interviews
health	 range of curative services but interview, with
facilities	 limited preventive services
	 doctor.	 Prospective
recording
Private clinics have longer	 Semi-structured	 Spot-checks
operating hours and open during interviews with
holidays and weekends	 doctors
Survey of	 Private sector personnel were
	 Self-administered	 In-depth
health workers more satisfied with their jobs questionnaires by
	 interviews and POD
and had better attitudes to
	 health workers	 of health workers
patients than public sector
personnel	 In-depth
interviews and POD
in conmiunity
satisfaction study
Participant
observations
User	 Users of private facilities were User interview.
	 Prospective
interviews	 more likely to be non-Malays, 	 recording of cases
those seeking curative care and
those with third party coverage.
Age did not influence the type User interviews	 Prospective
of facilities used by patients.	 recording of
cases
Shorter waiting times and longer User interviews	 In-depth
consultation times in private 	 interviews and POD
sector,	 in cousnunity
satisfaction study
Rate of referral is	 User interviews	 Prospective
significantly higher in public 	 recording
than private sector
PPs prescribed more items of 	 User interviews	 Clinic drug list
drugs and more non-essential
drugs than public sector
personnel.
One area in which different methods contradicted one another'
related to user interviews and the prospective recording of
cases. In the prospective recording of cases, use of private
clinics was related to younger ages but no significant
relationship between age and type of facility used was found
in user interviews. Poor age recording is one possible
explanation: prospective recording used age data from the OPD
card which was infrequently updated. The age on the OPD card
was the age when patient first visited the clinic. Age of
patients in the prospective recording could be more accurately
calculated and recorded if date of birth was used. Different
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referral and investigation rates among patients in both
sectors were found from prospective recording and user
interviews. The lower rates recorded in prospective recording
most probably due to under-reporting.
10.3 EXPLANATIONS AND INTERPRETATIONS OF FINDINGS
This research was designed to explore the general areas of
public-private interactions in health care. The four main
hypotheses underlying this study were:
1. There is no difference in the nature of services offered
by public and private providers in a rural district in
Malaysia.
2. There is no difference in the socio-demographic
characteristics, level of training, job satisfaction and
attitudes towards patients between public and private
sector personnel in a rural district in Malaysia.
3. There is no difference in the clientele of public and
private facilities in a rural district in Malaysia.
4. Interactions between private practitioners and public
health facilities in a rural district in Malaysia are
mutually beneficial to both providers and users of their
services.
These broad hypotheses can be subdivided further and are
discussed below.
The concern of the study was not to address directly issues of
equity, efficiency, and effectiveness of health services
provided by both providers. However this research does have
implications for these health policy goals. A specific study
of equity, efficiency or effectiveness would have necessitated
a different study design: the research reported here may
nevertheless provide a starting point for such future
216
analyses.
10.3.1 Nature of the service
Findings from this study do not support the null hypothesis
that there is no difference in the nature of the services
between the two sectors. Curative (pp. 82 - 83), preventive
( pp . 84 - 87) and diagnostic services (pp. 88 - 90) differed
between the two sectors. There were also significant
differences in the hours these services were open and in
charges levied for services.
This difference could be explained by the existence of
competition not only among the private clinics themselves but
also between public and private facilities. Competition
between the public and private sectors implies that the
services offered by public facilities could influence the
provision of services in the private sector. Other factors
such as the demand for a particular service and the
opportunity to make a profit could also explain why private
providers do or do not offer a particular service.
The following discussion will illustrate how interactions of
these factors could influence the provision of services in the
private sector.
i) Clinic operation
One way in which private clinics compete with public'
facilities is to improve accessibility of their services.
Private practitioners operate for many more hours (62.8 vs
38.5 hours) and make their services available during weekends.
Demand for private services during holidays, weekends and
after office hours is likely to be high because most public
facilities were closed during these times. Sarder and Chen
(1981) reported from Bangladesh that almost all private
practitioners in their study were available at any time at the
request of clients while Griffin and Paqueo (1993) reported
longer operating hours in private clinics and their
217
availability during holidays in the Philippines.
Willingness to do housecalls is another example of private
clinics providing different services in order to compete with
the public facilities. This service is further motivated by
high profits available to the private practitioners to provide
this service. It was estimated that for each housecall between
RN 100 to 120 was charged; this service was normally used by
those in the upper socio-economic group who could afford to
pay. This service could be used by private doctors as one way
of satisfying and keeping their regular patients. The good
road system throughout the villages in the district further
encouraged private doctors to provide this service. Public
facilities could not afford to undertake housecalls because of
lack of resources particularly manpower and transport.
Furthermore housecalls are not a good way of using resources;
time used for travelling could be used by the public provider
to provide services to clients, but in the private sector
these costs were shifted to the users.
Opportunities to increase their profit and the absence of any
regulations to limit the number of clinics owned, have
encouraged the establishment of 'short hours' clinics (pp 80 -
82). The location of these 'short hours' clinics in smaller
towns of the district improves the access of patients to
services. Private practitioners also attempted to use their
time more efficiently by operating these 'short hours' clinics
during times when their main clinics have few patients.
However, priority was given to their main clinics in bigger
towns leaving most of these 'short hours' clinics to be run by
untrained staff. These clinics were also poorly equipped with
basic and emergency equipment and supplies (pp. 90 - 91).
218
ii) Curative services
This study has shown that private clinics play a major role in
providing curative services especially for the treatment of
acute illness. Competition with other facilities in both the
public and private sector, as well as the demand for curative
services has a major influence on their availability in the
private sector.
High demand for curative care in private clinics was reflected
by the user interviews which showed that patients seeking care
during the study period were about twenty times more likely to
seek curative care in private than public facilities (odds
ratio 19.2; 95% confidence limits 9.7 - 37.9) . Despite the
high charges for acute illness care in private facilities (PM
16.96 per visit), demand for private services remained high.
This may have been because of the greater accessibility of
private clinics, more flexible operating hours and days,
shorter waiting times and better doctor/staff-patient
relationships. The focus group discussions also revealed that
community members perceived the private practitioners to be
offering better quality of care. It is also possible that
patients prefer the private facilities for curative services
because they were more likely to see a doctor than other
personnel. Their impression is supported by the fact that
99.3% of patients attending private facilities in this study
were seen by doctors compared to only 49.4% in the public
facilities.
Private providers also sought to provide some services not
available in most public facilities in order to attract
patients: sexually transmitted disease care is an example.
High demand for this service was not only because it was not
provided by health centres but also because some patients
prefer not to go to the district hospital for fear of being
notified and possibly stigmatised by the condition. The lack
of provision by local public services and the high demand from
patients allows private providers to charge high fees for this
service (around P.M 25.00 to P.M 30.00 for gonorrhoea treated
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with kanamycin injection).
The failure of the health centres to provide treatment for
sexually transmitted diseases results in part from the absence
of a doctor during much of their operating hours and the lack
of available drugs. Medical assistants were not allowed to
treat cases of STDs; the 'Blue Book' guidelines restricted
their use of antibiotics. Most of the health centre doctors
indicated that penicillin and other health centre available
antibiotics were not effective in the treatment of STDs,
particularly gonorrhoea, due to the presence of resistant
strains. Drugs recommended for treatment of resistant strains
of gonorrhoea such as ceftriaxone and kanamycin (WHO, 1991)
were not available in the health centres. This suggests that
public sector services were somewhat inflexible and slow to
respond to new demands. Failure to treat STDS in the health
centres may lead to patients who cannot afford private
services or those staying far from the district hospital,
remaining untreated for longer, and possibly leading to
further disease transmission and the risk of related diseases
such as infections of the newborns and HIV.
In the absence of any standard protocol for the management of
STD5 in the country, and with most private practitioners not
attending continuing medical education, the effectiveness of
care by private practitioners needs to be examined further.
Lack of demand from patients for private services and lack of
skills of the providers are the two most probable reasons for'
private clinics not providing services for the treatment of
tuberculosis. Tuberculosis is a chronic illness which needs
long-term treatment and follow-up; high costs might force
patients to shift to the public sector. All public facilities
were required to provide this service for free under the
national tuberculosis control programme. Doctors treating
tuberculosis need to follow specific management regime. Lack
of awareness of the management regime is likely to be a factor
causing private practitioners to refer suspected cases of
tuberculosis to public facilities and to rarely commence
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treatment in their own clinics. This was also suggested by
Hooi (1994) in his earlier studies of management of
tuberculosis involving private practitioners in another state
in Malaysia. Uplekar and Shepard (1991) identified the lack of
awareness and skills in managing tuberculosis among private
practitioners in India. As in the case of STDs, the
availability of treatment for tuberculosis through private
clinics should be carefully examined: while it can be
effectively treated and may avoid delays, the quality of such
care would need to be carefully monitored.
Lack of demand was the main reason for neither public nor
private provider to offer treatment for malaria. Malaria is
relatively rare in the district and none of the facilities
maintained stocks of the required drugs. From 1987 to 1992,
between three and six cases were reported every year in the
district, most of which were among foreign workers (MOH, 1992
a). The prevalence is likely to increase in the future because
of imported cases through foreign workers. It was surprising,
however, that private clinics screening foreign workers were
not in a position to treat malaria given the possibility that
this disease is more common among foreign workers coming from
Indonesia and Bangladesh. Alternatively, disease notification
and referral from private practitioners to public facilities
needs to be improved to avoid any further delay and potential
spread of this disease.
Even though there might be demand for out-of-hours emergency
services in the private sector due to high incidence of motor-'
vehicle accidents in the district, the low profits available
from providing this service goes some way towards explaining
why private doctors tend not to provide it. Private doctors
would have to maintain stocks of emergency drugs and
equipment. During emergencies, it would be difficult for
private practitioners to charge patients since they are often
not in a position to pay, both because of their condition and
the unavailability of cash at the time. Furthermore, private
practitioners usually have to refer these cases to hospital
after early resuscitation and community members generally do
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not approve of doctors charging for cases (even if non-urgent)
which are subsequently referred.
Another reason why the private practitioners do not do
emergency work is because many of them (seven of 13) in this
study do not reside in the district and most were solo-
practitioners. Poor compensation and excessive workload due to
long working hours were also among the reasons for general
practitioners in the UK being reluctant to provide out-of-
hours emergency services even though required to under the NHS
(Anonymous [Lancet], 1994; Livingstone et alq 1989). Many GPS
in the UK have resorted to using deputising services to cover
their night calls but this has proved to be difficult outside
urban areas where commercial deputising services were
difficult to obtain (Iliffe and Haug, 1991)
Twenty four hours emergency services were not available in the
health centres because of the reluctance of health personnel
to provide out-of-hours services because their call-allowance
was abolished under the New Remuneration Scheme. Patients
needing out-of-hours emergency services have no choice but to
attend the Accident and Emergency Unit of the district
hospital.
The provision of emergency services by private practitioners
could help to reduce the workload in the district hospital as
seen in studies done in UK. Myers (1982) found that 54% of
patients attending a district hospital could flave been treated
by general practitioners. Reilly (1981) reported that 55% of'
patients who referred themselves to accident and emergency
departments could have been managed by their general
practitioners. Private practitioners in Malaysia could be
influenced to provide emergency services through incentives or
regulation but further studies would need to e carried out to
explore their capability and the feasibility of providing this
service in the private sector.
The lower prevalence of chronic illness among users of private
than public facilities (23.2% vs 33.4%) suggested that the
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demand for treatment of chronic illnesses in private
facilities is low. Even though access to public services was
restricted by the allocation of only one day per week for
treatment of chronic illnesses, most patients still sought
care in these facilities, presumably because of the high cost
associated with private sector treatment of chronic illnesses.
However these services are increasingly important because of
the rising prevalence of chronic diseases resulting in part
from the epidemiological transition (Omran, 1971; Phillips,
1991). Use of private providers could reduce the workload on
public facilities; those using private clinics also have the
advantage of seeing the same doctor on follow-up, getting
adequate drugs and having services available anytime during
the week as well as for much of the weekend. However, the
quality and cost-effectiveness of services for treatment of
chronic illnesses by private practitioners needs to be
studied. Systems of influencing practitioners to use cost-
effective treatments through training, providing clear
clinical guidelines and monitoring prescribing habits could
also be explored.
This study demonstrated that inadequacies existed in both
public and private sectors in the provision of curative
services. This is clearly seen in relation to drug supplies
and prescribing patterns. On the one hand, private providers
tended to over-prescribe and use non-essential drugs (see pp
184 - 188) and on the other, curative services in public
facilities were affected by a shortage of drugs and supplies.
Over-prescribing of drugs by private practitioners has also
been shown in studies from other countries (Greenhaigh, 1987;
Ahmad and Bhutta, 1990; Gilson et al, 1993). Gilson et a].
(1993) in Tanzania found that 15.4% of patients attending
private church dispensaries were prescribed three or more
drugs compared to only 4.7% among patients in government
dispensaries. Among those who received chioroquine, 52.8% of
patients attending private church dispensaries received the
drugs by injection compared to only 5.2% of patients in
government health centres.
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There are many explanations for over-prescribing and over-use
of non-essential drugs in the private sector. First, the
private practitioners had access to a wide variety of drugs
(any on the market) as they were not covered by the MOH drug
list. The Drug Control Authority licenses all drugs in the
country; drugs were licensed based on their safety rather than
costs. A second possible reason for poor prescribing habits
was that most private practitioners were rarely involved in
continuing medical education (Shahabudin and Edariah, 1991).
Their main source of information was from drug salesmen who
promoted particular drugs. Thirdly, selling drugs is one of
the main sources of income for the private practitioners and
they therefore may seek to use those drugs on which their
profit is greatest. In addition, patients consulting private
doctors who paid out-of-pocket for the services often demanded
drugs. This is reflected by the absence of consultation fees
in many private clinics: their charges are almost always
related to the drugs prescribed. Private practitioners who had
to compete with other private and public facilities were
likely to follow the demand for drugs by patients for fear of
losing them to other providers.
Many studies in developing countries have reported a shortage
of drugs in public facilities (Guyon et al, 1994; Gilson et
al, 1994; Garner et al, 1990; Lasker 1981); this may be
related to lack of funds, poor planning and inefficient
systems of distribution. In the district only 22.9's of the
operating budget was allocated for drugs and equipment while
most of the operating allocation was absorbed by staff
salaries. With most chronically ill patients using public
facilities, it is unlikely that this allocation is adequate.
Drug distribution was poor due to the limited coordination
between the many levels of management in public facilities.
For example in this study, vaccine supply to the health
centres was affected by poor communication and cooperation
between the district hospital and health centres. Planning for
the adequate supply of drugs is complicated by the movement of
patients between one level and another in the public sector
and between the public and private sector. Often patients who
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bypassed the health centres or district hospital for the state
general hospital came back to get drugs in the district
facilities. Patients who were being treated by private
practitioners for chronic illnesses obtained drugs from public
facilities and often demanded the same drugs they had received
from private practitioners. A shortage of drugs is likely to
occur when neither of these groups of patients is taken into
account in planning services.
iii) Preventive services
Lack of demand for private provision of preventive services
and the relatively high quality of such services at low cost
in public facilities explained the limited private role in
offering preventive care.
Low demand for preventive services in private facilities is
reflected from findings in user interviews; most (92.3%)
patients needing preventive care used public facilities.
Antenatal, immunisation and contraceptive services provided
for free in public facilities, were generally perceived of
high quality and explained the low demand for these services
from private clinics. A community-based survey, asking where
people would turn for particular services would have been more
informative, but relevant insights are still possible from
this study.
The quality of antenatal care in public facilities is
perceived to be high, as was specifically pointed out in the
community satisfaction study. Furthermore antenatal services
in the public sector are comprehensive, covering antenatal
care, home visits, delivery services and postnatal care.
Patients might also prefer to attend MCH services in health
centres run by mostly female doctors and staff. Private
providers were mostly men.
The poor quality of preventive services in the private sector
as a factor shifting demand to public facilities can be seen
in the provision of contraceptive and immunisation services.
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Patients were exposed to dangerous practices such as the sale
of oral contraceptives despite health-related
contraindications and the absence of proper screening before
prescribing any contraceptive method. Some private clinics
compete with public facilities by offering intrauterine
devices which are not offered in public facilities. This could
help to attract patients to their clinics through the
availability of wider choice of contraceptive methods.
However, lack of skills, the absence of clinical guidelines
and the profit motive of the private practitioners may also
contributed to poor quality of contraceptive services
The poor quality of immunisation services by private clinics
was seen in the poor maintenance of the cold chain (pp. 86 -
87), a factor which could potentially undermine the
effectiveness of their participation in immunisation
programmes.
Even though public facilities played a significant role in
preventive care, there were signs of inefficiencies. For
example in antenatal care, the MOH required all mothers to
have a minimum of six visits to health centres for every
pregnancy. High risk mothers were required to attend more
frequently. Antenatal mothers would have at least 12 visits if
their first visit was in the 16th week of pregnancy and
delivery in the 40th. The efficiency and effectiveness of
these frequent antenatal visits has been raised by a number of
researchers (Tucker et al, 1994, Hall et al 1980). This may be
an area where the public sector could substantially cut costs'
without losing effectiveness.
An imbalance in staff allocation in health centres also
suggest inefficiency in public facilities in providing
preventive services. In health centres, most (18 to 20)
workers were providing preventive services (mainly MCH
services), while only three staff (one medical assistant and
two attendants) provided curative services. The doctors spent
most of their time on MCH services and allocated only one day
per week in each health centre to treatment of chronic
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illnesses. Historically, MCIi services in health centres were
given high priority by the government because of the high
maternal and infant mortality in the 'sixties' and
'seventies'. It is unlikely that the current allocation of
staff is optimal given the decreasing maternal and infant
mortality rate and increasing prevalence of chronic illness
requiring curative care.
The limited role played by private practitioners in preventive
care implies that the population served by them may miss the
opportunity of accessing appropriate preventive services.
Policy makers need to find ways to encourage private
practitioners to provide and to improve the effectiveness of
preventive services they already provide.
iv) Diagnostic services and medical equipments
Potential for high profit and high demand from patients
explained why private clinics were more likely to offer
expensive diagnostic services (X-rays, ultrasound scan and
ECG) while not providing the basic diagnostic services (such
as urine analysis, blood haemoglobin, sputum and stool
examination). Lack of funds and trained personnel explained
the public sector concentration on basic and cheaper
diagnostic services.
However, findings from this study suggest that diagnostic
services provided by private practitioners were unlikely to be
appropriate by looking at the higher rates for expensive'
diagnostic services among private than public sector users
(5.1 vs 2.4 per 100 patients). The higher rates could be due
to the absence of these services in public services but one
could not rule out demand induced by the private practitioners
themselves; this has been reported in relation to diagnostic
investigations by Abe (1985) in Japan and Hiliman et al (1990)
in the USA.
The effectiveness of diagnostic services provided by private
clinics is a concern given the lack of training in using these
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investigations among most of the private doctors and their
staff. Quality of assessment with X-rays and ultrasound is
likely to be low. Private practitioners often depend on sales
personnel for advice and did not refer their patients for
second opinions even when in doubt about their findings. It is
possible that such diagnostic equipment is used to generate
profit without much benefit to patients. In the absence of
strong regulations, private providers were found to respond to
financial incentives and to provide services beyond their
capability.
The lack of any regulation on minimum standards for private
clinics coupled with the motive of the owner to cut costs in
order to maximise profit explained the lack of basic and
emergency equipment and supplies in private clinics.
In the public facilities, the shortage of basic and emergency
equipment might be due to lack of funding, bureaucracy which
complicated the process of maintaining the equipment and poor
managerial skill of health workers in allocating scarce
resources.
10.3.2 Human resources
The hypothesis that there was no difference between public and
private providers in terms of their socio-demographic
characteristics, level of training, job satisfaction and
attitudes towards patients between public and private sector
personnel was not supported as differences were found in all
these aspects.
i) Socio-deinographic characteristics
The compulsory service in the public services explained the
presence of more younger doctors in the public than the
private sector (mean age: 31.1 vs 41.2 years) . Only those who
have completed this five year mandatory service can resign to
start their private practice or commence further training and
specialisation. However some young doctors continue to work in
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the public sector to gain experience or save enough capital to
start their own practices. Poor salary and service conditions
in the public sector failed to retain the older and
potentially more experienced doctors. Thus, this group of
doctors was likely to be found in the private sector. In the
community satisfaction study, the older private practitioners
were viewed as having more experience and providing better
quality care than the young public sector doctors. Older
doctors in private practice were also reported by Ngalande-
Banda and Walt (1995) in Malawi and Pineault et al (1991) in
Canada.
The predominance of female doctors in public facilities
especially in the health centres resulted from the state
policy of allocating more female doctors to run the MCH
services which was the main priority in the health centres
(Deputy Director of Selangor State Health Services). Since MCH
services provide services for mothers and children, female
doctors were thought to be more acceptable, particularly in
rural communities. It is also possible that female doctors
themselves prefer to work in health centres which have fixed
working hours and no on-call duties due to family commitment.
In Canada, the tendency for women doctors to work in public
rather than private facilities was explained by the financial
security through fixed salary, fixed working hours and the
presence of fringe benefits such as maternity leave (Pineault
et al, 1991)
Rapid turnover of private sector staff who leave if they get'
permanent jobs in the public sector explained why non-medical
staff in private facilities were younger than those in public
facilities (mean age: 22.8 vs 37.4 years) . This suggests that
even though private practice was attractive to doctors, public
sector services were more attractive for non-medical staff.
This is probably because of better training opportunities and
pay offered. Trained nurses who left the public services were
likely to prefer to work in private hospitals, where salaries
were higher.
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Ethnic policies in Malaysia may explain the differences in the
ethnic distribution between public and private sector
personnel. The ethnic composition of health workers in the
public sector was determined by the quota system applied by
the government. More Malays than other ethnic groups were
recruited into public services and sponsored by the government
in the universities. Those sponsored were bonded to serve in
the public sector after their compulsory years. Most of the
private doctors were private students and were therefore not
required to serve in the public services beyond their
compulsory service. The private practitioners were inclined to
employ more Chinese and Indian clinical staff as a business
strategy to solve the problem of language barriers in order to
attract patients from all three major ethnic groups in the
district.
Lack of resources in the public sector is one reason for the
low income of public sector doctors. Private doctors have
significantly higher income levels than their public sector
counterparts. Similar findings were reported from India
(Kansal, 1992) and Malawi (Ngalande-Banda and Walt, 1995).
Currently the doctors follow the same salary structures as
other civil servants which favoured seniors in administrative
positions. Apart from the lack of resources, the government
refused to increase the salary of the health workers to avoid
demands from other civil servants for salary increases. There
were suggestions that doctors should be placed under a
different salary commission (MMA, 1991 a).
Although among the doctors, income in the private sector was
higher, the reverse was observed among the non-medical staff.
Public sector clinical staff (nurses and medical assistants)
had significantly higher incomes than those in the private
sector. The lower salary of non-medical staff working in
private clinics compared to those in the government sector was
also reported by Kansal (1992) in his survey in India. He
found that a private sector nurse earned between Rs 400-1250
a month while her public sector counterpart earned between Rs
1730 - 4100 a month. While differences in age, level of
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training and duration of service could explain the differences
in the income level of non-medical staff in both sectors,
Kansal (1992) suggested a possible factor was exploitation of
workers by private doctors to reduce operating costs of their
clinics.
ii) Training
The absence of any regulations controlling the employment of
non-medical personnel and their lower salary costs led to
greater employment of untrained staff in the private clinics.
While most (60.8%) of the clinical staff in the public service
were trained, the private clinics tended to employ untrained
staff as was also observed by Ngalande-Banda and Walt (1995)
in Malawi. These workers tend to be school leavers who are
'trained' on-the-job. Apart from being cheaper these school
leavers are easier to find in rural areas than trained staff
who were more inclined to work in public facilities or private
hospitals located in urban areas.
These untrained workers were observed to perform various
skilled tasks including dispensing drugs and taking X-rays:
this raises questions about the quality and effectiveness of
these activities. The training such workers received from
their employers was unstandardised and supervision was either
poor or absent. The community was not very concerned about
this aspect either because of their ignorance or because they
preferred their interpersonal skills. This contrasts to the
study by Gilson et al (1994) in Tanzania which showed that the'
community were not satisfied with the private (church)
dispensaries because they were staffed by untrained workers.
Lack of participation of private practitioners in continuing
medical education activities might also affect the
effectiveness of their care. The low priority given by private
doctors to CME confirms an earlier study by Shahabudin and
Edariah (1991). They found that all 22% of 364 doctors in
their survey who did not participate in CME were private
practitioners.
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Loss of income, difficulty getting locums, being a solo
practitioner and working far from the urban areas where most
of the CME activities took place were the main reasons for
their lack of participation in CME. On the other hand the
presence of an organised in-service training programme in the
Ministry of Health and incentives for promotion were among the
reasons for participation of public sector personnel in CME
activities.
iv) Job satisfaction
Doctors and staff in the private sector were more satisfied
with most aspects of their jobs than those working in the
public sector. Effectiveness of public sector services could
be affected by lower levels of job satisfaction among the
personnel. There are many interacting factors which lead to
the low morale of the public sector workers: lack of resources
in the public sector, low salaries, inadequate drugs,
equipment and supplies and unfilled posts leading to increased
workload are all relevant. Public sector doctors had lower
incomes but a higher workload than private doctors. The public
doctors saw more patients per hour than private doctors. Those
in the district hospital were responsible for in-patient care
and on-call duties while those in health centres also had
administrative duties involving supervision of staff. A survey
conducted by the MMA among 205 public sector doctors showed
that 84% of them were not satisfied with their salaries (MMA,
1993 b)
The non-doctors in the private sector were more satisfied than
public sector staff even though most of them were paid less.
They received other incentives such as bonuses, overtime
payment, free meals and paid holidays. It is also likely that
the staffin the private sector did not demand high salaries
since they were mostly untrained. In contrast, public sector
staff were more demanding knowing they could receive much
higher pay if they worked in private hospitals.
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Poor managerial skills among health managers was a further
reason for poor job satisfaction among public sector workers.
Undergraduate training and internship prepare the doctors with
clinical skills, but young doctors received little input on
management despite the fact that they were often placed in-
charge of health centres (Green, 1994). They faced
difficulties running the health centres which were staffed by
more experienced subordinates. The supervisors (such as
district health officers, MOIC of district hospital and
sisters) were criticised for providing poor quality
supervision to their junior colleagues. On the other hand the
private practitioners had little difficulty managing their
clinics: they had fewer staff to take care of, a less
complicated management structure and more experience.
Inflexible bureaucratic requirements in the public services
also led to poor job satisfaction. The drug supply system and
maintenance of equipment and vehicles was complicated by the
inefficient involvement of various levels of management, most
of which were poorly coordinated. Prospects for promotion were
affected by the need to transfer to another place because
promotional posts were not created at their current workplace.
v) Attitudes towards patients
This study showed that the private sector health workers
exhibited more positive attitudes towards patients than those
in the public sector. The mean attitude score for private
practitioners was higher than public sector doctors (33.6 vs.'
27.3). This is supported by findings from participant
observation which generally showed that doctor/staff-patient
relationships were better in the private than public sector:
staff in private clinics showed greater respect and were more
friendly and helpful to patients while the private
practitioners built better rapport with their patients during
consultations. In the community satisfaction study poor
attitudes of public sector health workers towards their
patients was raised as an important factor affecting their
satisfaction (Chapter IX). The negative attitude of public
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sector personnel towards their patients is likely to impede
effectiveness of their care.
Studies conducted in other countries support the findings of
this study. Gilson et al (1994) in a qualitative study in
Tanzania reported that in government facilitie staff showed
little kindness to patients and were generally unsympathetic.
She also observed that informal charging and discrimination in
service provision were commonly practised. Kapil (1988) in
India reported that respondents, particularly among the poor,
complained about the arrogant and insensitive behaviour of
government doctors and other health personnel. DiMatteo et al
(1979) showed in a study in USA that physicians' caring
attitudes and openness to communication influenced patients'
decisions to continue the physician-patient relationship.
The poor attitudes of public sector workers can partly be
explained by their poor job satisfaction. Most aspects of job
satisfaction (income, allowances, workload, relation with
superiors, equipment and prospect of transfer) were shown to
be correlated with the attitude score in this study. Calnan
(1988) showed that general practitioners in the UK with better
attitudes towards their patients (measured by the degree of
social orientation) also were more satisfied with their jobs.
However further studies need to be undertaken to determine
whether the relationship between job satisfaction and
attitudes towards patients is causal and what other factors
influence attitudes.
In the private sector, apart from good job satisfaction, the
attitudes of the health workers could also be due to the need
for them to compete with other clinics and with public
facilities to attract patients. They have to behave in a
manner desired by patients, otherwise they will lose their
business. Abel-Smith (1976 p. 71) has observed that generally
doctors paid under salaried systems which remove financial
competition were less concerned with pleasing their patients.
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10.3.3 Clientele of public and private facilities
The hypothesis that there is no difference in the clientele of
public and private facilities was tested when comparisons were
made on socio-demographic characteristics, time spent in
clinic, rate of referral and methods of reimbursement among
the users. This hypothesis was not supported because
differences were found in all aspects compared. All the
comparisons were made on a section of the population that used
the service during the study period; comparison of utilisation
rates of different types of facilities could, however, only be
made if a population-based study had been undertaken.
i) Socio-demographic characteristics
The ethnic distribution of patients shows that, after
controlling for other confounding factors including socio-
economic status, the use of private facilities was strongly
associated with the non-Malays (odds ratio = 3.4, confidence
limit = 2.4. - 4.7). This is consistent with an earlier
household study (MOH, 1988 b). The ethnicity of the providers
is the most likely explanation for this observation. The
predominance of Malay health workers in the public facilities
and the language barrier faced by the non-Malay patients has
led them to seek care in private facilities. The presence of
multi-ethnic health personnel in the private facilities
encouraged non-Malays to seek care in these facilities. This
raises an issue of inequity as the non-Malays were not able to
use the subsidised care in public facilities. The non-Malays,
even those who are poor, may either feel that they have to use
private facilities (even if they cannot afford them) •or may
not use any services t all. The likelihood of the non-Malay
population in the district seeking care in the private
facilities could be better demonstrated if a community survey
was undertaken..
The socio-economic status of patients was found to be
significantly associated with type of facility used. Most
patients from lower socio-economic status used public
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facilities while those of the higher socio-economic groups
were more likely to use private facilities. This finding
echoes those of earlier studies by Heller (1982), MOH (1988 b)
and Aijunid (1992) using household surveys; all showed
utilisation of private health facilities increased with
income. The average charges in private clinics were RN 17.54,
equivalent to one day's salary for a labourer.
Provision of free services in public facilities does not solve
the issue of inequity. Despite their ability to pay, 39.9% of
the users of public facilities in this study were from middle
and upper socio-economic groups. On the other hand 49% of
users of private facilities were from lower socio-economic
group. In an earlier study (MOH, 1988 b), 31% of patients
earning RN 1,000 and more used public facilities. The use of
the highly subsidised public facilities by the non-poor partly
results from these patients being granted special privileges.
Firstly, it is government policy to give priority to
government servants seeking care in public facilities. They
are also exempted from any fees for out-patient care and a
separate counter to serve government servants has been set up
in most hospitals to avoid waiting. They also have highly
subsidised fees for in-patient care. In addition, users in the
upper socio-economic group may receive better quality care
from health workers in the public sector: they use their
social position in the community and their personal
connections with the health staff to ensure more prompt and
better quality attention.
The presence of more women in public rather than private
facilities reflects their seeking preventive services,
especially maternal and child health services. After
controlling for the type of services sought, differences in
the gender distribution of users in both sectors disappeared.
The lack of a significant relationship between gender and type
of facility used has also been reported from an earlier
household study in the same district (Aijunid, 1992). However,
household studies in other developing countries have shown
that men are likely to use private health care while women
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tend to use public facilities (Akin et al 1986; Feidmen 1983;
Ganatra and Hirve, 1994). In these studies the higher status
of males relative to females and their control of financial
resources was offered as the likely explanation.
In this study, the lack of a significant relationship between
gender and type of facilities used could be due to the
increasingly equal status of women as they participate in the
labour market. In 1990, 46.8% of women were in full employment
in Malaysia (Department of Statistics, 1990 b); through
employment they could be using their own resources to seek
care in private or public facilities.
The lack of a relationship between age and type of facilities
used in this study was supported by an earlier household study
from the same district (Aijunid, 1992). This could be
explained by the financial support which the elderly obtain
from family members. Without such support it might be
anticipated that the elderly would seek care in the subsidised
public facilities. Traditional Asian values of respecting and
supporting the elderly could still be well observed among
people in the country particularly in the rural areas.
Furthermore the government policy of allowing tax relief for
money spent on health care of elderly family members
introduced in 1990 could increase the financial support for
the poor (MOF, 1992).
Comparison of the household characteristics of the users made
in this study revealed that users of public facilities were'
more likely to have more children in their households. However
the number of working individuals and total number of
individuals in the households did not appear to influence the
types of clinics used.
The likelihood of those with more children using public
facilities rather than private providers could be explained by
the financial burden faced by families with many children.
However the lack of a significant relationship between the
number of working individuals and the total number of
237
individuals in the household with the type of facility used is
difficult to explain. It might be anticipated that those
households with more working individuals would seek care in
private facilities as they are likely to be more financially
secure. Those with many individuals in the household might be
expected to seek care in public rather than private
facilities. Ways in which individuals in households distribute
their resources to spend on health care is clearly complex and
needs further research to provide clearer explanations.
Private patients travel a longer distance than public patients
to obtain care (8.8 vs 6.3 km). This is quite surprising
because all the health centres and private clinics were
located near to each other in each town. This difference
persisted after controlling for socio-economic status,
implying that users of private facilities were willing to
travel a greater distance. There could be three reasons for
this: absence of a regular provider, likelihood of bypassing
the nearest facility and reasons for choosing a particular
provider. Private sector patients were more likely than
private sector patients not to have a regular provider (21% vs
12.5%) and to bypass the nearest health facility (48.1% vs
38.2%). In searching for effective treatment, they might move
from one doctor to another and were willing to travel longer
distances to obtain this (Ming, 1988). This is facilitated by
the good road system in the district.
ii) Time epent in the clinic
On average patients attending private facilities had a shorter
waiting time (21.1 vs 52.1 minutes) but longer consultations
than in the public sector (6.8 vs 5.6 minutes). The total time
spent by patients in the private clinics was shorter than in
the public facilities (35.4 vs 67.4 minutes).
This is consistent with earlier studies (Heller, 1982; MOH,
1988 b) although in both studies the time spent was reported
by patients and not measured objectively. The mean
consultation time in private clinics was about 20% longer than
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in the public sector. However in both types of facilities the
mean consultation time was shorter than reported in many
developed countries: 8.25 minutes in the UK (Department of
Health and Social Security, 1987), 12 minutes in New Zealand
(Baker, 1976), 15 minutes in Canada (Collyer, 1969) and 21
minutes in Sweden (Andersson and Mattson, 1989). These
international comparisons need to be interpreted with caution
because of the differences in the case-mix, the role of
primary care providers (Wilson, 1991) and system of
reimbursement in different countries.
The difference in time spent by patients could be explained by
the reimbursement mechanisms and the workload in the two
sectors. Private practitioners were paid on a fee-for-service
basis; there is always an incentive for them to see a maximum
number of patients and to be efficient with their time. A
shorter waiting time also attracts patients. Private
practitioners used their time effectively during the
consultation, being friendly, courteous and willing to provide
information to patients. This influenced patient satisfaction.
However, public doctors and staff paid a fixed salary had
little incentive to do so. Since output of their work was not
linked to their income there was a tendency for time wastage
(e.g taking long and frequent tea breaks) as suggested by the
respondents in the community satisfaction study and confirmed
by participant observations.
Differences in workload in public and private facilities could
also help explain the difference in the time patients spend in'
the facilities. Private doctors saw fewer patients per hour
than their colleagues in the public sector (5.3 vs 8.0
patients per hour). The higher workload in the public sector
could lead to longer waiting times and health workers would
shorten the consultation time as they rush through cases to
finish their workload.
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iii) Referral rates
Referral rates were twice as high in the public than the
private sector. However in both sectors, the rates between 3%
to % were probably lower compared to developed countries such
as in the USA (7.9%) (Salem-Schatz et al, 1994) and in the UK
(10%) (Webb and Lloyd, 1994). Caution must be taken in these
comparisons given different methods in calculating this rate.
The absence of gate-keeping and a weak referral system,
allowing patients to bypass the primary level of care, are
among the reasons for low referral rates. It also reflects
differences in the case-mix; more patients seeking antenatal
care and care for chronic illnesses used the public rather
than private facilities.
The lower referral rate in private than public facilities is
also due to the reluctance on the part of the private
practitioners to refer their patients for fear of losing them
to the public sector which would affect their income (Chapter
VII). In this respect private doctors may continue to manage
their patients beyond their capability and may only refer at
a later stage when patients had suffered serious
complications.
The tendency of private practitioners to refer to private
rather than public facilities is due to their satisfaction
with replies to their referral letters. However in India,
general practitioners were induced to refer patients to'
private consultants and investigation centres. Through 'cut
practice' these general practitioners received up to 40% of
the fees charged by the consultants (Yesudian, 1994). In
Malaysia, this is called fee-sp1itting' which was banned by
the Malaysian Medical Council in 1990. Rodwin (1992) reported
that 'fee-splitting' had existed in the American health system
but was banned by government in 1992 even though this was
opposed by the American Medical Association. To what extent
this is practised generally in developing countries has not
been reported and warrants investigation.
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iv) Methods of reimbursement
Out-of-pocket fee-for-service payment was the most common
method of payment for private practitioners in this study.
This was also reported in other developing countries such as
Malawi (Ngalande-Banda and Walt, 1995), Papua New Guinea
(Thomason, 1994), Thailand (Bennett and Tangcharoensathien,
1994), Bangladesh (Sarder and Chen, 1981), India (Bhat, 1993)
and South Africa (Naylor, 1988). In most developing countries,
the absence of a third party funding mechanism such as
national health insurance or social security to cover everyone
in the country and to pay for services provided by private
practitioners is one reason for this. However, in more
developed countries such as Canada, Australia, New Zealand,
France, Germany and Japan, where national health insurance is
well established, doctors were also reimbursed on a fee-for-
service basis (Ron et al, 1991 p.58; Barnum et al, 1995) . It
was also found in an earlier study in Malaysia that fee-for-
service methods of reimbursement were preferred by private
practitioners (EPU, 1989) if national health insurance were to
be introduced in the country. Their preference is most
probably because they can generate more income through this
method of payment, rather than, for example, capitation.
The advantage of a fee-for-service method of reimbursement is
that it provides incentives for private practitioners to
operate longer and more flexible clinic hours and to provide
good quality care in order to attract patients. However this
method of reimbursement is likely to be inefficient as there'
are also incentives to over-prescribe drugs, over-use
expensive diagnostic investigations and open multiple, poorly
managed clinics as shown in this study. Another disadvantage
is the loss of tax revenue by the government because the
income of private practitioners paid through fee-for-service
is difficult to monitor.
The use of private practitioners by employees of private
companies and parastatal bodies covered by health insurance
explained why those with third party coverage were more likely
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to use private facilities. These private companies and
parastatal bodies used private practitioners because their
workers would get quicker and potentially more efficient
service from these facilities, reducing productivity losses.
Private companies also exerted some control over the private
doctors: some private doctors complained that were not allowed
to issue medical certificates to sick workers as the employers
had to pay full salaries during medical leave. Thus the
workers were forced to take annual leave when they were sick.
As the private practitioners had to bid for contracts every
year from these companies, it is likely that they would be
more obliged to work in favour of the employers than the
employees.
10.3.4 Interactions between the public and private sectors
The final hypothesis that interactions between private
practitioners and public health services are beneficial to
both providers and consumers was tested. Seven forms of
interaction were studied: immunisation returns from private
practitioners, the MOH/MMP. hepatitis B immunisation project,
patient referrals, utilisation of public ambulances by private
practitioners, medical examination of foreign workers, private
practice by public sector doctors and disease notifications.
Interactions between public and private providers could
potentially be beneficial by helping to reduce the burden on
the providers, improving the quality of services and
increasing consumer choice. However, the hypothesis was not
supported because these benefits were unlikely to be gained
given the poor interactions between these providers. These
theoretical benefits are discussed in turn:
i) Reducig the burden of providers
The workload in the public sector could be reduced through
interactions with private practitioners. Referral of patients
from the public to the private sector for ultrasound scanning,
for example, would reduce the workload of the state general
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hospital. It is potentially more efficient at the district
level as otherwise patients have to pay transport Costs and
spend time travelling to the state capital for such services.
It could also be more efficient for public facilities as this
avoids the cost of buying and maintaining such equipment.
Although this was potentially advantageous, this study
revealed questionable effectiveness of services provided by
private practitioners who were mostly untrained in ultrasound
scanning.
Allowing private practitioners to screen foreign workers also
shifted the workload away from public facilities. However,
services by private practitioners were unlikely to be
effective in controlling the importation and spread of
communicable diseases as most private doctors do not notify or
appropriately treat communicable diseases they detect. There
was also evidence to suggest that private doctors skipped some
of the screening tests required to maximise their profits.
In the MOH/MMA hepatitis B immunisation project, some of the
workload in providing immunisation services from public
facilities could potentially be shifted to the private sector.
However, inefficiency in vaccine supply and poor demand from
patients were among the important reasons for poor
participation of private practitioners in this project.
The need to increase salaries of government doctors could be
reduced by allowing them to work as locums in the private
sector. This saves government funds to a certain extent but if'
not properly monitored could lead to doctors neglecting their
public sector duties.
Extension of public ambulances to be used by the private
practitioners could reduce the financial burden on the private
practitioners who otherwise have to provide this service
themselves. Given the fact that most private practitioners
were solo practitioners and they were unorganised, it would
not be efficient for the private doctors to provide this
service themselves. However, there was evidence to suggest
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that the existing ambulance service was inefficiently used;
use of ambulances to transport non-emergency cases by private
practitioners and as couriers to transport samples and letters
in the public sector are two examples of inefficient use of
this scarce resources.
ii) Improving the quality of services
Public and private sector interactions were beneficial in
potentially improving effectiveness of care given by both
providers through improvement in quality of services. For
example as a condition for participation in the MOH/MMA
hepatitis B immunisation project, private practitioners were
required to allow their vaccine storage to be assessed and
monitored by public sector staff. The public sector staff were
trained in proper maintenance of the cold chain and hence
could help to improve the quality of vaccines kept and used by
private practitioners. This would help to improve the
effectiveness of immunisation services given by private
providers.
Two-way referrals between the public and private sectors,
including providing appropriate information and replies to
referral letters, would increase the quality of services as
this would enable both providers to manage their patients
properly and improve their skills. However this study revealed
poor functioning of this system. Public sector doctors did not
reply to referral letters sent by private practitioners. Some
private practitioners referred their patients without referral'
letters or provided inadequate information. The current
referral system does not operate efficiently as some patients
bypass lower level services through self-referral. Private
practitioners also bypassed the district hospital to refer to
either private or public hospital outside the district. The
current referral system was also ineffective since private
practitioners often referred cases at a late stage.
There was some evidence suggesting that, with proper
monitoring, locum practice by public sector doctors could
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increase the quality of care in three ways. First through
increasing the income of public doctors, thus increasing their
job satisfaction and improving their attitudes towards their
patients. Second, private practitioners would be able to
provide a greater variety of services and longer hours of
service by employing locums. Third, private practitioners who
were mostly solo-practitioners would be able to employ locums
to work in their clinics enabling them to attend CME
activities.
Proper notification of notifiable diseases could enable the
district health workers to better control communicable
diseases. However, the current system of disease notification
was not effective partly because of non-enforcement of the
related regulations and lack of awareness of the providers.
Feedback from public health workers which would keep the
providers informed and encourage their participation in
surveillance of communicable disease in the district (Kirsch
and Harvey, 1994) was not given to the private practitioners.
Data from immunisation returns could assist district health
officers to better asses the coverage of immunisation
services. It is probably more efficient than community survey
which are difficult to conduct by the district health team
given their inadequate resources.
iii) Increasing consuter choice
Interactions between public and private sector allows greater
choice for patients to satisfy their needs. For example in
MOH/MMA hepatitis B immunisation, patients may choose to have
the services in public or private facilities. If referral from
the public to the private sector were allowed and formalised,
patients Would not be restricted in being referred to public
hospitals after seeing doctors in the health centres. Foreign
workers and their agents currently have more choice for
medical examinations given that there are many private clinics
in the country. However, since most patient have to pay out-
of -pocket for services in private clinics, their accessibility
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might be limited.
It was shown in Chapter VII that both providers faced many
problems in their interactions due to the following factors:
a) Weak and inappropriate policies
There is often a gap between policy formulation and its
implementation. For policies to be implemented, policy makers
should take into account the financial, managerial and
technical aspects of the policy and the effect of the policies
on the implementors themselves (Walt, 1994 p. 177). In this
study some of the policies formulated at the central level on
public and private sector interactions were found to be weak,
unacceptable to the health workers and failed to take into
consideration existing problems faced by the implementors at
the ground level.
Weakness in policies which guide the implementation of the
MOH/MMA hepatitis B immunisation project, was one factor
impeding the participation of private practitioners in the
project. The policy allowing vaccine distribution to be
monopolised by Apex Pharmacy was weak leading to long delays
in vaccine supply and turning away private practitioners from
this project. Distribution of vaccines should be contracted
through a competitive process and be subjected to independent
monitoring. The policy to restrict the ages of those for whom
this service was made available reduced demand for such
services in the private clinics. This was one of the reasons'
for poor private sector involvement in the project. If the age
group were extended to cover adults, the private practitioners
would have had more demand for this service at least
temporarily and would not have to compete with the health
centres if this age group of takers were not covered by the
health centres. However, it may not be cost-effective to
immunise the population against hepatitis B at a later age as
many might already have been exposed to the disease.
Alternatively, allowing increase in the profit margin of the
private practitioners by increasing the maximum charges
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allowed or lowering the price of vaccines sold could attract
the private practitioners. But further analysis is needed as
the increased charges in private clinics might reduce
patients' accessibility; lowering the vaccine price means
increasing the subsidy which would have to be shouldered by
the government.
The policy to disallow public to private referral at the
district level was also weak. Public doctors continue to refer
patients to the private sector doctors because of the absence
of an ultrasound scan machine in public facilities in the
district and patients' refusal to travel to the state general
hospital because of travel and time costs.
The policy disallowing public sector ambulances to be used by
the private sector was also inappropriate. It was not followed
by public sector personnel at the ground level on humanitarian
grounds and in order to preserve good relationships with the
community.
Policies to allow screening of foreign workers by private
practitioners were weak because most private practitioners did
not notify diseases such as malaria and STD5, despite being
required by law. Furthermore most private clinics were not
equipped to carry out required investigations and had to
depend on private laboratories which were not available in the
district. These undermined the whole exercise which aimed to
prevent the importation of communicable diseases through
foreign workers.
Disallowing locums by public sector doctors in the private
sector was not acceptable to public sector doctors because of
their poor salaries. Furthermore private practitioners need
locums to cover their services given the fact that most of
them were solo-practitioners. Public doctors continued to do
locums illegally but this led to poor management of patients
such as inappropriate referrals.
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Reasons for poor policy formulation may include central
planning of activities without the involvement of local level
workers. The involvement of different actors, including those
at the local level could result in better processes of
formulating and implementing policy (Walt and Gilson, 1994;
Reich, 1993). Impediments to proposed policies could be
identified, potential opposition recognised and innovative
solutions, found.
b) Incentives and disincentives
Lack of incentives and the presence of disincentives were
another reason for problems faced by both providers in their
interactions. For example, in the MOH/MMA hepatitis B
immunisation project, the RN 8.00 profit as an incentive for
the private practitioners was not adequate because they had to
also suffer a variety of disincentives. The disincentives
included the need for paper work to apply to join the scheme
from MMA, provide monthly returns, poor supply of vaccines and
absence of other incentives such as discounts that they could
obtain if they ordered from their own suppliers. The presence
of other brands of vaccines provided them with almost the same
if not more profit, further discouraging private practitioners
from joining the scheme.
In disease notifications, there are hardly any incentives for
private practitioners to cooperate with the public sector.
They were likely to lose their patients when they notified
them due to poor handling of investigations by public sector
workers. There was no way of compensating them for their time
and costs associated with notifications such as phone calls
and stamps.
There were no incentives for the private practitioners to
provide their monthly immunisation returns. Maintaining
immunisation records and completing return forms took time.
Due to this most private practitioners were not submitting
them regularly and the quality of information sent by those
who participated was doubtful.
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Ability to learn from the referral and satisfaction gained
from proper management of the patient is an incentive for
private practitioners in patients referral. However, the
failure to obtain satisfactory replies is a major
disincentive, as is the potential 'loss' of their patient to
the public sector.
Utilisation of public ambulances was advantageous to the
private practitioners where they would not have to provide
their own ambulance service to patients. However they faced
bureaucratic difficulties leading to delays in obtaining the
service.
High profit (about RN 60 to 70 per patient) is probably the
main incentive for most private practitioners to undertake
medical examinations of foreign workers. Furthermore they
would not have to compete with public facilities for patients
and the charges were not controlled by MOH. However
competition among the private practitioners undermined this
exercise as some private practitioners skipped investigations
to increase their profit. Mechanisms to assure the quality of
services provided are required.
c) Poor inter and intra-agency collaboration and coordination
Collaboration between different agencies at different levels
from planning through the implementation stage is vital to
ensure success in health programmes (Sahan, 1988). However
this was found to be lacking especially at the district 1evel
and could possibly explain the problems faced by both
providers in their interactions. For example, the MOH works
with other agencies in the public and private sector at the
national level in the MOH/MNA hepatitis B immunisation project
and foreign workers medical examination. In these two
activities committees were formed at central level between
these agencies to coordinate their activities. However no
similar committees were formed at the district level to
promote collaboration. This has led to extreme lack of
communication between public and private providers at the
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district level.
Lack of coordination and collaboration within the same agency
between central and district level is also an important factor
affecting public and private interaction. For example in the
Ministry of Health, the central level failed to inform the
district health team of their precise role in the MOH/MMA
hepatitis B immunisation project and in foreign workers
medical examinations. As a result, both activities were not
monitored by the district health workers. The reason is poor
communication: in the MOH information, usually in the form of
circulars from the central level, are sent to the districts
through state health offices passing through various
directors, deputy directors and heads of units. The
information might be given different interpretation and
priority at various stages or may not even reach the districts
at all.
In the private sector, the MMA played only a limited role in
organising the private practitioners. MMA had very little
influence on their activities and most private practitioners
in the district were either not members or non-active members
of the organisation. Due to this whatever was being decided at
the national level was poorly communicated to the private
practitioners in the district. For example some private
practitioners were not aware of the MOH/MMA hepatitis B
project and changes made in the running of the foreign workers
medical examination were not known to most of them.
d) Lack of resources in public sector
Lack of resources in the public sector is probably one of the
reasons for problems in public-private interactions. The
obvious one is the unavailability of public ambulance use by
private practitioners.
Even if inter and intra-agency coordination were to be
improved, lack of resources, particularly human resources
would still be an important obstacle for public-private
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interaction. Given the current workload, the district health
team could not afford to monitor vaccine storage in every
private clinic as required in MMA/MOH hepatitis B immunisation
project. This was shown in the collection of immunisation
returns which was affected by lack of personnel to visit every
private clinic every month.
e) Attitudes of public sector personnel and private
practitioners
The poor interaction between private practitioners and public
sector personnel could also be due to their poor attitudes.
There were elements of distrust and jealousy between public
sector personnel and private practitioners. The difference in
their age, experience, training background and income
contribute to their hostile relationship. Private
practitioners felt that the public sector personnel were young
and inexperienced and hence would not be able to provide
proper care for their patients. On the other hand, public
sector doctors often considered the private practitioners to
be less competent; many doctors who failed to become
specialists left government service to become private
practitioners (Ming, 1982 a; Ming, 1982 b). The public sector
personnel assumed that the primary objective of the private
practitioners was to make profits leaving ethical issues
aside. The study has shown that there were very few
initiatives among both providers to work together. For
example, notification forms were not distributed to the
private practitioners, referral letters from private'
practitioners were not replied to while the private
practitioners gave poor responses in submitting immunisation
returns or assisting public sector personnel to resuscitate
patients when requesting ambulance service.
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10.4 SUMMARY
Comparisons made in this study and explanations given for the
differences between public and private health services have
highlighted several policy issues that need to be addressed.
Competition with public facilities and other private clinics,
patient demand, lack of regulations and incentives and
priority to maximise profit influenced the activities of the
private practitioners. Lack of resources and lack of
management capacity of the district health team are among the
key weaknesses in the public sector. Signs of inefficiency,
ineffectiveness of care and inequity were apparent in both
public and private sector services.
The interactions between public and private sector providers
were affected by the presence of weak and inappropriate
policies, lack of incentives and the presence of disincentives
for the private providers, lack of resources in the public
sector and poor inter and intra-agency coordination and
collaboration plus negative attitudes of personnel in both
sectors.
Options to address most of these issues will be discussed in
the next chapter.
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XI. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
This chapter discusses the policy issues arising from this
study. It is presented in five sections: the regulation of
private practitioners, options to improve resources in the
health sector, ways of improving delivery of health services
in the public and private sector, options to coordinate public
and private sector providers and finally a summary.
Health policy can be defined as courses of action that affect
the set of institutions, organisations, services and funding
arrangements of the health care system (Walt, 1994 p. 41). The
ultimate objective of health policy can be considered to be to
improve health status through the most efficient, effective
and equitable use of health resources, including health
services. These considerations underlie the policy proposals
presented here. It should be acknowledged however that this
study did not specifically set out to test the effectiveness,
efficiency or equity implications of services provided by
public and private providers. Nevertheless, this study has
shed light on each of these characteristics and these are
taken into account in the following discussion. It is also
necessary to state clearly that the policy process, both in
Malaysia and elsewhere, does not follow a simple linear and
rational course. Rather, it is influenced by a range of actors
and stakeholders, who interact through a variety of processes,
all of which are in turn influenced by the broader macro-
economic and macro-political context within which health care
is addressed. As such, these recommendations may serve as an
entry point for further debate and discussion and should not
be seen as an end-point in themselves.
11.1 REGULATION OF PRIVATE PRACTITIONERS
It has been argued that health care needs to be regulated
because of the failure of the competitive health care market
due to uncertainty of demand, existence of monopolies,
imperfect information and externalities (Robinson, 1994).
Regulation entails passing legislation or using existing
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government powers to influence the prices, quantities and
quality of health care delivered (Bennett, 1991). It is an
intervention to control against inefficiency, inequity and
poor quality of care resulting from market failure in health
care. An alternative way of influencing the behaviour of
private providers is through the provision of incentives
(Bennett et al, 1994). An obstacle to giving incentives to
private sector providers is resentment from public sector
doctors and personnel because in most developing countries
private practitioners already enjoyed higher income. Lack of
resources in the public sector might also make it difficult
for government to provide incentives or even to regulate
private practitioners.
i) Prerequisite for effective regulation
Before imposing any form of regulation, there is a need to
maintain a register of all private clinics in the country.
This would assist the government in maintaining a record of
all clinics in the country, along with basic information
regarding their locations and personnel employed. This
database would be of use in planning health services in the
country and in enforcing regulatory requirements.
Besides having regulations, the question of who to enforce
them needs to be considered. Currently the role of regulating
private providers is shouldered by both the government through
the MOH and the professional body which is the Malaysian
Medical Council (MMC).
The MOH needs to strengthen its function as a regulator: it
needs to have the resources, the skills and the capacity to
manage this function. Adequate resources need to be allocated
to ensure that enforcement activities can be conducted out
smoothly. This study has shown that most private clinics were
not visited regularly by MOH officers to enforce the Dangerous
Drug (Amendment) Act (1984) and the Poison (Amendment) Act
(1987) due to a lack of manpower. Most of the enforcement
activities were carried out by officers from MOH headquarters
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and the state level. Furthermore officers from different units
visited private clinics to enforce different regulations. For
example officers from the Engineering Unit in the MOH visited
private clinics to inspect X-ray machines while the Pharmacy
Unit enforced regulations regarding drugs. This is unlikely to
be efficient and effective as emerged from this study. One way
to improve this is to decentralise some of the regulatory
functions to the district health team. Ways of combining
enforcement activities so that the number of visits and
personnel involved could be reduced without decreasing
effectiveness of the exercise should be explored. The
feasibility of district health teams to carry out some of
these functions should be studied. Currently, health
inspectors in the district health office were inspecting
sanitation aspect of private hospitals to enforce the Private
Hospital Act (1971). These officers could also be used to
inspect private clinics. With training, their role could be
extended to include not only sanitation aspect but also
inspection of drugs and medical equipment. Continuous in-
service training is also necessary to update skills and
knowledge in line with new developments to ensure
effectiveness of their enforcement activities.
The professional conduct of doctors is currently regulated by
the MMC. The role of a professional body may be limited either
because of conflict of interest or its highly centralised
function (Yesudian, 1994). The function of MMC should be
decentralised at least to the state level and the appointments
of representative from the consumers to the Council should be'
considered to increase participation of lay members. This
could help the MMC to be more efficient and effective in its
function and to protect the public. Possibilities of expanding
the regulatory role of the MNC to cover other areas of
enforcement such as accrediting training programmes under
continuing medical education schemes and training private
practitioners to operate expensive diagnostic equipment (see
below) should also be explored.
255
Many of the existing rules and regulations covered in this
study such as the Dangerous Drug (Amendment) Act (1984), the
Poison (Amendment) Act (1987), Communicable Disease Control
Act (1988) and Radiation Act (1988) pertaining to the private
health sector are poorly enforced. This was evident in the
present study. One reason is that the regulations are weakened
by the presence of numerous loopholes. For example it is
difficult to prosecute private practitioners for not notifying
notifiable diseased under the Communicable Disease Control Act
(1988) as it would need to be proven that diagnosis of a
notifiable diseases was made by the private doctor at the time
of the patient visit. Doctors could therefore simply avoid
making or documenting such diagnoses if they wished to avoid
the work associated with notifying the conditions to the
health authorities. These regulations need to be studied and
if necessary modified to remove loopholes so that they can be
enforced. There is also a need for more widespread
consultation with the private sector in order to develop
mechanisms which facilitate their participation.
ii) Minimum standards for private clinics
This study has shown that minimum requirements for private
clinics to operate are often not met. The options to improve
this include providing incentives to ensure that these
standards are met or simply regulating them and ensuring by
legislation and enforcement activity, that these standards are
met if practices wish to continue to operate.
A minimum standard should include building requirements which
satisfy sanitation and safety standards and availability of
basic and emergency equipments and supplies. Existing
regulations which apply only to private hospitals should be
extended to cover private clinics. Private clinics should be
regularly inspected to ensure that they maintain standards.
There is also a need for a regulation to limit the number of
clinics a solo-practitioner can operate as this study has
shown 'short hours' clinics owned by those doctors with
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multiple clinics, were often poorly equipped and tended to be
run by untrained staff. It is not clear, however, what the
impact of such a regulation would be on accessibility of
services as it would reduce the number of services available
to patients. An alternative mechanism might be to always
ensure that the doctor himself or any other trained staff
member is present during clinic operating hours. The impact on
the providers such as reduction in their income due to this
regulation which could lead to withdrawal of private
practitioners from rural areas needs to be further studied.
iii) Employment of trained workers
Ensuring that the private doctors employ a minimum number of
trained workers needs to be carefully considered. Currently
there are no training programmes available in the public or
private sector to train the sort of multi-skilled staff
required for private clinic work. Available nurse training
programmes may not be suitable for workers in private clinics:
dispensing of medicine, for example, is commonly done by the
staff in private clinics but not by trained nurses. If trained
nurses were required to be employed by the private doctors,
the costs would be high and would have a negative impact on
the consumers if the extra costs were passed on to them, as
would be likely. In the presence of a national health
insurance scheme, the extra cost would need to be borne by the
state and those providing it with revenue, again raising the
cost for consumers. A more focused option would be to stop
some risky procedures from being practised in the private'
clinics such as the dispensing of medicine by untrained staff.
Such a policy proposal is likely to be resisted by private
practitioners, and given the shortage of pharmacists in the
country, public acceptability of such proposal may be limited.
This highlights the need for considerable policy debate
before such proposals are finalised.
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iv) Use of expensive diagnostic equipment
There is a need for licensing expensive and more sophisticated
diagnostic equipment such as X-rays, ultrasound scans, MRI and
CT Scan machines to ensure that they are operated only by
those with appropriate training. Such a measure would help to
ensure the safety of patients, the quality of care provided
and could possibly assist in reducing supplier-induced demand
for services. Those operating such services should be required
to participate in accredited training programmes on a regular
basis. Providers should be required to display a certificate
showing that they are allowed to operate the services.
Existing training programmes which are mostly run by private
companies selling the machines would similarly need to be
standardised and accredited.
v) Display of charges in private clinics
Unstandardised and high charges for services in the private
clinics has led to a degree of community dissatisfaction.
Private practitioners, despite competing among themselves and
the public facilities justified their high charges through
over-prescribing and the use of expensive diagnostic
investigations. Suggestions by a number of the community
leaders that the government regulate and control the charges
for privately provided health care services might be difficult
to implement. However a suggestion for private practitioners
to display their fee schedules publicly should be considered
by the government. This could help patients to choose their'
clinics and to a certain extent might discourage private
practitioners from over-charging their patients. However, the
impact of such proposals needs to be studied as it might
reduce the flexibility of private doctors to charge less to
poorer patients.
vi) Continuing medical education
It would be beneficial if means could be found to promote the
continuing medical education of both public and private
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practitioners. Recently suggestions by consumer associations
to make it compulsory and to relate attendance of CME of
private practitioners to the renewal of their annual practice
permit was rejected by the MMA and MCGP in favour of
incentives such as tax exemption to cover travelling expenses
and employment of locums (MMA, 1994 a). Incentives for private
practitioners to attend CME were found in other developed
countries. For example in the UK, payment of the Postgraduate
Education Allowance (PGEA) was started by the Department of
Health in 1990 and has been shown to increase participation of
general practitioners in CME (Al-Shehri, 1992). However, Al-
Shehri (1992) argued that some of the educational activities
qualified for PGEA in the UK were of low educational value and
suggested assessment on the effectiveness of ME activities
stimulated by the PGEA. In Australia, through the rural
register scheme, free locums were provided to general
practitioners practising in rural areas to enable them to
attend CME (Davies and Davies, 1991).
Through CME activities private practitioners could improve
their skills in management of chronic illnesses and provision
of preventive care particularly antenatal care, contraceptive
and immunisation services. In this study it was shown that
private practitioners play a limited role in providing these
services either because of poor quality of their services or
because of the limited demand from the users, often preferring
to use public rather than private facilities for these
services.
Ways to influence the private practitioners to attend CME
either through regulation or incentives should be given high
priority by policy makers. However CME activities are
expensive and should be instituted when adequate standards can
be guaranteed. A mechanism for auditing CME programmes to
ensure that they are of an appropriate quality and provided
through registered institution and teachers should be
considered.
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Clinical guidelines could be introduced through CME activities
and it could help to improve efficiency and effectiveness of
services given by private practitioners. Even though there is
evidence to show that clinical guidelines could help primary
care doctors to improve their prescribing of drugs (Russel et
al, 1992) and diagnostic tests (Schectman et al, 1991), Farmer
(1993) suggested that guidelines were only likely to be
adopted if they are realistic and reflect the routine working
practice of the doctors. The development of guidelines might
be time consuming and expensive and a central agency is needed
to coordinate the activities to avoid duplications, to
disseminate them to the providers for implementation and to
continually update them to take account of changes in medical
knowledge (Haines and Feder, 1992)
11.2 MOBILISING OF RESOURCES FOR THE HEALTH SECTOR
Resource inadequacies contributed to many of the problems
related to the provision of services in the public sector. The
use of private providers were also shown to be affected by the
lack of resources on the part of the users. Two ways to solve
this problem would be to use the currently available resources
efficiently and to find new resources for the health sector
11.2.1 Improvement in efficiency
i) Improving services in the public sector
The public sector could provide more efficient service through'
strengthening the management capacity of district managers,
improving the role of medical assistants and improving the
services of public sector personnel. These will be discussed
in turn:
a) strengthening management capacity of district managers
This study has shown significant weaknesses in management
capacity at the district level which were likely to be
responsible for inefficiencies in public sector services. For
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example poor supervision of subordinates, poor management of
resources leading to shortages of drugs, vaccines and
equipments were refections of their limited management skill.
It is also clear that doctors, especially the junior ones,
were not necessarily be the most appropriate managers of the
health centres or the district health team. Cassels (1995)
suggested the need for training a cadre of health managers to
undertake management responsibilities of health facilities in
developing countries. This should be considered by policy
makers in Malaysia. Existing in-service training programmes
should include training to develop management skills of these
workers.
District level managers should be given the opportunity to re-
allocate resources at their level to improve efficiency and
productivity. For example health centre managers should be
allowed to re-allocate appropriately trained nurses from
preventive programmes to assist the medical assistants running
the curative services which currently have acute shortages of
manpower. Shortages in drugs and equipment in health centres
could be reduced if more power were given to district level
managers to manage their own resources to purchase drugs and
to buy and maintain equipment locally rather than going
through various levels of management in the Ministry of
Health.
b) Improving role of medical assistants
The shortage of doctors to run curative services in health'
centres and district hospital especially at the district level
could be improved by employing more trained non-medical staff
particularly medical assistants. The current guidelines
followed by the Ministry of Health which restricts the role of
medical assistant who were trained needs to be modified.
Guidelines in the 'Blue book' (MOH 1992 c), which control the
use of drugs by medical assistants need to be modified so that
they can treat patients with chronic illnesses and sexually
transmitted diseases. If medical assistants were allowed to
manage chronic illnesses, then the chronic illness clinic
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could be extended from the present one day a week in the heath
centres. More opportunities for training and promotions should
be available to the medical assistants. The current intake of
160 trainees of medical assistants per year (MOH, 1991 b) is
inadequate and should be increased so that all existing posts
in the health centres can be filled. All these could boost
their morale and quality of care given by medical assistants.
Currently efforts to increase the role of medical assistants
were opposed by the medical profession most probably because
they fear that their position and income might be threatened.
c) Improving service by public sector personnel
Poor job satisfaction of public sector personnel which were
related to poor service conditions could result in lower
productivity and poor quality of services.. Improvement in
service conditions of public sector personnel needs to be
given high priority by policy makers. The New Remuneration
Scheme introduced in 1991 which aimed at rewarding the health
workers according to their productivity needs to be reviewed.
Better ways to asses productivity of workers need to be
established as the current system was said to lead to
favouritism. The 'on-call allowance' abolished under the New
Remuneration Scheme should be reinstated as it has led to the
refusal by public sector personnel to provide out-of-hours
emergency services in health centres. The impact of
introducing a 'critical allowance' as a form of 'non-private
practice' allowance under the scheme needs to be studied. As
the quantum was too small to compensate the doctors, it has
created resentment among workers who were not paid the
allowance. Other improvements such as promotions without the
need to be transferred, improved supervision and non-monetary
incentives such as better training opportunities should be
considered.
Government should also consider better ways to compensate the
public sector doctors. If increases in salary are not possible
other ways such as better training opportunities and
promotional prospects should be considered. The public sector
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doctors should be allowed to operate as locums in private
practice but under controlled conditions with proper
monitoring by MOH. The MMA proposed that public sector doctors
be allowed to work a maximum of eight hours per week in
private clinics and that their immediate superiors be
responsible for ensuring that doctors do not abuse the
privilege (MMA, 1993 c). Ways to implement this suggestion
need to be carefully studied.
Populations served by public and private facilities to a
certain extent are influenced by the ethnic group of health
providers. The delivery of health services in the public
sector is staffed predominantly by Malay health workers. This
raises serious issues of equity as the non-Malays, including
the poor, may feel forced to use services in the private
sector because of language barriers. The private sector is
staffed by multi-ethnic health workers and are therefore more
acceptable. The government policy of employing more Malays
than other ethnic groups needs to be reconsidered. Even though
it is a part of the New Economic Policy (Prime Minister
Department, 1991 b) to assist the disadvantaged Malays, it has
led to serious problems in the health sector. Allowing health
facilities to employ more non-Malay staff could be one way of
addressing this issue. Alternatively, incentives for the
existing staff to learn languages spoken by other ethnic
minority could be considered, although this is less likely to
be effective.
ii) Strengthening the referral system	 p
The referral system was shown in this study to operate
inefficiently as the private practitioners bypass the district
hospital to refer to either private hospitals or to higher
level public hospitals outside the district even for cases
which could be managed in district hospitals. Poor reply to
referral letters and fear of losing patients to public sector
facilities were among the reasons for such action. Patients
themselves could bypass the lower level services to seek care
in public hospitals as self-referral is allowed under the
263
current system.
One way to improve the current referral system is to introduce
a gate-keeping function in the country by penalising use of
higher level services without an appropriate referral.
Patients should be allocated to a particular provider and
access to upper levels of care be made possible only through
referrals. This would be a major change from the current
health system in the country. Apart from improving the
referral system it would also help to reduce 'healer shopping'
among the patients which is not only inefficient but might
also be harmful. The advantage of the current system is that
it allows freedom of choice for consumers which may play a
role in patient satisfaction. Private practitioners were also
providing good interpersonal quality of care to attract
patients to them. However, the disadvantages of the present
system includes the possibility of mismanagement of cases,
unnecessary repeat investigations or even treatment due to
poor communication among the providers especially between
doctors in the public and private sector. Another disadvantage
of the present system is that it may be too consumer driven
which could be a reason for over-treatment and over-
prescribing as the private practitioners follow patient demand
to please them. Allocation of patients to a particular
provider with some degree of patient choice such as permission
to change their provider after a minimum specified period
could be one way to preserve consumer freedom while
introducing gate-keeping.
Other ways to strengthen the referral system include regular
auditing of replies to referral letters. The hospital
administrators should also ensure that patients be initially
returned back to the private practitioners before deciding on
further long-term care options or when they have completed
their management in the hospitals.
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iii) Improving prescribing habits
Over-prescribing of drugs and over-use of expensive diagnostic
services are a source of inefficiency in the private sector.
Participation of private practitioners in continuing medical
education and regulating the use of expensive diagnostic
equipment could help to solve this problem. Introducing and
promoting medical audit in the country might assist in
influencing some of the less efficient practices. However,
audit is difficult to introduce even more so in the private
sector.
In developed countries such as in the UK, Netherlands and
Canada activities of general practitioners including their
prescribing were monitored through medical audit (Webb et al,
1991; Metsemakers et al, 1992 and McAuley, et al 1990). In the
UK, under the PACT (Prescribing Analysis and Cost) system,
general practitioners were regularly given feedback on amounts
and costs, comparing individual prescribing habits with those
in the same practice, same area and nationally (Reilly, 1993).
Russel et al (1992) showed that medical audit, by setting and
disseminating clinical standards, improved prescribing of
general practitioners in the UK. However, Schofield (1993) in
his review, argued that conducting medical audit may not
automatically lead to improvements in quality of care: it is
most likely to influence clinical practice if it is done
voluntarily by those who were actively involved in setting
standards and discussing their performance. Introducing
medical audit in Malaysia could be beneficial through
improving prescribing of the private practitioners but further
studies are needed to find the best ways of implementing and
encouraging participation of private practitioners.
Public education is a long-term measure to help improve
prescribing habits of doctors. The public should be educated
on the dangers and side effects of taking drugs unnecessarily.
For example the misconception tthat injections are better than
oral medications, particularly among the Chinese community
need to be corrected. This would help reduce demand for
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unnecessary drugs.
11.2.2 New resources for health care
Improving efficiency alone would probably not be adequate to
overcome the resource constraints in the health sector.
Additional means of accessing new resources for health care
should be explored: through the introduction of national
health insurance and user fees.
1) National health insurance
Plans to introduce national health insurance in Malaysia were
considered in the early 1980's partly due to calls for the
government to develop ways of utilising the services of
private sector doctors to serve the public in a more equitable
manner (Ming, 1983; Rajakumar, 1984; Tan, 1985). The
government subsequently commissioned two studies, in 1983
(EPU, 1985) and 1988 (EPtJ, 1989) funded by the Asian
Development Bank: these aimed at finding options for financing
health services and utilising services in the private sector.
The main recommendation of the first study was to establish a
National Health Security Fund (EPTJ, 1985). The second study
proposed a National Health Insurance system developed through
the Fund and proposed ways to fund services provided by public
and private sector providers (EPU, 1989). The government has
not yet made any decision on these recommendations and is
currently focusing its efforts on training of personnel
required to run the National Health Insurance.
The introduction of a national health insurance might be one
way of improving equity. Funding of services given by private
providers through national health insurance would reduce the
income barrier for the poor to use their services. However,
Gilson and Mills (1995) have suggested that implementing
national health insurance itself would create problems in
equity as it is usually targeted at small and economically
advantaged formally-employed populations and that the
financing strategies would involve excessive government
266
subsidisation as the majority of those benefitting are likely
to be civil servants (Gilson and Mills, 1995). In the proposal
for national health insurance in Malaysia the use of the
existing Employees Provident Fund and Social Security
Organisation fund to form the National Health Security Fund
would only provide coverage for approximately 20% of the
population who are currently contributing to these two funds.
Ways to extend the coverage of national health insurance to
every individual in the country is a major task for the policy
makers. It entails developing ways of collecting premiums from
those working in the informal sector and formulating
appropriate exemption mechanisms for the poor.
Even though national health insurance could possibly generate
extra funds for the health sector, inefficiency in running the
funds could lead to high administrative costs. Experience from
other countries has shown that 50% of insurance funds in Mali
and 14% of income from insurance funds in Kenya were absorbed
in administration (Gilson and Mills, 1995) while Yang (1991)
reported that administration costs ranged between 10% and 22%
of total revenue of insurance schemes in different regions of
Korea.
Proper ways of reimbursing providers is a key issue to be
tackled in order to ensure efficiency of such financing
system. For example in Korea, increases in the cost of health
care after the introduction of national health insurance was
partly due to fee-for-service reimbursement of doctors which
led to physician-induced visits (Yang, 1991). Higher
utilisation of health services due to supplier-induced demand
were shown to be related to fee-for-service payment for
providers under insurance schemes in South Africa (Broornberg
and Price, 1990). A capitation method of payment could be
applied to control supplier-induced demand. However, in
developed countries where this method of payment for providers
has been used, there is a tendency for doctors to develop
lists that are too large, provide poor inter-personal quality
of care and more frequent referral of patients to specialists
(Ron et al, 1991). Whatever methods of reimbursement are used,
267
ways to ensure cost-containment and good quality of care need
to be built in.
One advantage of national health insurance is that it could
bring greater integration of private practitioners with the
national health system. It may be easier to influence
activities of the private practitioners and to regulate them
when their services are funded through a national health
insurance scheme. For example, in South Africa it has been
proposed that accredited private providers under the national
health insurance system should be required to fulfil minimum
standards covering staff employment, equipment and also
quality and package of services provided (Broomberg and
Shisana, 1995). This could be considered in the implementation
of national health insurance in Malaysia.
ii) User fees
The introduction of user fees at the health centres and/or
increasing the RN 1.00 charges in out-patient unit of district
hospital would be one way of generating new resources in
health sector. However this may have serious equity
consequences. The poor who use the public facilities would be
badly affected unless effective exemption mechanism were
applied. In order to introduce user fees, the current system
would have to be changed in favour of one allowing fees to be
held locally. The present system of management which requires
all monies collected to be returned to the Ministry of Finance
would not guarantee that resources raised could be retained in
the health sector. Furthermore it could not be used to improve
the quality of services given at local health facilities. Even
the current fees from in-patient hospital charges are
difficult to collect when people simply refuse to pay. It is
also possible that charges in private clinics will also be
raised once user fees are introduced or raised in the public
facilities. Introducing user fees at the health centres will
probably not be supported by politicians who have been using
issues of free health care to get grassroots support from
people in the rural areas. Considering all these factors it is
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unlikely that the introduction or increase in user fees should
be given high priority by policy makers in Malaysia at this
moment.
11.3 DELIVERY OF HEALTH SERVICES
Currently the provision of services by private practitioners
has been determined mainly by market forces. As a result
services with poor demand such as antenatal care or care for
chronic illness, have not been commonly provided by the
private sector. Services which do not generate profit such as
emergency services have not been provided at all by the
private sector. Some of these services such as antenatal care
and emergency services are essential and populations served by
private practitioners such as the non-Malays would be deprived
of these services. This is more so if these sectors of the
community perceive that the public health services do not
operate in their favour.
One way to encourage private practitioners to provide these
services would be for the government to fund a package of
basic essential services and to encourage private
practitioners to provide it. This could be done most
conveniently through the proposed national health insurance.
However decisions must be made on which services to fund.
Recently the World Bank (1993) suggested that developing
countries should consider a minimum package of essential
health services (public health and clinical interventions) to
be publicly funded and delivered by either or both the publics
and private providers. The World Bank (1993) suggested six
groups of clinical interventions in the essential clinical
package : antenatal care and delivery services, family
planning services, management of sick children (treatment of
diarrhoeal diseases, acute respiratory infections, measles and
malaria), treatment of tuberculosis, case management of STD's
and limited care (alleviation of pain, treatment of infection
and minor trauma)
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It was argued that production of a package of services would
improve cost-effectiveness through synergism between treatment
or preventive activity in the package, joint production costs
and efficient use of specialised resources (Bobadilla et a].,
1994). Through the package, government would be able to pool
its resources to provide priority services. It was estimated
that in middle income countries the minimum package of public
health and clinical interventions could be provided for about
US $ 22.00 per person per year. This is likely to be
affordable in Malaysia where the government spent about US
46.00 per person per year in 1991 (MOH, 199]. b). This
essential package of health services should be considered by
the Malaysian government as a guide to an efficient means of
spending the resources available from the National Health
Security Fund when it is launched. However, the impact of such
packages of care on health outcome remain to be assessed.
Based on the findings from this study it is suggested that the
minimum essential packages to be delivered by private clinics
and health centres in Malaysia should include all the services
suggested in the package excluding delivery services. Most
private clinics and health centres do not have labour room
facilities and staff were not trained to provide delivery
services. Due to the good national road system and the
preference by the community, this service is better left to
the district hospital. The curative services in the private
clinics should be extended to include treatment of chronic
illnesses specifically hypertension, diabetes and ischaemic
heart disease. These three diseases are interrelated and on
the rise as a result of the demographic and epidemio].ogical
transitions as the country becomes more affluent.
11.4 COORDINATION BETWEEN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTOR
This study has shown that there is a need for coordination
between the public and private sectors and to improve
communication and facilitate discussion between key players.
At the national level, the Public-Private Consultative Council
performed this function; it provide a forum for discussion
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between two sectors. Currently the Council is chaired by the
Director General of Health and members consists of MOH senior
officers and representatives of MMA, MCGP and FPMPA. Through
this Council, the MMA/MOH Hepatitis B programme and foreign
workers medical examination were planned and coordinated.
However, there is a need for a similar body to function at
district level. Some form of district level consultative
committee to coordinate all activities involving the public
and private sector should be formed. The committee could be
chaired by the district health officer and the members should
include all the managers of the health centres and various
programmes in the district, officers from other government
agencies involved with specific health activity and the
private practitioners.
Apart from discussing specific projects involving the public
and private sector, these committees could be use to plan CME
activities or develop clinical guidelines to standardise and
improve the quality of care in both sectors.
11.5 SUMMARY
This chapter identified the policy issues arising from this
study which need to be considered by policy makers in Malaysia
in order to improve efficiency, effectiveness and
accessibility of health services provided by both public and
private providers. These issues include regulation and
incentives to influence behaviour of the private
practitioners, strengthening of the referral system,
introduction of national health insurance to fund health
services delivered by public and private sector and decisions
on an essential health packages to be delivered. Services in
the publie sector could be improved through strengthening the
management capacity of district managers, improving in-service
conditions of public sector personnel and increasing the role
of medical assistants. For these to be taken forward, an
271
extensive degree of policy dialogue involving all stake-
holders, cautious introduction of reforms and careful
evaluation is needed.
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XII. CONCLUSION AND FURTHER RESEARCH
This chapter reiterates the main findings and reflects on the
results. Future research priorities are also identified. The
study tested the implicit hypotheses that there is no
difference in the nature of the services, the characteristics
of the health workers and the clientele of public and private
sector facilities and that the interactions between both type
of providers are mutually beneficial.
12.1 METHODS
Multiple methods were employed in this study: most of them
were able to validate and explain information collected by
alternative methods and to help identify weaknesses of some of
the study tools.
12.2 ROLE OF PRIVATE PRACTITIONERS
a) Private practitioners alongside the public providers play
a vital role in the provision of health services in rural
areas of Malaysia. The nature of services in private clinics
is influenced by competition with public facilities and other
private clinics, demand for the services from the population
and the profit motive by the providers. Private practitioners
were more likely to provide those services not available in
public facilities, demanded by the population and on which
profits could be maxirnised.
b) Private practitioners play a significant role in curative
care for acute illnesses but the efficiency of these services
was limited by over-prescribing of drugs and expensive
diagnostic tests. The role of private practitioners in
preventive care is limited by the high demand for quality
preventive services provided at low cost through public
facilities.
c) Private practitioners were mostly Indians, male and
received their training abroad while public sector doctors
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were mostly Malays, females and were trained locally. Private
clinics were run by older doctors but were supported by
younger and mostly untrained staff while public facilities
were run by younger doctors who were well supported by trained
staff. Ethnic policies in employment of public sector
personnel, requirement for a period of compulsory service and
the absence of regulation to control the employment of
untrained staff, help explained the differences in socio-
demographic characteristics and the level of training of
health workers in both sectors.
d) The effectiveness of services in private clinics is reduced
by their lack of participation in continuing medical education
and their employment of untrained staff. In the public sector,
effectiveness of care is likely to be affected by poor job
satisfaction and the negative attitudes of personnel towards
their patients, lack of resources and consumer
dissatisfaction.
e) Private health services are more accessible to those in the
upper and middle income groups while the presence of mostly
Malay health personnel in public facilities reduced the access
which the non-Malays have to public sector facilities due to
language barriers.
12.3 INTERACTIONS BETWEEN PRIVATE PRACTITIONERS AND PT.IBLIC
HEALTH SERVICES
Based on the findings of the seven activities in this'
research, the following conclusions emerge:
a) Interactions between the public and private sector are
potentially beneficial in reducing the workload of the public
services, improving the quality of care in both sectors and
increasing consumer choices. Various deficiencies in their
interactions limit achievement of this potential, however.
b) Policies on public and private interactions formulated at
the central level were weak, often lacked input from lower
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levels and often disregarded problems faced by those at the
lower levels.
c) The participation of private practitioners in many of the
activities identified were limited by the lack of incentives
or the presence of specific disincentives.
d) Lack of resources in the public sector, negative attitudes
of health personnel in both sectors and poor inter and intra-
agency coordination and collaboration are important reasons
for most of the problems in public and private sector
interactions.
12.4 FURTHER RESEARCH
It should be emphasised that more research on the private
health sector in developing countries is urgently needed to
assist policy makers to make appropriate decisions in respect
of health sector reform. Further research in the following
areas is hereby suggested:
a) Population-based studies to asses the effectiveness and
efficiency of curative and preventive care by public and
private sector providers are indicated.
b) Interventions aimed at improving services in the private
sector, such as incentives to encourage participation in
continuing medical education, to follow clinical guidelines in
case management and to introduce medical audit should be
subjected to randomised control trials. In this way,
effectiveness, efficiency and acceptability of the
interventions could be assessed and appropriate policies to
influence provider behaviour adopted.
c) Research on the content and implementation of existing
regulations governing services provided by private medical
practitioners should be conducted in order to identify
mechanisms to improve their efficiency and effectiveness.
275
d) Operational research on the quality of care provided by
both public and private providers should be encouraged in
order to improve services in both sectors.
e) Research on the role of private practitioners in providing
promotive and preventive health care would help to asses the
merits and de-merits of promoting their involvement in such
activities in the future.
f) Policy analysis on policies related to private health care
would shed light on the factors leading to a formulation of
policies, the important actors behind such policies and their
interests, implementation of these policies and their impact
on the health care system of the country. Such study may help
identify potential improvements in the processes of policy
formulation and their content which will enhance the
likelihood of such policies being implemented.
g) Many countries in the Asian region have a similar health
system. Comparative studies between these countries should be
carried out so that experience in regulating the private
providers, providing incentives to influence their behaviours
and improving their interactions with public sector providers,
could be learned.
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Appendix 1
Table 1: Di.tribution of health resources among the states of Malaysia in 1991
States	 Household	 Population/doctor" Population! health Population per
income	 centre	 hospital bed"'
Terengganu	 905	 4,508	 13,434	 663
Kelantan	 726	 4,019	 16,055	 957
Kedah	 860	 3,782	 20,003	 744
Pahang	 1,067	 3,399	 13,614	 675
Penis	 852	 3,229	 19,303	 464
Johor	 1,220	 2,968	 15,461	 667
N. Sembilan	 1,162	 2,513	 13,352	 405
Selangor	 1,790	 2,478	 13,475	 846
Perak	 1,067	 2,344	 14,796	 520
Melaka	 1,162	 2,051	 15,469	 586
Penang	 1,375	 1,656	 16,659	 366
Fed. Territory	 2,102	 642	 n.r	 328
Sabah	 1,358	 6,011	 17,123	 490
Sarawak	 1,199	 4,630	 17,583	 628
Malaysia	 1.254	 2,441	 15,287	 520
Mean bousehold income in 1990
Public and Private doctor.
Excluding beds from Special Institutions of MOM
(Sourc. MOB, 1991 b Department of Statistic., 1990 a)
Table 2: Medically certified deaths by specific cause in Malaysia, 1986 and 1991
1986	 1991
	
Nos	 Nos
Cardiovascular diseases	 8,209	 26.3	 10,058	 28.8
Malignant neoplasm 	 3,278	 10.5	 3,898	 11.2
Birth injuries arid perinatal mortality 	 3,172	 10.2	 2,666	 7.6
Septicaemla	 1,247	 4.0	 1,421	 4.1
Nephritis and nephrosia	 1,028	 3.3	 1,076	 3.1
Congenital anomalies	 964	 3.1	 1,081	 3.1
Pneumonia	 951	 3.0	 924	 2.6
Motor vehicle accidents 	 857	 2.7	 1,646	 4.7
Tuberculosis	 634	 2.0	 451	 1.3
Diabetes mellitus	 555	 1.8	 752	 2.1
Others	 10,388	 33.1	 10,965	 31.4
All causes	 31,233	 100.0	 34,938	 100.0
(Source: NON, 1990 a; MaN, 1991 b)
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Table 1: Ten principal causes of hospitalisation in government hospitals in Malaysia, 1991
Nos
Normal delivery	 261,675	 19.9
Complications of pregnancy	 151,966	 11.6
Accidenti	 134,755	 10.2
Diseases of Respiratory System	 82,311	 6.3
Disease of Circulatory System	 80,277	 6.1
Perinatal conditions 	 71,628	 5.4
Diseases of Digestive system	 69,269	 5.3
Symptoms and Signs and ill-defined conditions	 65,239	 5.0
Intestinal Infectious diseases 	 43,772	 3.3
Diseases of Urinary System 	 30,529	 2.3
Others	 324,167	 24.6
All Causes	 1,315,588	 100.0
(SourceMOM, 1991 b)
Table 2: Notifiable diseases in Malaysia, 1986 and 1991
	
1986	 1991
	
Nos	 Nos
Malaria	 42,710	 54.0	 39,189	 59.3
Tuberculosia	 9,421	 11.9	 11,059	 16.7
Gonococcal infections 	 5,685	 7.2	 2,697	 4.1
Syphilis	 1,440	 1.8	 1,889	 2.9
Dengue Haemorrhagic fever 	 1,408	 1.8	 1,924	 2.9
Viral hepatitis	 7,261	 9.2	 2,590	 3.9
Typhoid	 2,845	 3.6	 1,999	 3.0
liv	 4	 0.0	 1,706	 2.6
Others	 8,255	 10.5	 3,052	 4.6
ALL CASES	 79,029	 100.0	 66105	 100.0
(Source, MOM 1991 b)
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Table 1: Government agencies involved in health functions other than MOE in Malaysia
Ministries	 Functions
Ministry of Education	 Two University Hospitals
Three Medical schools
Ministry of Labour	 Enforcement of health and safety regulations for
induatrial workers
Ministry of Internal Affairs	 Hospital for Aborigines
Ministry of Home Affairs	 Rehabilitation progranines for drug addicts
Ministry of Science, Technology and Environment 	 Enforce regulation regarding air and water
pollution
Ministry of Welfare	 Institutions for mentally retarded
Nursing homes for the aged
Ministry of Defence	 Three Army Hospitals and
Clinics for army personnel and familieS
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MOH Financial Allocation 1985-1992
Billion (RM)
a
2.5
2
1.5
I
0.5
0
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
MOH Financial Allocation In Relation to
National Budget and GNP 1985-1992
Percentage
1985 1988 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
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Table 1: Causes of deaths in Tanjung Karang District Hospital in 1992
Nos
Heart diseases	 25	 35.2
Poisoning and toxic effects	 12	 16.9
Cerebral vascular diseases	 10	 14.1
Motor vehicle accidents	 7	 9.9
Birth asphyxia	 7	 9.9
Hypertension	 3	 4.2
Diabetes Mellitus	 2	 2.8
Cancers	 2	 2.8
COP.D'	 1	 14
Others	 2	 2.8
All Causes	 71	 100.0
• chronic Ob.tructive Airway diaeaael
(Source: I4H, 1992 b)
Table 2: Ten principal causes of admission to Tanjung Karang District Hospital in 1992
Hoe
Normal delivery	 2,378	 27.3
Complications of pregnancy 	 1,351	 15.5
Motor Vehicle Accidents 	 396	 4.6
Hypertensive Diseases	 394	 4.5
Acute gastroenteritis 	 362	 4.2
Bronchial Asthma 	 333	 3.8
Poisoning and toxic effects	 277	 3.2
Abortions	 261	 3.0
Neonatal jaundice	 188	 2.2
Diabetes Mellitus 	 166	 1.9
Others	 2,590	 29.8
All Causes	 8,696	 100.0
(Source: NOH, 1992 b)
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Appendix 6
INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR INFORMAL INTERVIEWS OF POLICY MAKERS
Preparation
*	 Confirm the date and time of interview
*	 Check the recorder, batteries and cassettes
*	 Note personal particulars of respondents
Name
Organi sat ion
Position
*	 Label the cassette and the notes
Topics to be covered:
1. What is the view of Ministry of Health on the role of
private practitioners ? What role should they play ?
2. What about their role in rural areas of Malaysia ?
3. What kind of activities Ministry of Health is working with
the private practitioners ?
4. What are the problems faced by MOH in such activities ?
5. What other activities involving private practitioners being
planned for the future ?
6. What is your opinion on the role of MOH in regulating the
private practitioners?
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Table 1: Respondents interviewed in the first stage of the study
Public sector	 Private sector
Director General Of Health, MOM 	 President of Malaysian Methcal Association
Director of Planning and Development Division, 	 President of Federation of Private Medical
MON	 Practitioners Association
Director of Medical Services, MOM	 Chairman of Malaysian College of General
Practitioners
Deputy Director of Selangor Health Services, MOM Secretary General of Malaysian College of General
Practitioners
Senior Medical Officer of Health in-charge of
MOH/t+A Hepatitis-B irriminisation project, MOH
Senior Medical Officer of Health in-charge of
Control of Communicable DIseases, MON
Deputy Director, Pharmaceutical Services. MOM
Deputy Director of Social Services, Economic
Planning Unit, Prime Ministers Department
Senior Administrative Officer, Economic Planning
Unit, Prime Ministers Department
Head, Department of Community Health, National
University of Malaysia (Former Deputy Director
General of Health)
Chairman of Koperasi Doktor-Doktor Malaysia
General Manager of Koperasi Doktor-Doktor Malaysia
President, Federation of Malaysian Consumers
Association
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Appendix 8
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR HEALTH FACILITIES SURVEY
FORM Q].
1. CLINIC CODE __________________
2. Address of the clinic __________________
3. Ownership of the clinic:
(_) Public clinic
tj Owned by the doctor in-charged(_] Owned by a group of doctors
(_) Others: ___________________
4.When was the clinic established ? ___________
BTAPV
5. How many doctors worked in this clinic ?
______________ Doctors
Doctors	 Temporary/Permanent 	 Hours/week
1 (OWNER)	 PER?4NENT
2
3
4
5
TOTM.. DOCTOR HOURS
6. Do you employ temporary doctors 7
I Yes
(J No	 (XfNo.gotoQ.8)
7. Where do you get your temporary doctors 7
C_I Public Clinics
(_) Private Clinics
C_I Others (Specify ________
8. What are the other categories of staff who run this clinic?
Category of	 Numbers	 Numbers	 Total
Staff	 trained	 untrained
Medical
Assistants
Staff Nurse
Assistant Nurses
Midwives
Nursing aids
Lab. Technician
Others:
(Specify)
316
Yes-1 No.2
(I
(I
LI
(1
(I
LI
(I
L I
(1
(1
C I
11
C I
LI
L I
(1
LI
(I
ci
(I
C I
( ]
[I
SIRVIcU
9. What are the clinic operating hours ?
Days	 Opening Hours	 Total clinic hours
	 Number of patients
Mondays_____________________ ________________________ ______________________
Tuesdays____________________ _______________________ _____________________
Wednesdays_____________________ ________________________ ______________________
Thursdays_____________________ ________________________ ______________________
Fridays_____________________ ________________________ ______________________
Saturdays_____________________ ________________________ ______________________
Sundays_____________________ ________________________ ______________________
Public_Holidays ____________________ _______________________ _____________________
10. Does the clinic provide the following services ?
24 hour services
General OPD services
Emergency services
House calls
Antenatal services
Family Planning services
Insnunisation:
BCG
DPT (Triple ntigen)
DT (Double ntigen)
Tetanus Toxoid
Oral Polio
Hepatitis B
Rubella
Measles
Others: (Specify)
Treatment of Malaria
Treatment of STD
Treatment of Tuberculosis
Treatment of Hypertension
Treatment of Diabetes Mellitus
11. What type of surgical procedures are provided by this
clinic ?
Yes - 1 No • 2
Wound dressing	 (_]
Toilet and suturing 	 C_i
Incision and drainage of abscess 	 C_I
Circumcision	 (_]
Fracture setting	 (_i
Others
12. What are the diagnostic tests are done in this clinic ?
Yes-i No.2
Urine tests for sugar/protein
Urine microscopic examination
Urine pregnancy test
Blood Haemoglobin level
Blood glucose level
Blood cell count
Blood for Malaria parasite
VDRL test
Blood Cholesterol
Blood for G6PD deficiency
Sputum microscopic examination
Stool for Ova and cysts
ECO
X-rays
Ultrasound scan
PAP smear
Others:
C_i
Li
Li
f_i
C_I
CI
CI
CT
1_i
Li
Li
C I
(1
CI
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13. Do you use private lab aervices ?
() Yes
I_I No (Go to Q. 15)
14. What are the tests that you sent to private lab ?
1. _______________________
2. ______________________
3. ______________________
4. ______________________
5. _______________________
15. What are other services provided by this clinic 'P
1 _______________________________
2.
3.
4.
5. _____________________
RG3B
16. How do you determine the fee a patient is charged 'P What
factors do you take into account 'P
(Probe for the following after the spontaneous response
a)	 Patient's income	 (_I Yes	 f_I No
IfYes. How 'P ____________________
b) Methods of payment	 f_] Yes	 f_I No
If Yes. How 'P _______________________
c) Patient's occupation	 f_I Yes	 f_I No
If Yes, How 7 ______________________
d) Types of drugs prescribed f_I Yes	 f_I No
IfYea, How 'P ______________________
e) *IA PEE SCHEDULE	 f_I Yes	 f_i No
f) Others : Specify)
17 What proportion of your patients paid by the following
methods 'P
Out of their own pocket	 ____________
Paid by their employers	 ____________
Paid by their insurance	 ____________
OthersSpecify ____________
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18. Do any factories/companies/local authorities
registered this clinic as their panel ?
F_I	 Yes
F_I	 NoIf Yes, which ones 7
19. Is there a standard fee for consultations, investigations
surgical procedures and services in your clinic 7
Yes - 1, No - 2
consultations	 (_JInvestigations	 C_ISurgical procedures F_IIrrmunisation	 (_]
House calls	 F_IAntenatal. services F_IFamily Planning services F_I
20. (If yes in Q.19) How much do you charge for the
following?
a) Consultation fees	 ___________
b Investigations
Urine tests for sugar/protein 	 ___________
Urine microscopic examination 	 __________
Urine pregnancy test	 __________
Blood Haemoglobin level	 __________
Blood glucose level	 __________
Blood cell. count	 __________
Blood for Malaria parasite 	 __________
VDRLtest	 __________
Blood Cholesterol	 __________
Blood for G6PD deficiency	 __________
Sputum microscopic examination	 __________
Stool for Ova and cysts __________
ECG___________
X-rays
Ultrasound scan	 ___________
PAPsmear	 ___________
Others:
o Surgical procedures
Wound dressing
Toilet and suturing
Incision and drainage
Circumcision
Others
d	 Invnunisation
BCG
DPT (Triple Antigen)
DT (Double Antigen
Tetanus Toxoid
Oral Polio
Hepatitis B
Rubella
Measles
Others: Specify)
e Housecalls	 -
f Antenatal services	 -
g Family planning services 	 -
h	 General medical examination
i) for Insurance -
ii for employment -
iii)f or foreign workers
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ZXLIST POR OBSV3TIONS AFrIR D1TZRVI!S
A). BTRUCrURI
21. Type of building:
f_I Wood
(_) Brick
(_J Wood and brick
f_I Government clinic
f_I Others : (Specify)
22. How many rooms does the clinic has :_
Number of rooms
Reception___________
Consultation room ______
Treatment room	 _______
X-ray room	 ______
Store room	 ______
Others:
23. Waiting room
23A. Is the floor clean ?
f_I Yes
f_I No
(Clean : No rubbish, papers, dust or cigarette buds on the floor)
23B. Are there adequate chairs for patients to sit 7
f_i Yes
f_I No
(Adequate : There is enough chairs for patients to sit and none of
them has to stand)
23C. Is there reading materials for patient to read 7
f_I Yes
f_I No
23D. Is the room air conditioned 7
I] Yes
f_I No
24. Consultation room
24A. Is the floor clean 7
(1 Yes
f_I No
24B. Is the room air-conditioned?
f_I Yes
f_I No
24C. Is there privacy 7
f_I Yes
f_I No
24D.Does the room have
Yes - 1, No - 2
chair for patients 	 f_i
examination couch	 f_j
desk for doctor	 f_i
Sink for washing hand 	 f_i
25. Treatment/dressing room
25?.. Is the floor clean 7
f_i Yes
f_i No
25B. Is the room air-conditioned 7
I_I Yes
LIN0
25C. Does the roots has:
Yes • 1 , No - 2
examination couch	 f_i
Sink for washing hand	 f_i
examination lamp	 f_i
dressing trolley	 f_i
covered rubbish bin	 f_i
26.	 Toilets
26?.. How many toilets does the clinic have 7
2GB. What type of toilet does the clinic have
f_i Pour flush latrine
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F_I Flush latrine
(_] Others : (Specify)
26C.Does the toilet have water supply?
F_] Ye
F_I No
26D. Is the toilet clean 7
Nos. Clean _________
Nos. Dirty _________
26E. Does the toilet have facilities for washing hands?
F_I Yes
F_) No
B) ZQUIPIITS
R5.SIC EQUTP)IT
27. SPHYMIETZR
27A. Is there a BP set in every consultation rooiu ?
F_I Yes
F] No
27B. Are all of them in good condition 7
F_I Yes
F_I No
Nos. not working_____________
(Check whether the cuffs, tubing and the control knob are in good
condition)
28. INPMIT WEIGBING SCALI
28A. Is there an infant weighing scale in the clinic 7
(I Yes
(_] No
28B. Is it in good working order 7
F_I Yes
F] No
29. RZFRIGKRATOR
29A. Does the clinic have a refrigerator ?
F_I Yes
F_I No
29B. Is there a Mini-Max thermometer in the f ridge:
F_I Yes
f_I No
29C. Is there a Temperature monitoring Chart
F_I Yes
F_I No
29D. Is there any ice packs in the freezer
F_i Yes
F]No
29E. Where are these vaccine stored:
Freezer General	 N/A
conpartment
BCG	 F_I	 F_I	 F_I
DPT (Triple Antigen) F_I	 F_I	 F_I
DT (Double Antigen) F_I	 F_I	 F_I
Tetanus Toxoid	 F_I	 F_I	 F_I
Oral Polio	 F_I	 F_I	 F_I
Hepatitis B	 F_I	 F_I	 F_I
Rubella	 F_I	 F_I	 F_I
Measles	 F_I	 F_I	 F_I
Diluente	 F_I	 F_I	 F_I
30. DISPOSABLI NEEDLKS AD SYRINOZS
3GA. Does the clinic has disposable needles arid syringes
F_I Yes
LINO
30B. Does the clinic has at least 20 in stock?
F_I Yes
F_I No
31. STZRILIZZR
3lA. Does the clinic has sterilizer?
F_I Yes
UN0
32].
313. Is the sterilizer is in good working condition?
F_I Yes
F_I No
RGERC! lQUIPI8IT
32. LABYNGOSCOPI
32A. Does the clinic has any laryngoscope 7
F_I Yes
F_I No (If No, go to 31
32B. Does the clinic have
Yes - 1, No - 2
Children set	 (I
Adult set	 F_I
32C. Are all the sets in good working order 7
F_I Yes
F_I No
33. AJU NAG SIT
33A. Does the clinic have ambu bag set 7
F_I Yes
F_I No (If NO, go to 32)
333. Is the set in good working order 7
F_I Yes
F_I No
(Check whether the bag is punctured or the tube is broken)
34. SUCTION
34A. Does the clinic have suction 7
F_I Yes
F_I No (If NO, go to 33)
34B. Is the machine in good working order 7
F_I Yes
F_I No
(Check whether the motor is functioning and tubes are not broken)
35. INTRAVEROUS CANNULA
3SA. Does the clinic have intravenous cannula 7
F_I Yes
F_I No (If NO, go to 34)
353. Does the clinic has
Yes - 1, No 2
Adult cannula	 F_I
Children cannula I_I
Scalp cannula	 F_I
DIAGNOSTIC ZQUIPMERTS
36. URINE TESTING STICES
36A. Does the clinic have these sticks 7
F_I Yes
f_I No (If No, go to 35)
363. Are all the sticks still within their expiry date 7
F_I Yes
F_I No
37. SA.X IITS
3Th. Does the clinic have this kit 7
F_I Yes
F_I No (If NO, go to 36)
373. Is the set working 7
F_I Yes
F_I No
(Check if there is any more reagent and the tubes are not broken)
38. CALORIMETER
38A. Does the clinic have this machine 7
F_) Yes
F_I No (If NO, go to 37)
38B. Is the set working 7
f_i Yes
F_I No
(Ask whether the set is working or not)
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39. XXcROSCOP!
39A. Doea the clinic have microscope ?
() Yes
(_] No If NO, go to 38)
39B. Is the set working ?
(_] Yes
[_J No
(check the eye piece and the light source)
40. GLUCTXR
40A. Does the clinic have this machine ?
L_3 Yes
1_i No (If NO, go to 39)
40B. I. the set working ?
C_i Yes
UNO
(Ask whether the machine is working or not)
41. ZCQ	 NINK
41A. Does the clinic have this machine ?
[_] Yes
(_] No (If NO, go to 40)
41B. Is the eet working ?
[ Yes
(_1 No
(Ask to see ECG recording done on that day)
42. X-RkY XAcHIN
4Th. Does the clinic has this machine 2
(_J Yes
(_] No (If NO, go to 41)
42B. Is the machine working?
(_) Yes
UNO
(Ask to see X-ray film done that day)
42C. Does the doctor receive any training in radiology before 2
(_] Yes
(] No (If No: Go to Q. 40E)
42D. When was did the doctor attended the training, where was it held and who
conducted the training 2
(Date)
(Place)
(Organisers)
42E. Does he has anybody trained in radiology to consult for
second opinion 2
(_) 'Yes
[_] No
43. ULTPASOUND SCP.N )cHINE
43A. Does the clinic have this machine 2
[1 Yes
[_) No (If NO, go to 42)
43B. Is the machine working?
(_J Yes
I ) No
(Ask to see U1trasoun report done that day)
43C. Does the doctor receive any training to use ultrasound
machine before 2
(_] Yes
(I No (If No, go to Q.4lE)
43D. When was did the doctor attended the training, where was
it held and who conducted the training 2
(Date)
(Place)
(Organisers)
43E. Does he has anybody trained in ultrasonography to consult for
second opinion 2
(3 Yes
(I No
44. BLOOD	 ilST&Y IU.
44A. Does the clinic have this machine ?
I_I Yes
C_i No If NO, go to 43)
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44B. Is the machine working?
[_I Yea
F_I No(Ask to see test resulte done on that day)
44C. Does he have anybody trained in pathology to conanit for
second opinion 7
(I Yes
(_J No
45. Other equipments available
STATIONIRY
Yes - 1 No - 2
TYPES	 Available	 In-stock(20 or more)
46. Out-Patient cards	 F_I	 F_i
47. Appointment cards	 (I	 (I
48. Antenatal cards	 (_)	 F_I
49. Immunisation book (Buku 	 F_I	 F_I
Panduan Inimunisasi)
50. Immunisation Card	 [I	 (]
51. Referral forms	 (_)	 F_I
52. Notifications form (HEALTH 1) 	 F_i	 F]
53. Imniunisation return form	 (_]	 F I(FORN EPID 24)
54. Medical certificate	 F_I	 F_I
55. DDA REGISTER	 F_I
56. POISON REGISTER
DRUGS and SUPPLIES
check whether the following drugs are available in the clinics and
whether they are within the expiry date:
Available	 Within
Expiry date
	
Yes-i	 Yes-1
	
No-2	 No-2
No exp. date - 3
57. Aznpicillin capsule	 F_I	 (j
58. Mefenamic Acid	 F_i	 F_I
59. Streptomycin injection	 F_I	 F_I
60. Nydrocortisone injection	 F_I	 F_I
61. Adrenaline injections	 F_I	 f_I
62. Intravenous saline	 C_I	 F_I
63. Oxygen supply	 F_I
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Appendix 9
CLINIC DRUG LIST
(FORM 11)
CLINIC CODE
DATE GIVEN
DATE COLLECTED
PLEASE LIST DOWN ALL THE DEUGS AVAILABLE IN YOUR CLINIC.
YOU MAY USE ADDITIONAL PAPERS IF NECESSARY
THANK YOU
A) ANTIBIOTICS
B) ANALGESICS
C) ANTIPYRETICS
D) ANTI DIABETICS
E) MITIHYPERTENSIVES
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F) DRUGS FOR TREATING SEXUALLY TRANSHITrED
DISEASES
G) DRUGS AND SUPPLIES FOR FAMILY PLANNING
H) ANTI-TUBERCULOSIS DRUGS
J) EMERGENCY DRUGS AND SUPPLIES
K) DRUGS FOR ASTHMA
L) COUGH MIXTURES
M) VITAMINS AND MINERALS
N) INJECrIONS
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0) REM4S AND LOTIONS
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Appendix 10
ONE WEEK PROSPECTIVE RECORDING
(FORM Q3)
CLINIC CODE:
DATESTART _____________
DATEEND _____________
Please record the following characteristics of ALL of your patients
Been for ONE WEEK in this BOOK.
Please write clearly the diagnosis of the patients.
Please use the CODE listed below.
Please write down code for the referral centre for cases that you
referred.
The book will be collected at the end of the completed week.
CODE
Sex : Male - M	 Ethnicity : Malay - M
Female - F Chinese - C
Indian - I
Others - 0
Referral Centre :	 Payment
Cash - 1
Panel - 2
1 - District Hospital Tg. Karang 	 Insurance - 3
2 - Other government Hospitals 	 Others - 4 (Specify)
3 - Private Hospitals
4 - Private Clinics
5 - Government Health Centres
6 - Others (Specify)
Date Sex	 Ethnicity	 Age	 Diagnosis	 Referral	 Payment
centre	 method
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Appendix ii.
SPOT CHECK FOR)!
(PORN 12)
1. Clinic code:_______________
2. Date of Visit:_____________
3. Time Arrived at clinic:____
4. Who is seeing the patients?
Public Facilities:
[_1 Doctor
[] Medical Assistant
[] Staff Nurses
F] Assistant Nurses
[] Others: (Specify)
Private Clinics:
[] Doctor who owns the clinic
[_] Partner
[] Locum doctor
[_] Clinic assistant
[_] Others: (Specify)
5. What type of services is schedule for that day:
[] General OPD
F] Antenatal
[_] Child Health Session
[_] Family Planning
[1 Hypertension & DM clinic
[_] Others: (Specify)
6. Time left the clinic: ____________
7. Notes:
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Appendix 12
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR SURVEY OF HEALTH WORKERS
PLEASE NOTE THAT:
1. THIS QUESTIONNAIRE IS A PART OF A RESEARCH PROJECT BY
THE FACULTY OF MEDICINE, UNIVERSITI KEBANGSAAN MAL1AYSIA
AND LONDON SCHOOL OF HYGIENE & TROPICAL MEDICINE,
UNIVERSITY OF LONDON.
2. THE MAIN AIM OF THIS RESEARCH IS TO UNDERSTAND THE
FUNCTION AND DUTIES OF HEALTH WORKERS BOTH IN PUBLIC
AND PRIVATE SECTORS IN RURAL AREAS OF MALAYSIA.
3. PLEASE FILL UP THIS QUESTIONNAIRE AND IT WILL BE
RE-COLLECTED AFTER ONE WEEK.
4. ALL INFORMATION GIVEN IN THIS FORM WILL BE TREATED AS
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL. NO INDIVIDUAL WILL BE
IDENTIFIED AND THE INFORMATION GIVEN IN THIS FORM WILL
ONLY BE USED FOR RESEARCH PURPOSES ONLY.
5. IF THERE ARE ANY QUERIES REGARDING THIS QUESTIONNAIRE,
PLEASE DO NOT HESITATE TO CONTACT THE HEAD OF THE
PROJECT:
DR SYED MOHAMED ALJtJNID
JABATAN KES IHATAN MASYARAKAT
FAKULT I PERUBATAN
UNIVERSITI KEBANGSAAN MALAYSIA
JALAN BOMBA
45500 TANJUNG KARANG
SELIANGOR DE
(TEL. NO: 8798599)
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(INSTRUCTIONS : WHERE INDICATED, PUT A TICK (/) IN THE
APPROPRIATE BOX.)
1. What is your date of birth 7 ______ _______ _______
(day)	 (month)	 (year)
2. Sex:
(_J male[3 female
3. What is your highest educational level 7
[3 No formal education
[3 Primary school
(_1 Secondary school form 3
(_) Secondary school form 5
[_) Secondary school form 6
[_) College/institute
(3 University
(3 Others (Specify) ___________
4. Ethnic group:
(_J	 Malay
(_3	 Chinese
F_I	 Indian
[_] Others _______________
(Specify)
5. What is your current occupation?
6. In which of the following categories does your monthly income fall:
[_I less than $500 per month
(_3 $500 to $999
3 $1,000 to $1,499
c: $1,500 to $1,999
(_] $2,000 to $2,499
[_3 $2,500 to $2,999$3,000 to $3,4990 $3,500 to $3,999(_) $4,000 to $4,999
(_) $5,000 and above
7. Where do you work now?
(3 Government clinic
(_) Government hospital
(_] Private clinic
(_) District Health Office
[_J Others ________________
(Specify)
8. Please list down your duties under your current occupation.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
9. Please state how much time do you spent on each of these
activities.
INSTRUCTIONS
A). If the activity being asked is done daily, fill up in the
column Hours/day' the amount of time you spent on that particular activity.
B). If the activity is carried out weekly, fill up the column
'Days/week' the number of days per week you spent on that activity.
C). If the activity is carried out monthly, please fill up the column 'Days/month' the number of
days you spent on that activity in one month.
a) Seeing patients and lot conducting clinic sessions
______Hours/day _Days/week	 ______Days/month
b) Giving health education
______Hours/day _Days/week 	 ______Days/month
c) Preparing, packaging and/or dispense medicine:
______Hours/day _Days/week	 Days/month
dl Cleaning and domestic job:
______Hours/day _Days/week	 ______Days/month
e) Recording and/or filling forms or returns:
______Hours/day _Days/week	 _____Days/month
331
f) Home visiting
______Hours/day _Days/week	 ______Days/month
g) Attending meetings
______Hours/day _Days/week	 ______Days/month
h) Teaching and giving lectures to staffs
______Hours/day _Days/week 	 ______Days/month
i) Attending courses or training
______Hours/day	 Days/week	 ______Days/month
10. Do you have any job before your current occupation ?
I_I Yes
(_] No	 (If NO, go to Question 12)
11. Please write down all your PREVIOUS occupations, how long were you on each of them and whether
you were working in public or private clinic/hospital?
Occupations	 Duration	 PLACE OF WORK
Public	 Private	 Others
clinic	 clinic	 (Specify)
I_I	 (_1 ________________
[_1 ________________
t_]	 [_1 ________________
12.
12A. (FOR THOSE WORKING IN GOVERNMENT SECTOR)
How long have you been working with Ministry of Health?
________ years ________months
123. (FOR THOSE WORKING IN PRIVATE SECTOR)
How long have you been working in private clinic?
_________ years _______months
13. How long have you been working in THIS clinic?
years ______months
14. Do you have any part-time work ?
(]	 Yes
C_I No (If No. go to Question 18)
15. Do you do part-time work in other clinics or hospitals?
(_I Yes
(_] No (If No. go to Question 17)
16. What type of clinic or hospital do you work for part-time?
(I Government Clinic
[_3 Private Clinic
(I Government Hospital
(_] Private Hospital
(_] Others (Specify) ________________
17. What is you part-time occupation?
18. Did you ever undergo any BASIC training or courses BEFORE
you work in your current occupation ?
[_J Yes
(_I No	 (if No. go to Q. 20)
19. Please list down all BASIC courses or training you have undergone BEFORE , which year the
course or training started, duration. organisation which conducted the course and please state in
your opinion whether the course or training you had undergone is relevant to you duties now?
Name	 Year	 Duration	 Organised	 1.Relevant to
of the	 of the	 by:	 current job
course	 course	 2. relevant
20. Did you ever go for any training/courses (including POST- BASIC training) AFTER you work in your
current occupation?
(I Yes
[_J No (If No, go to Question 22
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21. Please list down all coureec or training (including POST-BASIC training/courses) that you
have undergone AFTER working in your current occupation, which year the course or training
started, duration, organisation which conducted the course and please atate in your opinion
whether the course or training you had undergone is relevant to you duties now?
Name	 Year	 Duration	 Organised	 l.Relevant
of the	 of the	 by:	 2.Not
course	 couree	 relevant
22. Do you have any intention to go for further training/courses in future?
[_J Yes	 Why? --------------------
(if Yes, go to Q. 23)
(_J No Why ?
23. Please indicate the training/courses that you would li.ke to go in future.
1. _______________________________________
2. _____________________________________
3. _____________________________________
4. _______________________________________
5. _______________________________________
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1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28
24.	 Please read the following statements regarding your CURRENT OCCUPATION. At the end of each
statement, there is a score which ranges from 1 to 5. Score of 1 means you strongly
disagree with the statement and score of S means you strongly agree with the
statement.
1 - Strongly disagree with the Statement
2 - Disagree with the statement
3 - You are undecided
4 - You agree with the statement
S - Strongly agree with the statement
Circle your response at the end of each statement.
The pay that I receive now is not adequate compare to my workload.
The prospect for promotions in my present job is very limited.
I receive adequate supervision from my supervisor.
I am not satisfied with the way my superior/
employer treated me when I made mistakes.
I was not given enough chances to attend courses or training.
I do not have any problem in getting cooperation
from my colleague in my daily work.
I am overworked most of the times.
I am satisfied with the equipments in my clinic/office.
My superiors support me in my work.
Frequently I have to do works which are not
my duties.
I am worried that I might be transferred to another place.
My supervisor does not understand the work I am doing.
I think my superior/employer are not able to give a fair
assessment on my work.
More chances to attend courses/training should be given to workers
here.
I find it difficult to control my subordinates.
My claims are often deducted due to inadequate funds.
Vehicles in my clinic/office often break down.
Clinic/office which I work often has shortage of staff.
My superior/employer often takes care of the staffs' welfare.
I find it difficult to meet my patients' demand.
My patients do not understand my needs.
My patients' behaviours sometimes make me angry.
My patients often challenge my authority.
I will be treat my patient nicely if they are also nice to me.
Patients often creates problems for me in my daily works.
I feel that my patients do not follow my advice given to them.
If I treat my patients nicely, it will only brings more trouble
for me.
My patients often do not appreciate my service to them.
12345
12345
12345
12345
12345
12345
12345
12345
12345
12345
12345
12345
12345
12345
12345
12345
12345
12345
12345
12345
12345
12345
12345
12345
12345
12345
12345
12345
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Appendix 13
Box 1: Statements for satisfaction scores in survey of health workers
SATISFACTION SCORE
INCOME
1.	 The pay that I receive now is not adequate compared to my work load
PROMOTIONS
1.	 The prospect for promotions in my present job is very limited
RELATION WITH SUBORDINATES
1.	 I find it difficult to control my subordinates
RELATION WITH COLLEAGUE
1.	 I do not have any problem in getting cooperation from my colleague in my daily work
EQUIPMENTS
1.	 I am satisfied with equipment in my clinic/office.
TRANSFER
1.	 I am worried that I might be transferred to another place
ALLOWANCES
1.	 My claims were often deducted due to inadequate funds
OFFICE VEHICLE
1.	 Vehicle in my clinic often break down
RELATION WITH SUPERIORS
1. I receive adequate supervision from my supervisor
2. I am not satisfied with the way my superior/employer treated inc when I made mistake
3. My superiors support me in my work
4. My supervisor does not understand the work I am doing
5. I think my superior/employer are not able to give fair assessment on my work
6. My superior/employer often takes care of the staff's welfare
TRAINING
1. I was not given enough chances to attend courses or training
2. More chances to attend courses/training should be given to workers here
WORKLOAD
1. I am overworked most of the time
2. Often I have to do works beyond my duties
3. Clinic/office which I work often has shortage of staff.
335
Appendix 14
Box 1: Statement, for attitude score in survey of health workers
ATTITUDE SCORE
1. I find it difficult to meet my patient. demand
2. My patient. do not understand my needs
3. My patient a behaviour sometimes make me angry
4. My patient. often challenge my authority
5. I will treat my patient nicely if they are also nice to me
6. Patient. often create. problems for me in my daily work
7. I feel that my patients do not follow my advice given to them
a.	 If I treat my patient. nicely, it will only brings more trouble for me
9.	 My patients often do not appreciate my service to them
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Appendix 15
Table 1: Public and private sector doctors interviewed in health workers survey
Participant code 	 Clinic code	 Sex	 Age	 Length of Service
(Years)
PUBLIC SICTOR DOCTORS
PS23	 DR	 F	 27	 3
PS9	 MCi	 F	 32	 6
PS11	 HC3	 F	 27	 3
P510	 RCS	 F	 28	 3
P58	 RC4	 F	 28	 2
PS19	 HC2	 F	 28	 4
PS2O	 DR	 P	 29	 5
PS24	 DR	 84	 30	 4
Psi	 DRO	 84	 42	 17
PS12	 DR	 84	 46	 13
PRIVATZ SICTOR DOCTORS
PP1	 PC2	 14	 43	 12
FF2	 PC5	 84	 39	 7
FF3	 PC6	 84	 44	 9
FF6	 PC14	 14	 37	 2
FF7	 PC8	 84	 42	 7
FF9	 PC11	 84	 38	 5
PP11	 PC1O	 F	 45	 12
DRO : District Health Office
Sex: F- Female M - Male
Table 2: Public sector staff interviewed in health workers survey
Participant code	 Posts	 Clinic code	 Sex	 Age	 Length of Service
(Years)
PS2	 Sister	 DRO	 F	 45	 26
PS3	 Sister	 BC].	 F	 36	 17
PS25	 SN	 DH	 F	 39	 16
PS26	 SN	 HC3	 F	 40	 19
PS27	 SN	 HC5	 F	 36	 13
PS28	 MA	 RC2	 M	 39	 16
PS29	 MA	 DR	 84	 37	 14
PS3O	 AN	 DH	 F	 47	 27
PS31	 AN	 Rd	 F	 40	 18
PS32	 MW	 HC2	 F	 40	 16
PS33	 MW	 DR	 F	 47	 25
PS34	 N	 MCi	 F	 39	 16
PS35	 N	 HC2	 F	 42	 24
PS36	 Arr	 DH	 F	 48	 26
PS37	 MA	 HC4	 N	 48	 27
SN - Staff nurse; AN - Assistant nurse G1 - Comaunity Nurse
MW - Midwife; ATT - Attendant MA - Medical Assistant
Sex: F - Female M - Male
Table 3: Private sector staff interviewed in health workers survey
Participant code	 Posts	 Clinic code	 Sex	 Age	 Length of Service
CAl	 CA	 PC14	 F	 24	 4 months
CA2	 CA	 PCi	 F	 34	 3years
CA3	 CA	 PC6	 F	 19	 6 months
CM	 CA	 PC11	 F	 21	 3 years
CAS	 CA	 PCS	 P	 20	 1 year
CA6	 CA	 PC8	 P	 18	 2 years
CM	 CA	 PC2	 F	 38	 10 years
CAB	 CA	 PC4	 F	 42	 20 years
CA9	 CA	 PC7	 F	 33	 13 years
CA - Clinic Assistant
Sex F - Female
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Appendix 16
IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR SURVEY OF HEALTH WORKERS
PREPARATIC
*	 Confirm the date and time of interview
a	 Check the recorder, batteries and cassettes
*	 Note personal particulars of respondents
Name
Organisation
Position
*	 Label the cassette and the notes
TOPICS TO B! COVRDz
A) JOB SATISFACTIOW
1. What aspects of the job that give you most satisfaction ?
2. What are his/her dissatisfaction with the job ?
To get his/her opinions on
Pay
Allowances (milage, overtime, on-call etc)
Proniot ions
In-service Training
Relationship with supervisors
Relationship with other colleagues
Relationship with subordinates
Workload (including shifts, on-calls etc)
Equipments
Drugs
Supplies (eg stationeries, plasters etc)
Transfers
B) ATTITUDE TOWARDS TNXIR PATIENTS
l.In your daily activities, what kind of difficulties
that you face when dealing with your patients ?
Look for:
Feels that patients do not appreciate their job
Feels that patients is too demanding
Patients do not comply to advice/treatment
Difficulties in developing rapport with their patients
2. Scenario
"A moth.r with 2 y.ar old child is x.f.rr.d to you for r.fuaal to
allow h.r child to ha 4— '4ssd against .asl.s. Tb. child has
history of f.v.r with rash.s at thu ag. of f iv. months. Tb. child
ha. six siblings ag. b.tw..n 3 to 12 ysar. old. Thu fath.r is a
farm.r and th. aoth.r is a bousswifs".
How will you deal with this patient ?
(Look for : How much emphasis the staff give to:
a) develop rapport and thrust with the patient ?
b)considers social and cultural background in managing this patient including beliefs ?
c) to get her family/husband involved in health education and how flexible and innovative
in trying to solve the patient's problem.
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Table 1: ParticipantS of FGD among public sector staff in health workers survey
Participant code	 Posts	 Clinic code	 Sex	 Age	 Length of Service
(Years)
PS6	 MA	 HC3	 N	 43	 21
PS1S	 MA	 OH	 M	 38	 15
P542	 AT!	 OH	 M	 47	 26
PS44	 ATT	 14C2	 M	 48	 26
PS43	 SN	 OH	 F	 38	 14
PS38	 SN	 HC1	 F	 34	 11
PS4O	 MW	 DR	 F	 40	 13
PS41	 MW	 RC1	 F	 29	 8
PS39	 N	 HC5	 F	 40	 18
SN - Staff nurse; AN Assistant nurse CN - Coninunity Nurse
MW - Midwife; AT! - Attendant MA = Medical Assistant
Sex: F - Female N - Male
Table 2: Participants of FGD among private sector staff in health workers survey
Participant code	 Posts	 Clinic code Sex	 Age	 Length of Service
(Years)
CAb	 CA	 PC5	 P	 26	 8
CAll	 CA	 PC14	 F	 19	 1
CAl2	 CA	 PC].	 F	 19	 1
CA13	 CA	 PC11	 F	 23	 4
CA14	 CA	 PC6	 F	 25	 5
CAbS	 CA	 PC2	 F	 28	 10
CA - Clinic Assistant Sex : F - Female
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Appendix 18
GUIDE FOR FOCUS GROUPS DISCUSSION IN HEALTH WORKERS
SURVEY
A) JOB SATXSTACTION
1. FrOm your experience working in the clinics, what aspect of your job that give you most
satisfaction?
2. What are the things about your work that you are not satisfied with ?
(For Q. 1 and 2 : Get opinions On:
Pay
Allowances (milage, overtime, on-call etc)
Promotions
In-service Training
Relationship with supervisors
Relationship with other colleagues
Relationship with subordinate
Workload (including shifts, on-calls etc)
Equipment
Drugs
Supplies (eg stationeries, plasters etc)
Transfers
B) AFITUDE TOWARDS PATITS
1. In your daily activities, what kind of difficulties
that you face when dealing with your patients ?
Look for : Feels that patients do not appreciate their job
Feels that patients is too demanding
Patients do not comply to advice/treatment
Difficulties in developing rapport with their patients
2. Scenarios
'A oth.r with 2 year old child is referred to you for r.fusal to
allow her child to be iunis.d against .asl... Th. child has
history of fever with rash.s at tb. age of f iv. Lontha. Thu child
has aix sibling, age b.twean 3 to 12 years old. The father is a
fari.r and the oth.r is a hous.wif..
How will you deal with this patient 7
(Look for : How much emphasis the staff give to:
a) develop rapport and thrust with the patient 7
b) considers social and cultural background in managing this patient including beliefs 7
c) to get her family/husband involved in health education and how flexible and innovative
in trying to solve the patient's problem.
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Tabl. 1: Public sector p.r.cnn.l interviewed on public-private int.ractions
Part 3.cipant cod.
	
Position	 Sex	 Age	 Length of service	 Duration in(years)	 the district
Psi	 District Health Officer	 N	 42	 17	 2 year,
P82	 District Health Si.t.r	 V	 45	 26	 3 years
P83	 District Health Si.t.r	 F	 36	 17	 8 Lonths
P84	 Public Health !azr..	 F	 37	 15	 5 years
P85	 Public Health Horse	 F	 40	 22	 3 year,
P86	 Medical Assistant	 N	 43	 21	 14 year.
PSI	 Medical Assistant	 N	 42	 16	 9 years
P88	 Medical Officer	 F	 28	 2	 1 year
p59	 Medical Officer	 F	 32	 6	 3 years
P810	 Medical Officer	 F	 28	 3	 1 year
PS11	 Medical Officer	 F	 27	 3	 6 eonths
9812	 NOIC of District Hospital 	 N	 46	 13	 2 years
P813	 Medical Assistant	 N	 43	 17	 9 years
P814	 Mediel Assistant	 N	 42	 22	 8 years
9515	 Medical Assistant	 N	 38	 15	 15 years
P516	 District Hospital Bieter	 F	 39	 17	 2 years
PS17	 Medical Officer	 N	 32	 4	 6 nths
P821	 Senior Health Inspector	 N	 44	 17	 5 year.
PS22	 Health Inspector	 N	 32	 4	 2 years
Table 2: Private practitioner, interviewed on public-private interactions
Participant code	 Clinic code	 Sex	 Age	 Length of Service as PP Duration in
the district
991	 Pd	 N	 43	 12 years	 10 years
992	 PCS	 N	 39	 7 year.	 7 years
993	 PC6	 N	 44	 9 years	 9 years
9P4	 PC4	 N	 50	 20 year.	 20 years
PP5	 PCi	 N	 49	 17 years	 17 years
PP6	 PC14	 N	 37	 2 year.	 2 years
p97	 PC8	 N	 42	 7 years	 7 years
998	 PC7	 N	 40	 18 years	 18 years
pP9	 PC11	 N	 38	 5 years	 4 year.
P910	 PCB	 N	 41	 6 years	 4 year.
PP11	 PC1O	 F	 45	 12 years	 12 years
PP12	 PC3	 N	 36	 6 months	 6 months
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IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR STUDY OF PUBLIC-PRIVATE
IN'rER.ACTIoNS
Quid.lins. for int.rvi.wsr:
i) The respondents should be contacted few days before the interviews to confirm his/herparticipation in the interview
ii) Interview should be carried out in a place where there is no disturbance or interruption
iii) In private clinics, try to schedule the interview at the time when not likely to beinterrupted by patients such as at the end of clinic sessions
iv) All interviews should be tape recorded.
v) Start the interview with general topic first before going to specific questions in theinterview guide.
rn-DEPTH INTERVIEWS IDZ FOR PRXVBIZ DOCrORS
Topics to be covered
A) GEWZRAL TOPIC
1. What is your opinion on the interactions between public and private doctor in this
district?
2. What kind of activities are you involved with the public doctors? Please describe these
activities.
3. What are the problems faced by you with regard to the particular activities ?
4. In his opinion how could it be improved ?
5. Should the interactions be encouraged and how could this be done ?
6. Is there any other forte of interactione that you want to suggest?
B) SPECIFIC TOPIC
3..	 XOH/)S(A HEPATITIS B IIO(UNISATION PROJECT
a)	 Do you take part in this programme ?Look for reasons for participation or non-participation)
b)	 What is your opinion on the implementation of this programme?
c)	 What aspect of the programme should be improved and how?
Pay attention to
i) Recruitment and its criteria
ii) Incentives for participation
such as price of vaccine
getting more patients
iii) Disincentives for participation
such as: "returns
iv) Vaccine supplies and distribution
v) Competition with other vaccines
e.g. Hepavacc vaccine •
2. REFERRAlS OF PATIERTS
a) Where do you normally refer your patients?
b) What is your opinion on the current referral system between private and public sector ?
ci	 Is there any areas which need to be improved and how 7
d)	 Do you received referrals from public doctors and what are the referrals for ?
ci	 Do you have any problems dealing with these referrals ?
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3. UTILISATION OP PUBLIC 1UL1INCZ SERVICE
a) Rave you ever requested for ambulance service from the government facilities?
b) Can you describe what are the things that you have to do to get the ambulance?
c) What are your problems in getting this service?
d) Can you suggest ways to improve this?
4. PORZI WORKERS )ICL EXRJ(TNATION
a) Do you provide this service in your clinic?
b) What are the actual things you do in this activity?
c) What are the problems you encounter in providing this service?
d) Can you suggest ways to improve this activity?
5. LOCUX PRACTICE BY GOVEROIT DOCTORS
a) Do you employ government doctors to work as locum in your clinic?
b) Recently there were suggestions by MMA for the governmemt to legalise locum practice by
government doctors. What is your opinion on this suggestions?
c) What are the advantages if locum by government doctors is legalized?
d) What are the disadvantages if locum by government doctors is legalised?
6. DISEASE NOTIFICATIOWS
a) Do you normally notify notifiable diseases to District health Office?
b) What are problems faced by you in this activity ?
(Look for :	 inadequate forms
improper guidelines
difficult forms
no feed back
problems with the patients
such as patient's privacy
unsure of diagnosis
c) Please suggest ways to improve this 7
7. I*UNISATION RETURKS
a) Do you submit monthly ininunisation returns to District health Office?
b) Were you informed on the reasons for the returns?
c) Do you face any difficulty to provide this data?
d) Do you get any benefit from this returns?
e) Can you suggest ways to improve this activity?
f) Do you want any feedback on the data that you sent?
8 • VISITS BY DISTRICTS ERALTH OFFICERS
a) Do any officers from District Health Office ever visit your clinic 7
Please describe what they normally do during their viait
b) In your opinion, does the visits has any benef its to you ?
C)	 Do you have any suggestions on ways to make this visit as means to improved public-private
relationship in this district?
IN-DEPTH INTERVIEWS UIDI FOR PUBLIC STAFF
Topics to be covered
A) GERERAI. TOPIC
1. What is your opinion on the interactions between public and private doctor in this
district?
2. What kind of activities are you involved with the private doctors? Please describe these
activities.
3. What are the problems faced by you with regard to these activities ?
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4.	 In your opinion how could it be improved ?
S.	 Should the interactions be encouraged and how could this be done 7
6. Is there any factors in your organisation which hinders interactions between public and
private sector 7
7. Is there any other form of interactic,n, that you want to suggest?
3) SPZCIPIC TOPIC
1. MC/IO(k HEPATITIS B XXMUNISATION PROJZCT
a) What ii your involvement in this programne 7
b) What is your opinion on the implementation of this progranune?
c) How did the private doctor response to this progranine 7
d) What aspect of the progranine should be improved and how?
Pay attention to:
Recruitment and its criteria
Incentives for participation
auch as price of vaccine, getting more patients etc
Disincentives for participation such as: "returns"
Vaccine supplies and distribution
Competition with other vaccines Hepavacc vaccine
2. RZPZRP.ALS OP PATIITB
a) Where do you normally refer your patients?
b) What is your opinion on the current referral system between private and public sector 7
c) Is there any area8 which need to be improved and how 7
d) Do you received referrals from private doctors and what are the referrals for 7 Do you
have any problems dealing with these referrals 7
e) Do you refer patients to private doctor and what are the referrals for? Do you have any
problems in these referrals?
3. UTILISATION OF PUBLIC A) VLMCX SERVICI
a) Have any private doctors ever requested for ambulance service from your clinics/hospital?
b) What do you normally do when you receive such request?
c) What are your problems in providing this service to the private doctors?
d) Can you suggest ways to improve this?
4 FOR2I1 WORKKRS )DICAL XXMINATION BY PRIVATB DOCTORS
a) Have you heard about this service by private doctors?
b) What is your involvement in this activity?
c) What is your opinions on this service ?
d) Can you suggest ways to improve this activity?
5 • LOCUX PRACTICX BY GOVZT DOCTORS
a) Have you ever been employed as locum in private clinic?
b) Recently there were suggestions by PSIA for the government to legalise locum practice by
government doctors. What is your opinions on this suggestions?
c) What are the advantages if locum by government doctors is legalised?
d) What are the disadvantages if locum by government doctora is legalised?
6. DXSZASZ XOTITICATIS
a) Do you normally notify notifiable diseases to District Health Office?
b) Do you normally receive notifications of notifiable diseases from the GP's?
b	 What are problems faced by you in this activity 7
L,00k for:
inadequate forms
improper guidelines
difficult forms
no feed beck
patient's privacy
unsure of diagnosis
c	 Please suggest ways to improve this ?
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7. I1(UNISATION JZTDRNS
a) Do you or your staff receive monthly imminisation returns from private doctors?
b) Can you diicues problems you in getting this data?
c) Can you suggest ways to improve this activity?
d) Do you provide any feedback to the private doctors?
S. VISITS 3Y VISTPJCTS EZALTH OFFICERS
a) Do you visit GP clinics 7 Please describe the purpose of your visits and what you normally
do during these visits 7
b) In your opinion. does the visita has any benefits to you 7
C)	 Do you have any suggestions on ways to make this visit as the means of improving
public-private relationship in this district?
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Appendix 22
Table 1: Participants of FGD on interactions among public sector doctors
Participant code	 Clinic code	 Sex	 Age	 Length of Service Duration in
the district
PS18	 DH	 N	 30	 4 years	 6 months
959	 HC1	 P	 32	 6 years	 3 years
PS11	 HC3	 F	 27	 3 years	 6 monthe
psio	 14C5	 F	 28	 3 years	 1 year
P38	 NC4	 F	 28	 2 years	 1 year
9519	 HC2	 F	 28	 4 years	 3 months
PS2O	 DH	 F	 29	 5 years	 2 years
Table 2: Participants of FGD on interactions among PPs
Participant code	 Clinic code	 Sex	 Age	 Length of Service as PP Duration in
(years)	 the district
(years)
P92	 PCS	 N	 39	 7	 7
995	 PCi	 N	 49	 17	 17
997	 PC8	 N	 42	 7	 7
999	 PC11	 N	 38	 5	 4
P910	 PC8	 N	 41	 6	 4
P913	 PC7	 N	 35	 6	 6
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GUIDE FOR FGD ON PUBLIC-PRIVATE IN'rERACTIONs
A) GENERAL TOPIC
1. What is your opinion on the interactions between public
and private doctor in this district ?
2. What kind of activities are you involved with the pub-
lic/private doctors ? Please describe these activities.
3. What are the problems faced by you with regard to these
activities?
4. In your opinion how could it be improved?
5. Should the interactions be encouraged and how could this
be done?
6. Is there any factors in your organisation which hinders
interactions between public and private sector ?
7. Any other interactions that you want to suggest?
B) SPECIFIC TOPIC
Discuss these specific topics in the groups if it is not
mentioned spontaneously in the first part of the
discussion.
1. MMA/MOH HEPATITIS B VACCINATION PROGRAMME
2. REFERRALS OF PATIENTS
3. MEDICAL EXAMINATIONS OF FOREIGN WORKERS
4. LOCIJM PRACTICE BY GOVERNMENT DOCTORS
5. DISEASE NOTIFICATIONS
6. IMMUNISATION RETURNS BY PPS
7. UTILISATION OF PUBLIC AMBULANCE BY PPS
8. VISITS BY DISTRICTS HEALTH OFFICERS
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IN'rERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR USERS
PART ONE (FORM Q9)
(TO BE FILLED BY INTERVIEWERS)
DATE
INTERVIEWER
CLINIC CODE
TIME PATIENT ARRIVED IN THE CLINIC
TIME PATIENT CALLED IN FOR CONSULTATION______
TIME PATIENT GO OUT OF CONSULTATION ROOM_____
TIME PATIENT FINISH AND READY TO GO HOME________
PATIENT REGISTRATION NUMEER
1. Where is the interview done?
1_i Health Centre
f_i Private Clinic
f_i District Hospital
2. Who is the person being interviewed ?
f_I male adult patient (GO TO Q. 4)
(_) female adult patient (GO TO Q.4)
F_) Parent of a sick child
F_i Relative of a sick child
f_i others
(specify __________
3. Do you stay with the patient?
F_) Yes
f_I No
4. Date of birth of the patient?
day	 month	 year
5. How old is the patient?
years
6. What is the ethnic group of the patient?
(_) Malay
f_i Chinese
(_) Indian
f_I Others
(Specify ____________
7. What is your home address:
8. What is your occupation ?
F_i Not working
F_I Farmer
F_I Fisherman with own boat
F_I Fisherman without own boat
f_I Trader
F_I Shopkeeper
f_I Factory worker
F_I Labourer
f_i Student
f_i Government Servant
f_i Others ____________
(Specify)
9. What is your highest educational level 7
f_i No formal education
f_i Primary school
f_i Form 3 secondary school
F_i Form S Secondary School
(_i Form 6 secondary School
1_I College
f_i University
f_I Others __________
Specify)
10. How do you come to clinic today ?
f_i Walking
I_i Bicycle
F_i Motorcycle
f_I Bus
f_I Taxi
f_I Others C Specify ________________
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11. Number of household members
12. Information on household members:
Age	 Sex	 Relation to patient	 Occupation	 Educational level
13. Do you or your household members own any of the following?
F_i Bicycle
F_I Motorcycle
F_I Car
F_) Van
F_I Lorry
[I Fishing Boat
F_I None of the above
14. Do you or your household members posses plot of land ?
(_I Yes, how many acres __________
F_I No
15. Do you or your household members rent plot of land for agricultural purposes?
F_I Yes, how many acres __________
UNO
16. Do you or your household members rent your land to someone else for agricultural purpose?
I_i Yes, how many acres __________
L_) No
(If in Q 14, 15 and 16, none of the answer is Yes, GO TO Q 18)
17. What is grown in the land?
Crops	 Own land	 Land rented FROM	 Land rented TO
someone else	 someone else
(Acres)	 Acres)	 (Acres
Paddy_________________________ _________________________ __________________________
Cocoa_________________________ _________________________ __________________________
Oilpalm ______________________ ______________________ _______________________
Coconut__________________________ __________________________ ___________________________
Others
(Specify)	 _________________________ _________________________ __________________________
18. Is this the clinic that you usually visit ?
(_1 Yes (Go to Q. 20)
F_i No
19. What is the clinic that you usually visit ?
[_] Other Private clinic
(_] OPD of District Hospital
(_) Health Centre
F_I Community clinic
(_) Midwife Clinic
(_J Others (Specify _______________
20. Why do you usually come to this clinic ?
f_i Near to house
[_) Give effective treatment
f_I Good 'layanan' from staff
F_I Cheap
f_I Others _______________
(Specify)
21. Is there any other clinic nearer to your home than this one ?
t_] Yes
No (GO TO Q 24)
I_I Don't know (GO TO Q 24)
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22. What is the type of clinic which is nearer to your home ?(_] Private clinic
Fl OPD of District Hospital
Fl Health centre
Fl Community clinic
F_I Midwife Clinic
F_I Others (Specify ________________
23. What is the reason that you do not seek treatment from the clinic nearer to your home 7
24A. (I? THIS IS A PRIVATE CLINIC)
What is the reason you choose to come to private clinic?.(_J Near to house
1_I Give effective treatment(_J Good 'layanan from staff
1_I Cheap[_) Others _______________(Specify)
24B. (IF THIS IS A PUBLIC CLINIC)
What is the reason you choose to come to government clinic?.
F_I Near to house
(_I Give effective treatment
F_I Good layanan' from staff
F_I Cheap
F_I Others _______________(Specify)
CURRENT ILLNESS
25. What was the problem that made you come to the clinic today ?
26. How long has this been going on V
27. Did you seek care from other government or private clinic for this episode of illness before
visiting this clinic ?
F_I Yes
F_I No (GotoQ. 23)
28A. What are the clinics that you visited before you come here 7
F_I Private clinic
F_I OPD of District Hospital
F_I Health centre
F_I Community clinic
F_I Midwife Clinic
F_I Others _________(Specify)
28B. What is the reason for you to come to this clinic after you have sought treatment from other
clinic before 7
28C. Were you referred to this clinics by staff/doctors in the clinic you visited previously?
F_I Yes
C_I No (GO TO Q.29)
28D. Were you given referral letter to come to this clinic?
(_) Yes(IWo
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PREVIOUS ILLNESS
29.	 (ASK THE PERSON WETHER HE\SI4E StJVFERS FR(4 ANY OF THE FOLLOWING ILLNESS, DURATION OF EACH
ILLNESS • WHETHER ON REGULAR FOLLOW-UP OR NOT 1D SOURCE OF CARE USED FOR THE PARTICULAR
1. Have	 Duration of	 REGULARITY OF
	 •SOURCE OF2. Do not have illness
	 TREAThENT	 CARE
3. Do not know	 1. Regular
2. Not reaular
I1YPERTENS ION
DIABETES
HEART DISEASES
ASTTh1A
(* SOURCE OF CARE 1. Private clinic
2. CPU of District Hospital
3. Health centre
4. Coninunity clinic
5. Midwife Clinic
6. Self-treatment
7. Traditional healers
8. Others (Specify ______________
30. Do the following health workers treated you today?
Doctor	 E_) Yea	 j_) No
Medical Assistant	 (_J Yes	 I_I No
Nurses	 (_J Yes	 I_i No
Others____________(Specify)
31A. During this visit, did you undergo any surgical procedures ?
(3 Yes(_) No (Go to Q.32)
31B. What surgical procedures you have undergone ?
32. What tests/investigations you have undergone ?[_) Blood test(_] Chest X-ray
(3 Urine test
3 Ultrasound scan
o(_] Others _______________(Specify)
33A. Do you have to pay for this visit ?(_] Yes(_J No ( Go to Q. 26
33B. How much do you have to pay this visit 7
33C. How do you pay for it ?(_J Out of your own pocket
L_1 Paid by your employer(_] Paid by your insurance(_] Others (Specify _______________
34A. Are you being referred to any other clinic/hospital 7
(3 Yes
(_1 No C Go to Q. 35)
34B. Why are you referred for?
(3 For further management
(3 For investigations(_] For admission to ward(_] Others _____________(Specify)
34C. Where are you being referred to 7(3 Private clinic(_) Private Hospital
(3 District Hospital Tg karang[3 Other government hospital(_] Health centre(_] Coninunity clinic
F_I Midwife clinic
F_I Others (Specify) _________________
34D. Were you given referral letters?(_) Yes
UNO
35A. Were you asked to come back for follow-up '
(3 Yes(_J No (GO TO Q. 36)
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3SB. Were you given a apecific date to return?
[_J Yes
UNO
36. Can we visit you at your home tomorrow for further interviews?
[_) YesUIo
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PART TWO (FORM Q 10)
(TO BE FILLED BY THE DOCTOR TREATING THE PATIENT)
DATE__________________________
CLINIC CODE___________________
PATIENT REGISTRATION NTTh4BER______________
Patient Ethnic group:
(_J Malay
(_) Chinese
I_I Indian
(_) Others
(Specify ______________
1. Diagnosis:
2. Investigations done/ordered:
a)
b)
c)
3. Surgical procedures done:
a)
b)
c) -
4. Medication given/prescribed:
a)
b)
c)
d) _________________
5. Referral
i) Reason for referral _________________________
ii) Where patient is referred to_______________
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Box 1: Background of Pant Serong Malay Village
Pant Serong is a traditional Malay village. It is administered by committee known as JKKXI(
(Jawatan Kuasa Kebajikan, Kemajuan dan Kebajikan Kampung), the village development, welfare and
security committee. Members of this conveittee were selected by the District Development Council
chaired by the District Officer. The JKXKX is headed by the village headman called Tok Sidang. The
village population is 870 people; 91% are Malays and 9% Chinese. The size of the village is 9.61
square km. All the 181 houses in the village has electricity, pipe water Supply and safe latrine.
Sixty five percent of the villagers are farmers, 20% are government servants and 10 percent are
unskilled factory workers and 5% shopkepers/traders. Moat of the farmers are Malays whereas
shopkeepers and traders are mostly Chinese. Oil palm, paddy, cocoa and coconut are the main crops
grown by the farmers. The government servants are mostly teachers and office workers working in
government offices within the district. The factory workers were mainly young adults working in
electronic factories located in the capital of the state, about 80 km from the district. The
nearest town to this village which is the biggest one in the district, is 8 km away and the
village is accessible by road.
The Only public transport is the bus service which operates through the village to the main town
every two to three hours. Most of the villagers use motorcycles as their primary mode of
transport. There is a primary school, a religious school and a kindergarten in the village.
Secondary school students attended secondary schools in the nearest town. The nearest health
facility is a government Community Clinic located in another village about 4 km away. The clinic
is run by a Community Nurse. A health centre and the district hospital and six private clinics are
located in the nearest town. The villagers also utilised an estate hospital located in an oil palm
estate about 10 km from the village. The estate hospital is owned by the oil palm estate to treat
the estate workers but it also extends it's service to patients from nearby villages. The
villagers do not pay for services at this hospital but the estate management charges the District
Heath Office for services rendered to the community.
Box 2: Background of Pasir Penarnbang chinese Village
Pasir Penambang Village is a fishing village located about 15 km from the biggest town of the
district. It has a population of 2,336 people, 88 percent are Chinese, 7 percent are Malays and
5 percent are Indian. A survey done in 1984 showed that 76% of the villagers were fishermen, 14
percent were shop keepers and traders and the remaining 10 percent were factory workers,
mechanics arid construction workers (Gobir et al, 1984). The village leader, the Tok Sidang and
10 JXXKK committee members administer the village. All houses in the village have electricity
and piped water supply but most houses do not have a modern system of sewage removal. Household
wastes were disposed into the river.
A two kilometre granite road connects the village with the main road of the district. The only
public transport system is a bus service operating along the main road. There is a Chinese
Primary School in the village. Two private clinics located in the village itself; these operate
for two to three hours daily. A public Community Clinic located about two km from the village.
The nearest town is about two kilometres away where there is a private clinic and health centre.
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Box 3: Background of Sungai Terep Indian Estate
Sungai Terap Estate is located 12 km from the biggest town of the district alongside the main
road which runs through the district. It is an oil palm plantation estate owned by a private
company. There were 232 people in the estate from 45 households; all of them are Indians.
Housing were provided by the estate management. All the heads of the familiee worked in the 150
acre plantation either as labourers or tractor drivers. All the houses in the estate were
supplied with electricity and piped water subsidised by the estate. The families in the estate
had organised themselves and elected their temple leader as the headman. Besides functioning as
a religious leader for the coelminity, he represented the community in meetings with the estate
management and settled disputes among families in the estate. There is an Indian Primary school
in the estate. The nearest health facility is a Community Clinic located about 4 km from the
estate. A government Health Centre and a private clinic are located about 6 km away. The estate
management provide free health care to the families through an estate hospital located in
another estate also owned by the company about 10 km away.
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GUIDE FOR FGD IN STUDY OF COMMTJNITY SATISFACTION
A. Pr.paration
1)	 check list of participants given by community leaders
ii) Replace participants dropped from the list
iii) Invite participants and confirm their attendance
iv) Confirm the date, time and place of meeting
v) Visit the place of meeting to make sure it is suitable
vi) Make arrangements for refreshments
B. In. truction.
j ) Pacilitator
* Overall in-charge of the FOD.
* Introduce yourself and others in the team.
* Explain to participants on the purpose of the discussion.
* Reassure participants of confidentiality
* Encourage discussion among participants on the research topics.
* Use the guidelines given. You do not have to follow the exact sequence; be flexible but do
not miss any topic as far as possible.
* Start the discussion by asking the participant name; try to remember the names and address
the participants by their names.
* Talk clearly but be polite.
* Remind the participants that they do not cross talk.
* Observe the participants as they discussed. Try to make everyone to join the discussion.
* Start each topic by asking the participant questions to promote discussion.
* Try to prevent discussion being dominated by some of the participants. Stimulate others to
talk by asking them directly.
* Do not spend too much time on one issue. Move the discussion and refer to the guide on topics
to be covered.
* Summarize the discussions from time to time to stimulate further discussion
* Do not give your own opinions if the participants ask, pass the questions to other
participants
* Try to reach a stage where the participants are discussing among themselves
* At the end of the discussion, remind the participants that the meeting is about to end. Ask
each participants for any additional comments
* Thank the participants at the end of FGD and invite them for refreshment
* Arrange for debriefing with all members of the team after each discussion
* Arrange for transcribing of all the tapes with team members
* Translate the transcript into Malay
ii) R.cerd.r
* Take down personal particulars of participants (name, sex, age, marital status. occupation).
* Observer the discussion and note down what being discussed
* Operate the tape recorder.
* Observe and note all discussion as far as possible especially when participants cross-talks.
* Observe and note whether all participants are taking part in discussion.
* Observe and note participants' reactions to issue being discussed; when they all agree ox
disagree or when they reluctant to give their opinions.
* Remind facilitator if any topic were missed in the discussion.
iii) G.n.ral Assistant
* Arrange the table and chairs
* Ensure that late corners do not join the FGD once it has started
* Entertain the late corners
* Serve refreshment after the discussion
* Rearrange the table and chairs after the discussion
* Assist the facilitator and recorder to transcribe and translate the discussion
C. QDZSTIONS
1. When you or your family members are sick, which clinic you or your family visit?
2. What are the reasons for choosing the particular clinic?
3. What are the good things about public services 7
4. What are the bad things about public services 'P
5. What are the good things about private services 7
6. What are the bad things about private services 7
Obtain response on the following:
1. Operating hours
2. Availability of services
3. Waiting tilDe
4. charges
5. Availability and effectiveness of drugs
6. Availability of equipment
7. Relations with staff
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Table 1: Coulnunity leaders interviewed in Study of couummity satisfaction
CODE	 Sex	 Age	 Occupations	 Status
Malay village
t14l	 N	 48	 Farmer	 Village headman
MLJ42	 N	 56	 Farmer	 JXKK member/religious
leader
J.U.Fl	 F	 43	 Housewife	 Leader of Womens
Institute
MLF2	 p	 37	 Cook	 UMNO Wanita leader
chinese village
Cull	 N	 45	 Insurance agent	 JKKK member/MCA leader
CU42	 N	 56	 Trader	 Village headman
F	 29	 Bank clerk	 McA Wanit& leader
CLW2	 F	 32	 Teacher	 Teacher
Indian estate
11141	 M	 53	 Headmaster	 Headmaster
11142	 N	 52	 Labourer	 Workers Union leader
ILW1	 F	 42	 Housewife	 MIC Wanita leader
1LW2	 F	 32	 Teacher	 Teacher
SEX: N - Male; F - Female
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GUIDE FOR I3!-DIPTH Ikrsavj.XWS OF CO(UNIT LEADERS IN STUDY OP COUNXTY SATISFACTION
PREPARATION
*	 Confirm the date and time of interview
*	 Check the recorder, batteries and cassettes
*	 Note personal particulars of respondents
Name
Age
Position in the convminity
*	 Label the cassette and the notes
TOPICS TO BE COVERED:
1. When you or members of your family are sick, which clinic do you or your family usually
visit 7
2. What are the reasons for choosing this particular clinic?
3. What are the good things about government clinics 7
4. What are the bad things about government clinics 7
5. What are the good things about private clinics 7
6. What are the bad things about private clinics 7
Obtain response on the following:
1. Operating hours
2. Availability of services
3. Waiting time
4. Charges
5. Availability and effectiveness of drugs
6. Availability of equipment
7. Relation with staff
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Table l Vaccine storag. in public and privet. faciliti..
Clinic.	 Fridge	 Teeperatur.	 Xc. pack in	 No Food .tuff.	 No Vaccin, on	 No Hxpired
	
condition	 monitoring	 freezer	 door ahelves	 vaccine.
Long Hour. PC
PCi	 Good	 I	 I	 I	 I	 1
PC2	 Good	 I	 I	 I	 1	 1
PC3	 Good	 I	 X	 I	 I	 1
PC5	 Good	 I	 I	 I	 X	 1
PC6	 Good	 I	 I	 I	 I	 1
PC7	 Poor	 I	 X	 I	 I	 I
PC	 Good	 I	 I	 I	 X	 1
PCXO	 Poor	 I	 I	 I	 I	 1
PC11	 Good	 X	 I	 1	 X	 1
PC14	 Good	 X	 1	 1	 1	 1
Short Hour. PCI
PC4	 Good	 I	 1	 I	 X	 X
PC9	 XXX	 HR	 HR	 HR	 HR	 1
PC12	 Poor	 I	 X	 X	 X	 1
PC13	 Good	 I	 1	 1	 I	 1
PC15	 XXX	 HR	 HR	 HR	 HR	 1
Public Facilitie.
DH	 Good	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1
PCi	 Good	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1
HC2	 Good	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1
HC3	 Good	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1
NC4	 Good	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1
HCS	 Good	 1	 1	 j	 1	 1
1 - Present X - Absent XXX - No refrigerator in the clinic HR = Not relevant
Pridge condition.:Good - Pridge in good working order, no rusty part., no leaking, door seal i. good
Poor - Fridge 1. old, sons part, of the door are rusty, evidence of leaking and faulty door .eal
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Table ir Availability of edical procedure. in public md privet. feciliti..
Clinic.	 Wound dr...ing	 Toilet & euturing	 Inci.ion &	 Mel.	 S.tting of
	
drainage	 circumcision	 tractures
Long Hour. PC.
Pd	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1
PC2	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1
PC3	 1	 1	 1	 X	 X
PC5	 1	 1	 1	 I	 I
PC6	 1	 1	 1	 1	 X
PC7	 1	 1	 1	 1	 I
ce	 1	 1	 1	 1
PC1O	 1	 1	 1	 I	 X
PC11	 1	 1	 1	 1	 I
PC14	 1	 1	 1	 1	 I
Short Hour. PC.
PC4	 1	 1	 1	 I	 X
PC9	 1	 1	 1	 I	 X
PC12	 1	 1	 1	 I	 I
PC13	 1	 1	 1	 I	 I
PC15	 1	 1	 1	 I	 I
Public Fac3iitiee
DH	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1
EC1	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I
HC2	 1	 1	 1	 1	 I
HC3	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1
HC4	 1	 1	 1	 1	 I
HC5	 1	 1	 1	 1	 I
1 • eervicee available	 X - service. not availabis
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Table i Medical record. kept in public and private faciiitiee
Clinicg	OPD	 Appointment	 Antenatal	 leeminisation	 eferral	 Notification	 Medical	 rugs
record	 card	 record	 record	 form	 form	 certificate.	 regiSter
Long Hour. PCa
PCi	 1	 1	 I	 H	 H	 X	 1	 1
PC2	 1	 1	 X	 H	 1	 I	 1	 1
PC3	 1	 X	 H	 H	 H	 H	 1	 1
PC5	 I	 1	 I	 1	 1	 I	 1	 1
PC6	 1	 H	 I	 I	 H	 I	 1	 X
PC7	 1	 1	 I	 H	 H	 H	 1	 H
pce	 1	 1	 H	 X	 H	 H	 1	 H
PC1O	 1	 1	 I	 1	 1	 H	 1	 X
PC11	 1	 H	 I	 I	 I	 H	 1	 I
PC14	 1	 1	 I	 H	 H	 H	 1	 X
Short Sour. PCC
pc4	 1	 1	 H	 H	 X	 H	 1	 X
PC9	 1	 1	 H	 I	 I	 H	 1	 H
PC12	 1	 H	 H	 H	 H	 H	 1	 H
PC13	 1	 I	 I	 I	 H	 1	 1	 X
PCl5	 1	 1	 H	 H	 H	 H	 1	 I
Public clinic.
DII	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1
Ed	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 H
HC2	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 I	 1	 H
Rd	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 X
HC4	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 H	 1	 X
HC5	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 H	 1	 X
1 • Available H - Not available
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STANDARD REFERRAL FORM USED IN PUBLIC FACILITIES
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HEALTH I FORM
(Health 1)
(Rev 7/71,)
NOTIFICATION OF INFECTIOUS DISEASE
To
Te Hw.ra OFFICER.
SIR.
I have the honour to report the following case of infectious disease
- Name
Residence
Age
Sex -
Occupation
Nationality
Th	 -
Date of onset
If a case of smallpox. whether vaccinated or not
Date of my first visit to the patient
Date of my last visit to the patient
I have the honour to be.
Sir.
Your obedient servant.
Dated	 19
The followsng are aoidtabie discuses us the Stales at West Malayms.
Anthrax seine pohoind.tis dialer. (Inclisdmg cholera due to the El Tar wibrio) nieniogocucoul
ascnmgftm. duckenpox chancvuid diphtheria dengue fever dysentery (amoebic and baol1ar4 acute
.ifcctwc encephalitis. .usianasis. food pamonmg gonococcai lofections. haamorrhagic fever, usfccnoos
hepatitis leprosy leptuapirsi mfcceions measles niaiana mumps. .pihaimia noonato,um plague. puerpeest
fryer pcmphigvs conatcsum rabies smallpox eactudmg ,atsola minor (alasmm) syphilis and ar sequchee.
septic abortion typhus typhoid (cxv, (including puraiyphoid (ever) tubc,eulosis (.11 (anna) tetanus
flconatorum •rachoma ahep.nç cough ycliose (ever yaws and any other disease cit as m(eeluous or
c.wnaguous nature .h.cti she Mmarcr ma by ardcr published us the G.rn,r dcclaic to be included within
the cxpnnsiun ,nlectious disease
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Tabli 1 Factors cone dered by PPs in tharging patients
Clinics	 Patients SES	 Patient S age	 Drugs	 *A fees	 Payment	 Otherprescribed	 schedule	 method.	 factors
Long Hour. PC.
pci	 1	 1	 1	 X	 1	 1
PC2	 1	 X	 1	 5	 5	 1PC3	 1	 5	 1	 5	 5	 5PC5	 1	 5	 1	 5	 1	 5PC6	 1	 X	 1	 X	 1	 1PC7	 1	 5	 1	 X	 1	 5
pee	 1	 5	 1	 5	 5	 5
Pcio	 1	 1	 1	 X	 1	 5PC11	 1	 5	 1	 5	 1	 5PC14	 1	 1	 1	 5	 1	 1Short Hours PCS
PC4	 1	 5	 1	 5	 5	 XPCC	 1	 5	 1	 X	 1	 5PC12	 1	 1	 1	 5	 1	 5PC13	 1	 1	 1	 5	 1	 1PC15	 1	 1	 1	 X	 1	 X
1 - Considered
X - Not considered
SES - Socio-ecoflainjc Statue
P54k - Malaysian Medical Association
Table 2: Difference in number of patients estimated by interviews and prospective recording.
Clinics	 Estimated	 Average from
	 Differences
	
average	 recording
Long Hours PC	 356	 305	 +14.3
Short Hours PC	 71	 66	 +7.0
District Hospital	 1350	 1390	 -3.0
Health Centres	 515	 493	 +4.3
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Table 1: Top ten conditions among patients attending public and private facilities
PUBLIC	 PRIVATE
Conditions	 Conditions
tJRTI*	 16.3	 URTI*
	 27.8
Antenatal check-up	 10.5	 Asthma	 4.2
Child health screening	 10.3	 AGE	 4.0
Hypertension	 8.8	 Gastritis	 3.8
Transport accidents 	 6.0	 Skin infections	 3.8
Gastritis	 5.1	 Bronchitis	 3.4
Asthma	 4.3	 Eczema	 3.0
Diabetes mellitus 	 3.8	 pever'	 2.7
'Cough'	 3.4	 'Backache'	 2.5
'Fever'	 3.1	 Hypertension	 2.5
Others	 28.4	 Others	 42.3
* URTI = Upper respiratory tract infection
** AGE - Acute gastroenteritis
Table 2: Types of tests undergone by patients attending public and private facilities
Type of	 PUBLIC (3855)	 PRIVATE (3376)
tests	 Nos	 Noa
Blood tests	 246	 (38.9)	 16	 (12.6)
Urine analysis	 255	 (40.4)	 39	 (30.7)
Stool exam.	 13	 (2.1)	 0	 (0.0)
Sputum exam.	 1].	 (1.7)	 0	 (0.0)
ECG	 26	 (4.1)	 0	 (0.0)
X-rays	 80	 (12.7)	 11	 8.7)
Ultrasound	 0	 (0.0)	 61	 (48 0)
Total	 631	 (100.0)	 127	 (100.0)
Rate per 100	 16.4	 3.8
patients
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ItJNIZATION RETURN FORM USED BY PPS
tupofaD IUtInIn dan otor Iiisat. wIt* uIw .................
LYRUSAN SERI PADUXA BAGINDA
kepads P.g.wsI ssIIwtpn 	 Soiw (PlO 2
O.er.I/M.Jl4s P.rbsid.ns,i 	 (Plnd.si Ogos 9O
I	 SILM$GM OOS/$I.sI1IWl
I	 I	 (PlO. Of DOSES/INJECIIOIIS) 	 I
I .................................. I
JEPIIS PELALIAJI 	 Primary cows.
(TYPE OF PVUIISATIOSI)	 (Unde 1 year)
II.......
-I
I	 I Pett	 E.ô.is (etigs
I	 (lit) f(2nd) I (3rd
I .......................... I .................$........
ICE	 I
I .......................... I .......................... K:......
I IlepatitisS	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I
I .......................... I .........I------- I ..............
triple Antigen (OPT) Of	 I	 I	 I	 I
f Dob(e Antigen CDT)	 I	 I	 I	 I
I .......................... I ......... I ....... I ........ I ........ I
. 
Oral Polio	 I	 I	 I	 I
I .......................... I ..........................k.
IMessl.s.tlefA	 I	 I
I(I,erI yesr)	 I	 I
I .......................... I......- ...................
Skells (f.lei)	 I	 I
1----..........- I.......................
IetOfsJs tcsoid	 I	 I	 I	 I
(antenstat)	
!	 !	 !	 !	 !
s PVlmsiy kumaeàaias	 i.rdlOi*Mot
I
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Box 1: List of notifiable diseases in Malaysia
AIDS *
Cholera*
Dengue fever and dengue haemorrhagic
fever*
Diphtheria
Dysenteries (all types)
Food Poisoning*
Leprosy
Malaria
Measles
P1 ague
Poliomyelitis (Acute) *
Rabies*
Relapsing fever
Chancroid
Gonococcal Infections (all forms)
Syphilis
Tetanus
TulDerculosis (All form)
Typhoid and other Salmonelloses
Typhus and other Rickettsioses
Viral Encephalitis
Viral Hepatitis
Whooping cough
Yellow fever*
* : Diseases need to notified urgently through
telephone
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Table 1: Number of patients selected in each facilities in user interviews
Facilities	 Total no. of patients	 No. selected
	
seen per week	 (%)
Private clinice
PC'
	 196	 21 (10.7)
PC2	 660	 71 (10.8)
PC3	 177	 19 (10.7)
PC4	 78	 9 (11.5)
PC5	 136	 15 (11.0)
PC6	 290	 33 (11.4)
PC7	 415	 46 (11.1)
PC8	 350	 39 (11.1)
PC9	 50	 6 (12.0)
PCi 0	 300
	 33 (11.0)
PC"	 660	 72 (10.9)
PC12	 81	 9 (11.1)
PC13	 94	 10 (10.6)
PC14	 380	 39 (10.3)
PC15	 51	 6 (11.8)
Total
	 3918	 428 (10.9)
Public facilities
DH
	 1350	 162 (12.0)
HC1
	 275	 34 (12.4)
IC2	 579	 74 (12.8)
11C3	 569	 73 (12.8)
HC4	 659	 82 (12.4)
NC5	 494	 64 (12.9)
Total
	 3926	 489 (12.5)
Table: 2: Ethnic and gender distributions among patient attending public and private facilities
Ethnic	 MALE	 FEMALE
groups	 Public	 Private	 Public	 Private
Malays	 124 (56.6)	 95 (43.3)	 228 (68.9)	 103 (31.1)
Chinese	 13 (15.9)	 69 (84.1)	 22 (32.3)	 46 (67.6)
Indians	 36 (47.4)	 40 (52.6)	 62 (47.0)	 70 (53.0)
Others	 1 (20.0)	 4 (80.0)	 3 (75.0)	 1 (25.0)
Total	 174 (45.5)	 208 (55.5)	 315 (58.9)	 220 (41.1)
- 39.98 d.f- 2	 - 40.34 d.f- 2
p < 0.0001	 p a 0.0001
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